rationale behind rule (Pennsylvania) · Go Syfert
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rationale behind rule in Pennsylvania

67 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1965–2024 10 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (28)

CaseFollowedCited
Fish v. Behersgreen
pa · 1999 · cited in 3 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015Id. at 723.

2015Id. at 723.

33
Silver v. Zoning Board of Adjustmentgreen
pa · 1969 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1971–2021
2 sentences

1971The court in Upper Darby Township Appeal, 391 Pa. 347, 354 , 138 A. 2d 99, 102 (1958) stated: “If we were to prevent the natural growth and expansion of a protected nonconforming use, we would invade the constitutional guarantees of due process which indeed brought the nonconforming principle into being ” (Emphasis added) The Court recently re-emphasized this principle in the case of Silver v. Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment, 435 Pa. 99, 102 , 255 A. 2d 506, 507 (1969) wherein it said: “The rationale behind the doctrine [of expansion] can be traced to the due process requirements prote

1971The court in Upper Darby Township Appeal, 391 Pa. 347, 354 , 138 A. 2d 99, 102 (1958) stated: “If we were to prevent the natural growth and expansion of a protected nonconforming use, we would invade the constitutional guarantees of due process which indeed brought the nonconforming principle into being ” (Emphasis added) The Court recently re-emphasized this principle in the case of Silver v. Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment, 435 Pa. 99, 102 , 255 A. 2d 506, 507 (1969) wherein it said: “The rationale behind the doctrine [of expansion] can be traced to the due process requirements prote

22
Ritter v. Rittergreen
pa · 1986 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2000–2003
2 sentences

2003Ritter v. Ritter, 359 Pa.Super. 12 , 518 A.2d 319, 321 (1986).

2003Ritter v. Ritter, 359 Pa.Super. 12 , 518 A.2d 319, 321 (1986).

22
Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Boardgreen
pacommwct · 2006 · cited in 3 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2010–2021
2 sentences

2021“The rationale behind this rule is that ‘once an employee is on the employer’s premises, actually going to or leaving the employee’s work station is a necessary part of that employee’s employment.’” ICT Grp., 995 A.2d at 932 (quoting Allegheny Ludlum, 913 A.2d at 349 ).

2017We explained that “[i]t is well established in Pennsylvania that ‘any injury occurring to an employee up until the 11 time he leaves the premises of the employer, provided that it is reasonably proximate to work hours, is compensable.’ The rationale behind this rule is that ‘once an employee is on the [e]mployer’s premises, actually getting to or leaving the employee’s work station is a necessary part of that employee’s employment.’” ICT Group, 995 A.2d at 932 (quoting Allegheny Ludlum, 913 A.2d at 349 ).

13
McPeake v. Cannon, Esquire, PCgreen
pa · 1989 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1997–2019
2 sentences

2019Id. at 441-442 (internal citations omitted).

1997Id., 381 Pa.Super. at 232-33 , 553 A.2d at 441-42 .

12
Commonwealth v. Farrisgreen
pasuperct · 1977 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1986–1988
2 sentences

1988Commonwealth v. Farris, 251 Pa.Superior Ct. 277, 282, 380 A.2d 486 , 489 *357 (1977).

1986Commonwealth v. Farris, 251 Pa.Superior Ct. 277, 282, 380 A.2d 486, 489 (1977).

12
Upper Darby Township Appealgreen
pa · 1958 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1971–1972
2 sentences

1971The court in Upper Darby Township Appeal, 391 Pa. 347, 354 , 138 A. 2d 99, 102 (1958) stated: “If we were to prevent the natural growth and expansion of a protected nonconforming use, we would invade the constitutional guarantees of due process which indeed brought the nonconforming principle into being ” (Emphasis added) The Court recently re-emphasized this principle in the case of Silver v. Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment, 435 Pa. 99, 102 , 255 A. 2d 506, 507 (1969) wherein it said: “The rationale behind the doctrine [of expansion] can be traced to the due process requirements prote

