rationale behind rule in Montana

2014Lozeau, ¶ 14 (citing Let the People Vote v. Bd. of Co. Comm. of Flathead Co., 2005 MT 225, ¶ 18 , 328 Mont. 361 , 120 P.3d 385 ). ¶34 While this three-part test is appropriate in cases involving alternate legal remedies, the rationale behind the doctrine of equitable tolling serves broader purposes than merely those embodied by this test.

2014Lozeau, ¶ 14 (citing Let the People Vote v. Bd. of Co. Comm. of Flathead Co., 2005 MT 225, ¶ 18 , 328 Mont. 361 , 120 P.3d 385 ). ¶34 While this three-part test is appropriate in cases involving alternate legal remedies, the rationale behind the doctrine of equitable tolling serves broader purposes than merely those embodied by this test.

2013Part of the rationale behind this exception “is that, as a practical matter, ‘a defendant often times must remain silent even in the face of invalid conditions’ to guard against the possibility that the sentencing court may forego a more lenient sentence if the defendant objects to one of the conditions.” Micklon , ¶ 9 (quoting Lenihan, 184 Mont. at 343 , 602 P.2d at 1000 ).

2013Part of the rationale behind this exception “is that, as a practical matter, ‘a defendant often times must remain silent even in the face of invalid conditions’ to guard against the possibility that the sentencing court may forego a more lenient sentence if the defendant objects to one of the conditions.” Micklon , ¶ 9 (quoting Lenihan, 184 Mont. at 343 , 602 P.2d at 1000 ).

2009“The rationale behind the exception is that there is a guarantee of trustworthiness at the time the testimony is given, namely, the witness is under oath and subject to cross- 4 examination.” Hamilton, 284 Mont. at 50 , 943 P.2d at 966 (citing State v. Bouldin, 153 Mont. 276, 282 , 456 P.2d 830, 833 (1969)). ¶12 Here, Jacko conceded that Deputy Shores was unavailable to testify.

2009“The rationale behind the exception is that there is a guarantee of trustworthiness at the time the testimony is given, namely, the witness is under oath and subject to cross- 4 examination.” Hamilton, 284 Mont. at 50 , 943 P.2d at 966 (citing State v. Bouldin, 153 Mont. 276, 282 , 456 P.2d 830, 833 (1969)). ¶12 Here, Jacko conceded that Deputy Shores was unavailable to testify.

2001In Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 484 , 83 S.Ct. 407, 415 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 , a case holding evidence of flight alone insufficient for probable cause, the Supreme Court stated “we have consistently doubted the probative value in criminal trials of evidence that the accused fled the scene of an actual or supposed crime.” Wong Sun quoted Alberty v. United States and reaffirmed the following reasoning: [I]t is not universally true that a man who is conscious that he has done a wrong “will pursue a certain course not in harmony with the conduct of a man who is conscious of having do

2001In Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 484 , 83 S.Ct. 407, 415 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 , a case holding evidence of flight alone insufficient for probable cause, the Supreme Court stated “we have consistently doubted the probative value in criminal trials of evidence that the accused fled the scene of an actual or supposed crime.” Wong Sun quoted Alberty v. United States and reaffirmed the following reasoning: [I]t is not universally true that a man who is conscious that he has done a wrong “will pursue a certain course not in harmony with the conduct of a man who is conscious of having do

2011The rationale behind this principle is that “when the use of a thing is granted, everything is granted by which the grantee may reasonably enjoy such use, that is, rights that are incident to something else granted-here to water and ditch rights.” Laden, 112 Mont. at 306 , 116 P.2d at 883 . ¶44 Next, the statute states that ‘[n]o person may encroach upon or otherwise impair any easement for a canal or ditch used for irrigation or any other lawful domestic or commercial purpose, including carrying return water.” Section 70-17-112(2), MCA.

2011The rationale behind this principle is that “when the use of a thing is granted, everything is granted by which the grantee may reasonably enjoy such use, that is, rights that are incident to something else granted-here to water and ditch rights.” Laden, 112 Mont. at 306 , 116 P.2d at 883 . ¶44 Next, the statute states that ‘[n]o person may encroach upon or otherwise impair any easement for a canal or ditch used for irrigation or any other lawful domestic or commercial purpose, including carrying return water.” Section 70-17-112(2), MCA.

