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12 West Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1933–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Helmick v. Potomac Edison Co.green2 sentences2013However, “[t]he ‘deliberate intention’ exception to the Workers’ Compensation system is meant to deter the malicious employer, not to punish the stupid one.” Helmick v. Potomac Edison Co., 185 W.Va. 269, 274 , 406 S.E.2d 700, 705 (1991). 2013However, “[t]he ‘deliberate intention’ exception to the Workers’ Compensation system is meant to deter the malicious employer, not to punish the stupid one.” Helmick v. Potomac Edison Co., 185 W.Va. 269, 274 , 406 S.E.2d 700, 705 (1991). | 2 | 2 |
Totten v. Adongaygreen2 sentences1997Although the common knowledge exception was originally crafted to be used only "in rare cases," Totten v. Adongay, 175 W.Va. 634, 639 , 337 S.E.2d 2, 7 (1985), the majority here expands it to ridiculous proportions. 1997Although the common knowledge exception was originally crafted to be used only "in rare cases," Totten v. Adongay, 175 W.Va. 634, 639 , 337 S.E.2d 2, 7 (1985), the majority here expands it to ridiculous proportions. | 1 | 3 |
Giles v. Marylandgreen1 sentence2023In the context of Brady, “any allegation of suppression boils down to an assessment of what the State knows at trial in comparison to the knowledge held by the defense.” Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 96 (1967) (White, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
Mumaw v. U.S. Silica Co.green2 sentences2013This is a high threshold that cannot be successfully met by speculation or conjecture.” Mumaw v. U.S. Silica Co., 204 W.Va. 6, 12 , 511 S.E.2d 117, 123 (W.Va. 1998). 2 Ironically, since Blevins, the Legislature has only attempted to bolster the knowledge requirement under subparagraph (d)(2)(ii)(B), yet this Court has set itself on a parallel track in the opposite direction. 2013This is a high threshold that cannot be successfully met by speculation or conjecture.” Mumaw v. U.S. Silica Co., 204 W.Va. 6, 12 , 511 S.E.2d 117, 123 (W.Va. 1998). 2 Ironically, since Blevins, the Legislature has only attempted to bolster the knowledge requirement under subparagraph (d)(2)(ii)(B), yet this Court has set itself on a parallel track in the opposite direction. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hallergreen2 sentences1999Pt. 3, State v. Haller, 178 W.Va. 642 , 363 S.E.2d 719 (1987). [12] In several different contexts, this Court has liberally construed the knowledge requirement for lay opinion testimony. 1999Pt. 3, State v. Haller, 178 W.Va. 642 , 363 S.E.2d 719 (1987). [12] In several different contexts, this Court has liberally construed the knowledge requirement for lay opinion testimony. | 1 | 1 |
Spencer v. Steinbrechergreen2 sentences1999See, e.g., Syl. pt. 2, Evans v. Mutual Mining, 199 W.Va. 526 , 485 S.E.2d 695 (1997) (concluding the owner of destroyed or damaged personal property is qualified to give lay testimony as to the value of the personal property based on his or her personal knowledge); State v. Haller, 178 W.Va. 642, 646 , 363 S.E.2d 719, 723 (1987) (permitting a witness who is familiar with a drug and its physical or chemical properties to give an opinion of the identity of the drug); Royal Furniture Co. v. City of Morgantown, 164 W.Va. 400, 407 , 263 S.E.2d 878, 882-83 (1980) (finding operators of retail busines 1999See, e.g., Syl. pt. 2, Evans v. Mutual Mining, 199 W.Va. 526 , 485 S.E.2d 695 (1997) (concluding the owner of destroyed or damaged personal property is qualified to give lay testimony as to the value of the personal property based on his or her personal knowledge); State v. Haller, 178 W.Va. 642, 646 , 363 S.E.2d 719, 723 (1987) (permitting a witness who is familiar with a drug and its physical or chemical properties to give an opinion of the identity of the drug); Royal Furniture Co. v. City of Morgantown, 164 W.Va. 400, 407 , 263 S.E.2d 878, 882-83 (1980) (finding operators of retail busines | 1 | 1 |
