rationale behind rule in Arizona

1996The rule permits admission of hearsay statements “made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” The rationale behind the exception is that “doctors will seek and patients will give reliable information to further necessary medical treatment.” State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 199 , 735 P.2d 801, 809 (1987).

1996The rule permits admission of hearsay statements “made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” The rationale behind the exception is that “doctors will seek and patients will give reliable information to further necessary medical treatment.” State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 199 , 735 P.2d 801, 809 (1987).

2008Courts apply a two-part test in determining admissibility under this exception: (1) whether “the declarant’s apparent ‘motive ... [was] consistent with receiving medical care’ ”; and (2) whether it was “ ‘reasonable for the physician to rely on the information in diagnosis or treatment.’” State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 199 , 735 P.2d 801, 809 (1987), quoting State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404, 420-21 , 661 P.2d 1105, 1121-22 (1983).

2008Courts apply a two-part test in determining admissibility under this exception: (1) whether “the declarant’s apparent ‘motive ... [was] consistent with receiving medical care’ ”; and (2) whether it was “ ‘reasonable for the physician to rely on the information in diagnosis or treatment.’” State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 199 , 735 P.2d 801, 809 (1987), quoting State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404, 420-21 , 661 P.2d 1105, 1121-22 (1983).

2011See, e.g., Nature’s Sunshine Prods., Inc. v. Watson, 174 P.3d 647, 652-53 (Utah Ct.App.2007) (replacement did not apply to same-lender refinancing when obligation amount of new mortgage sixteen times larger than obligation on initial mortgage sixteen years earlier and materially prejudicial to intervening lienholder). ¶ 20 The rationale behind the doctrine of replacement is consistent with the rationale and policy considerations for equitable subro-gation.

2011See, e.g., Nature’s Sunshine Prods., Inc. v. Watson, 174 P.3d 647 , 652- 53 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) (replacement did not apply to same-lender refinancing when obligation amount of new mortgage sixteen times larger than obligation on initial mortgage sixteen years earlier and materially prejudicial to intervening lienholder). ¶20 The rationale behind the doctrine of replacement is consistent with the rationale and policy considerations for equitable subrogation.

2008The rationale behind this exception is that “practitioners will seek and patients will give rehable information to further necessary treatment.” State v. Rushton, 172 Ariz. 454, 457 , 837 P.2d 1189, 1192 (App.1992).

2008The rationale behind this exception is that “practitioners will seek and patients will give rehable information to further necessary treatment.” State v. Rushton, 172 Ariz. 454, 457 , 837 P.2d 1189, 1192 (App.1992).

2021See Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. at 1579, 1581 (“[A] court is not hidebound by the precise arguments of counsel.”). ¶27 During the second round of summary judgment briefing, the parties agreed that the Facility contained both personal property and permanent improvements.

2019Cardiac Specialists Chartered, 228 Ariz. 528, 530, ¶ 9 (App. 2012) (discussing expert medical testimony establishing causation).

2019Colo. 1984) (analyzing the analogous federal rule); see also Edwards v. Young, 107 Ariz. 283, 284 (1971) (“Because Arizona has substantially adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we give great weight to the federal interpretations of the rules.”) (citing Jenney v. Ariz. Express, Inc., 89 Ariz. 343, 349 (1961), and Harbel Oil Co. v. Steele, 80 Ariz. 368, 373-74 (1956)). ¶9 In fact, the nature of the 2014 Case is easily ascertained from the allegations in the complaint, which refers to the Joneses collectively as “Trustees” or, individually, as “Successor Trustee” or “Co-Trustee” through

2019Colo. 1984) (analyzing the analogous federal rule); see also Edwards v. Young, 107 Ariz. 283, 284 (1971) (“Because Arizona has substantially adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we give great weight to the federal interpretations of the rules.”) (citing Jenney v. Ariz. Express, Inc., 89 Ariz. 343, 349 (1961), and Harbel Oil Co. v. Steele, 80 Ariz. 368, 373-74 (1956)). ¶9 In fact, the nature of the 2014 Case is easily ascertained from the allegations in the complaint, which refers to the Joneses collectively as “Trustees” or, individually, as “Successor Trustee” or “Co-Trustee” through

