106 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1917–2025 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gerdtsgreen2 sentences2025Similar to Goble, Mr. Gerdts argued the knowledge instruction created a mandatory presumption because it “allowed the jury to find he acted with knowledge if he intentionally walked past the van, regardless of whether he knowingly damaged the van.” Id. at 727-28 . 2025We disagreed, concluding the knowledge instruction did not create a mandatory presumption because “[u]nlike the offense at issue in Goble, there was no second mens rea element to conflate.” Id. at 728 . | 4 | 7 |
State v. Goblegreen2 sentences2025The disputed portion of the knowledge instruction read, “Acting knowingly or with knowledge also is established if a person acts intentionally.” Id. at 202 (emphasis omitted). 2025On appeal, we concluded the knowledge instruction created a confusing mandatory presumption because it “allowed the jury to presume Goble knew [the officer’s] status at the time of the incident if it found Goble had intentionally assaulted [the officer].” Id. at 203 . | 3 | 11 |
State v. Gerdtsgreen2 sentences2010This court considered an identical challenge in State v. Atkins, 156 Wash.App. 799 , 236 P.3d 897 (2010), and held the knowledge instruction created an impermissible mandatory presumption, which in that case was harmless under Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 , 111 S.Ct. 1884 , 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991). [31] 140 Wash.App. 858 , 166 P.3d 1268 (2007). [32] Id. at 862, 166 P.3d 1268 . [33] Id. at 863-64, 166 P.3d 1268 . [34] Id. at 865, 166 P.3d 1268 . [35] Id. at 866-68, 166 P.3d 1268 . [36] Id. at 868, 166 P.3d 1268 . [37] 136 Wash.App. 720 , 150 P.3d 627 (2007). [38] Id. at 728 , 150 P.3d 627 . [39] 2010This court considered an identical challenge in State v. Atkins, 156 Wash.App. 799 , 236 P.3d 897 (2010), and held the knowledge instruction created an impermissible mandatory presumption, which in that case was harmless under Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 , 111 S.Ct. 1884 , 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991). [31] 140 Wash.App. 858 , 166 P.3d 1268 (2007). [32] Id. at 862, 166 P.3d 1268 . [33] Id. at 863-64, 166 P.3d 1268 . [34] Id. at 865, 166 P.3d 1268 . [35] Id. at 866-68, 166 P.3d 1268 . [36] Id. at 868, 166 P.3d 1268 . [37] 136 Wash.App. 720 , 150 P.3d 627 (2007). [38] Id. at 728 , 150 P.3d 627 . [39] | 2 | 4 |
Rogers v. Miles Laboratories, Inc.green2 sentences2015This knowledge requirement is " an idea which ` rings of negligence."' Rogers, 116 Wn.2d at 207 ( internal quotation marks omitted) quoting Brown, 44 Cal.3d at 1059 ). 2015This knowledge requirement is “an idea which ‘rings of negligence.’ ” Rogers, 116 Wn.2d at 207 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1059 ). ¶40 Here, Taylor alleges that ISI failed to warn physicians of dangers that it knew or should have known about based on both the medical literature and the studies that indicate the da Vinci System has a high learning curve. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Gendrongreen2 sentences2009See, e.g., Lacy, 119 F.3d at 747 ; United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 957-58 (1st Cir. 1994). 2009See, e.g., Lacy, 119 F.3d at 747 ; United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 957-58 (1st Cir. 1994). [8] See footnote 5, supra. [9] Garbaccio asserts no claim that RCW 9.68A.110(2) suffers from any constitutional deficiency. | 2 | 2 |
Boeing Co. v. Heidygreen2 sentences2009See 147 Wn.2d at 83 (noting the schedule of benefits was the same, with or without a knowledge requirement). 2009See 147 Wash.2d at 83 , 51 P.3d 793 (noting the schedule of benefits was the same, with or without a knowledge requirement). | 2 | 2 |
