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28 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Olivier v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburghgreen2 sentences2005Indeed, to hold to the contrary "would require a client to hire a backup lawyer to continually review the work of the primary lawyer." Gill v. Warren , 751 S.W.2d 33 (Ky.App.1988); See also Olivier v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 499 So.2d 1330, 1337 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1986) (contrary holding would allow attorney to defeat malpractice claim by using appeal process to continue relationship until prescription has run). 2000Indeed, to hold to the contrary "would require a client to hire a backup lawyer to continually review the work of the primary lawyer." Gill v. Warren, 751 S.W.2d 33 (Ky.App.1988); See also Olivier v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 499 So.2d 1330, 1337 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1986) (contrary holding would allow attorney to defeat malpractice claim by using appeal process to continue relationship until prescription has run). | 4 | 4 |
Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc.green2 sentences1990In Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc,, 260 La. 542 , 256 So.2d 620, 623 (1972) our Supreme Court quoted with approval from a law review article by Wex Malone explaining the rationale behind this analysis as follows: All rules of conduct, irrespective of whether they are a product of a legislature or are a part of the fabric of the court-made law of negligence, exist for purposes. 1990In Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc,, 260 La. 542 , 256 So.2d 620, 623 (1972) our Supreme Court quoted with approval from a law review article by Wex Malone explaining the rationale behind this analysis as follows: All rules of conduct, irrespective of whether they are a product of a legislature or are a part of the fabric of the court-made law of negligence, exist for purposes. | 2 | 2 |
Matherne v. Gray Ins. Co.green2 sentences2008Co., 661 So.2d 432, 95-0975 (La.10/16/95), we explained that ". . . the ripeness doctrine is a tool designed to determine when judicial review is appropriate" and that the rationale behind the doctrine is that "most courts would rather avoid speculative cases, defer to finders of fact with greater subject matter expertise, decide cases with fully-developed records, and avoid overly broad opinions, even if these courts might constitutionally hear a dispute." Matherne, 661 So.2d at 435 . 2008Co., 661 So.2d 432, 95-0975 (La.10/16/95), we explained that ". . . the ripeness doctrine is a tool designed to determine when judicial review is appropriate" and that the rationale behind the doctrine is that "most courts would rather avoid speculative cases, defer to finders of fact with greater subject matter expertise, decide cases with fully-developed records, and avoid overly broad opinions, even if these courts might constitutionally hear a dispute." Matherne, 661 So.2d at 435 . | 1 | 1 |
Galland v. NEW ORLEANS PUB. SERVICE, INC.green1 sentence1996See Galland v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 377 So.2d 84 (La.1979), and Green v. TACA, 304 So.2d 357 (La.1974). [Emphasis added.] Although the Kraaz case involved damages caused by third party criminal activity, the rationale behind the standard of care adopted by the Kraaz court as quoted above was not based on the criminal nature of the activity, but upon an analogy to the standard required of common carriers having nothing to do with criminal activity. | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Taca International Airlinesgreen1 sentence1996See Galland v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 377 So.2d 84 (La.1979), and Green v. TACA, 304 So.2d 357 (La.1974). [Emphasis added.] Although the Kraaz case involved damages caused by third party criminal activity, the rationale behind the standard of care adopted by the Kraaz court as quoted above was not based on the criminal nature of the activity, but upon an analogy to the standard required of common carriers having nothing to do with criminal activity. | 1 | 1 |
Picou v. Ferraragreen1 sentence1989However, in Picou v. Ferrara, 483 So.2d 915, 918 (La.1986) our Supreme Court, in considering a jury verdict predicated on erroneous instructions, stated that "... the reviewing court, under its constitutional authority to review facts, should make an independent determination of the facts from the record, if possible, without according any weight whatsoever to the factual findings of the erroneously instructed jury." (emphasis added) That holding does not reconcile the "allocation of functions" between trial and appellate courts. | 1 | 1 |
Canter v. Koehring Companygreen1 sentence1989The rationale behind this principle of review is based not only on the trial court's better capacity to evaluate live witnesses *1243 but also "upon the proper allocation of trial and appellate functions between the respective courts." Id. at 826 quoting Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So.2d 716, 724 (La.1973). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gill v. Warren