2019Colo. 1984) (analyzing the analogous federal rule); see also Edwards v. Young, 107 Ariz. 283, 284 (1971) (“Because Arizona has substantially adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we give great weight to the federal interpretations of the rules.”) (citing Jenney v. Ariz. Express, Inc., 89 Ariz. 343, 349 (1961), and Harbel Oil Co. v. Steele, 80 Ariz. 368, 373-74 (1956)). ¶9 In fact, the nature of the 2014 Case is easily ascertained from the allegations in the complaint, which refers to the Joneses collectively as “Trustees” or, individually, as “Successor Trustee” or “Co-Trustee” through

2019“The rationale behind this rule is that the nature of the plaintiff’s cause of action can be determined from the body of the complaint.” Colo. Springs Cablevision, Inc. v. Lively, 579 F. Supp. 252, 255 (D.

2012See, e.g., Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of Am., Inc., 163 Ariz. 539, 546 , 789 P.2d 1040, 1047 (1990) (recognizing that plaintiff satisfies burden by presenting facts from which causal relationship may be inferred, but cannot leave causation to jury’s speculation); Kreisman v. Thomas, 12 Ariz.App. 215, 218 , 469 P.2d 107, 110 (1970) (noting that “causation must be shown to be Probable and not merely Possible, and generally medical expert testimony that a subsequent illness or disease ‘could’ or ‘may’ have been the cause of the injury is insufficient”) (emphasis added). 4 ¶ 9 The rationale behind

2012See, e.g., Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of Am., Inc., 163 Ariz. 539, 546 , 789 P.2d 1040, 1047 (1990) (recognizing that plaintiff satisfies burden by presenting facts from which causal relationship may be inferred, but cannot leave causation to jury’s speculation); Kreisman v. Thomas, 12 Ariz.App. 215, 218 , 469 P.2d 107, 110 (1970) (noting that “causation must be shown to be Probable and not merely Possible, and generally medical expert testimony that a subsequent illness or disease ‘could’ or ‘may’ have been the cause of the injury is insufficient”) (emphasis added). 4 ¶ 9 The rationale behind

2012See Seisinger v. Siebel, 220 Ariz. 85, 93, ¶ 38 , 203 P.3d 483, 491 (2009) (recognizing requirement that expert testimony in a medical malpractice action is a substantive component of *531 the common law reflecting “a policy decision ... that the plaintiffs substantive burden of production could only be met by a particular kind of evidence”); Robertson, 163 Ariz. at 546 , 789 P.2d at 1047 (stating that “plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the issue of proximate cause”); see also Grain Dealers Mnt.

2012See Seisinger v. Siebel, 220 Ariz. 85, 93, ¶ 38 , 203 P.3d 483, 491 (2009) (recognizing requirement that expert testimony in a medical malpractice action is a substantive component of *531 the common law reflecting “a policy decision ... that the plaintiffs substantive burden of production could only be met by a particular kind of evidence”); Robertson, 163 Ariz. at 546 , 789 P.2d at 1047 (stating that “plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the issue of proximate cause”); see also Grain Dealers Mnt.

2012See, e.g., Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of Am., Inc., 163 Ariz. 539, 546 , 789 P.2d 1040, 1047 (1990) (recognizing that plaintiff satisfies burden by presenting facts from which causal relationship may be inferred, but cannot leave causation to jury’s speculation); Kreisman v. Thomas, 12 Ariz.App. 215, 218 , 469 P.2d 107, 110 (1970) (noting that “causation must be shown to be Probable and not merely Possible, and generally medical expert testimony that a subsequent illness or disease ‘could’ or ‘may’ have been the cause of the injury is insufficient”) (emphasis added). 4 ¶ 9 The rationale behind

2012See, e.g., Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of Am., Inc., 163 Ariz. 539, 546 , 789 P.2d 1040, 1047 (1990) (recognizing that plaintiff satisfies burden by presenting facts from which causal relationship may be inferred, but cannot leave causation to jury’s speculation); Kreisman v. Thomas, 12 Ariz.App. 215, 218 , 469 P.2d 107, 110 (1970) (noting that “causation must be shown to be Probable and not merely Possible, and generally medical expert testimony that a subsequent illness or disease ‘could’ or ‘may’ have been the cause of the injury is insufficient”) (emphasis added). 4 ¶ 9 The rationale behind

2005The rationale behind the rule is that "[w]ithout defendant's testimony, a reviewing court cannot properly weigh the probative value of the testimony against the impact of the impeachment." State v. Conner, 163 Ariz. 97, 102 , 786 P.2d 948 , 953 *942 (1990).

