13 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.green1 sentence2022(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (quoting City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 , 289 n.10 (1982)); see also Chihuahuan Grasslands All. v. Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 884, 892 (10th Cir. 2008) (The voluntary cessation exception “exists to counteract the possibility of a 6 defendant ceasing illegal action long enough to render a lawsuit moot and then resuming the illegal conduct.”); Owens v. Carlson, 2022 CO 33 , ¶ 24 (inmate plaintiff’s claim was not moot because if the court were to dismiss the appeal, the DOC “would be free to change its mind yet again” and reinstitute the c | 1 | 1 |
Chihuahuan Grasslands Alliance v. Kempthornegreen1 sentence2022(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (quoting City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 , 289 n.10 (1982)); see also Chihuahuan Grasslands All. v. Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 884, 892 (10th Cir. 2008) (The voluntary cessation exception “exists to counteract the possibility of a 6 defendant ceasing illegal action long enough to render a lawsuit moot and then resuming the illegal conduct.”); Owens v. Carlson, 2022 CO 33 , ¶ 24 (inmate plaintiff’s claim was not moot because if the court were to dismiss the appeal, the DOC “would be free to change its mind yet again” and reinstitute the c | 1 | 1 |
Rios v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.green1 sentence2014Co., 469 F.Supp.2d 727, 737 (S.D.Iowa 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 73 Plaintiffs' two arguments in support of refunding UM/UIM premiums as damages for fraudulent inducement are unpersuasive. 174 First, plaintiffs cite to several rescission cases allowing recovery of insurance premiums. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rankingreen2 sentences2013See People v. Rankin, 191 Colo. 508, 510 , 554 P.2d 1107, 1108 (1976); People v. Smith, 182 Colo. 31, 33 , 510 P.2d 893, 894 (1978); Meredith v. People, 152 Colo. 69, 71 , 380 P.2d 227, 227-28 (1963). 117 There seems to be little consensus concerning the rationale behind the rule, but courts typically rely on some amalgam of the following: protecting defendants from conviction based on confessions to imaginary crimes; avoiding reliance on coerced confessions extracted under police pressure; and promoting better police investigations by ensuring that they "extend beyond the words of the accused 2013See People v. Rankin, 191 Colo. 508, 510 , 554 P.2d 1107, 1108 (1976); People v. Smith, 182 Colo. 31, 33 , 510 P.2d 893, 894 (1978); Meredith v. People, 152 Colo. 69, 71 , 380 P.2d 227, 227-28 (1963). 117 There seems to be little consensus concerning the rationale behind the rule, but courts typically rely on some amalgam of the following: protecting defendants from conviction based on confessions to imaginary crimes; avoiding reliance on coerced confessions extracted under police pressure; and promoting better police investigations by ensuring that they "extend beyond the words of the accused | 1 | 1 |
Meredith v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2013See People v. Rankin, 191 Colo. 508, 510 , 554 P.2d 1107, 1108 (1976); People v. Smith, 182 Colo. 31, 33 , 510 P.2d 893, 894 (1978); Meredith v. People, 152 Colo. 69, 71 , 380 P.2d 227, 227-28 (1963). 117 There seems to be little consensus concerning the rationale behind the rule, but courts typically rely on some amalgam of the following: protecting defendants from conviction based on confessions to imaginary crimes; avoiding reliance on coerced confessions extracted under police pressure; and promoting better police investigations by ensuring that they "extend beyond the words of the accused 2013See People v. Rankin, 191 Colo. 508, 510 , 554 P.2d 1107, 1108 (1976); People v. Smith, 182 Colo. 31, 33 , 510 P.2d 893, 894 (1978); Meredith v. People, 152 Colo. 69, 71 , 380 P.2d 227, 227-28 (1963). 117 There seems to be little consensus concerning the rationale behind the rule, but courts typically rely on some amalgam of the following: protecting defendants from conviction based on confessions to imaginary crimes; avoiding reliance on coerced confessions extracted under police pressure; and promoting better police investigations by ensuring that they "extend beyond the words of the accused | 1 | 1 |
