knowledge requirement in Georgia

2000“The knowledge requirement does not refer to a plaintiff’s comprehension of general, non-specific risks that might be associated with such conditions or activities.” Id.

1998The knowledge requirement does not refer to a plaintiff's comprehension of general, non-specific risks that might be associated with such condition or activities." (Punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Vaughn v. Pleasent, 266 Ga. 862, 864 , 471 S.E.2d 866 (1996).

2012See Barr v. State, 302 Ga. App. 60, 61-62 (1) ( 690 SE2d 643 ) (2010); Cleveland v. State, 218 Ga. App. 661, 663 (1) ( 463 SE2d 36 ) (1995).

2012See Harrison, 309 Ga. App. at 456 (2); Barr, 302 Ga. App. at 61-62 (1); Cleveland, 218 Ga. App. at 663 (1).1 1 In Harrison, we questioned whether Barr and Cleveland were correct in concluding that the knowledge requirement did not apply to the purity and weight of the substance.

2012As to the knowledge requirement of the trafficking statute, the State must prove “that the defendant knew that he possessed a substance and knew that the substance contained some amount of cocaine.” Harrison, 309 Ga. App. at 456 (2).

2012“A person who, though not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing is then in constructive possession of it.” (Citation omitted.) White v. State, 313 Ga. App. 605, 606 (1) ( 722 SE2d 198 ) (2012). 5 As to the knowledge requirement of the trafficking statute, the State must prove “that the defendant knew that he possessed a substance and knew that the substance contained some amount of cocaine.” Harrison , 309 Ga. App. at 456 (2).

1999(Punctuation and footnotes omitted; emphasis in original.) Vaughn, supra, 266 Ga. at 864 ; Cornwell, supra, 228 Ga. App. at 65 (evidence must show plaintiff fully appreciated the specific danger).

1998Rather, the knowledge that a plaintiff who assumes the risk must subjectively possess is that of the specific, particular risk of harm associated with the activity or condition that proximately causes injury.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Cornwell v. Chambers of Ga., 228 Ga. App. 64, 65 ( 491 SE2d 132 ) (1997). ‘Whether a party assumed the risk of his injury is a jury question that should not be decided by summary adjudication unless the defense is conclusively established by plain, palpable and undisputed evidence.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 66 .” Bodymasters, supra at 173-174 .

1998The knowledge requirement does not refer to a plaintiff's comprehension of general, non-specific risks that might be associated with such conditions or activities." (Citations, punctuation and footnotes omitted; emphasis in original.) Id. at 864 , 471 S.E.2d 866 ; see also Smith v. Mangram, 222 Ga.App. 585, 586 , 474 S.E.2d 758 (1996); York v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, 217 Ga.App. 839 , 459 S.E.2d 470 (1995); Turner v. Sumter Self Storage Co., 215 Ga.App. 92, 94-95 (3), 449 S.E.2d 618 (1994).

1998The knowledge requirement does not refer to a plaintiff's comprehension of general, non-specific risks that might be associated with such conditions or activities." (Citations, punctuation and footnotes omitted; emphasis in original.) Id. at 864 , 471 S.E.2d 866 ; see also Smith v. Mangram, 222 Ga.App. 585, 586 , 474 S.E.2d 758 (1996); York v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, 217 Ga.App. 839 , 459 S.E.2d 470 (1995); Turner v. Sumter Self Storage Co., 215 Ga.App. 92, 94-95 (3), 449 S.E.2d 618 (1994).

1998The knowledge requirement does not refer to a plaintiff's comprehension of general, non-specific risks that might be associated with such conditions or activities." (Citations, punctuation and footnotes omitted; emphasis in original.) Id. at 864 , 471 S.E.2d 866 ; see also Smith v. Mangram, 222 Ga.App. 585, 586 , 474 S.E.2d 758 (1996); York v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, 217 Ga.App. 839 , 459 S.E.2d 470 (1995); Turner v. Sumter Self Storage Co., 215 Ga.App. 92, 94-95 (3), 449 S.E.2d 618 (1994).

1998The knowledge requirement does not refer to a plaintiff's comprehension of general, non-specific risks that might be associated with such conditions or activities." (Citations, punctuation and footnotes omitted; emphasis in original.) Id. at 864 , 471 S.E.2d 866 ; see also Smith v. Mangram, 222 Ga.App. 585, 586 , 474 S.E.2d 758 (1996); York v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, 217 Ga.App. 839 , 459 S.E.2d 470 (1995); Turner v. Sumter Self Storage Co., 215 Ga.App. 92, 94-95 (3), 449 S.E.2d 618 (1994).