green
2 sentences2005Indeed, to hold to the contrary "would require a client to hire a backup lawyer to continually review the work of the primary lawyer." Gill v. Warren , 751 S.W.2d 33 (Ky.App.1988); See also Olivier v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 499 So.2d 1330, 1337 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1986) (contrary holding would allow attorney to defeat malpractice claim by using appeal process to continue relationship until prescription has run). 2000Indeed, to hold to the contrary "would require a client to hire a backup lawyer to continually review the work of the primary lawyer." Gill v. Warren, 751 S.W.2d 33 (Ky.App.1988); See also Olivier v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 499 So.2d 1330, 1337 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1986) (contrary holding would allow attorney to defeat malpractice claim by using appeal process to continue relationship until prescription has run). | 4 | 1992–2005 |
State v. Brown
neutral
2 sentences2013State v. Brown, 318 So.2d 24 (La.1975); State v. Gay, 616 So.2d 1290 (La.App. 2 Cir.1993), writ denied, 624 So.2d 1223 (La.1993). 2012State v. Brown, 318 So.2d 24 (La.1975); State v. Gay, 616 So.2d 1290 (La.App. 2 Cir.1993), writ denied, 624 So.2d 1223 (La.1993). | ^However, such evidence may be admitted by certain statutory and jurisprudential exceptions to the exclusionary rule when it tends to prove a material issue and has independent relevance other than showing that the defendant is of bad character. | 3 | 2009–2013 |
State v. Gay
green
2 sentences2013State v. Brown, 318 So.2d 24 (La.1975); State v. Gay, 616 So.2d 1290 (La.App. 2 Cir.1993), writ denied, 624 So.2d 1223 (La.1993). 2012State v. Brown, 318 So.2d 24 (La.1975); State v. Gay, 616 So.2d 1290 (La.App. 2 Cir.1993), writ denied, 624 So.2d 1223 (La.1993). | ^However, such evidence may be admitted by certain statutory and jurisprudential exceptions to the exclusionary rule when it tends to prove a material issue and has independent relevance other than showing that the defendant is of bad character. | 3 | 2009–2013 |
State Ex Rel. Elaire v. Blackburn
green
2 sentences2013Explaining the rationale behind this rule, the Supreme Court stated: It would be unfair to permit the defendant to have the advantage of the possibility that a lesser “compromise” verdict will be returned (as opposed to being convicted of the offense charged) and then to raise the complaint for the first time on appeal, that the evidence did not support the responsive verdict to which he failed to object.' Blackburn, 424 So.2d at 251-52 . 2010Blackburn, supra, 424 So.2d at 251-252 . | 2 | 2010–2013 |
State v. Moses
green
2 sentences2013State v. Brown, 318 So.2d 24 (La.1975); State v. Gay, 616 So.2d 1290 (La.App. 2 Cir.1993), writ denied, 624 So.2d 1223 (La.1993). 2012State v. Brown, 318 So.2d 24 (La.1975); State v. Gay, 616 So.2d 1290 (La.App. 2 Cir.1993), writ denied, 624 So.2d 1223 (La.1993). | ^However, such evidence may be admitted by certain statutory and jurisprudential exceptions to the exclusionary rule when it tends to prove a material issue and has independent relevance other than showing that the defendant is of bad character. | 2 | 2012–2013 |
State v. Luquette
red
2 sentences2009The rationale behind this rule being that a "[d]efendant ought not to be placed in the position of having to consent, or perhaps prejudice the jury by withholding consent." State v. Luquette, 275 So.2d at 400 , citing State v. Craighead, supra . 1996The rationale behind this rule being that a "[d]efendant ought not to be placed in the position of having to consent, or perhaps prejudice the jury by withholding consent." State v. Luquette, 275 So.2d at 400 , citing State v. Craighead, supra . | 2 | 1996–2009 |
State v. Brown
green
1 sentence2024Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Freeman
green
1 sentence2013In response to Ms. Brown’s argument that attempted cruelty to a juvenile is not a legally cognizable responsive verdict, the State cites State v. Freeman, 409 So.2d 581 (La.1982), in which the Supreme Court upheld the verdict of attempted cruelty to a juvenile after the defendant claimed that no such verdict exists. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Abel v. United States
green
2 sentences2007Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 , 80 S.Ct. 683 , 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960); State v. Dobard, 01-2629 (La.6/21/02), 824 So.2d 1127 . 2007Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 , 80 S.Ct. 683 , 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960); State v. Dobard, 01-2629 (La.6/21/02), 824 So.2d 1127 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Dobard
green
1 sentence2007Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 , 80 S.Ct. 683 , 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960); State v. Dobard, 01-2629 (La.6/21/02), 824 So.2d 1127 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc.
