rationale behind exception in Massachusetts

1999As explained in Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 53 (1974), quoting from Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970), the rationale behind this exception is that a “car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.” See Commonwealth v. Markou, 391 Mass. 27, 29-31 (1984); Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891, 901 (1990); Commonwealth v. White, 422 Mass. 487, 497-498 (1996); Commonwealth v. Motta, 424 Mass. 117, 122-124 (1997); Commonwealth v. Gajka, 425 Mass. 751, 752 (1997); Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 426 Mass. 99

1996See Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891, 904 (1990) (“the inherent mobility of automobiles creates an exigency that they, and the contraband there is probable cause to believe they contain, can quickly be moved away while a warrant is being sought”).

1999As explained in Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 53 (1974), quoting from Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970), the rationale behind this exception is that a “car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.” See Commonwealth v. Markou, 391 Mass. 27, 29-31 (1984); Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891, 901 (1990); Commonwealth v. White, 422 Mass. 487, 497-498 (1996); Commonwealth v. Motta, 424 Mass. 117, 122-124 (1997); Commonwealth v. Gajka, 425 Mass. 751, 752 (1997); Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 426 Mass. 99

1996The rationale behind this exception is that a “car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.” Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, supra at 53 , quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).

1999As explained in Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 53 (1974), quoting from Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970), the rationale behind this exception is that a “car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.” See Commonwealth v. Markou, 391 Mass. 27, 29-31 (1984); Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891, 901 (1990); Commonwealth v. White, 422 Mass. 487, 497-498 (1996); Commonwealth v. Motta, 424 Mass. 117, 122-124 (1997); Commonwealth v. Gajka, 425 Mass. 751, 752 (1997); Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 426 Mass. 99

1996The rationale behind this exception is that a “car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.” Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, supra at 53 , quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).

2025Notwithstanding that the rationale behind the defense of duress does not hinge on whether a defendant has engaged in a voluntary act, Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 462 Mass. 827, 833 (2012), we note that the judge's instruction here included some of the same language as that in Commonwealth v. Robinson, 382 Mass. 189, 207 (1981), where voluntariness and duress were essentially melded together.

2025Notwithstanding that the rationale behind the defense of duress does not hinge on whether a defendant has engaged in a voluntary act, Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 462 Mass. 827, 833 (2012), we note that the judge's instruction here included some of the same language as that in Commonwealth v. Robinson, 382 Mass. 189, 207 (1981), where voluntariness and duress were essentially melded together.

2021See Abraham v. Woburn, 383 Mass. 724 , 726 n.1 (1981); Commonwealth v. Lenane, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 14, 19 (2011).

2021See Abraham v. Woburn, 383 Mass. 724 , 726 n.1 (1981); Commonwealth v. Lenane, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 14, 19 (2011).

2018See New England Trust Co . v. Wood , 326 Mass. 239 , 244-245 (1950) ; New England Trust Co . v. Sanger , 337 Mass. 342 , 350 (1958).

2010Insp. of N. Attleborough, 353 Mass. 671, 675 (1968).

2010Cf. Commonwealth v. McDuffee, 379 Mass. 353, 359 (1979) (noting that “the rationale behind the requirement of a specific exception is to enable the judge to make any necessary correction”).

2010Cf. also Commonwealth v. Reid, 384 Mass. 247, 257-258 (1981) (where defendant did not object to portion of jury charge challenged on appeal, she failed to preserve issue, given rule that party claiming error in charge must bring it to judge’s attention to permit judge to correct error, if any).

2007Id. at 24 (citations omitted).

2002The rationale behind this exception to the hearsay rule is that such statements “may be taken as particularly trustworthy.” Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 364 Mass. 211, 222 (1973), quoting J.

2001We decline to do so; the rationale behind this rule has maintained its vitality and the rule itself remains “consonant with the needs of contemporary society.” Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 628 (1976).

2000See id. citing Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 403 Mass. 50, 59 (1988); Slate v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 400 Mass. 378, 382 (1987); Maldonado v. Thomson Nat’l Press Co., 16 Mass.App.Ct. 911, 912-13 (1983).