2012See Barr v. State, 302 Ga. App. 60, 61-62 (1) ( 690 SE2d 643 ) (2010); Cleveland v. State, 218 Ga. App. 661, 663 (1) ( 463 SE2d 36 ) (1995).

2012See Harrison, 309 Ga. App. at 456 (2); Barr, 302 Ga. App. at 61-62 (1); Cleveland, 218 Ga. App. at 663 (1).1 1 In Harrison, we questioned whether Barr and Cleveland were correct in concluding that the knowledge requirement did not apply to the purity and weight of the substance.

2019See supra notes 20-26; 28-30 & accompanying text; see also State v. Mondor , 346 Ga. App. 612 , 615 (2), 816 S.E.2d 790 (2018) (physical precedent only) (holding that because section (a) of the hit-and-run statute did not require that the defendant know or should have known that the accident caused a death, in part, because section (a) did not use the word knowingly, while section (b) mandated punishment based on the circumstances of the accident and whether the defendant "knowingly" violated the statute).

2019R. was disabled when he attacked her.31 30 See Cox v. Garvin, 278 Ga. 903, 903 ( 607 SE2d 549 ) (2005) (holding that the term “willfully” as used in a criminal statute required only that the defendant intended to commit the offense, but did not include a knowledge requirement). 31 See supra notes 20-26; 28-30 & accompanying text; see also State v. Mondor, 346 Ga. App. 612 , 615 (2) ( 816 SE2d 790 ) (2018) (physical precedent only) (holding that because section (a) of the hit-and-run statute did not require that the defendant know or should have known that the accident caused a death, in part,

2019See Cox v. Garvin , 278 Ga. 903 , 903, 607 S.E.2d 549 (2005) (holding that the term "willfully" as used in a criminal statute required only that the defendant intended to commit the offense, but did not include a knowledge requirement).

2019See Cox v. Garvin , 278 Ga. 903 , 903, 607 S.E.2d 549 (2005) (holding that the term "willfully" as used in a criminal statute required only that the defendant intended to commit the offense, but did not include a knowledge requirement).

2011“The deliberate ignorance instruction is based on the alternative to the actual knowledge requirement at common law that if a party has his suspicions aroused but then deliberately omits to make further enquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance, he is deemed to have knowledge.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Perez-Castillo v. State, 257 Ga. App. 633, 634 ( 572 SE2d 657 ) (2002).

2011“The deliberate ignorance instruction is based on the alternative to the actual knowledge requirement at common law that if a party has his suspicions aroused but then deliberately omits to make further enquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance, he is deemed to have knowledge.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Perez-Castillo v. State, 257 Ga. App. 633, 634 ( 572 SE2d 657 ) (2002).

2015See Baker v. State, 257 Ga. 567, 568-569 ( 361 SE2d 808 ) (1987).

2015See Baker v. State, 257 Ga. 567, 568-569 ( 361 SE2d 808 ) (1987).

2013Copeland v. State, 263 Ga. App. 776, 780 ( 589 SE2d 319 ) (2003); Smallwood v. State, 296 Ga. App. 16, 25 ( 673 SE2d 537 ) (2009), overruled on other grounds, Stephens v. State, 289 Ga. 758, 759, n. 2 ( 716 SE2d 154 ) (2011); Hines, 320 Ga. App. at 865 .

2013Copeland v. State, 263 Ga. App. 776, 780 ( 589 SE2d 319 ) (2003); Smallwood v. State, 296 Ga. App. 16, 25 ( 673 SE2d 537 ) (2009), overruled on other grounds, Stephens v. State, 289 Ga. 758, 759, n. 2 ( 716 SE2d 154 ) (2011); Hines, 320 Ga. App. at 865 .

2013Copeland v. State, 263 Ga. App. 776, 780 ( 589 SE2d 319 ) (2003); Smallwood v. State, 296 Ga. App. 16, 25 ( 673 SE2d 537 ) (2009), overruled on other grounds, Stephens v. State, 289 Ga. 758, 759, n. 2 ( 716 SE2d 154 ) (2011); Hines, 320 Ga. App. at 865 .

2013Copeland v. State, 263 Ga. App. 776, 780 ( 589 SE2d 319 ) (2003); Smallwood v. State, 296 Ga. App. 16, 25 ( 673 SE2d 537 ) (2009), overruled on other grounds, Stephens v. State, 289 Ga. 758, 759, n. 2 ( 716 SE2d 154 ) (2011); Hines, 320 Ga. App. at 865 .

