rationale behind rule in Tennessee

2021State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d 817, 819-20 (Tenn. 1997) (citing Neil P. Cohen, et. al., Tennessee Law of Evidence § 8.03(2).1 at 532 (3d ed. 1995)).

2019State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d 817, 819-20 (Tenn. 1997) (citing Cohen, Tennessee Law of Evidence § 8.03(2).1 at 532 (3d ed. 1995).

2019Welch v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility for the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 193 S.W.3d 457, 464 (Tenn. 2006).

2017Welch v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility for the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 193 S.W.3d 457, 464 (Tenn. 2006).

2018In other words, even if a defendant’s statements are true, the defendant may be liable if the statements “imply facts that are not true.” Id. at *12 (citing Zelenik, 2013 WL 175807 , at *11). ‘“The rationale behind this rule is that, when truthful statements carry a defamatory innuendo, the factual implication should also be true to justify the implication.”’ Isbell, 2000 WL 1817252 , at *6 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Tucker, 737 So. 2d 706, 717 (La. 1999)).

2000“The rationale behind this rule is that, when truthful statements carry a defamatory innuendo, the factual implication should also be true to justify the implication.” Fitzgerald v. Tucker, 737 So.2d 706, 717 (La. 1999).

2000In Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. l988), a case cited by our supreme court in Rickman, the Delaware Supreme Court made further comment upon the rationale behind the rule: "[W]e are no more inclined to endorse [the assumption that a defendant's propensity for satisfying sexual needs is so unique that it is relevant to his guilt] than we are to consider previous crimes of theft as demonstrating a larcenous disposition and thus admissible to show proof of intent to commit theft on a given occasion." Rickman, 876 S.W.2d at 829 (quoting Getz, 538 A.2d at 734 ) (alteration in original).

1995In Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del.1988), a case cited by our supreme Court in Rick-man, the Delaware Supreme Court made *232 further comment upon the rationale behind the rule: “We are no more inclined to endorse [the assumption that a defendant’s propensity for satisfying sexual needs is so unique that it is relevant to his guilt] than we are to consider previous crimes of theft as demonstrating a larcenous disposition and thus admissible to show proof of intent to commit theft on a given occasion.” Rickman, 876 S.W.2d at 829 (quoting Getz, 538 A.2d at 734 ).

2025An appellate court “‘may presume that the trial court approved the verdict as the thirteenth juror’ when it has overruled a motion for new trial without comment.” State v. Leath, 461 S.W.3d 73, 115 (Tenn. Crim.

2019Relying on its own prior decisions, the Court of Appeals reiterated that “[t]he requirement that official actions or proceedings be open to the public serves the underlying rationale behind the privilege, allowing the press to be ‘the eyes and ears of the members of the public who would have been able to witness the proceeding or obtain the information had they been present to see or hear for themselves.’” Id. at *3 (quoting Lewis v. NewsChannel 5 Network, L.P., 238 S.W.3d 270, 285 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)).

2019See State v. Flood, 219 S.W.3d 307, 319 (Tenn. 2007) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973)) (“Out-of-court statements are traditionally excluded because they lack the conventional indicia of reliability” and are “not subject to cross-examination[.]”).

2019See State v. Flood, 219 S.W.3d 307, 319 (Tenn. 2007) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973)) (“Out-of-court statements are traditionally excluded because they lack the conventional indicia of reliability” and are “not subject to cross-examination[.]”).

2018The rationale behind this rule is that “[t]he trial judge and the jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their demeanor on the stand.” Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1966).

2017The well-recognized rationale behind this rule is that “the appearance of bias is as injurious to the integrity of the judicial system as actual bias.” State v. Odom, 336 S.W.3d 541, 575 (Tenn. 2011) (internal quotation omitted).

2015As a result, “[p]arents who have not themselves severely abused their own child may still be found to have committed severe child abuse if they knowingly exposed the child to, or knowingly failed to protect the child from, conduct constituting severe child abuse.” Id.; see also In re H.L.F., 297 S.W.3d 223, 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).

2011Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230 (1922)). -5- Thus, in the present case, the applicability of the doctrine of prior suit pending hinges upon whether the Florida case is an action in rem or quasi in rem.

2010Bilbrey, 937 S.W.2d at 808 (footnotes omitted).

2003The rationale behind such a rule is that publication requires “the communication of a defamatory matter to a third person” and “communication among agents of the same corporation . . . are not to be considered as statements communicated or publicized to third persons.” Sullivan v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp., 995 S.W.2d 569, 572 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Quality Auto Parts Co. v. Bluff City Buick Co., 876 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tenn. 1994)); Woods v. Helmi, M.D.A., 758 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). -3- Siegfried contends that the intra-corporate communication rule does not apply to not-for- profit organ

2003The rationale behind such a rule is that publication requires “the communication of a defamatory matter to a third person” and “communication among agents of the same corporation . . . are not to be considered as statements communicated or publicized to third persons.” Sullivan v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp., 995 S.W.2d 569, 572 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Quality Auto Parts Co. v. Bluff City Buick Co., 876 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tenn. 1994)); Woods v. Helmi, M.D.A., 758 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). -3- Siegfried contends that the intra-corporate communication rule does not apply to not-for- profit organ

2003The rationale behind such a rule is that publication requires “the communication of a defamatory matter to a third person” and “communication among agents of the same corporation . . . are not to be considered as statements communicated or publicized to third persons.” Sullivan v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp., 995 S.W.2d 569, 572 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Quality Auto Parts Co. v. Bluff City Buick Co., 876 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tenn. 1994)); Woods v. Helmi, M.D.A., 758 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). -3- Siegfried contends that the intra-corporate communication rule does not apply to not-for- profit organ

2000The rationale behind this exception “is that such declarations are deemed reliable because the declarant is motivated to tell the truth; that is, the declarant makes the statements for the ultimate purpose of receiving proper diagnosis and treatment.” State v. Livingston, 907 S.W.2d 392, 396 (Tenn. 1995).

2000“The proper question is whether the meaning reasonably conveyed by the published words is reasonably understood in a defamatory sense by the reader or listener.” Pate v. Service Merchandise Co., 959 S.W.2d 569, 574 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).