79 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1964–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Purtell v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See Purtell v. State, 761 S.W.2d 360, 365 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). 2009See Purtell v. State, 761 S.W.2d 360, 365 (Tex. Crim. | 4 | 4 |
Plumlee v. Paddockgreen2 sentences2018See Montgomery, 930 S.W.2d at 778 ; see also Plumlee, 832 S.W.2d at 759 . 2015See Montgomery, 930 S.W.2d at 778 ; see also Plumlee v. Paddock, 832 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Tex.App.- Fort Worth 1992, writ denied). | 3 | 3 |
Montgomery v. Browdergreen2 sentences2018See Montgomery, 930 S.W.2d at 778 ; see also Plumlee, 832 S.W.2d at 759 . 2015See Montgomery, 930 S.W.2d at 778 ; see also Plumlee v. Paddock, 832 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Tex.App.- Fort Worth 1992, writ denied). | 3 | 3 |
Whittington v. City of Austingreen2 sentences2015See 2005 Whittington, 174 S.W.3d at 907 . 2015See 2005 Whittington, 174 S.W.3d at 907 . | 2 | 2 |
Bluelinx Corp. v. Texas Construction Systems, Inc.green2 sentences2013See Truly v. Austin, 744 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1988); Bluelinx Corp. v. Tex. Const. Sys., Inc., 363 S.W.3d 623, 627 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.).3 The rationale behind this rule is that parties should be bound by their express agreements, and recovery under an equitable theory is generally inconsistent with an express agreement which already addresses the matter. 2013See Truly v. Austin, 744 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1988); Bluelinx Corp. v. Tex. Const. Sys., Inc., 363 S.W.3d 623, 627 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.).3 The rationale behind this rule is that parties should be bound by their express agreements, and recovery under an equitable theory is generally inconsistent with an express agreement which already addresses the matter. | 2 | 2 |
Truly v. Austingreen2 sentences2013See Truly v. Austin, 744 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1988); Bluelinx Corp. v. Tex. Const. Sys., Inc., 363 S.W.3d 623, 627 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.).3 The rationale behind this rule is that parties should be bound by their express agreements, and recovery under an equitable theory is generally inconsistent with an express agreement which already addresses the matter. 2013See Truly v. Austin, 744 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1988); Bluelinx Corp. v. Tex. Const. Sys., Inc., 363 S.W.3d 623, 627 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.).3 The rationale behind this rule is that parties should be bound by their express agreements, and recovery under an equitable theory is generally inconsistent with an express agreement which already addresses the matter. | 2 | 2 |
Castleberry v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Woodson, 777 S.W.2d at 529 ; see Castleberry v. State, 704 S.W.2d 21 , 27–28 (Tex. Crim. 2011Woodson , 777 S.W.2d at 529 ; see Castleberry v. State , 704 S.W.2d 21 , 27–28 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Briscoe v. Goodmark Corp.green2 sentences2009Briscoe v. Goodmark Corp. , 102 S.W.3d 714, 716 (Tex. 2003). 2009Briscoe v. Goodmark Corp., 102 S.W.3d 714, 716 (Tex.2003). | 2 | 2 |
Blake v. Stategreen2 sentences2003Blake v. State , 971 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tex. Crim. 2001Blake v. State, 971 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). | 2 | 2 |
Stout v. Oliveiragreen2 sentences2015The law relevant to the challenged acknowledgment has been well explained by the Dallas Court of Appeals: The law is settled that a certificate of acknowledgment is prima facie evidence that [the signatory] appeared before the notary and executed the deed in question for the purposes and consideration therein expressed.…The rationale behind this rule was stated in Stout: “The reason is obvious, because, if the rule were otherwise, titles would be insecure and ruinous consequences would ensue from the doubt and uncertainty with which titles would be clouded.” [Stout v. Oliveira, 153 S.W.2d 590, 1987The rationale behind this rule was stated in Stout : The reason is obvious, because, if the rule were otherwise, titles would be insecure and ruinous consequences would ensue from the doubt and uncertainty with which titles would be clouded. 153 S.W.2d at 597 . | 1 | 2 |
Alvarez v. Stategreen1 sentence2017See Alvarez v. State, 508 S.W.2d 100, 102 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Cruse v. O'QUINNgreen1 sentence2017See, e.g., Cruse v. O’Quinn, 273 S.W.3d 766, 776 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied); see also Jankowiak v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. | 1 | 1 |
| Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appealsgreen | 1 | 1 |
Walters v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 217-18 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); Lomax v. State, 16 S.W.3d 448, 450 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Lomax v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 217-18 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); Lomax v. State, 16 S.W.3d 448, 450 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Loomis v. Cobbgreen1 sentence2015Id. (quoting Loomis v. Cobb, 159 S.W. 305, 307 (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1 |
| Lundy v. Massongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nationwide Bi-Weekly Administration, Inc. v. Belo Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Gillum v. Republic Health Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Grayson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| The City of El Paso v. Lilli M. Heinrichgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fortune Production Co. v. Conoco, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Hennigan v. IP Petroleum Co., Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Carrgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hill v. Spencer & Son, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Hoppergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Russeau v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Coleman v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Henson v. Citizens Bank of Irvinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| State National Bank of Marshall v. Tittlegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kennedy v. Hydegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Dallas County Hospital Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Texas General Indemnity Company v. Bottomgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Morrison by Morrison v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hendrick Medical Center v. Howellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Weatherford Oil Tool Company v. Campbellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moulton v. Alamo Ambulance Service, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Phoenix Refining Co. v. Powellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dardas v. Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson, P.C.