Evans v. Mutual Mininggreen2 sentences1999See, e.g., Syl. pt. 2, Evans v. Mutual Mining, 199 W.Va. 526 , 485 S.E.2d 695 (1997) (concluding the owner of destroyed or damaged personal property is qualified to give lay testimony as to the value of the personal property based on his or her personal knowledge); State v. Haller, 178 W.Va. 642, 646 , 363 S.E.2d 719, 723 (1987) (permitting a witness who is familiar with a drug and its physical or chemical properties to give an opinion of the identity of the drug); Royal Furniture Co. v. City of Morgantown, 164 W.Va. 400, 407 , 263 S.E.2d 878, 882-83 (1980) (finding operators of retail busines 1999See, e.g., Syl. pt. 2, Evans v. Mutual Mining, 199 W.Va. 526 , 485 S.E.2d 695 (1997) (concluding the owner of destroyed or damaged personal property is qualified to give lay testimony as to the value of the personal property based on his or her personal knowledge); State v. Haller, 178 W.Va. 642, 646 , 363 S.E.2d 719, 723 (1987) (permitting a witness who is familiar with a drug and its physical or chemical properties to give an opinion of the identity of the drug); Royal Furniture Co. v. City of Morgantown, 164 W.Va. 400, 407 , 263 S.E.2d 878, 882-83 (1980) (finding operators of retail busines | 1 | 1 |
Mullens v. Lillygreen2 sentences1999See, e.g., Syl. pt. 2, Evans v. Mutual Mining, 199 W.Va. 526 , 485 S.E.2d 695 (1997) (concluding the owner of destroyed or damaged personal property is qualified to give lay testimony as to the value of the personal property based on his or her personal knowledge); State v. Haller, 178 W.Va. 642, 646 , 363 S.E.2d 719, 723 (1987) (permitting a witness who is familiar with a drug and its physical or chemical properties to give an opinion of the identity of the drug); Royal Furniture Co. v. City of Morgantown, 164 W.Va. 400, 407 , 263 S.E.2d 878, 882-83 (1980) (finding operators of retail busines 1999See, e.g., Syl. pt. 2, Evans v. Mutual Mining, 199 W.Va. 526 , 485 S.E.2d 695 (1997) (concluding the owner of destroyed or damaged personal property is qualified to give lay testimony as to the value of the personal property based on his or her personal knowledge); State v. Haller, 178 W.Va. 642, 646 , 363 S.E.2d 719, 723 (1987) (permitting a witness who is familiar with a drug and its physical or chemical properties to give an opinion of the identity of the drug); Royal Furniture Co. v. City of Morgantown, 164 W.Va. 400, 407 , 263 S.E.2d 878, 882-83 (1980) (finding operators of retail busines | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fairchildgreen2 sentences1999While Rule 803(6) evidence is not self-authenticating, see State v. Fairchild, 171 W.Va. 137, 147 , 298 S.E.2d 110, 120 (1982) ("in no instance may records of this kind prove themselves"); Daniel B. v. Ackerman, 190 W.Va. 1, 6 , 435 S.E.2d 1, 6 (1993), this does not preclude admission where either the record itself or other circumstantial factors provide the necessary foundation. 1999While Rule 803(6) evidence is not self-authenticating, see State v. Fairchild, 171 W.Va. 137, 147 , 298 S.E.2d 110, 120 (1982) ("in no instance may records of this kind prove themselves"); Daniel B. v. Ackerman, 190 W.Va. 1, 6 , 435 S.E.2d 1, 6 (1993), this does not preclude admission where either the record itself or other circumstantial factors provide the necessary foundation. | 1 | 1 |
