rationale behind rule in Illinois

2011Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, and during the brief period when consideration of self-interest could not have been fully brought to bear, the utterance may be taken as expressing the real belief of the speaker as to the facts just observed by him.'" People v. Damen, 28 Ill.2d 464, 471 , 193 N.E.2d 25 (1963) (quoting Keefe v. State, 50 Ariz. 293 , 72 P.2d 425, 427 (1937)).

2011Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, and during the brief period when consideration of self-interest could not have been fully brought to bear, the utterance may be taken as expressing the real belief of the speaker as to the facts just observed by him.’ ” People v. Damen, 28 Ill. 2d 464, 471 (1963) (quoting Keefe v. State, 72 P.2d 425, 427 (Ariz. 1937)).

2021Flores is correct that Rule 274 provides that “[a] party may make only one postjudgment motion directed at a judgment order that is otherwise final and appealable.” In Sears v. Sears, 85 Ill. 2d 253, 259 (1981), our supreme court explained that the rationale behind the rule against successive postjudgment motions is to promote finality, i.e. to create “a time when the case in the trial court is really over and the loser must appeal or give up.” The court went on to explain that “justice is not served by permitting the losing party to string out his attack on a judgment over a period of months,

2021Flores is correct that Rule 274 provides that “[a] party may make only one postjudgment motion directed at a judgment order that is otherwise final and appealable.” In Sears v. Sears, 85 Ill. 2d 253, 259 (1981), our supreme court explained that the rationale behind the rule against successive postjudgment motions is to promote finality, i.e. to create “a time when the case in the trial court is really over and the loser must appeal or give up.” The court went on to explain that “justice is not served by permitting the losing party to string out his attack on a judgment over a period of months,

2020The rationale behind the rule was that “a municipality’s duty is to preserve the ‘well-being of the community’ and that such a duty is ‘owed to the public at large rather than to specific members of the community.’ ” Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 183 Ill. 2d 30, 44 (1998) (quoting Schaffrath v. Village of Buffalo Grove, 160 Ill. App. 3d 999, 1003 (1987)).

2020The rationale behind the rule was that “a municipality’s duty is to preserve the ‘well-being of the community’ and that such a duty is ‘owed to the public at large rather than to specific members of the community.’ ” Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 183 Ill. 2d 30, 44 (1998) (quoting Schaffrath v. Village of Buffalo Grove, 160 Ill. App. 3d 999, 1003 (1987)).

2020The rationale behind the rule was that “a municipality’s duty is to preserve the ‘well-being of the community’ and that such a duty is ‘owed to the public at large rather than to specific members of the community.’ ” Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 183 Ill. 2d 30, 44 (1998) (quoting Schaffrath v. Village of Buffalo Grove, 160 Ill. App. 3d 999, 1003 (1987)).

2020The rationale behind the rule was that “a municipality’s duty is to preserve the ‘well-being of the community’ and that such a duty is ‘owed to the public at large rather than to specific members of the community.’ ” Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 183 Ill. 2d 30, 44 (1998) (quoting Schaffrath v. Village of Buffalo Grove, 160 Ill. App. 3d 999, 1003 (1987)).

2025The rationale behind this doctrine is that “it would be manifestly unfair to allow a party a second trial upon the basis of error which that party injected into the proceedings.” Id.

2025The rationale behind this doctrine is that “it would be manifestly unfair to allow a party a second trial upon the basis of error which that party injected into the proceedings.” In re Detention of Swope, 213 Ill. 2d 210, 217 (2004).

2018“Since the rationale behind the doctrine of ratification is that the person ratifying obtains a benefit through the actions of someone who is acting in his behalf, then ratification will be found ‘[a]s long as the principal has full knowledge of the facts and has the choice of either accepting or rejecting the benefits of the transaction.’ ” Id. (quoting Swader v. Golden Rule Insurance Co., 203 Ill.

2017"Since the rationale behind the doctrine of ratification is that the person ratifying obtains a benefit through the actions of someone who is acting in his behalf, then ratification will be found '[a]s long as the principal has full knowledge of the facts and has the choice of either accepting or rejecting the benefits of the transaction.' " Id. (quoting Swader v. Golden Rule Insurance Co. , 203 Ill.

2017App. 3d 452, 461 (1986) (“The agent’s authority must be derived from some act or statement of the principal.” (Emphasis in original.)). ¶ 41 The rationale behind the doctrine of apparent authority is that “[t]he principal, having created the appearance of authority, is estopped to deny it to the detriment of a third party.” State Security Insurance Co. v. Burgos, 145 Ill. 2d 423, 432 (1991).

2017App. 3d 452, 461 (1986) (“The agent’s authority must be derived from some act or statement of the principal.” (Emphasis in original.)). ¶ 41 The rationale behind the doctrine of apparent authority is that “[t]he principal, having created the appearance of authority, is estopped to deny it to the detriment of a third party.” State Security Insurance Co. v. Burgos, 145 Ill. 2d 423, 432 (1991).

2016People v. Blair, 2013 IL 114122, ¶ 30 . ¶ 18 In stating the rationale behind the doctrine and articulating the appropriate remedy, we have explained that when a statute violates the constitution it “suddenly cuts off rights that are guaranteed to every citizen” and “perverts the duties owed to those citizens.” People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 397 (1990).