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Scott Douglas LACY, Defendant-Appellantgreen2 sentences2009See, e.g., Lacy, 119 F.3d at 747 ; United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 957-58 (1st Cir. 1994). 2009See, e.g., Lacy, 119 F.3d at 747 ; United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 957-58 (1st Cir. 1994). [8] See footnote 5, supra. [9] Garbaccio asserts no claim that RCW 9.68A.110(2) suffers from any constitutional deficiency. | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Tarangogreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Woolfolkgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Michlitschgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Ingersoll v. DeBartolo, Inc.green | 2 | 2 |
State v. Goblegreen2 sentences2009Goble argued that this statement "relieved the State of the burden of proving his knowledge of [the officer's] status at the time of the offense" and that the knowledge instruction, as a whole, was "confusing, misleading, and a misstatement of the law." Goble, 131 Wash.App. at 202 , 126 P.3d 821 . ¶ 23 We held that the language stating that intent establishes knowledge "allowed the jury to presume Goble knew [the officer's] status at the time of the incident if it found Goble had intentionally assaulted [the officer]." The majority also held that the instruction "conflated the intent and knowl 2009Goble argued that this statement "relieved the State of the burden of proving his knowledge of [the officer's] status at the time of the offense" and that the knowledge instruction, as a whole, was "confusing, misleading, and a misstatement of the law." Goble, 131 Wash.App. at 202 , 126 P.3d 821 . ¶ 23 We held that the language stating that intent establishes knowledge "allowed the jury to presume Goble knew [the officer's] status at the time of the incident if it found Goble had intentionally assaulted [the officer]." The majority also held that the instruction "conflated the intent and knowl | 1 | 6 |
State v. Douglasgreen2 sentences2007See Gerdts, 136 Wash.App. at 727 , 150 P.3d 627 . ¶ 7 "Jury instructions are `sufficient when they allow counsel to argue their theory of the case, are not misleading, and when read as a whole properly inform the trier of fact of the applicable law.'" State v. Douglas, 128 Wash.App. 555, 562 , 116 P.3d 1012 (2005) (quoting Bodin v. City of Stanwood, 130 Wash.2d 726, 732 , 927 P.2d 240 (1996)). 2007Accordingly, we must examine the substance of Gerdts’s arguments. ¶19 “Jury instructions are ‘sufficient when they allow counsel to argue their theory of the case, are not misleading, and when read as a whole properly inform the trier of fact of the applicable law.’ ” State v. Douglas, 128 Wn. | 1 | 3 |
Bodin v. City of Stanwoodgreen2 sentences2007See Gerdts, 136 Wash.App. at 727 , 150 P.3d 627 . ¶ 7 "Jury instructions are `sufficient when they allow counsel to argue their theory of the case, are not misleading, and when read as a whole properly inform the trier of fact of the applicable law.'" State v. Douglas, 128 Wash.App. 555, 562 , 116 P.3d 1012 (2005) (quoting Bodin v. City of Stanwood, 130 Wash.2d 726, 732 , 927 P.2d 240 (1996)). 2007Accordingly, we must examine the substance of Gerdts's arguments. ¶ 19 "Jury instructions are `sufficient when they allow counsel to argue their theory of the case, are not misleading, and when read as a whole properly inform the trier of fact of the applicable law.'" State v. Douglas, 128 Wash.App. 555, 562 , 116 P.3d 1012 (2005) (quoting Bodin v. City of Stanwood, 130 Wash.2d 726, 732 , 927 P.2d 240 (1996)). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Douglasgreen2 sentences2007See Gerdts, 136 Wash.App. at 727 , 150 P.3d 627 . ¶ 7 "Jury instructions are `sufficient when they allow counsel to argue their theory of the case, are not misleading, and when read as a whole properly inform the trier of fact of the applicable law.'" State v. Douglas, 128 Wash.App. 555, 562 , 116 P.3d 1012 (2005) (quoting Bodin v. City of Stanwood, 130 Wash.2d 726, 732 , 927 P.2d 240 (1996)). 2007Accordingly, we must examine the substance of Gerdts's arguments. ¶ 19 "Jury instructions are `sufficient when they allow counsel to argue their theory of the case, are not misleading, and when read as a whole properly inform the trier of fact of the applicable law.'" State v. Douglas, 128 Wash.App. 555, 562 , 116 P.3d 1012 (2005) (quoting Bodin v. City of Stanwood, 130 Wash.2d 726, 732 , 927 P.2d 240 (1996)). | 1 | 2 |