2010The rationale behind this rule is to promote judicial economy and to ‘“bring[] alleged errors to the attention of each court involved, so that actual error can be prevented or corrected at the first opportunity.’ ” State v. West, 2008 MT 338, ¶ 17 , 346 Mont. 244 , 194 P.3d 683 (quoting City of Missoula v. Asbury, 265 Mont. 14, 20 , 873 P.2d 936, 939 (1994)).

2010The rationale behind this rule is to promote judicial economy and to ‘“bring[] alleged errors to the attention of each court involved, so that actual error can be prevented or corrected at the first opportunity.’ ” State v. West, 2008 MT 338, ¶ 17 , 346 Mont. 244 , 194 P.3d 683 (quoting City of Missoula v. Asbury, 265 Mont. 14, 20 , 873 P.2d 936, 939 (1994)).

2002This Court recognized that although a trial of such a case in the district court may be “awkward, difficult, and unsatisfactory,” the “learned district judge would be able to devise ways and means not incompatible with the Code for disposing of the case.” Heldenbrand, 147 Mont. at 279 , 411 P.2d at 749 . ¶74 Although Heldenbrand dealt with an appeal of an administrative agency decision, in light of our holding in Madison River, where we applied the same standard of review (arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful) to legislative decisions as to those of administrative agencies, we conclude the ratio

2002This Court recognized that although a trial of such a case in the district court may be “awkward, difficult, and unsatisfactory,” the “learned district judge would be able to devise ways and means not incompatible with the Code for disposing of the case.” Heldenbrand, 147 Mont. at 279 , 411 P.2d at 749 . ¶74 Although Heldenbrand dealt with an appeal of an administrative agency decision, in light of our holding in Madison River, where we applied the same standard of review (arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful) to legislative decisions as to those of administrative agencies, we conclude the ratio

1989See State v. Eiler (Mont. 1988), [ 234 Mont. 38 ,] 762 P.2d 210 , 45 St.Rep. 1710 ; State v. Howie (Mont. 1987), [ 228 Mont. 497 ,] 744 P.2d 156 , 44 St.Rep. 1711 .

1989See State v. Eiler (Mont. 1988), [ 234 Mont. 38 ,] 762 P.2d 210 , 45 St.Rep. 1710 ; State v. Howie (Mont. 1987), [ 228 Mont. 497 ,] 744 P.2d 156 , 44 St.Rep. 1711 .

1984An extensive discussion of the rationale behind this rule is found in our opinion in Eslinger v. Ringsby Truck Line, Inc. (1981), 195 Mont. 292 , 636 P.2d 254 , and that rationale applied equally well to the case at bar.

1984An extensive discussion of the rationale behind this rule is found in our opinion in Eslinger v. Ringsby Truck Line, Inc. (1981), 195 Mont. 292 , 636 P.2d 254 , and that rationale applied equally well to the case at bar.

1984In Eslinger, supra, we concluded: “The sudden emergency doctrine admonition contained in Kudrna v. Comet Corporation (1977), 175 Mont. 29 , 572 P.2d 183 ] ... is well taken and now, in view of this juris *378 diction’s adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence, we would at this time admonish the trial courts that the instruction not be given in an ordinary automobile accident case.

1984In Eslinger, supra, we concluded: “The sudden emergency doctrine admonition contained in Kudrna v. Comet Corporation (1977), 175 Mont. 29 , 572 P.2d 183 ] ... is well taken and now, in view of this juris *378 diction’s adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence, we would at this time admonish the trial courts that the instruction not be given in an ordinary automobile accident case.

1976The rationale behind this presumption was first expressed by this Court in Sullivan v. City of Butte, 65 Mont. 495, 498 , 211 P. 301 , and quoted with approval in Dunham : “ ‘While our Constitution does not forbid the enactment of retrospective laws generally, it is a rule recognized by authorities everywhere that retrospective laws are looked upon with disfavor.

1976The rationale behind this presumption was first expressed by this Court in Sullivan v. City of Butte, 65 Mont. 495, 498 , 211 P. 301 , and quoted with approval in Dunham : “ ‘While our Constitution does not forbid the enactment of retrospective laws generally, it is a rule recognized by authorities everywhere that retrospective laws are looked upon with disfavor.

1969Cf. Greene Plbg. & Heating Co. v. Morris, 114 Mont. 234 , 395 P.2d 252 .