1971The court in Upper Darby Township Appeal, 391 Pa. 347, 354 , 138 A. 2d 99, 102 (1958) stated: “If we were to prevent the natural growth and expansion of a protected nonconforming use, we would invade the constitutional guarantees of due process which indeed brought the nonconforming principle into being ” (Emphasis added) The Court recently re-emphasized this principle in the case of Silver v. Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment, 435 Pa. 99, 102 , 255 A. 2d 506, 507 (1969) wherein it said: “The rationale behind the doctrine [of expansion] can be traced to the due process requirements prote

12
Danville Area School District v. Danville Area Education Ass'ngreen
pa · 2000 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024Ass’n, PSEA/NEA, 754 A.2d 1255, 1262 (Pa. 2000)). 14 The rationale behind this principle was described as follows: To view this type of agreement otherwise would lead to chaos and a breakdown in the entire scheme of collective bargaining for which the parties have provided and contracted.

11
Commonwealth v. Korngreen
pasuperct · 2016 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 263 A.3d 626 , 646 (Pa. 2021) The Supreme Court has further articulated the rationale behind such a requirement stating, "[i]n short, probable cause exists when, based upon a totality of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit of probable cause, there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Commonwealth. v. Korn, 139 A.3d 249, 254 (Pa. Super. 2016) However, the Superior Court best articulated the standard: a warrant unconstitutional for its lack of particularity authorizes a search in terms so ambiguous as to allow the

11
Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddongreen
pa · 1999 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023The rationale behind this principle was that, having essentially renounced the law, an individual was in physician liable to the public at large.” Amici Brief at 6 (quoting Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 733 A.2d 623, 630 (Pa. 1999)).

11
Commonwealth v. Wileygreen
pasuperct · 2009 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022The rationale behind such a presumption was expressly rejected by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618 (Pa. 2017), with respect to due-diligence analyses raised under the newly-discovered fact exception, which is analogous to the circumstances here. 6 “We may affirm the decision of the PCRA court if there is any basis on the record to support the PCRA court’s action; this is so even if we rely on a different basis in our decision to affirm.” Commonwealth v. Wiley, 966 A.2d 1153, 1157 (Pa. Super. 2009) (cleaned up). - 12 - J-A14011-22 Further discussion of the Ski-Mask Stud

11
Alan R. v. Kemper National Insurance Companiesgreen
pasuperct · 1996 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021See id.

11
Chavez v. ABF Freight Systems, Inc.green
nmctapp · 2001 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021The court further explained that “[t]he rule recognizes that a traveling employee is subject to hazards [he or she] would otherwise have the option of avoiding and that hazards of travel become the hazards of the employment.” Id. at 697 (quoting Chavez v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 27 P.3d 1011, 1014 (N.M.

11
State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. v. Reelgreen
or · 1987 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019Fund Corp. v. Reel, 735 P.2d 364, 367 (Or. 1987)) (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted).

11
Starinieri Unemployment Compensation Casegreen
pa · 1972 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017Bd. of Review, 289 A.2d 726, 727 (Pa. 1972).

11
Commonwealth v. Robertsgreen
pasuperct · 1975 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017The rationale behind this waiver principle is that “[i]t is for the court which accepted the plea to consider and correct, in the first instance, any error which may have been committed.” Commonwealth v. Roberts, 237 Pa.Super. 336 , 352 A.2d 140, 141 (1975) (holding that common and previously condoned mistake of attacking guilty plea on direct appeal without first filing petition to withdraw plea with trial court is procedural error resulting in waiver; stating, “(t)he swift and orderly administration of criminal justice requires that lower courts be given the opportunity to rectify their erro

2017The rationale behind this waiver principle is that “[i]t is for the court which accepted the plea to consider and correct, in the first instance, any error which may have been committed.” Commonwealth v. Roberts, 237 Pa.Super. 336 , 352 A.2d 140, 141 (1975) (holding that common and previously condoned mistake of attacking guilty plea on direct appeal without first filing petition to withdraw plea with trial court is procedural error resulting in waiver; stating, “(t)he swift and orderly administration of criminal justice requires that lower courts be given the opportunity to rectify their erro

11
Commonwealth v. Assorted Consumer Fireworksgreen
pacommwct · 2011 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014The rationale behind this rule is that forfeiture “is a civil consequence of violating a criminal statute” and, consequently, “property is forfeited not as a result of a criminal conviction but in a separate civil proceeding.” Commonwealth v. Assorted Consumer Fireworks, 16 A.3d 554, 558 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). 2 window, the officers smelled a strong odor of burnt marijuana emanating from within the vehicle.

