11 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1977–2004 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Samuel G. Benogreen2 sentences2004"The rationale behind this rule is not difficult to perceive, for even if the issue injected is irrelevant or collateral, a defendant should not be allowed to profit by a gratuitously offered misstatement.” Patterson, 580 A.2d at 1323 (quoting United States v. Beno, 324 F.2d 582, 588 (2d Cir.1963)). 20 . 1994The rationale behind this rule is not difficult to perceive, for even if the issue injected is irrelevant or collateral, a defendant should not be allowed to profit by a gratuitously offered misstatement. 324 F.2d at 588 (emphasis and citations omitted). 4 . | 4 | 4 |
United States v. Willie Bell, (Two Cases)green2 sentences1990Beno, supra, 324 F.2d at 588 (citations omitted); see also Cowan v. United States, 331 A.2d 323, 325-326 (D.C.1975) (evidence of illegally seized drugs admissible to impeach defendant’s credibility in bribery trial when defendant’s direct testimony implied he was not using drugs); United States v. Bell, 165 U.S. App.D.C. 146, 152-154, 506 F.2d 207, 213-215 (1974) (when defendant represented that he had never sold drugs, evidence of prior drug buy was “vital” to the jury’s assessment of his credibility). 1977See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 , 74 S.Ct. 354 , 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954); United States v. Bell, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 146 , 506 F.2d 207 (1974). | 1 | 2 |
Warren v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2004First, "a witness' having told the same story on more than one occasion has no bearing on the truth of the statement." Id.; accord, Warren v. United States, 436 A.2d 821, 836 (D.C.1981) ("mere repetition does not imply veracity" (citation omitted)). 2004First, “a witness’ having told the same story on more than one occasion has no bearing on the truth of the statement.” Id.; accord, Warren v. United States, 436 A.2d 821, 836 (D.C.1981) (“mere repetition does not imply veracity” (citation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
McGrier v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2004This court more than once has cautioned that the charge of "misconduct,” implying bad faith and improper motive, "has been applied all too freely, and without serious reflection, to statements made by attorneys— prosecutors and defenders alike — in the heat of a trial, when semantic and stylistic precision are not uppermost in their minds.... [S]ome less sinister name should be given to the rhetorical excesses of attorneys who say what they should not say when engaged in forensic combat.” McGrier v. United States, 597 A.2d 36, 41 (D.C.1991). | 1 | 1 |
Cowan v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1990Beno, supra, 324 F.2d at 588 (citations omitted); see also Cowan v. United States, 331 A.2d 323, 325-326 (D.C.1975) (evidence of illegally seized drugs admissible to impeach defendant’s credibility in bribery trial when defendant’s direct testimony implied he was not using drugs); United States v. Bell, 165 U.S. App.D.C. 146, 152-154, 506 F.2d 207, 213-215 (1974) (when defendant represented that he had never sold drugs, evidence of prior drug buy was “vital” to the jury’s assessment of his credibility). | 1 | 1 |
Capps v. Clinegreen2 sentences1987“Courts are reluctant to infer a pecuniary recompense from performance of filial or parental duties such as humanity enjoins.” Hence the burden is upon [the person] who claims a money recompense for personal services performed, whether voluntarily, or upon the request of the other, to establish a contract expressed or implied for such consideration. 227 Ark. 201, 203 , 297 S.W.2d 654, 655 (1957) (quoting Williams v. Walden, 82 Ark. 136, 141 , 100 S.W. 898, 900 (1907); see also 66 Am.Jur.2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 31 (1973). 1987“Courts are reluctant to infer a pecuniary recompense from performance of filial or parental duties such as humanity enjoins.” Hence the burden is upon [the person] who claims a money recompense for personal services performed, whether voluntarily, or upon the request of the other, to establish a contract expressed or implied for such consideration. 227 Ark. 201, 203 , 297 S.W.2d 654, 655 (1957) (quoting Williams v. Walden, 82 Ark. 136, 141 , 100 S.W. 898, 900 (1907); see also 66 Am.Jur.2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 31 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Stategreen1 sentence1987“Courts are reluctant to infer a pecuniary recompense from performance of filial or parental duties such as humanity enjoins.” Hence the burden is upon [the person] who claims a money recompense for personal services performed, whether voluntarily, or upon the request of the other, to establish a contract expressed or implied for such consideration. 227 Ark. 201, 203 , 297 S.W.2d 654, 655 (1957) (quoting Williams v. Walden, 82 Ark. 136, 141 , 100 S.W. 898, 900 (1907); see also 66 Am.Jur.2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 31 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
Adams v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1978Adams v. United States, D.C.App., 302 A.2d 232, 234 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroadgreen2 sentences1977See, e. g, Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line, 323 U.S. 574 , 65 S.Ct. 421 , 89 L.Ed. 465 (1945); C. 1977See, e. g, Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line, 323 U.S. 574 , 65 S.Ct. 421 , 89 L.Ed. 465 (1945); C. | 1 | 1 |
Walder v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1977See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 , 74 S.Ct. 354 , 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954); United States v. Bell, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 146 , 506 F.2d 207 (1974). 1977See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 , 74 S.Ct. 354 , 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954); United States v. Bell, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 146 , 506 F.2d 207 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cokas v. Perkins
green
2 sentences1998"The rationale behind this rule is an assumption that medical negligence aggravating the original injury is foreseeably within the scope of the risk created by the original tortious conduct.” Cokas, supra, 252 F.Supp. at 565 . 6 . 1998"The rationale behind this rule is an assumption that medical negligence aggravating the original injury is foreseeably within the scope of the risk created by the original tortious conduct.” Cokas, supra, 252 F.Supp. at 565 . 6 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Strother v. District of Columbia
green
2 sentences1996Strother, supra, 372 A.2d at 1297-98 . 1996Strother, supra, 372 A.2d at 1297-98 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Williams v. Walden
neutral
1 sentence1987“Courts are reluctant to infer a pecuniary recompense from performance of filial or parental duties such as humanity enjoins.” Hence the burden is upon [the person] who claims a money recompense for personal services performed, whether voluntarily, or upon the request of the other, to establish a contract expressed or implied for such consideration. 227 Ark. 201, 203 , 297 S.W.2d 654, 655 (1957) (quoting Williams v. Walden, 82 Ark. 136, 141 , 100 S.W. 898, 900 (1907); see also 66 Am.Jur.2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 31 (1973). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Toliver v. United States
green
2 sentences1987The rationale behind this exception is that the government should not be denied the opportunity to introduce evidence of events that are “intimately entangled with the charged criminal conduct.” Toliver, supra, 468 A.2d at 960 . 1987The rationale behind this exception is that the government should not be denied the opportunity to introduce evidence of events that are “intimately entangled with the charged criminal conduct.” Toliver, supra, 468 A.2d at 960 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.