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11 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gardner v. Gardnergreen2 sentences1992The rationale behind this exception to the general rule is that “[m]arital property ‘encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived,’ ” Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820, 824 (Utah App.1989) (quoting Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988)), and that the trial court may, in the exercise of its broad discretion, divide the property equitably regardless of its source or time of acquisition. 1990The rationale behind this exception to the general rule is that "[m]arital property 'encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived,’ ” Sorensen v. Sorensen, 169 P.2d 820, 824 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (quoting Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988)), and that the trial court may, in the exercise of its broad discretion, divide the property equitably, regardless of its source or time of acquisition. | 2 | 2 |
Eagle Mountain City v. Parsons Kinghorn & Harris, P.C.green2 sentences2021The rationale behind this rule is rooted in a “strong presumption of freedom of contract,” which also allows contracts to be voided if the contract “violates a clear and compelling public policy” or a “well-defined and dominant policy.” Id. ¶ 15 & n.7 (citations omitted). ¶124 In definitively holding that legal malpractice claims are presumed voluntarily assignable absent circumstances that clearly violate public policy, we noted that Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse had “already recognized that the involuntary assignment of [legal malpractice] claims . . . does not violate public pol 2021The rationale behind this rule is rooted in a “strong presumption of freedom of contract,” which also allows contracts to be voided if the contract “violates a clear and compelling public policy” or a “well-defined and dominant policy.” Id. ¶ 15 & n.7 (citations omitted). ¶124 In definitively holding that legal malpractice claims are presumed voluntarily assignable absent circumstances that clearly violate public policy, we noted that Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse had “already recognized that the involuntary assignment of [legal malpractice] claims . . . does not violate public pol | 1 | 1 |
Boucher Ex Rel. Boucher v. Dixie Medical Centergreen1 sentence2018See, e.g. , id. at 242 (rejecting the Dillon framework for bystander recovery based on foreseeability and holding that a plaintiff "who feared for her own safety but was not objectively within the zone of danger created by the defendants' breach of duty[ ] may not recover for emotional distress caused by her fright"); Boucher , 850 P.2d at 1182 (declining to adopt modifications of the Dillon rule and noting that our court had "unequivocally ... rejected any approach that allows plaintiffs who are not within the zone of danger to recover for emotional distress caused by witnessing another's inj | 1 | 1 |
Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc.green1 sentence2018See, e.g. , id. at 242 (rejecting the Dillon framework for bystander recovery based on foreseeability and holding that a plaintiff "who feared for her own safety but was not objectively within the zone of danger created by the defendants' breach of duty[ ] may not recover for emotional distress caused by her fright"); Boucher , 850 P.2d at 1182 (declining to adopt modifications of the Dillon rule and noting that our court had "unequivocally ... rejected any approach that allows plaintiffs who are not within the zone of danger to recover for emotional distress caused by witnessing another's inj | 1 | 1 |
State v. Menziesgreen1 sentence2005Id. at 506-07. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Piper Aircraft Distribution System Antitrust Litigation. Van-S-Aviation Corporation v. Piper Aircraft Corporationgreen1 sentence1994Antitrust Litig., 551 F.2d 213, 219 (8th Cir.1977). | 1 | 1 |
Donald Yoffe v. Keller Industries, Inc., a Corporation and Henry A. Keller and Norman S. Edelcup, Individualsgreen1 sentence1994Ry., 668 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.1981), ce rt. denied, 456 U.S. 946 , 102 S.Ct. 2013 , 72 L.Ed.2d 469 (1982); Yoffe v. Keller Indus., Inc., 580 F.2d 126, 129 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915 , 99 S.Ct. 1231 , 59 L.Ed.2d 464 (1979). 5 The rationale behind this rule is that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice “render[s] the proceedings a nullity and leave[s] the parties as if the action had never been brought.” In re Piper Aircraft Distribution Sys. | 1 | 1 |
Sorensen v. Sorensengreen1 sentence1992The rationale behind this exception to the general rule is that “[m]arital property ‘encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived,’ ” Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820, 824 (Utah App.1989) (quoting Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988)), and that the trial court may, in the exercise of its broad discretion, divide the property equitably regardless of its source or time of acquisition. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse
green
2 sentences2021The rationale behind this rule is rooted in a “strong presumption of freedom of contract,” which also allows contracts to be voided if the contract “violates a clear and compelling public policy” or a “well-defined and dominant policy.” Id. ¶ 15 & n.7 (citations omitted). ¶124 In definitively holding that legal malpractice claims are presumed voluntarily assignable absent circumstances that clearly violate public policy, we noted that Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse had “already recognized that the involuntary assignment of [legal malpractice] claims . . . does not violate public pol 2021The rationale behind this rule is rooted in a “strong presumption of freedom of contract,” which also allows contracts to be voided if the contract “violates a clear and compelling public policy” or a “well-defined and dominant policy.” Id. ¶ 15 & n.7 (citations omitted). ¶124 In definitively holding that legal malpractice claims are presumed voluntarily assignable absent circumstances that clearly violate public policy, we noted that Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse had “already recognized that the involuntary assignment of [legal malpractice] claims . . . does not violate public pol | 1 | 2021–2021 |
McRae & DeLand v. Feltch
green
1 sentence2019The court noted that the rationale behind this rule "is to prohibit piecemeal litigation ... and to prevent the needless proliferation of litigation." Id. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Straub v. Fisher and Paykel Health Care
green
2 sentences2018See, e.g. , id. at 242 (rejecting the Dillon framework for bystander recovery based on foreseeability and holding that a plaintiff "who feared for her own safety but was not objectively within the zone of danger created by the defendants' breach of duty[ ] may not recover for emotional distress caused by her fright"); Boucher , 850 P.2d at 1182 (declining to adopt modifications of the Dillon rule and noting that our court had "unequivocally ... rejected any approach that allows plaintiffs who are not within the zone of danger to recover for emotional distress caused by witnessing another's inj 2018See, e.g. , id. at 242 (rejecting the Dillon framework for bystander recovery based on foreseeability and holding that a plaintiff "who feared for her own safety but was not objectively within the zone of danger created by the defendants' breach of duty[ ] may not recover for emotional distress caused by her fright"); Boucher , 850 P.2d at 1182 (declining to adopt modifications of the Dillon rule and noting that our court had "unequivocally ... rejected any approach that allows plaintiffs who are not within the zone of danger to recover for emotional distress caused by witnessing another's inj | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Commission
green
1 sentence2009The rationale behind this rule permits courts to avoid "procedural confusion and piecemeal litigation." Id. 119 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
International Paper Company v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen Gmbh
green
1 sentence2006Id. at 418 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Webb v. Interstate Land Corp.