11
Leechburg Area School District v. Dalegreen
pa · 1981 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
11
Wing v. COM., UNEMP. COMP. BD. OF REV.green
pa · 1981 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
11
Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. J. W. Bishop & Co.green
pa · 1981 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
11
Commonwealth v. Rodgersgreen
pa · 1977 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990
11
Clark v. Troutmangreen
pa · 1985 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
11
Dick Corp. v. State Public School Building Authoritygreen
pacommwct · 1976 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1986–1986
11
Commonwealth v. Clarkgreen
pa · 1973 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985
11
Commonwealth v. Terrygreen
pa · 1975 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985
11
Borough of Green Tree v. Board of Property Assessments, Appeals & Reviewgreen
pa · 1974 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
11
Posnick v. Posnickgreen
dc · 1960 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1976–1976
11
Commonwealth ex rel. Dulles v. Dullesgreen
pasuperct · 1956 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1965–1965
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (43)

CaseCitedYears
Commonwealth v. Parker green
pasuperct · 2016
2 sentences

2024The rationale behind the rule is to prevent a parole officer from aiding the police “by statutorily circumventing the warrant requirement, based on reasonable suspicion, instead of the heightened standard of probable cause.” Id.

2024The rationale behind the rule is to prevent a parole officer from aiding the police “by statutorily circumventing the warrant requirement, based on reasonable suspicion, instead of the heightened standard of probable cause.” Id.

32018–2024
GILMORE BY GILMORE v. Dondero green
pa · 1990
2 sentences

2018Id. at 604 , 582 A.2d at 1108 .

2018Id. at 604 , 582 A.2d at 1108 .

31995–2018
Shenango Valley Osteopathic Hospital v. Department of Health of Commonwealth green
pa · 1982
2 sentences

2019The rationale behind the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies "not only reflects a recognition of the [G]eneral [A]ssembly's directive of strict compliance with statutorily-prescribed remedies, it also acknowledges that an unjustified failure to follow the [statutory] scheme undercuts the foundation upon which the ... process was founded." East Coast Vapor , 189 A.3d at 510 (quoting Shenango Valley Osteopathic Hospital v. Department of Health , 499 Pa. 39 , 451 A.2d 434 , 438 (1982) ). 10 While the failure to exhaust a statutory or administrative remedy normally bars this Court from he

2019The rationale behind the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies "not only reflects a recognition of the [G]eneral [A]ssembly's directive of strict compliance with statutorily-prescribed remedies, it also acknowledges that an unjustified failure to follow the [statutory] scheme undercuts the foundation upon which the ... process was founded." East Coast Vapor , 189 A.3d at 510 (quoting Shenango Valley Osteopathic Hospital v. Department of Health , 499 Pa. 39 , 451 A.2d 434 , 438 (1982) ). 10 While the failure to exhaust a statutory or administrative remedy normally bars this Court from he

22018–2019
Smith v. City of Chester green
pa · 1986
2 sentences

1998As this court stated in Smith v. City of Chester, 357 Pa.Super. 24 , 515 A.2d 303 (1986): The rationale behind this doctrine is to aid plaintiffs in making a prima facie case of negligence against defendants by allowing an inference of negligence to be deduced from competent evidence on the theory that in the course of ordinary events, the injury or damage complained of would not have occurred in absence of negligence.

1998As this court stated in Smith v. City of Chester, 357 Pa.Super. 24 , 515 A.2d 303 (1986): The rationale behind this doctrine is to aid plaintiffs in making a prima facie case of negligence against defendants by allowing an inference of negligence to be deduced from competent evidence on the theory that in the course of ordinary events, the injury or damage complained of would not have occurred in absence of negligence.