green
1 sentence2003The rationale behind this rule was that “[i]f it [can] be said that the work activities of the injured employee [have] no direct concern with navigation or commerce, it [is] ‘local’ and therefore the State laws [are] applicable.” Id., citing M. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Schaefer v. Lynch
green
1 sentence1999Id. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Taylor
green
1 sentence1998Taylor , 93-2201 at p. 32, 669 So.2d at 381 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Lima v. Schmidt
green
1 sentence1997The Lima court also explained that the rationale behind this rule is that "[a] plaintiff cannot justly be held to be `sleeping on his rights' when he is relying upon a honored fiduciary relationship." Lima, 595 So.2d at 630 citing Note, Civil Procedure— Statute of Limitation Accrual in Attorney Malpractice Actions: Thorpe v. DeMent, 20 Wake Forest L.Rev. 1017, 1038 (1984). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Franklin v. Paul Dupuis & Associates
neutral
1 sentence1996See also: Franklin v. Paul Dupuis & Associates, 543 So.2d 970 (La.App. 3 Cir.1989), writ den. 545 So.2d 1042 (La.1989). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Franklin v. Paul Dupuis & Associates
green
1 sentence1996See also: Franklin v. Paul Dupuis & Associates, 543 So.2d 970 (La.App. 3 Cir.1989), writ den. 545 So.2d 1042 (La.1989). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Ross v. La Coste De Monterville
green
1 sentence1995The rationale behind this requirement is reflected in the policy behind the concept of garde: `[T]he owner of a thing is in a better position than the innocent victim to guard against the unreasonable risks of structural defects in the thing he owns which arise before he transfers possession of it to another.' Ross, 502 So.2d at 1032 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Dupre v. City of Opelousas
green
2 sentences1992The rationale behind the rule of sui generis tax laws is clearly stated in Dupre v. City of Opelousas, 161 La. at 275 , 108 So. at 480 -481: After the taxes have been collected, it would be unreasonable, if not disastrous, to permit a taxpayer, after he has made payment, without having been coerced to do so, to recover the taxes paid by him, on the ground that the levy was unconstitutional or illegal. 1992The rationale behind the rule of sui generis tax laws is clearly stated in Dupre v. City of Opelousas, 161 La. at 275 , 108 So. at 480 -481: After the taxes have been collected, it would be unreasonable, if not disastrous, to permit a taxpayer, after he has made payment, without having been coerced to do so, to recover the taxes paid by him, on the ground that the levy was unconstitutional or illegal. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Virgil v. American Guar. & Liability Ins.
green
1 sentence1989The rationale behind this principle of review is based not only on the trial court's better capacity to evaluate live witnesses *1243 but also "upon the proper allocation of trial and appellate functions between the respective courts." Id. at 826 quoting Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So.2d 716, 724 (La.1973). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Calvert v. Simon
green
1 sentence1985The rationale behind the rule was explained in Calvert v. Simon, 311 So.2d 13 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1975) at p. 17: Louisiana law permits recovery by a party damaged by libelous statements made without probable cause and with malice by another party in a judicial proceeding, but consistent with orderly procedure and the concept of unhampered expression in the course of litigation, requires the party claiming such damage to await the determination of the original proceeding. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Suhor v. Gusse
green
1 sentence1984However, after a review of this decision we are of the opinion that the ruling in Suhor, supra is controlling. 2 Clearly the rationale behind the doctrine, humane consideration for the plight of an impecunious defendant, is no less served in the area of special damages. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Gonzales v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc.
green
1 sentence1981Gonzales, supra. Kevin Naquin, the assistant manager, testified he was stocking a shelf down the aisle from where the accident occurred. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State in Interest of Dino
green
1 sentence1980Considering this policy, we reiterate that: "Because most juveniles are not mature enough to understand their rights and are not competent to exercise them, the concepts of fundamental fairness embodied in the Declaration of Rights of our constitution require that juveniles not be permitted to waive constitutional rights on their own." Dino, supra, at 594 . [Footnotes omitted]. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.