Bodin v. City of Stanwoodgreen2 sentences2007See Gerdts, 136 Wash.App. at 727 , 150 P.3d 627 . ¶ 7 "Jury instructions are `sufficient when they allow counsel to argue their theory of the case, are not misleading, and when read as a whole properly inform the trier of fact of the applicable law.'" State v. Douglas, 128 Wash.App. 555, 562 , 116 P.3d 1012 (2005) (quoting Bodin v. City of Stanwood, 130 Wash.2d 726, 732 , 927 P.2d 240 (1996)). 2007Accordingly, we must examine the substance of Gerdts's arguments. ¶ 19 "Jury instructions are `sufficient when they allow counsel to argue their theory of the case, are not misleading, and when read as a whole properly inform the trier of fact of the applicable law.'" State v. Douglas, 128 Wash.App. 555, 562 , 116 P.3d 1012 (2005) (quoting Bodin v. City of Stanwood, 130 Wash.2d 726, 732 , 927 P.2d 240 (1996)). | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Moreygreen | 1 | 2 |
| In re the Personal Restraint of Andressred | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Personal Restraint of Andressred | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Mullengreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Shabeebgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Rousselgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Richgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Loughgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ignacio Marin v. King Co Wagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Elizabeth Gordon v. New York City Board of Educationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Allen
green
2 sentences2024Moreover, we note that unlike the prosecutor in Allen, the prosecutor here did not incorrectly state the knowledge standard as “should have known.” See Allen, 182 Wn.2d at 374 . 2019To this end, our Supreme Court has observed that the knowledge standard can be "understandably misinterpret[ed]. . . to allow a finding of knowledge. . . if the defendant `should have known." Allen, 182 Wn.2d at 374 (quoting State v. Shipp, 93 Wn.2d 510, 514 , 610 P.2d 1322 (1980)). | 7 | 2017–2024 |
State v. Cardwell
green
2 sentences2022Later, in State v. Cardwell, the court held that “[i]n order to meet the knowledge requirement of the [bail jumping] statute, the State is required to prove that a defendant has been given notice of the required court dates.” 155 Wn. 2020“In order to meet the knowledge requirement of the [bail jumping] statute, the State is required to prove that a defendant has been given notice of the required court dates.” State v. Cardwell, 155 Wn. | 6 | 2017–2022 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2025Officers must give these warnings before entering the home because the resident's knowledge of the privilege is a “ ‘threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise.’ ” Id. at 117 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L. 2025Officers must give these warnings before entering the home because the resident's knowledge of the privilege is a “ ‘threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise.’ ” Id. at 117 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L. | 5 | 2016–2025 |
State v. Cardwell
neutral
2 sentences2022App. 41, 47 , 226 P.3d 243 (2010), adhered to on remand, noted at 166 Wn. 2017App. 41, 47 , 226 P.3d 243 (2010), which held that "[i]n order to meet the knowledge requirement of the statute, the State is required to prove that a defendant has been given notice of the required court dates." But Cardwell is inapposite because it involved the sufficiency of the evidence, not the adequacy of the information. 17 No. 72728-1-1 / 18 First, Jordan challenges the sufficiency of the information charging felony harassment. | 4 | 2017–2022 |
State v. Fredrick
green
2 sentences2018Moreover, “the knowledge requirement is met when the State proves that the defendant has been given notice of the required court dates.” State v. Fredrick, 123 Wn. 2010State v. Fredrick, 123 Wn. | 3 | 2010–2018 |
State v. Ferrier
green