green
1 sentence2001Id. at 1192 . 122 However, under the U.C0.C., a real estate interest arising from a purchase materially differs from an interest arising from a judgment lien. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Curlee Bowers v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company, a Corporation
green
1 sentence1994Ry., 668 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.1981), ce rt. denied, 456 U.S. 946 , 102 S.Ct. 2013 , 72 L.Ed.2d 469 (1982); Yoffe v. Keller Indus., Inc., 580 F.2d 126, 129 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915 , 99 S.Ct. 1231 , 59 L.Ed.2d 464 (1979). 5 The rationale behind this rule is that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice “render[s] the proceedings a nullity and leave[s] the parties as if the action had never been brought.” In re Piper Aircraft Distribution Sys. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Economy Carpets Manufacturers & Distributors, Inc. v. Better Business Bureau of Baton Rouge Area, Inc.
green
1 sentence1994Ry., 668 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.1981), ce rt. denied, 456 U.S. 946 , 102 S.Ct. 2013 , 72 L.Ed.2d 469 (1982); Yoffe v. Keller Indus., Inc., 580 F.2d 126, 129 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915 , 99 S.Ct. 1231 , 59 L.Ed.2d 464 (1979). 5 The rationale behind this rule is that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice “render[s] the proceedings a nullity and leave[s] the parties as if the action had never been brought.” In re Piper Aircraft Distribution Sys. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Altbaum v. California
green
1 sentence1994Ry., 668 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.1981), ce rt. denied, 456 U.S. 946 , 102 S.Ct. 2013 , 72 L.Ed.2d 469 (1982); Yoffe v. Keller Indus., Inc., 580 F.2d 126, 129 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915 , 99 S.Ct. 1231 , 59 L.Ed.2d 464 (1979). 5 The rationale behind this rule is that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice “render[s] the proceedings a nullity and leave[s] the parties as if the action had never been brought.” In re Piper Aircraft Distribution Sys. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Getto
green
1 sentence1994Ry., 668 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.1981), ce rt. denied, 456 U.S. 946 , 102 S.Ct. 2013 , 72 L.Ed.2d 469 (1982); Yoffe v. Keller Indus., Inc., 580 F.2d 126, 129 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915 , 99 S.Ct. 1231 , 59 L.Ed.2d 464 (1979). 5 The rationale behind this rule is that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice “render[s] the proceedings a nullity and leave[s] the parties as if the action had never been brought.” In re Piper Aircraft Distribution Sys. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Bowers v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co.
green
1 sentence1994Ry., 668 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.1981), ce rt. denied, 456 U.S. 946 , 102 S.Ct. 2013 , 72 L.Ed.2d 469 (1982); Yoffe v. Keller Indus., Inc., 580 F.2d 126, 129 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915 , 99 S.Ct. 1231 , 59 L.Ed.2d 464 (1979). 5 The rationale behind this rule is that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice “render[s] the proceedings a nullity and leave[s] the parties as if the action had never been brought.” In re Piper Aircraft Distribution Sys. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Calhoun v. United States
green
1 sentence1994Ry., 668 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.1981), ce rt. denied, 456 U.S. 946 , 102 S.Ct. 2013 , 72 L.Ed.2d 469 (1982); Yoffe v. Keller Indus., Inc., 580 F.2d 126, 129 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915 , 99 S.Ct. 1231 , 59 L.Ed.2d 464 (1979). 5 The rationale behind this rule is that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice “render[s] the proceedings a nullity and leave[s] the parties as if the action had never been brought.” In re Piper Aircraft Distribution Sys. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Noble v. Noble
green
1 sentence1990Noble, 761 P.2d at 1373 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1989The rationale behind this rule is articulated by the court in People v. Superior Court of Yolo County, 3 Cal.3d 807 , 91 Cal.Rptr. 729 , 478 P.2d 449 (1970): [Fjrom the viewpoint of the observer, an innocent gesture can often be mistaken for a guilty movement. 1989The rationale behind this rule is articulated by the court in People v. Superior Court of Yolo County, 3 Cal.3d 807 , 91 Cal.Rptr. 729 , 478 P.2d 449 (1970): [Fjrom the viewpoint of the observer, an innocent gesture can often be mistaken for a guilty movement. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.