2016People v. Blair, 2013 IL 114122, ¶ 30 . ¶ 18 In stating the rationale behind the doctrine and articulating the appropriate remedy, we have explained that when a statute violates the constitution it “suddenly cuts off rights that are guaranteed to every citizen” and “perverts the duties owed to those citizens.” People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 397 (1990).

2008In general, Illinois courts look with suspicion upon the introduction of prior statements of witnesses, since “allow[ing] an accused to be convicted on the extrajudicial statements of witnesses *** runs counter to the notions of fairness on which our legal system is founded.” People v. Spicer, 79 Ill. 2d 173, 180 , 402 N.E.2d 169, 172 (1979).

2008In general, Illinois courts look with suspicion upon the introduction of prior statements of witnesses, since “allow[ing] an accused to be convicted on the extrajudicial statements of witnesses *** runs counter to the notions of fairness on which our legal system is founded.” People v. Spicer, 79 Ill. 2d 173, 180 , 402 N.E.2d 169, 172 (1979).

2007This court recently explained the rationale behind the doctrine: "It has been stated that the rationale behind the revestment doctrine is that the trial court considers the benefitting party to have ignored the judgment and started to retry the case ( Wilkins v. Dellenback, 149 Ill.App.3d 549, 555 [ 102 Ill.Dec. 799 , 500 N.E.2d 692 ] (1986)), the benefitting party by its conduct consents to have the prior ruling set aside ( Sears v. Sears, 85 Ill.2d 253, 260 [ 52 Ill.Dec. 608 , 422 N.E.2d 610 ] (1981)), or that the benefitting party by its conduct waives the right to question the jurisdiction

2007This court recently explained the rationale behind the doctrine: "It has been stated that the rationale behind the revestment doctrine is that the trial court considers the benefitting party to have ignored the judgment and started to retry the case ( Wilkins v. Dellenback, 149 Ill.App.3d 549, 555 [ 102 Ill.Dec. 799 , 500 N.E.2d 692 ] (1986)), the benefitting party by its conduct consents to have the prior ruling set aside ( Sears v. Sears, 85 Ill.2d 253, 260 [ 52 Ill.Dec. 608 , 422 N.E.2d 610 ] (1981)), or that the benefitting party by its conduct waives the right to question the jurisdiction

2007This court recently explained the rationale behind the doctrine: “It has been stated that the rationale behind the revestment doctrine is that the trial court considers the benefitting party to have ignored the judgment and started to retry the case (Wilkins v. Dellenback, 149 Ill.

2007This court recently explained the rationale behind the doctrine: "It has been stated that the rationale behind the revestment doctrine is that the trial court considers the benefitting party to have ignored the judgment and started to retry the case ( Wilkins v. Dellenback, 149 Ill.App.3d 549, 555 [ 102 Ill.Dec. 799 , 500 N.E.2d 692 ] (1986)), the benefitting party by its conduct consents to have the prior ruling set aside ( Sears v. Sears, 85 Ill.2d 253, 260 [ 52 Ill.Dec. 608 , 422 N.E.2d 610 ] (1981)), or that the benefitting party by its conduct waives the right to question the jurisdiction

2007This court recently explained the rationale behind the doctrine: "It has been stated that the rationale behind the revestment doctrine is that the trial court considers the benefitting party to have ignored the judgment and started to retry the case ( Wilkins v. Dellenback, 149 Ill.App.3d 549, 555 [ 102 Ill.Dec. 799 , 500 N.E.2d 692 ] (1986)), the benefitting party by its conduct consents to have the prior ruling set aside ( Sears v. Sears, 85 Ill.2d 253, 260 [ 52 Ill.Dec. 608 , 422 N.E.2d 610 ] (1981)), or that the benefitting party by its conduct waives the right to question the jurisdiction

2007This court recently explained the rationale behind the doctrine: "It has been stated that the rationale behind the revestment doctrine is that the trial court considers the benefitting party to have ignored the judgment and started to retry the case ( Wilkins v. Dellenback, 149 Ill.App.3d 549, 555 [ 102 Ill.Dec. 799 , 500 N.E.2d 692 ] (1986)), the benefitting party by its conduct consents to have the prior ruling set aside ( Sears v. Sears, 85 Ill.2d 253, 260 [ 52 Ill.Dec. 608 , 422 N.E.2d 610 ] (1981)), or that the benefitting party by its conduct waives the right to question the jurisdiction

2002See People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill.2d 228, 253 , 244 Ill.

2002See People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 228, 253 (2000) (Rathje, J., specially concurring); In re Marriage of Houghton, 301 Ill.

2002See People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 228, 253 (2000) (Rathje, J., specially concurring); In re Marriage of Houghton, 301 Ill.

2002See People v. Segoviano , 189 Ill. 2d 228, 253 (2000) (Rathje, J., specially concurring); In re Marriage of Houghton , 301 Ill.

2011Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, and during the brief period when consideration of self-interest could not have been fully brought to bear, the utterance may be taken as expressing the real belief of the speaker as to the facts just observed by him.'" People v. Damen, 28 Ill.2d 464, 471 , 193 N.E.2d 25 (1963) (quoting Keefe v. State, 50 Ariz. 293 , 72 P.2d 425, 427 (1937)).

2011Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, and during the brief period when consideration of self-interest could not have been fully brought to bear, the utterance may be taken as expressing the real belief of the speaker as to the facts just observed by him.’ ” People v. Damen, 28 Ill. 2d 464, 471 (1963) (quoting Keefe v. State, 72 P.2d 425, 427 (Ariz. 1937)).