2 sentences2025Officers must give these warnings before entering the home because the resident's knowledge of the privilege is a “ ‘threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise.’ ” Id. at 117 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L. 2025Officers must give these warnings before entering the home because the resident's knowledge of the privilege is a “ ‘threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise.’ ” Id. at 117 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Shipp
green
2 sentences2019Id. 6 No. 76869-7-1/7 Here, Coleman has not argued that the prosecutor misled the jury in explaining the knowledge standard to the jury. 2019To this end, our Supreme Court has observed that the knowledge standard can be "understandably misinterpret[ed]. . . to allow a finding of knowledge. . . if the defendant `should have known." Allen, 182 Wn.2d at 374 (quoting State v. Shipp, 93 Wn.2d 510, 514 , 610 P.2d 1322 (1980)). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Fredrick
neutral
2 sentences2018App. 347, 353 , 97 P.3d 47 (2004). 2010State v. Fredrick, 123 Wash.App. 347, 353 , 97 P.3d 47 (2004). | 2 | 2010–2018 |
Brown v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2015This knowledge requirement is " an idea which ` rings of negligence."' Rogers, 116 Wn.2d at 207 ( internal quotation marks omitted) quoting Brown, 44 Cal.3d at 1059 ). 2015This knowledge requirement is “an idea which ‘rings of negligence.’ ” Rogers, 116 Wn.2d at 207 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1059 ). ¶40 Here, Taylor alleges that ISI failed to warn physicians of dangers that it knew or should have known about based on both the medical literature and the studies that indicate the da Vinci System has a high learning curve. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Sibert
green
2 sentences2014State v. Sibert, 168 Wn.2d 306, 316-17 , 230 P.3d 142 (2010). 2010This court considered an identical challenge in State v. Atkins, 156 Wash.App. 799 , 236 P.3d 897 (2010), and held the knowledge instruction created an impermissible mandatory presumption, which in that case was harmless under Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 , 111 S.Ct. 1884 , 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991). [31] 140 Wash.App. 858 , 166 P.3d 1268 (2007). [32] Id. at 862, 166 P.3d 1268 . [33] Id. at 863-64, 166 P.3d 1268 . [34] Id. at 865, 166 P.3d 1268 . [35] Id. at 866-68, 166 P.3d 1268 . [36] Id. at 868, 166 P.3d 1268 . [37] 136 Wash.App. 720 , 150 P.3d 627 (2007). [38] Id. at 728 , 150 P.3d 627 . [39] | 2 | 2010–2014 |
State v. Sibert
green
2 sentences2010This court considered an identical challenge in State v. Atkins, 156 Wash.App. 799 , 236 P.3d 897 (2010), and held the knowledge instruction created an impermissible mandatory presumption, which in that case was harmless under Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 , 111 S.Ct. 1884 , 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991). [31] 140 Wash.App. 858 , 166 P.3d 1268 (2007). [32] Id. at 862, 166 P.3d 1268 . [33] Id. at 863-64, 166 P.3d 1268 . [34] Id. at 865, 166 P.3d 1268 . [35] Id. at 866-68, 166 P.3d 1268 . [36] Id. at 868, 166 P.3d 1268 . [37] 136 Wash.App. 720 , 150 P.3d 627 (2007). [38] Id. at 728 , 150 P.3d 627 . [39] 2010This court considered an identical challenge in State v. Atkins, 156 Wash.App. 799 , 236 P.3d 897 (2010), and held the knowledge instruction created an impermissible mandatory presumption, which in that case was harmless under Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 , 111 S.Ct. 1884 , 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991). [31] 140 Wash.App. 858 , 166 P.3d 1268 (2007). [32] Id. at 862, 166 P.3d 1268 . [33] Id. at 863-64, 166 P.3d 1268 . [34] Id. at 865, 166 P.3d 1268 . [35] Id. at 866-68, 166 P.3d 1268 . [36] Id. at 868, 166 P.3d 1268 . [37] 136 Wash.App. 720 , 150 P.3d 627 (2007). [38] Id. at 728 , 150 P.3d 627 . [39] | 2 | 2010–2014 |