PEOPLE v McMAHANgreen2 sentences2013See People v. Rankin, 191 Colo. 508, 510 , 554 P.2d 1107, 1108 (1976); People v. Smith, 182 Colo. 31, 33 , 510 P.2d 893, 894 (1978); Meredith v. People, 152 Colo. 69, 71 , 380 P.2d 227, 227-28 (1963). 117 There seems to be little consensus concerning the rationale behind the rule, but courts typically rely on some amalgam of the following: protecting defendants from conviction based on confessions to imaginary crimes; avoiding reliance on coerced confessions extracted under police pressure; and promoting better police investigations by ensuring that they "extend beyond the words of the accused 2013See People v. Rankin, 191 Colo. 508, 510 , 554 P.2d 1107, 1108 (1976); People v. Smith, 182 Colo. 31, 33 , 510 P.2d 893, 894 (1978); Meredith v. People, 152 Colo. 69, 71 , 380 P.2d 227, 227-28 (1963). 117 There seems to be little consensus concerning the rationale behind the rule, but courts typically rely on some amalgam of the following: protecting defendants from conviction based on confessions to imaginary crimes; avoiding reliance on coerced confessions extracted under police pressure; and promoting better police investigations by ensuring that they "extend beyond the words of the accused | 1 | 1 |
People v. Smithgreen2 sentences2013See People v. Rankin, 191 Colo. 508, 510 , 554 P.2d 1107, 1108 (1976); People v. Smith, 182 Colo. 31, 33 , 510 P.2d 893, 894 (1978); Meredith v. People, 152 Colo. 69, 71 , 380 P.2d 227, 227-28 (1963). 117 There seems to be little consensus concerning the rationale behind the rule, but courts typically rely on some amalgam of the following: protecting defendants from conviction based on confessions to imaginary crimes; avoiding reliance on coerced confessions extracted under police pressure; and promoting better police investigations by ensuring that they "extend beyond the words of the accused 2013See People v. Rankin, 191 Colo. 508, 510 , 554 P.2d 1107, 1108 (1976); People v. Smith, 182 Colo. 31, 33 , 510 P.2d 893, 894 (1978); Meredith v. People, 152 Colo. 69, 71 , 380 P.2d 227, 227-28 (1963). 117 There seems to be little consensus concerning the rationale behind the rule, but courts typically rely on some amalgam of the following: protecting defendants from conviction based on confessions to imaginary crimes; avoiding reliance on coerced confessions extracted under police pressure; and promoting better police investigations by ensuring that they "extend beyond the words of the accused | 1 | 1 |
Buxó v. Sellés Roldángreen1 sentence2004Taxation § 1487 (2001); see also Crisman v. Johnson, 23 Colo. 264, 267 , 47 P. 296 , 297-98 (1896). | 1 | 1 |
Crisman v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2004Taxation § 1487 (2001); see also Crisman v. Johnson, 23 Colo. 264, 267 , 47 P. 296 , 297-98 (1896). | 1 | 1 |
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.green2 sentences1996See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 , 87 S.Ct. 1404, 1407 , 18 L.Ed.2d 475 (1967). 1996See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 , 87 S.Ct. 1404, 1407 , 18 L.Ed.2d 475 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
Willey v. Mayergreen2 sentences1995The rationale behind this rule is that it "place[s] the risk that an agent may abuse his authority for his own benefit on the principal, rather than on the [innocent third party]." Willey v. Mayer, 876 P.2d 1260, 1266 (Colo.1994). 1995The rationale behind this rule is that it “placets] the risk that an agent may abuse his authority for his own benefit on the principal, rather than on the [innocent third party].” Willey v. Mayer, 876 P.2d 1260, 1266 (Colo.1994). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc.