Daniel B. ex rel. Richard B. v. Ackermangreen2 sentences1999While Rule 803(6) evidence is not self-authenticating, see State v. Fairchild, 171 W.Va. 137, 147 , 298 S.E.2d 110, 120 (1982) ("in no instance may records of this kind prove themselves"); Daniel B. v. Ackerman, 190 W.Va. 1, 6 , 435 S.E.2d 1, 6 (1993), this does not preclude admission where either the record itself or other circumstantial factors provide the necessary foundation. 1999While Rule 803(6) evidence is not self-authenticating, see State v. Fairchild, 171 W.Va. 137, 147 , 298 S.E.2d 110, 120 (1982) ("in no instance may records of this kind prove themselves"); Daniel B. v. Ackerman, 190 W.Va. 1, 6 , 435 S.E.2d 1, 6 (1993), this does not preclude admission where either the record itself or other circumstantial factors provide the necessary foundation. | 1 | 1 |
Royal Furniture Co. v. City of Morgantowngreen2 sentences1999See, e.g., Syl. pt. 2, Evans v. Mutual Mining, 199 W.Va. 526 , 485 S.E.2d 695 (1997) (concluding the owner of destroyed or damaged personal property is qualified to give lay testimony as to the value of the personal property based on his or her personal knowledge); State v. Haller, 178 W.Va. 642, 646 , 363 S.E.2d 719, 723 (1987) (permitting a witness who is familiar with a drug and its physical or chemical properties to give an opinion of the identity of the drug); Royal Furniture Co. v. City of Morgantown, 164 W.Va. 400, 407 , 263 S.E.2d 878, 882-83 (1980) (finding operators of retail busines 1999See, e.g., Syl. pt. 2, Evans v. Mutual Mining, 199 W.Va. 526 , 485 S.E.2d 695 (1997) (concluding the owner of destroyed or damaged personal property is qualified to give lay testimony as to the value of the personal property based on his or her personal knowledge); State v. Haller, 178 W.Va. 642, 646 , 363 S.E.2d 719, 723 (1987) (permitting a witness who is familiar with a drug and its physical or chemical properties to give an opinion of the identity of the drug); Royal Furniture Co. v. City of Morgantown, 164 W.Va. 400, 407 , 263 S.E.2d 878, 882-83 (1980) (finding operators of retail busines | 1 | 1 |
Cockerton v. Mercy Hospital Medical Centergreen2 sentences1997See Cockerton v. Mercy Hospital Medical Center, 490 N.W.2d 856 (Iowa App.1992)(where patient fell while in x-ray room expert testimony was not required on hospital’s negligence); Walker v. Southeast Alabama Medical Center, 545 So.2d 769 (Ala.1989)(where bed rail left down contrary to doctor’s order and patient fell, no expert testimony required on standard of care); Edelin v. Westlake Community Hospital, 157 Ill.App.3d 857 , 109 Ill.Dec. 890 , 510 N.E.2d 958 (1987)(expert not required where patient falls while leaving hospital, as matter involved administrative duty to provide escort); Rewis v 1997See Cockerton v. Mercy Hospital Medical Center, 490 N.W.2d 856 (Iowa App.1992)(where patient fell while in x-ray room expert testimony was not required on hospital's negligence); Walker v. Southeast Alabama Medical Center, 545 So.2d 769 (Ala. 1989)(where bed rail left down contrary to doctor's order and patient fell, no expert testimony required on standard of care); Edelin v. Westlake Community Hospital, 157 Ill.App.3d 857 , 109 Ill.Dec. 890 , 510 N.E.2d 958 (1987)(expert not required where patient falls while leaving hospital, as matter involved administrative duty to provide escort); Rewis | 1 | 1 |
Murphy v. Schwartzgreen2 sentences1997Id., 739 S.W.2d at 778-79 (Citation omitted). 1997Id., 739 S.W.2d at 778-79 (Citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Orvil Hassebrock v. Robert Bernhoft
green
1 sentence2023Id. at 342 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Ryan v. Clonch Industries, Inc.
