rationale behind rule in Mississippi

2000Essentially, “the buck stops here.” The rationale behind the rule of necessity was put best by United States Chief Justice John Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.(6 Wheat.) 264 , 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821), writing that a court: [m]ust take jurisdiction if it should.

2000Essentially, “the buck stops here.” The rationale behind the rule of necessity was put best by United States Chief Justice John Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.(6 Wheat.) 264 , 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821), writing that a court: [m]ust take jurisdiction if it should.

2015The rationale behind the principle that a “defendant may not receive a harsher sentence solely, or even partially, because he refuses to plead guilty and proceeds to require the prosecution to prove his guilt” “is that the coercion or inducement casts a chill oyer the exercise of guaranteed fundamental, constitutional rights.” Fermo, 370 So.2d at 982 . • ¶ 75.

1985The sentencing court may consider only legitimate factors and cannot base the sentence, either in whole or part, upon the defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights to a jury trial. [citations omitted] Fermo, 370 So.2d at 932 .

2011Collins, 594 So.2d at 29 (citing Cooper v. Lawson, 264 So.2d 890, 891 (Miss.1972)).

2010Collins, 594 So. 2d at 29 (citing Cooper v. Lawson, 264 So. 2d 890, 891 (Miss. 1972)).

2011The rationale behind the rule is that “guilt of a true lesser included offense is implicitly found in the jury’s verdict of guilt on the greater offense.” Id. (citing Washington v. State, 222 Miss. 782, 787 , 77 So.2d 260, 263 (1955)).

2011The rationale behind the rule is that "guilt of a true lesser included offense is implicitly found in the jury's verdict of guilt on the greater offense." Id. (citing Washington v. State, 222 Miss. 782, 787 , 77 So.2d 260, 263 (1955)).

2004The rationale behind the rule is that "dismissal by an appellate court after a defendant has fled its jurisdiction serves an important deterrent function and advances an interest in efficient, dignified appellate practice." 507 U.S. at 242 , 113 S.Ct. at 1204 -05 (citing Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 537 , 95 S.Ct. 1173, 1175 , 43 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975)).

2004The rationale behind the rule is that "dismissal by an appellate court after a defendant has fled its jurisdiction serves an important deterrent function and advances an interest in efficient, dignified appellate practice." 507 U.S. at 242 , 113 S.Ct. at 1204 -05 (citing Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 537 , 95 S.Ct. 1173, 1175 , 43 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975)).

2004The rationale behind the rule is that "dismissal by an appellate court after a defendant has fled its jurisdiction serves an important deterrent function and advances an interest in efficient, dignified appellate practice." 507 U.S. at 242 , 113 S.Ct. at 1204 -05 (citing Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 537 , 95 S.Ct. 1173, 1175 , 43 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975)).

2004The rationale behind the rule is that "dismissal by an appellate court after a defendant has fled its jurisdiction serves an important deterrent function and advances an interest in efficient, dignified appellate practice." 507 U.S. at 242 , 113 S.Ct. at 1204 -05 (citing Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 537 , 95 S.Ct. 1173, 1175 , 43 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975)).

2001Co. v. Rawson, 222 So.2d 131 (Miss.1969): This Court is not in the position to evaluate or weigh the truth or falsity of the witnesses who testified for appellant and appellees as is the jury, and we have so held many times.

1998Co. v. Rawson, 222 So.2d 131 (Miss. 1969): This Court is not in the position to evaluate or weigh the truth or falsity of the witnesses who testified for appellant and appellees as is the jury, and we have so held many times.

1997The Wickline Court further noted that stacking multiple coverages within a single policy had been mandated in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Bridges, 350 So.2d 1379 (Miss. 1977), and explained that the rationale behind this principle "is that multiple premiums are paid and multiple (stacked) coverages should be available." Wickline, 530 So.2d at 714 .

1993The Wickline Court further noted that stacking multiple coverages within a single policy had been mandated in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Bridges, 350 So. 2d 1379 (Miss. 1977), and explained that the rationale behind this principle "is that multiple premiums are paid and multiple (stacked) coverages should be available." Wickline, 530 So. 2d at 714.

1996Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Franklin County Timber Co., 488 So.2d 782 (Miss. 1986).

1994Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Franklin County Timber Co., 488 So. 2d 782 (Miss. 1986).

2023Wilner v. White, 929 So. 2d 315, 321 (Miss. 2006) (quoting Alexander, 621 So. 2d at 910 ). “[D]ismissals on the basis of the claim-splitting doctrine are made for the purpose of eliminating duplicative litigation and for docket control.” Carpenter, 186 So. 3d at 824 .

2023Wilner v. White, 929 So. 2d 315, 321 (Miss. 2006) (quoting Alexander, 621 So. 2d at 910 ). “[D]ismissals on the basis of the claim-splitting doctrine are made for the purpose of eliminating duplicative litigation and for docket control.” Carpenter, 186 So. 3d at 824 .

2011The rationale behind our standard of review is that the circuit court “is best suited to determine the prejudicial effect of an objectionable remark and is given considerable discretion in deciding whether the remark is so prejudicial as to merit a mistrial.” Id.

2011“Unless serious and irreparable damage results from an improper comment, the judge should admonish the jury then and there to disregard the improper comment.” Id. (citation and quotations omitted). ¶ 35.

1997The Wickline Court further noted that stacking multiple coverages within a single policy had been mandated in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Bridges, 350 So.2d 1379 (Miss. 1977), and explained that the rationale behind this principle "is that multiple premiums are paid and multiple (stacked) coverages should be available." Wickline, 530 So.2d at 714 .

1997The Wickline Court concluded that: [T]he operative provisions of the Mississippi Uninsured Motorist Act has been declared as a matter of positive law to provide that all classes [of] statutory insureds may recover of the UM insurer all amounts he or she may be entitled to recover as damages from the uninsured motorist, limited only by the limits of UM coverage multiplied by the number of vehicles insured in the policy. 530 So.2d at 715 .

1995In Garrett v. State, 549 So.2d 1325 (Miss. 1989), the rationale behind the rule forbidding the admission of polygraph results was explained.