2000See id. citing Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 403 Mass. 50, 59 (1988); Slate v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 400 Mass. 378, 382 (1987); Maldonado v. Thomson Nat’l Press Co., 16 Mass.App.Ct. 911, 912-13 (1983).

2000See id. citing Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 403 Mass. 50, 59 (1988); Slate v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 400 Mass. 378, 382 (1987); Maldonado v. Thomson Nat’l Press Co., 16 Mass.App.Ct. 911, 912-13 (1983).

2000Although Bavuso reinforces the rule that there is no duty to warn “where the danger presented by a given product is obvious,” id. (quotation omitted), that case makes clear that the rationale behind such a rule is that a warning would not reduce the likelihood of injury.

2000See id. citing Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 403 Mass. 50, 59 (1988); Slate v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 400 Mass. 378, 382 (1987); Maldonado v. Thomson Nat’l Press Co., 16 Mass.App.Ct. 911, 912-13 (1983).

1999As explained in Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 53 (1974), quoting from Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970), the rationale behind this exception is that a “car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.” See Commonwealth v. Markou, 391 Mass. 27, 29-31 (1984); Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891, 901 (1990); Commonwealth v. White, 422 Mass. 487, 497-498 (1996); Commonwealth v. Motta, 424 Mass. 117, 122-124 (1997); Commonwealth v. Gajka, 425 Mass. 751, 752 (1997); Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 426 Mass. 99

1999As explained in Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 53 (1974), quoting from Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970), the rationale behind this exception is that a “car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.” See Commonwealth v. Markou, 391 Mass. 27, 29-31 (1984); Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891, 901 (1990); Commonwealth v. White, 422 Mass. 487, 497-498 (1996); Commonwealth v. Motta, 424 Mass. 117, 122-124 (1997); Commonwealth v. Gajka, 425 Mass. 751, 752 (1997); Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 426 Mass. 99

1999As explained in Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 53 (1974), quoting from Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970), the rationale behind this exception is that a “car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.” See Commonwealth v. Markou, 391 Mass. 27, 29-31 (1984); Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891, 901 (1990); Commonwealth v. White, 422 Mass. 487, 497-498 (1996); Commonwealth v. Motta, 424 Mass. 117, 122-124 (1997); Commonwealth v. Gajka, 425 Mass. 751, 752 (1997); Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 426 Mass. 99

1999As explained in Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 53 (1974), quoting from Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970), the rationale behind this exception is that a “car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.” See Commonwealth v. Markou, 391 Mass. 27, 29-31 (1984); Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891, 901 (1990); Commonwealth v. White, 422 Mass. 487, 497-498 (1996); Commonwealth v. Motta, 424 Mass. 117, 122-124 (1997); Commonwealth v. Gajka, 425 Mass. 751, 752 (1997); Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 426 Mass. 99

1999As explained in Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 53 (1974), quoting from Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970), the rationale behind this exception is that a “car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.” See Commonwealth v. Markou, 391 Mass. 27, 29-31 (1984); Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891, 901 (1990); Commonwealth v. White, 422 Mass. 487, 497-498 (1996); Commonwealth v. Motta, 424 Mass. 117, 122-124 (1997); Commonwealth v. Gajka, 425 Mass. 751, 752 (1997); Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 426 Mass. 99

1998See Dearden, 304 Mass. at 661 (requiring plaintiff to allege all damages, such as personal and property, in one proceeding as all the damages arose from a single tortious act); Yentile, 26 Mass.App.Ct. at 216 (prohibiting claim splitting and, thus, plaintiffs’ attempt in a pending or subsequent action to undermine a Land Court judgment by raising a claim in Superior Court which was available as a defense in the Land Court action).

1998See Dearden, 304 Mass. at 661 (requiring plaintiff to allege all damages, such as personal and property, in one proceeding as all the damages arose from a single tortious act); Yentile, 26 Mass.App.Ct. at 216 (prohibiting claim splitting and, thus, plaintiffs’ attempt in a pending or subsequent action to undermine a Land Court judgment by raising a claim in Superior Court which was available as a defense in the Land Court action).