2005The rationale behind the rule is that "[w]ithout defendant's testimony, a reviewing court cannot properly weigh the probative value of the testimony against the impact of the impeachment." State v. Conner, 163 Ariz. 97, 102 , 786 P.2d 948 , 953 *942 (1990).

2004Maggio Co. v. Willis, 197 Ill.2d 397 , 259 Ill.Dec. 132 , 757 N.E.2d 1267, 1269 (2001) (looking to the comment of a supreme court rule to determine the rationale behind the rule, but noting that “we need not rely on statutory comments where the language of the particular provision is unambiguous”); Messing v. Bank of Am., N.A., 373 Md. 672 , 821 A.2d 22, 29 (2003) (stating that the comments to the Uniform Commercial Code “are not controlling authority and may not be used to vary the plain language of the statute,” but noting that the comments “are an excellent place to begin a search for the l

2004Maggio Co. v. Willis, 197 Ill.2d 397 , 259 Ill.Dec. 132 , 757 N.E.2d 1267, 1269 (2001) (looking to the comment of a supreme court rule to determine the rationale behind the rule, but noting that “we need not rely on statutory comments where the language of the particular provision is unambiguous”); Messing v. Bank of Am., N.A., 373 Md. 672 , 821 A.2d 22, 29 (2003) (stating that the comments to the Uniform Commercial Code “are not controlling authority and may not be used to vary the plain language of the statute,” but noting that the comments “are an excellent place to begin a search for the l

2004Maggio Co. v. Willis, 197 Ill.2d 397 , 259 Ill.Dec. 132 , 757 N.E.2d 1267, 1269 (2001) (looking to the comment of a supreme court rule to determine the rationale behind the rule, but noting that “we need not rely on statutory comments where the language of the particular provision is unambiguous”); Messing v. Bank of Am., N.A., 373 Md. 672 , 821 A.2d 22, 29 (2003) (stating that the comments to the Uniform Commercial Code “are not controlling authority and may not be used to vary the plain language of the statute,” but noting that the comments “are an excellent place to begin a search for the l

2004Maggio Co. v. Willis, 197 Ill.2d 397 , 259 Ill.Dec. 132 , 757 N.E.2d 1267, 1269 (2001) (looking to the comment of a supreme court rule to determine the rationale behind the rule, but noting that “we need not rely on statutory comments where the language of the particular provision is unambiguous”); Messing v. Bank of Am., N.A., 373 Md. 672 , 821 A.2d 22, 29 (2003) (stating that the comments to the Uniform Commercial Code “are not controlling authority and may not be used to vary the plain language of the statute,” but noting that the comments “are an excellent place to begin a search for the l

2004Maggio Co. v. Willis, 197 Ill.2d 397 , 259 Ill.Dec. 132 , 757 N.E.2d 1267, 1269 (2001) (looking to the comment of a supreme court rule to determine the rationale behind the rule, but noting that “we need not rely on statutory comments where the language of the particular provision is unambiguous”); Messing v. Bank of Am., N.A., 373 Md. 672 , 821 A.2d 22, 29 (2003) (stating that the comments to the Uniform Commercial Code “are not controlling authority and may not be used to vary the plain language of the statute,” but noting that the comments “are an excellent place to begin a search for the l

1990The Pennsylvania courts have developed a doctrine of "natural expansion," and enunciated the rationale behind the doctrine in Silver v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 435 Pa. 99 , 255 A.2d 506 (1969): The rationale behind the doctrine can he traced to the due process requirements protecting private property.

1990The Pennsylvania courts have developed a doctrine of "natural expansion," and enunciated the rationale behind the doctrine in Silver v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 435 Pa. 99 , 255 A.2d 506 (1969): The rationale behind the doctrine can he traced to the due process requirements protecting private property.