green
2 sentences2013The majority relies heavily on syllabus point 6 in Ryan , which holds that failure to perform a hazard inspection where such is mandatory is sufficient to impute “subjective realization”: 1 Where an employee has instituted a deliberate intent action against an employer under W.Va.Code § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii) (1994) (Repl.Vol.1998), and where the defendant employer has failed to perform a reasonable evaluation to identify hazards in the workplace in violation of a statute, rule or regulation imposing a mandatory duty to perform the same, the performance of which may have readily identified certain w 2013The majority relies heavily on syllabus point 6 in Ryan , which holds that failure to perform a hazard inspection where such is mandatory is sufficient to impute “subjective realization”: 1 Where an employee has instituted a deliberate intent action against an employer under W.Va.Code § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii) (1994) (Repl.Vol.1998), and where the defendant employer has failed to perform a reasonable evaluation to identify hazards in the workplace in violation of a statute, rule or regulation imposing a mandatory duty to perform the same, the performance of which may have readily identified certain w | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Stenger v. Hope Natural Gas Co.
green
2 sentences1999See, e.g., Syl. pt. 2, Evans v. Mutual Mining, 199 W.Va. 526 , 485 S.E.2d 695 (1997) (concluding the owner of destroyed or damaged personal property is qualified to give lay testimony as to the value of the personal property based on his or her personal knowledge); State v. Haller, 178 W.Va. 642, 646 , 363 S.E.2d 719, 723 (1987) (permitting a witness who is familiar with a drug and its physical or chemical properties to give an opinion of the identity of the drug); Royal Furniture Co. v. City of Morgantown, 164 W.Va. 400, 407 , 263 S.E.2d 878, 882-83 (1980) (finding operators of retail busines 1999See, e.g., Syl. pt. 2, Evans v. Mutual Mining, 199 W.Va. 526 , 485 S.E.2d 695 (1997) (concluding the owner of destroyed or damaged personal property is qualified to give lay testimony as to the value of the personal property based on his or her personal knowledge); State v. Haller, 178 W.Va. 642, 646 , 363 S.E.2d 719, 723 (1987) (permitting a witness who is familiar with a drug and its physical or chemical properties to give an opinion of the identity of the drug); Royal Furniture Co. v. City of Morgantown, 164 W.Va. 400, 407 , 263 S.E.2d 878, 882-83 (1980) (finding operators of retail busines | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Cochran v. Craig
green
2 sentences1999See, e.g., Syl. pt. 2, Evans v. Mutual Mining, 199 W.Va. 526 , 485 S.E.2d 695 (1997) (concluding the owner of destroyed or damaged personal property is qualified to give lay testimony as to the value of the personal property based on his or her personal knowledge); State v. Haller, 178 W.Va. 642, 646 , 363 S.E.2d 719, 723 (1987) (permitting a witness who is familiar with a drug and its physical or chemical properties to give an opinion of the identity of the drug); Royal Furniture Co. v. City of Morgantown, 164 W.Va. 400, 407 , 263 S.E.2d 878, 882-83 (1980) (finding operators of retail busines 1999See, e.g., Syl. pt. 2, Evans v. Mutual Mining, 199 W.Va. 526 , 485 S.E.2d 695 (1997) (concluding the owner of destroyed or damaged personal property is qualified to give lay testimony as to the value of the personal property based on his or her personal knowledge); State v. Haller, 178 W.Va. 642, 646 , 363 S.E.2d 719, 723 (1987) (permitting a witness who is familiar with a drug and its physical or chemical properties to give an opinion of the identity of the drug); Royal Furniture Co. v. City of Morgantown, 164 W.Va. 400, 407 , 263 S.E.2d 878, 882-83 (1980) (finding operators of retail busines | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Rewis v. Grand Strand General Hospital
