8 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 2002–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Federal Trade Commission v. Medical Billers Network, Inc.green1 sentence2015The knowledge requirement may be established with evidence showing that the individual ‘‘had actual knowl- edge of [the entity’s] material misrepresentations, reck- less indifference to the truth or falsity of such misrepresentations, or an awareness of a high probabil- ity of fraud along with an intentional avoidance of the truth.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Federal Trade Commission v. Bay Area Business Council, Inc., supra, 423 F.3d 636 . ‘‘An individual’s degree of participa- tion in business affairs is probative of knowledge. . . . [T]he [plaintiff] is not required to show that a | 1 | 1 |
State v. Drakefordgreen2 sentences2010See Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3 (a) (1).” State v. Smith, 289 Conn. 598, 609 , 960 A.2d 993 (2008); id. (“[a]gainst the backdrop provided by this fundamental principle of ethical conduct, this court has noted that, when determining whether to accept the entry of a nolle prosequi pursuant to [General Statutes] § 54-56b, ‘the trial court need not receive evidence, and thus makes no findings of fact, to determine the accuracy of the state’s representations’ ”); see, e.g., State v. Drakeford, 261 Conn. 420, 427 , 802 A.2d 844 (2002) (Noting that, in safeguarding criminal defendants’ right to 2010See Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3 (a) (1).” State v. Smith, 289 Conn. 598, 609 , 960 A.2d 993 (2008); id. (“[a]gainst the backdrop provided by this fundamental principle of ethical conduct, this court has noted that, when determining whether to accept the entry of a nolle prosequi pursuant to [General Statutes] § 54-56b, ‘the trial court need not receive evidence, and thus makes no findings of fact, to determine the accuracy of the state’s representations’ ”); see, e.g., State v. Drakeford, 261 Conn. 420, 427 , 802 A.2d 844 (2002) (Noting that, in safeguarding criminal defendants’ right to | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2010See Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3 (a) (1).” State v. Smith, 289 Conn. 598, 609 , 960 A.2d 993 (2008); id. (“[a]gainst the backdrop provided by this fundamental principle of ethical conduct, this court has noted that, when determining whether to accept the entry of a nolle prosequi pursuant to [General Statutes] § 54-56b, ‘the trial court need not receive evidence, and thus makes no findings of fact, to determine the accuracy of the state’s representations’ ”); see, e.g., State v. Drakeford, 261 Conn. 420, 427 , 802 A.2d 844 (2002) (Noting that, in safeguarding criminal defendants’ right to 2010See Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3 (a) (1).” State v. Smith, 289 Conn. 598, 609 , 960 A.2d 993 (2008); id. (“[a]gainst the backdrop provided by this fundamental principle of ethical conduct, this court has noted that, when determining whether to accept the entry of a nolle prosequi pursuant to [General Statutes] § 54-56b, ‘the trial court need not receive evidence, and thus makes no findings of fact, to determine the accuracy of the state’s representations’ ”); see, e.g., State v. Drakeford, 261 Conn. 420, 427 , 802 A.2d 844 (2002) (Noting that, in safeguarding criminal defendants’ right to | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kottmeier v. United States (In Re Kottmeier)
green
2 sentences2002Fla. 1999, 240 B.R. 440 (Claim of which debtors became aware during the bankruptcy proceeding, but was never scheduled by the debtors, was not abandoned by the Trustee's failure to pursue it, despite the Trustee's knowledge of the claim while the CT Page 11693 bankruptcy was pending.) 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(1) provides that the bankruptcy estate will be comprised of "all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." The bankruptcy estate owned the personal property at the time it was destroyed in the fire; the potential claim concerning the destructi 2002Fla. 1999, 240 B.R. 440 (Claim of which debtors became aware during the bankruptcy proceeding, but was never scheduled by the debtors, was not abandoned by the Trustee's failure to pursue it, despite the Trustee's knowledge of the claim while the CT Page 11861 bankruptcy was pending.) 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(1) provides that the bankruptcy estate will be comprised of "all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." The bankruptcy estate owned the personal property at the time it was destroyed in the fire; the potential claim concerning the destructi | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Ileto v. Glock, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019Judge Berzon determined that "the key to interpreting the predicate exception is [Congress'] use of the word 'knowingly' "; id. ; insofar as "[a]pplying the [arms act's] predicate exception as written-that is, as applying to all statutes capable of being applied to the sale or marketing of firearms, but imposing an actual knowledge requirement-would prohibit a swath of lawsuits against firearms manufacturers and sellers, including those brought by municipalities for violations of no-fault or absolute liability statutes or those brought by individuals alleging vicarious liability under state to 2019Judge Berzon determined that "the key to interpreting the predicate exception is [Congress'] use of the word 'knowingly' "; id. ; insofar as "[a]pplying the [arms act's] predicate exception as written-that is, as applying to all statutes capable of being applied to the sale or marketing of firearms, but imposing an actual knowledge requirement-would prohibit a swath of lawsuits against firearms manufacturers and sellers, including those brought by municipalities for violations of no-fault or absolute liability statutes or those brought by individuals alleging vicarious liability under state to | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
green
1 sentence2010Id., at 246, 93 S.Ct. 2041 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2010For example, in State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353-54 , 346 A.2d 66 (1975), the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected Schneckloth in construing the New Jersey constitution [11] and imposed a knowledge requirement for consent searches. [12] The court in Johnson observed that "[m]any persons, perhaps most, would view the request of a police officer to make a search as having the force of law. 2010For example, in State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353-54 , 346 A.2d 66 (1975), the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected Schneckloth in construing the New Jersey constitution [11] and imposed a knowledge requirement for consent searches. [12] The court in Johnson observed that "[m]any persons, perhaps most, would view the request of a police officer to make a search as having the force of law. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Russo v. Griffin
green
2 sentences2007Although attorneys throughout this state may be required to familiarize themselves with local *495 practices, rules or customs peculiar to their area, the crucial inquiry for malpractice purposes turns not on the substance of the underlying practice, rule, or custom but on whether a reasonable and prudent attorney can be expected to know of its existence and practical applications.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 24 , 510 A.2d 436 (1986). 2007Although attorneys throughout this state may be required to familiarize themselves with local *495 practices, rules or customs peculiar to their area, the crucial inquiry for malpractice purposes turns not on the substance of the underlying practice, rule, or custom but on whether a reasonable and prudent attorney can be expected to know of its existence and practical applications.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 24 , 510 A.2d 436 (1986). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. McClary
green
2 sentences2006Section 53-21 (a) (1) provides in relevant part that “[a]ny person who (1) wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that . . . the health of such child is likely to be injured . . . shall be guilty of a class C felony . . . .” In support of her claim that this language does not contain a knowledge requirement, the defendant relies on this court’s decision in State v. McClary, 207 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 541 A.2d 96 (1988). 2006Section 53-21 (a) (1) provides in relevant part that “[a]ny person who (1) wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that . . . the health of such child is likely to be injured . . . shall be guilty of a class C felony . . . .” In support of her claim that this language does not contain a knowledge requirement, the defendant relies on this court’s decision in State v. McClary, 207 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 541 A.2d 96 (1988). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.