green
2 sentences2022“The rationale behind this rule [known as the express-contract rule] is that parties should be bound by their express agreements, and recovery under an equitable theory is generally inconsistent with an express agreement [that] already addresses the matter.” Dardas v. Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson, P.C., 194 S.W.3d 603 , 620–21 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). 68 MMR Constructors, Inc. v. Dow Chem. 2020“The rationale behind this rule [known as the express-contract rule] is that parties should be bound by their express agreements, and recovery under an equitable theory is generally inconsistent with an express agreement which already addresses the matter.” Dardas v. Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson, P.C., 194 S.W.3d 603 , 620–21 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). | 4 | 2013–2022 |
Walter v. State
green
2 sentences2015Id. 2011Id. | 3 | 2011–2015 |
Lewis v. Davis
green
2 sentences2015Id. 2008Id. | 3 | 1996–2015 |
Hammock v. State
green
2 sentences2005“Jurors cannot be expected to know exactly how to use the evidence unless we tell them, nor can we guarantee that they will ‘remain open-minded until the presentation of all of the evidence and instructions.’” Hammock, 46 S.W.3d at 893 -94 (citing Rankin v. State, 974 S.W.2d 707 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)). 3. 2005"Jurors cannot be expected to know exactly how to use the evidence unless we tell them, nor can we guarantee that they will `remain open-minded until the presentation of all of the evidence and instructions.'" Hammock , 46 S.W.3d at 893 -94 (citing Rankin v. State , 974 S.W.2d 707 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996)). 3. | 3 | 2002–2005 |
Rankin v. State
green
2 sentences2005“Jurors cannot be expected to know exactly how to use the evidence unless we tell them, nor can we guarantee that they will ‘remain open-minded until the presentation of all of the evidence and instructions.’” Hammock, 46 S.W.3d at 893 -94 (citing Rankin v. State, 974 S.W.2d 707 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)). 3. 2005"Jurors cannot be expected to know exactly how to use the evidence unless we tell them, nor can we guarantee that they will `remain open-minded until the presentation of all of the evidence and instructions.'" Hammock , 46 S.W.3d at 893 -94 (citing Rankin v. State , 974 S.W.2d 707 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996)). 3. | 3 | 2002–2005 |
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences2012Davis, 349 S.W.3d at 539 ; Madding, 70 S.W.3d at 135 . 2012Davis , 349 S.W.3d at 539 ; Madding , 70 S.W.3d at 135 . | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Ex Parte Madding
green
2 sentences2012Davis, 349 S.W.3d at 539 ; Madding, 70 S.W.3d at 135 . 2012Davis , 349 S.W.3d at 539 ; Madding , 70 S.W.3d at 135 . | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Woodson v. State
green
2 sentences2011Woodson, 777 S.W.2d at 529 ; see Castleberry v. State, 704 S.W.2d 21 , 27–28 (Tex. Crim. 2011Woodson , 777 S.W.2d at 529 ; see Castleberry v. State , 704 S.W.2d 21 , 27–28 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Rush v. Smitherman
green
2 sentences2009Rush , 294 S.W.2d at 876–77 (“A bailor entrusts, for what he entrusts is his. 2009Rush, 294 S.W.2d at 876–77 (“A bailor entrusts, for what he entrusts is his. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Fleming v. State
green
2 sentences1995Id. 1995Id. | 2 | 1995–1995 |
Port Arthur Housing Co. v. City of Port Arthur
green
2 sentences1986The rationale behind the requirement was twofold: (1) to protect the city's water mains from contamination, and (2) to preserve the system's water pressure and supply. 181 S.W.2d at 1020 . 1986The rationale behind the requirement was twofold: 111)to protect the city's water mains from contamination. and (2) to preserve the system’s water pressure and supply. 181 S.W.2d at 1020 . | 2 | 1986–1986 |
| Pavlinko v. Yale-New Haven Hospital green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
McConnell v. Southside Independent School District
green
1 sentence2015Id. at 343-44 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
VSR Financial Services, Inc v. Gordon B. McLendon
green
1 sentence2015Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Westland Oil Development Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp.
green
1 sentence2015Id. (quoting Loomis v. Cobb, 159 S.W. 305, 307 (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Bell v. Sharif-Munir-Davidson Development Corp. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Gomez Leon v. State
green
1 sentence2015In Gomez Leon, the supreme court explained the rationale behind this rule: “The reason for excluding proof of such sales is that they do not meet the willing seller-willing buyer concept; they are made under a direct or an implied threat of condemnation, and, theoretically at least, are not free and voluntary.” Gomez Leon, 426 S.W.2d at 565 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Landers v. State green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Ngo v. State green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Richardson v. United States green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Murray v. United States green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Fulmer v. State green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| cluster 656129 green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Mendoza v. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| cluster 590916 green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Curtis v. M&S Petroleum, Inc. green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Dickey v. Jansen green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Thompson v. Vinson & Elkins green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Thomas v. Pryor red | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Berry v. Dodson, Nunley & Taylor, P.C. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Lofton v. State green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Hallett v. Houston Northwest Medical Center green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| South Dakota v. Opperman green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Abor v. Black green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Curtis v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Plummer v. Bradford green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Traveler's Insurance Company v. United States green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Travelers Indemnity Company v. Jarrett green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.