green
2 sentences1997See Cockerton v. Mercy Hospital Medical Center, 490 N.W.2d 856 (Iowa App.1992)(where patient fell while in x-ray room expert testimony was not required on hospital's negligence); Walker v. Southeast Alabama Medical Center, 545 So.2d 769 (Ala. 1989)(where bed rail left down contrary to doctor's order and patient fell, no expert testimony required on standard of care); Edelin v. Westlake Community Hospital, 157 Ill.App.3d 857 , 109 Ill.Dec. 890 , 510 N.E.2d 958 (1987)(expert not required where patient falls while leaving hospital, as matter involved administrative duty to provide escort); Rewis 1997See Cockerton v. Mercy Hospital Medical Center, 490 N.W.2d 856 (Iowa App.1992)(where patient fell while in x-ray room expert testimony was not required on hospital's negligence); Walker v. Southeast Alabama Medical Center, 545 So.2d 769 (Ala. 1989)(where bed rail left down contrary to doctor's order and patient fell, no expert testimony required on standard of care); Edelin v. Westlake Community Hospital, 157 Ill.App.3d 857 , 109 Ill.Dec. 890 , 510 N.E.2d 958 (1987)(expert not required where patient falls while leaving hospital, as matter involved administrative duty to provide escort); Rewis | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Bennett v. Winthrop Community Hospital
green
2 sentences1997See Cockerton v. Mercy Hospital Medical Center, 490 N.W.2d 856 (Iowa App.1992)(where patient fell while in x-ray room expert testimony was not required on hospital's negligence); Walker v. Southeast Alabama Medical Center, 545 So.2d 769 (Ala. 1989)(where bed rail left down contrary to doctor's order and patient fell, no expert testimony required on standard of care); Edelin v. Westlake Community Hospital, 157 Ill.App.3d 857 , 109 Ill.Dec. 890 , 510 N.E.2d 958 (1987)(expert not required where patient falls while leaving hospital, as matter involved administrative duty to provide escort); Rewis 1997See Cockerton v. Mercy Hospital Medical Center, 490 N.W.2d 856 (Iowa App.1992)(where patient fell while in x-ray room expert testimony was not required on hospital's negligence); Walker v. Southeast Alabama Medical Center, 545 So.2d 769 (Ala. 1989)(where bed rail left down contrary to doctor's order and patient fell, no expert testimony required on standard of care); Edelin v. Westlake Community Hospital, 157 Ill.App.3d 857 , 109 Ill.Dec. 890 , 510 N.E.2d 958 (1987)(expert not required where patient falls while leaving hospital, as matter involved administrative duty to provide escort); Rewis | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Rice v. Sebasticook Valley Hospital
green
2 sentences1997See Cockerton v. Mercy Hospital Medical Center, 490 N.W.2d 856 (Iowa App.1992)(where patient fell while in x-ray room expert testimony was not required on hospital’s negligence); Walker v. Southeast Alabama Medical Center, 545 So.2d 769 (Ala.1989)(where bed rail left down contrary to doctor’s order and patient fell, no expert testimony required on standard of care); Edelin v. Westlake Community Hospital, 157 Ill.App.3d 857 , 109 Ill.Dec. 890 , 510 N.E.2d 958 (1987)(expert not required where patient falls while leaving hospital, as matter involved administrative duty to provide escort); Rewis v 1997See Cockerton v. Mercy Hospital Medical Center, 490 N.W.2d 856 (Iowa App.1992)(where patient fell while in x-ray room expert testimony was not required on hospital's negligence); Walker v. Southeast Alabama Medical Center, 545 So.2d 769 (Ala. 1989)(where bed rail left down contrary to doctor's order and patient fell, no expert testimony required on standard of care); Edelin v. Westlake Community Hospital, 157 Ill.App.3d 857 , 109 Ill.Dec. 890 , 510 N.E.2d 958 (1987)(expert not required where patient falls while leaving hospital, as matter involved administrative duty to provide escort); Rewis | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Walker v. Southeast Alabama Med. Ctr.