green
1 sentence2022(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (quoting City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 , 289 n.10 (1982)); see also Chihuahuan Grasslands All. v. Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 884, 892 (10th Cir. 2008) (The voluntary cessation exception “exists to counteract the possibility of a 6 defendant ceasing illegal action long enough to render a lawsuit moot and then resuming the illegal conduct.”); Owens v. Carlson, 2022 CO 33 , ¶ 24 (inmate plaintiff’s claim was not moot because if the court were to dismiss the appeal, the DOC “would be free to change its mind yet again” and reinstitute the c | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Smith v. United States
green
2 sentences2013See People v. Rankin, 191 Colo. 508, 510 , 554 P.2d 1107, 1108 (1976); People v. Smith, 182 Colo. 31, 33 , 510 P.2d 893, 894 (1978); Meredith v. People, 152 Colo. 69, 71 , 380 P.2d 227, 227-28 (1963). 117 There seems to be little consensus concerning the rationale behind the rule, but courts typically rely on some amalgam of the following: protecting defendants from conviction based on confessions to imaginary crimes; avoiding reliance on coerced confessions extracted under police pressure; and promoting better police investigations by ensuring that they "extend beyond the words of the accused 2013See People v. Rankin, 191 Colo. 508, 510 , 554 P.2d 1107, 1108 (1976); People v. Smith, 182 Colo. 31, 33 , 510 P.2d 893, 894 (1978); Meredith v. People, 152 Colo. 69, 71 , 380 P.2d 227, 227-28 (1963). 117 There seems to be little consensus concerning the rationale behind the rule, but courts typically rely on some amalgam of the following: protecting defendants from conviction based on confessions to imaginary crimes; avoiding reliance on coerced confessions extracted under police pressure; and promoting better police investigations by ensuring that they "extend beyond the words of the accused | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Castellari v. Partners Health Plan of Colorado, Inc.
green
1 sentence1996County Workers Compensation Pool v. Davis, 817 P.2d 521 (Colo.1991); Castellari v. Partners Health Plan of Colorado, Inc., 860 P.2d 593 (Colo.App.1993). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
County Workers Compensation Pool v. Davis
green
1 sentence1996County Workers Compensation Pool v. Davis, 817 P.2d 521 (Colo.1991); Castellari v. Partners Health Plan of Colorado, Inc., 860 P.2d 593 (Colo.App.1993). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Padilla v. Industrial Com'n of Colorado
green
1 sentence1995Padilla v. Industrial Commission, 696 P.2d 273 (Colo.1985). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Cook
green
1 sentence1993Id. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. King
neutral
1 sentence1990In the court of appeals’ view, it was incumbent upon the defendant under these circumstances to make an independent demonstration “that his purpose was consistent with the rationale behind the rule and that it was reasonable for the physician to rely upon the information.” King, 765 P.2d at 609 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
McCall v. People
green
1 sentence1983The rescue idea is similar to the fourth amendment “exigent circumstances” doctrine, see Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C.Cir.1963); People v. Clements, 661 P.2d 267 (Colo.1983); McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397 (Colo.1981), in that an overriding concern for the life of a victim excuses police conduct that, apart from the emergency, would be improper or illegal. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Clements
green
1 sentence1983The rescue idea is similar to the fourth amendment “exigent circumstances” doctrine, see Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C.Cir.1963); People v. Clements, 661 P.2d 267 (Colo.1983); McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397 (Colo.1981), in that an overriding concern for the life of a victim excuses police conduct that, apart from the emergency, would be improper or illegal. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Lewis L. Wayne v. United States
green
1 sentence1983The rescue idea is similar to the fourth amendment “exigent circumstances” doctrine, see Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C.Cir.1963); People v. Clements, 661 P.2d 267 (Colo.1983); McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397 (Colo.1981), in that an overriding concern for the life of a victim excuses police conduct that, apart from the emergency, would be improper or illegal. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Baca
green
2 sentences1982People v. Baca, supra . 1982People v. Baca, supra. Both a plea leading to a normal sentence and one followed by a deferred sentence are preceded by a provi-dency hearing. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Green v. Davis
neutral
1 sentence1976Green v. Davis, 67 Colo. 52 , 185 P. 369 . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.