1999“The knowledge requirement does not refer to a plaintiff’s comprehension of general, non-specific risks that might be associated with such conditions or activities.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Trustees of Trinity College v. Ferris, 228 Ga. App. 476, 479 (3) ( 491 SE2d 909 ) (1997).

1999“The knowledge requirement does not refer to a plaintiff’s comprehension of general, non-specific risks that might be associated with such conditions or activities.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Trustees of Trinity College v. Ferris, 228 Ga. App. 476, 479 (3) ( 491 SE2d 909 ) (1997).

2013Copeland v. State, 263 Ga. App. 776, 780 ( 589 SE2d 319 ) (2003); Smallwood v. State, 296 Ga. App. 16, 25 ( 673 SE2d 537 ) (2009), overruled on other grounds, Stephens v. State, 289 Ga. 758, 759, n. 2 ( 716 SE2d 154 ) (2011); Hines, 320 Ga. App. at 865 .

2013Copeland v. State, 263 Ga. App. 776, 780 ( 589 SE2d 319 ) (2003); Smallwood v. State, 296 Ga. App. 16, 25 ( 673 SE2d 537 ) (2009), overruled on other grounds, Stephens v. State, 289 Ga. 758, 759, n. 2 ( 716 SE2d 154 ) (2011); Hines, 320 Ga. App. at 865 .

2024See also Langford v. Dept. of Community Health, 363 Ga. App. 121 , 125 (2) ( 871 SE2d 26 ) (2022) (no compliance with GTCA when plaintiff submitted the notice of claim to DOAS but completely omitted any state agency despite DOAS’s settlement discussions with plaintiff); Callaham v. Ga. Ports Auth., 337 Ga. App. 120, 122-123 ( 786 SE2d 505 ) (2016) (failure to send copy of ante litem notice to the state agency within 12 months despite the agency’s knowledge of the claim was fatal).

2024See also Langford v. Dept. of Community Health, 363 Ga. App. 121 , 125 (2) ( 871 SE2d 26 ) (2022) (no compliance with GTCA when plaintiff submitted the notice of claim to DOAS but completely omitted any state agency despite DOAS’s settlement discussions with plaintiff); Callaham v. Ga. Ports Auth., 337 Ga. App. 120, 122-123 ( 786 SE2d 505 ) (2016) (failure to send copy of ante litem notice to the state agency within 12 months despite the agency’s knowledge of the claim was fatal).

2023Rather, the knowledge that a plaintiff who assumes the risk must subjectively possess is that of the specific, particular risk of harm associated with the activity or condition that proximately causes injury.2 2 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Downes v. Oglethorpe Univ., Inc., 342 Ga. App. 250, 253 (1) ( 802 SE2d 437 ) (2017). 5 While assumption of risk is usually a question for the jury, the trial court may grant summary judgment on this issue if “the defense is conclusively established by plain, palpable and undisputed evidence.”3 Here, we agree with the trial court that Knight assumed t

2023Rather, the knowledge that a plaintiff who assumes the risk must subjectively possess is that of the specific, particular risk of harm associated with the activity or condition that proximately causes injury.2 2 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Downes v. Oglethorpe Univ., Inc., 342 Ga. App. 250, 253 (1) ( 802 SE2d 437 ) (2017). 5 While assumption of risk is usually a question for the jury, the trial court may grant summary judgment on this issue if “the defense is conclusively established by plain, palpable and undisputed evidence.”3 Here, we agree with the trial court that Knight assumed t

2020So, other than alleging that the bar slipped off the broomstick somehow and that appellants were negligent, Gonzalez-Nunez has not articulated a specific negligent act or omission on the part of either appellant that proximately caused his injury. 12 Little Rapids Corp. v. McCamy, 218 Ga. App. 111, 113 (1) ( 460 SE2d 800 ) (1995) (punctuation omitted). 8 plaintiff and his situation, rather than that of a reasonable person of ordinary prudence who appears in the completely separate defense of contributory negligence.”13 Of particular relevance here, the knowledge that a plaintiff who assumes a

2020So, other than alleging that the bar slipped off the broomstick somehow and that appellants were negligent, Gonzalez-Nunez has not articulated a specific negligent act or omission on the part of either appellant that proximately caused his injury. 12 Little Rapids Corp. v. McCamy, 218 Ga. App. 111, 113 (1) ( 460 SE2d 800 ) (1995) (punctuation omitted). 8 plaintiff and his situation, rather than that of a reasonable person of ordinary prudence who appears in the completely separate defense of contributory negligence.”13 Of particular relevance here, the knowledge that a plaintiff who assumes a