21988–1998
Williams v. Madenspacher green
pa · 2016
1 sentence

2022The rationale behind such a presumption was expressly rejected by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618 (Pa. 2017), with respect to due-diligence analyses raised under the newly-discovered fact exception, which is analogous to the circumstances here. 6 “We may affirm the decision of the PCRA court if there is any basis on the record to support the PCRA court’s action; this is so even if we rely on a different basis in our decision to affirm.” Commonwealth v. Wiley, 966 A.2d 1153, 1157 (Pa. Super. 2009) (cleaned up). - 12 - J-A14011-22 Further discussion of the Ski-Mask Stud

12022–2022
ICT Group v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board green
pacommwct · 2010
1 sentence

2021“The rationale behind this rule is that ‘once an employee is on the employer’s premises, actually going to or leaving the employee’s work station is a necessary part of that employee’s employment.’” ICT Grp., 995 A.2d at 932 (quoting Allegheny Ludlum, 913 A.2d at 349 ).

12021–2021
Keystone ReLeaf, LLC v. Pennsylvania Department of Health, Office of Medical Marijuana green
pacommwct · 2018
1 sentence

2019The rationale behind the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies "not only reflects a recognition of the [G]eneral [A]ssembly's directive of strict compliance with statutorily-prescribed remedies, it also acknowledges that an unjustified failure to follow the [statutory] scheme undercuts the foundation upon which the ... process was founded." East Coast Vapor , 189 A.3d at 510 (quoting Shenango Valley Osteopathic Hospital v. Department of Health , 499 Pa. 39 , 451 A.2d 434 , 438 (1982) ). 10 While the failure to exhaust a statutory or administrative remedy normally bars this Court from he

12019–2019
East Coast Vapor, LLC v. PA Department of Revenue green
pacommwct · 2018
1 sentence

2019The rationale behind the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies "not only reflects a recognition of the [G]eneral [A]ssembly's directive of strict compliance with statutorily-prescribed remedies, it also acknowledges that an unjustified failure to follow the [statutory] scheme undercuts the foundation upon which the ... process was founded." East Coast Vapor , 189 A.3d at 510 (quoting Shenango Valley Osteopathic Hospital v. Department of Health , 499 Pa. 39 , 451 A.2d 434 , 438 (1982) ). 10 While the failure to exhaust a statutory or administrative remedy normally bars this Court from he

12019–2019
Buczynski v. Industrial Commission of Utah green
utahctapp · 1997
1 sentence

2019The rationale behind the doctrine has been explained as follows: “[w]hen the travel is essentially part of the employment, the risk [of injury during activities necessitated by travel] remains an incident to the employment even though the employe[e] may not actually be working at the time of the injury.” Buczynski, 934 P.2d at 1174 (quoting State Accident Ins.

12019–2019
Commonwealth v. Thompson green
pa · 2009
2 sentences

2018We have described the rationale behind this rule as “simple and compelling” – no stare decisis effect is warranted because per curiam orders “do not set out the facts and procedure of the case nor do they afford the bench and bar the benefit 7 We expressly overrule Fagan and its progeny. [J-66-2017] - 15 of the Court’s rationale.” Id. at 937-38 .8 Because Baer carries no precedential value,9 its purported “practical effect” upon the lower courts is irrelevant to our decision today, which expressly disavows the application of Dean to cases involving the negligent installation or design of guard

2018We have described the rationale behind this rule as "simple and compelling"-no stare decisis effect is warranted because per curiam orders "do not set out the facts and procedure of the case nor do they afford the bench and bar the benefit of the Court's rationale." Id. at 937-38 . 8 Because Baer carries no precedential *468 value, 9 its purported "practical effect" upon the lower courts is irrelevant to our decision today, which expressly disavows the application of Dean to cases involving the negligent installation or design of guardrails.

12018–2018
2401 Pennsylvania Avenue Corp. v. Federation of Jewish Agencies green
pa · 1985
1 sentence

2015An [obligee] should not be required to perform a useless act as a condition of his right to recover for a breach when the obligor has demonstrated an absolute and unequivocal refusal to - 15 - J-A16011-15 perform.” 2401 Pennsylvania Avenue Corp., 489 A.2d at 737 .

12015–2015
Lopes v. Vieira green
caed · 2010
1 sentence

2015January 27, 2011) (citing Gilliland in holding that attorney-client privilege does not survive the dissolution of a corporation absent a compelling reason); Lopes v. Vieira, 688 F.Supp.2d 1050 (E.D.Cal.2010) (holding, under the reasoning of Gilliland, that defunct corporation did not retain attorney-client privilege); TAS Distributing Co., Inc. v. Cummins, Inc., No. 07-1141, 2009 WL 3255297 (C.D.Ill.

