rationale behind rule in Rhode Island

2024While having to discuss the details of a sexual assault allegation is certainly traumatizing for any victim, the excited-utterance exception attaches to the initial event, and the rationale behind the exception is that when the declarant made the statement, they were “still laboring under the stress of the nervous excitement engendered by the event * * * describe[d].” Jalette, 119 R.I. at 619 , 382 A.2d at 529 .

2024While having to discuss the details of a sexual assault allegation is certainly traumatizing for any victim, the excited-utterance exception attaches to the initial event, and the rationale behind the exception is that when the declarant made the statement, they were “still laboring under the stress of the nervous excitement engendered by the event * * * describe[d].” Jalette, 119 R.I. at 619 , 382 A.2d at 529 .

2011Our Supreme Court afforded a Bankruptcy Court judgment preclusive effect in DiSaia v. Capital Industries, Inc. , 113 R.I. 292 , 320 A.2d 604 (R.I. 1974).

2011Our Supreme Court afforded a Bankruptcy Court judgment preclusive effect in DiSaia v. Capital Industries, Inc. , 113 R.I. 292 , 320 A.2d 604 (R.I. 1974).

2009The rationale behind this rule is that “a person will presumably be truthful to a physician from whom he expects to receive medical attention.” Pina, 455 A.2d at 315 ; see Rule 803(4), Advisory Committee’s Note; State v. Lima, 546 A.2d 770, 774 (R.I.1988).

2009As we have had occasion to note, “[t]he purpose of the specificity requirement is to give the trial justice a chance to remedy any deficiency in the charge while there is still a meaningful opportunity to effectuate such a remedy.” Mead, 899 A.2d at 444 n. 5; see also DiFranco v. Klein, 657 A.2d 145, 147 (R.I.1995) (“The rationale behind this rule is to allow the trial justice an opportunity to make any necessary corrections to his or her instructions before the jury begins its deliberations.”).

2009In the absence of a sufficiently specific objection, “the trial justice cannot be expected to divine the nature of counsel’s objection.” Mead, 899 A.2d at 444 .

2005The rationale behind this requirement is that "the absence of required findings makes judicial review impossible." Sakonnett Rogers, Inc., 536 A.2d at 896 (citing East Greenwich Yacht Club, 118 R.I. at 569 , 376 A.2d at 687 ).

2005"What is required . . . is `the making of findings of fact and the application of legal principles in such a manner that a judicial body might review a decision with a reasonable understanding of the manner in which evidentiary conflicts have been resolved and the provisions of the . . . [appropriate law] applied.'" Cullen v. Town Council of Lincoln, 850 A.2d 900 , 904 (R.I. 2004) (citing Thorpe v. Zoning Bd. of Review of North Kingston, 492 A.2d 1236 , 1237 (R.I. 1985)).

2005The rationale behind this requirement is that "the absence of required findings makes judicial review impossible." Sakonnett Rogers, Inc., 536 A.2d at 896 (citing East Greenwich Yacht Club, 118 R.I. at 569 , 376 A.2d at 687 ).

2005The rationale behind this requirement is that "the absence of required findings makes judicial review impossible." Sakonnett Rogers, Inc., 536 A.2d at 896 (citing East Greenwich Yacht Club, 118 R.I. at 569 , 376 A.2d at 687 ).

2005"What is required . . . is `the making of findings of fact and the application of legal principles in such a manner that a judicial body might review a decision with a reasonable understanding of the manner in which evidentiary conflicts have been resolved and the provisions of the . . . [appropriate law] applied.'" Cullen v. Town Council of Lincoln, 850 A.2d 900 , 904 (R.I. 2004) (citing Thorpe v. Zoning Bd. of Review of North Kingston, 492 A.2d 1236 , 1237 (R.I. 1985)).

2004The rationale behind this rule is that “[i]f professionals who deal with a writing attach importance to possession of the writing, then the law likewise should attach significance to possession.” Id.

2004"Compliance with this rule is a `mandatory precondition' to preserving an objection to the jury instructions." Parrella v. Bowling, 796 A.2d 1091 (R.I. 2002) (quoting DiFranco, 657 A.2d at 147 ).

1995Brodeur, 505 A.2d at 422 ; A.R.

1993The rationale behind this rule is not difficult to perceive, for even if the issue injected is irrelevant or collateral, a defendant should not be allowed to profit by a gratuitously offered misstatement.” Id. at 320 (quoting United States v. Beno, 324 F.2d 582, 588 (2d Cir.1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 , 85 S.Ct. 147 , 13 L.Ed.2d 86 (1964)).

1993The rationale behind this rule is not difficult to perceive, for even if the issue injected is irrelevant or collateral, a defendant should not be allowed to profit by a gratuitously offered misstatement.” Id. at 320 (quoting United States v. Beno, 324 F.2d 582, 588 (2d Cir.1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 , 85 S.Ct. 147 , 13 L.Ed.2d 86 (1964)).

1993The rationale behind this rule is not difficult to perceive, for even if the issue injected is irrelevant or collateral, a defendant should not be allowed to profit by a gratuitously offered misstatement.” Id. at 320 (quoting United States v. Beno, 324 F.2d 582, 588 (2d Cir.1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 , 85 S.Ct. 147 , 13 L.Ed.2d 86 (1964)).

1993The rationale behind this rule is not difficult to perceive, for even if the issue injected is irrelevant or collateral, a defendant should not be allowed to profit by a gratuitously offered misstatement.” Id. at 320 (quoting United States v. Beno, 324 F.2d 582, 588 (2d Cir.1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 , 85 S.Ct. 147 , 13 L.Ed.2d 86 (1964)).