2020So, other than alleging that the bar slipped off the broomstick somehow and that appellants were negligent, Gonzalez-Nunez has not articulated a specific negligent act or omission on the part of either appellant that proximately caused his injury. 12 Little Rapids Corp. v. McCamy, 218 Ga. App. 111, 113 (1) ( 460 SE2d 800 ) (1995) (punctuation omitted). 8 plaintiff and his situation, rather than that of a reasonable person of ordinary prudence who appears in the completely separate defense of contributory negligence.”13 Of particular relevance here, the knowledge that a plaintiff who assumes a

2020So, other than alleging that the bar slipped off the broomstick somehow and that appellants were negligent, Gonzalez-Nunez has not articulated a specific negligent act or omission on the part of either appellant that proximately caused his injury. 12 Little Rapids Corp. v. McCamy, 218 Ga. App. 111, 113 (1) ( 460 SE2d 800 ) (1995) (punctuation omitted). 8 plaintiff and his situation, rather than that of a reasonable person of ordinary prudence who appears in the completely separate defense of contributory negligence.”13 Of particular relevance here, the knowledge that a plaintiff who assumes a

2020So, other than alleging that the bar slipped off the broomstick somehow and that appellants were negligent, Gonzalez-Nunez has not articulated a specific negligent act or omission on the part of either appellant that proximately caused his injury. 12 Little Rapids Corp. v. McCamy, 218 Ga. App. 111, 113 (1) ( 460 SE2d 800 ) (1995) (punctuation omitted). 8 plaintiff and his situation, rather than that of a reasonable person of ordinary prudence who appears in the completely separate defense of contributory negligence.”13 Of particular relevance here, the knowledge that a plaintiff who assumes a

2020So, other than alleging that the bar slipped off the broomstick somehow and that appellants were negligent, Gonzalez-Nunez has not articulated a specific negligent act or omission on the part of either appellant that proximately caused his injury. 12 Little Rapids Corp. v. McCamy, 218 Ga. App. 111, 113 (1) ( 460 SE2d 800 ) (1995) (punctuation omitted). 8 plaintiff and his situation, rather than that of a reasonable person of ordinary prudence who appears in the completely separate defense of contributory negligence.”13 Of particular relevance here, the knowledge that a plaintiff who assumes a

2017“A [trial] court should not instruct a jury regarding deliberate ignorance ‘when the evidence only points to either actual knowledge or no knowledge on the part of the defendant.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) United States v. Schlei, 122 F3d 944, 973 (II) (D) (11th Cir. 1997), *642 citing United States v. Stone, 9 F3d 934, 937 (11th Cir. 1993). 4 The deliberate ignorance instruction is based on the alternative to the actual knowledge requirement at common law that if a party has his suspicions aroused but then deliberately omits to make further enquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance, he

2017“A [trial] court should not instruct a jury regarding deliberate ignorance ‘when the evidence only points to either actual knowledge or no knowledge on the part of the defendant.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) United States v. Schlei, 122 F3d 944, 973 (II) (D) (11th Cir. 1997), *642 citing United States v. Stone, 9 F3d 934, 937 (11th Cir. 1993). 4 The deliberate ignorance instruction is based on the alternative to the actual knowledge requirement at common law that if a party has his suspicions aroused but then deliberately omits to make further enquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance, he

2017Rather, the knowledge that a plaintiff who assumes the risk must subjectively possess is that of the specific, particular risk of harm associated with the activity or condition that proximately causes injury (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Gilreath v. Smith, 340 Ga. App. 265, 268 (1) ( 797 SE2d 177 ) (2017).

2017Rather, the knowledge that a plaintiff who assumes the risk must subjectively possess is that of the specific, particular risk of harm associated with the activity or condition that proximately causes injury (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Gilreath v. Smith, 340 Ga. App. 265, 268 (1) ( 797 SE2d 177 ) (2017).

2012“A person who, though not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing is then in constructive possession of it.” (Citation omitted.) White v. State, 313 Ga. App. 605, 606 (1) ( 722 SE2d 198 ) (2012). 5 As to the knowledge requirement of the trafficking statute, the State must prove “that the defendant knew that he possessed a substance and knew that the substance contained some amount of cocaine.” Harrison , 309 Ga. App. at 456 (2).

2012“A person who, though not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing is then in constructive possession of it.” (Citation omitted.) White v. State, 313 Ga. App. 605, 606 (1) ( 722 SE2d 198 ) (2012). 5 As to the knowledge requirement of the trafficking statute, the State must prove “that the defendant knew that he possessed a substance and knew that the substance contained some amount of cocaine.” Harrison , 309 Ga. App. at 456 (2).