green
2 sentences1997See Cockerton v. Mercy Hospital Medical Center, 490 N.W.2d 856 (Iowa App.1992)(where patient fell while in x-ray room expert testimony was not required on hospital’s negligence); Walker v. Southeast Alabama Medical Center, 545 So.2d 769 (Ala.1989)(where bed rail left down contrary to doctor’s order and patient fell, no expert testimony required on standard of care); Edelin v. Westlake Community Hospital, 157 Ill.App.3d 857 , 109 Ill.Dec. 890 , 510 N.E.2d 958 (1987)(expert not required where patient falls while leaving hospital, as matter involved administrative duty to provide escort); Rewis v 1997See Cockerton v. Mercy Hospital Medical Center, 490 N.W.2d 856 (Iowa App.1992)(where patient fell while in x-ray room expert testimony was not required on hospital's negligence); Walker v. Southeast Alabama Medical Center, 545 So.2d 769 (Ala. 1989)(where bed rail left down contrary to doctor's order and patient fell, no expert testimony required on standard of care); Edelin v. Westlake Community Hospital, 157 Ill.App.3d 857 , 109 Ill.Dec. 890 , 510 N.E.2d 958 (1987)(expert not required where patient falls while leaving hospital, as matter involved administrative duty to provide escort); Rewis | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Edelin v. Westlake Community Hospital
green
2 sentences1997See Cockerton v. Mercy Hospital Medical Center, 490 N.W.2d 856 (Iowa App.1992)(where patient fell while in x-ray room expert testimony was not required on hospital's negligence); Walker v. Southeast Alabama Medical Center, 545 So.2d 769 (Ala. 1989)(where bed rail left down contrary to doctor's order and patient fell, no expert testimony required on standard of care); Edelin v. Westlake Community Hospital, 157 Ill.App.3d 857 , 109 Ill.Dec. 890 , 510 N.E.2d 958 (1987)(expert not required where patient falls while leaving hospital, as matter involved administrative duty to provide escort); Rewis 1997See Cockerton v. Mercy Hospital Medical Center, 490 N.W.2d 856 (Iowa App.1992)(where patient fell while in x-ray room expert testimony was not required on hospital's negligence); Walker v. Southeast Alabama Medical Center, 545 So.2d 769 (Ala. 1989)(where bed rail left down contrary to doctor's order and patient fell, no expert testimony required on standard of care); Edelin v. Westlake Community Hospital, 157 Ill.App.3d 857 , 109 Ill.Dec. 890 , 510 N.E.2d 958 (1987)(expert not required where patient falls while leaving hospital, as matter involved administrative duty to provide escort); Rewis | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Biggs v. Cumberland County Hospital System, Inc.
green
2 sentences1997See Cockerton v. Mercy Hospital Medical Center, 490 N.W.2d 856 (Iowa App.1992)(where patient fell while in x-ray room expert testimony was not required on hospital's negligence); Walker v. Southeast Alabama Medical Center, 545 So.2d 769 (Ala. 1989)(where bed rail left down contrary to doctor's order and patient fell, no expert testimony required on standard of care); Edelin v. Westlake Community Hospital, 157 Ill.App.3d 857 , 109 Ill.Dec. 890 , 510 N.E.2d 958 (1987)(expert not required where patient falls while leaving hospital, as matter involved administrative duty to provide escort); Rewis 1997See Cockerton v. Mercy Hospital Medical Center, 490 N.W.2d 856 (Iowa App.1992)(where patient fell while in x-ray room expert testimony was not required on hospital's negligence); Walker v. Southeast Alabama Medical Center, 545 So.2d 769 (Ala. 1989)(where bed rail left down contrary to doctor's order and patient fell, no expert testimony required on standard of care); Edelin v. Westlake Community Hospital, 157 Ill.App.3d 857 , 109 Ill.Dec. 890 , 510 N.E.2d 958 (1987)(expert not required where patient falls while leaving hospital, as matter involved administrative duty to provide escort); Rewis | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Jenkins v. Charleston General Hospital & Training School
green
2 sentences1985A Yes, sir. [3] Res Ipsa Loquitur may also be applicable in some cases. [4] The plaintiffs also cite the Court's decision in Jenkins v. Charleston General Hospital & Training School, 90 W.Va. 230 , 110 S.E. 560 (1922), as factual support for recognition of the common knowledge exception in the instant case. 1985A Yes, sir. [3] Res Ipsa Loquitur may also be applicable in some cases. [4] The plaintiffs also cite the Court's decision in Jenkins v. Charleston General Hospital & Training School, 90 W.Va. 230 , 110 S.E. 560 (1922), as factual support for recognition of the common knowledge exception in the instant case. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Britton
green
1 sentence1975Va., 203 S.E.2d 462 (1974). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Atkinson v. Plumb
neutral
1 sentence1933Va. 626 , 32 S. E. 229 ), and this Court, in view of the several formalities as well as the association’s knowledge of the claim, held Atkinson’s claim to have priority. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.