12015–2015
Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board green
pa · 2002
1 sentence

2011Because it is presumed that an undocumented alien cannot work in this country, the rationale behind this rule is that the claimant’s loss of earning power is caused by his immigration status, not his work-related injury, and, therefore, it would be an exercise in futility to require the employer to show *328 available work. 2 Id.

12011–2011
Uschock v. Com., Dept. of Transp. neutral
pa · 2007
12010–2010
Associated Rubber, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Com'n neutral
pa · 2007
12010–2010
Hernandez v. New York green
scotus · 1991
12006–2006
Best v. Equitable Life Assurance Society green
pa · 1950
12005–2005
McIntyre v. STRAUSSER green
pa · 1950
12005–2005
Canonsburg General Hospital v. Department of Health green
pa · 1980
12004–2004
Jones v. Three Rivers Management Corp. green
pa · 1978
11998–1998
Espy v. Butler Area Sewer Authority green
pacommwct · 1981
11992–1992
Gilbert v. Montgomery Township Zoning Hearing Board green
pacommwct · 1981
11992–1992
Marchetti v. United States green
scotus · 1968
11991–1991
United States v. Doe green
scotus · 1984
11991–1991
Commonwealth v. Thomas green
pa · 1978
11990–1990
Commonwealth Ex Rel. Gonzalez v. Andreas green
pasuperct · 1976
11989–1989
Cherry v. Willer green
pa · 1983
11988–1988
Szakmeister v. Szakmeister green
pa · 1985
11988–1988
Commonwealth v. Katchmer green
pa · 1973
11987–1987
Harleysville Mutual Insurance v. Schuck green
pa · 1982
11985–1985
Commonwealth v. Spruill green
pa · 1978
11985–1985
Kennedy v. Bulletin Co. green
pasuperct · 1975
11980–1980
Pennsylvania Railroad v. Pittsburgh green
pa · 1939
11980–1980
Critzer Et Ux. v. Donovan green
pa · 1927
11980–1980
Commonwealth v. Garvin green
pa · 1972
11979–1979
United States v. Wade green
scotus · 1967
11979–1979
Goade v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks green
calctapp · 1963
11978–1978
Commonwealth v. Wable green
pa · 1955
11978–1978
Commonwealth v. Roman green
pa · 1976
11978–1978
Givernaud v. Givernaud neutral
njch · 1912
11976–1976

Statutes the citing opinions construe

PA § 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4321 (3) PA § 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5322 (3) PA § 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5324 (3) PA § 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5327 (3) PA § 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5501 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 127 (1972–2026) CA 103 (1961–2025) OH 87 (1956–2026) IN 80 (1978–2025) TX 79 (1964–2022) PA 67 (1965–2024) AR 47 (1982–2026) FL 42 (1971–2024) AL 36 (1980–2025) NY 35 (1930–2024) TN 34 (1981–2025) MD 28 (1978–2025) LA 28 (1980–2024) WA 28 (1972–2026) MI 25 (1975–2016) IA 25 (1967–2025) MO 25 (1980–2021) WV 24 (1978–2024) MS 23 (1985–2023) AZ 21 (1969–2021) CT 21 (1974–2025) MT 20 (1969–2022) KY 18 (1979–2024) KS 18 (1975–2025) MA 17 (1979–2025) OR 17 (1975–2026) RI 16 (1984–2024) NC 15 (1980–2025) VA 15 (1993–2022) NM 14 (1989–2025) CO 13 (1976–2022) WI 13 (1963–2017) NH 12 (1991–2023) OK 11 (1981–2002) DC 11 (1977–2004) UT 11 (1989–2021) ID 10 (1991–2025) GA 10 (1978–2022) NJ 9 (1965–2015) ME 9 (1975–2020) SC 8 (1989–2025) AK 7 (1979–1994) SD 7 (1986–2016) WY 7 (1983–2020) HI 6 (1998–2021) MN 5 (1956–2017) NE 4 (1982–2007) VT 3 (2023–2024) DE 3 (1975–1980) NV 2 (1984–1992) ND 2 (2009–2009)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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