Giles v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2011Brady does not require the prosecutor to prepare notes for the defense or to highlight a particular line of questioning that is promising for the defense theory of the case. ¶ 39 "`[A]ny allegation of suppression boils down to an assessment of what the State knows at trial in comparison to the knowledge held by the defense.'" Dupuy, 760 F.2d at 1501 n. 5 (quoting Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 96 , 87 S.Ct. 793 , 17 L.Ed.2d 737 (1967) (White, J., concurring)). 2011Brady does not require the prosecutor to prepare notes for the defense or to highlight a particular line of questioning that is promising for the defense theory of the case. ¶ 39 "`[A]ny allegation of suppression boils down to an assessment of what the State knows at trial in comparison to the knowledge held by the defense.'" Dupuy, 760 F.2d at 1501 n. 5 (quoting Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 96 , 87 S.Ct. 793 , 17 L.Ed.2d 737 (1967) (White, J., concurring)). | 2 | 2011–2011 |
United States v. Albert Dupuy, United States of America v. Christie Buzard, United States of America v. Juan Antonio Tercero
green
2 sentences2011Brady does not require the prosecutor to prepare notes for the defense or to highlight a particular line of questioning that is promising for the defense theory of the case. ¶ 39 "`[A]ny allegation of suppression boils down to an assessment of what the State knows at trial in comparison to the knowledge held by the defense.'" Dupuy, 760 F.2d at 1501 n. 5 (quoting Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 96 , 87 S.Ct. 793 , 17 L.Ed.2d 737 (1967) (White, J., concurring)). 2011Brady does not require the prosecutor to prepare notes for the defense or to highlight a particular line of questioning that is promising for the defense theory of the case. ¶39 “ ‘[A]ny allegation of suppression boils down to an assessment of what the State knows at trial in comparison to the knowledge held by the defense.’ ”Dupuy, 760 F.2d at 1501 n.5 (quoting Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 96 , 87 S. Ct. 793 , 17 L. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Yates v. Evatt
green
2 sentences2010App. 799 , 236 P.3d 897 (2010), and held the knowledge instruction created an impermissible mandatory presumption, which in that case was harmless under Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 , 111 S. Ct. 1884 , 114 L. 2010App. 799 , 236 P.3d 897 (2010), and held the knowledge instruction created an impermissible mandatory presumption, which in that case was harmless under Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 , 111 S. Ct. 1884 , 114 L. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Atkins
green
2 sentences2010This court considered an identical challenge in State v. Atkins, 156 Wash.App. 799 , 236 P.3d 897 (2010), and held the knowledge instruction created an impermissible mandatory presumption, which in that case was harmless under Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 , 111 S.Ct. 1884 , 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991). [31] 140 Wash.App. 858 , 166 P.3d 1268 (2007). [32] Id. at 862, 166 P.3d 1268 . [33] Id. at 863-64, 166 P.3d 1268 . [34] Id. at 865, 166 P.3d 1268 . [35] Id. at 866-68, 166 P.3d 1268 . [36] Id. at 868, 166 P.3d 1268 . [37] 136 Wash.App. 720 , 150 P.3d 627 (2007). [38] Id. at 728 , 150 P.3d 627 . [39] 2010App. 799 , 236 P.3d 897 (2010), and held the knowledge instruction created an impermissible mandatory presumption, which in that case was harmless under Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 , 111 S. Ct. 1884 , 114 L. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Keend
green
2 sentences2010This court considered an identical challenge in State v. Atkins, 156 Wash.App. 799 , 236 P.3d 897 (2010), and held the knowledge instruction created an impermissible mandatory presumption, which in that case was harmless under Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 , 111 S.Ct. 1884 , 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991). [31] 140 Wash.App. 858 , 166 P.3d 1268 (2007). [32] Id. at 862, 166 P.3d 1268 . [33] Id. at 863-64, 166 P.3d 1268 . [34] Id. at 865, 166 P.3d 1268 . [35] Id. at 866-68, 166 P.3d 1268 . [36] Id. at 868, 166 P.3d 1268 . [37] 136 Wash.App. 720 , 150 P.3d 627 (2007). [38] Id. at 728 , 150 P.3d 627 . [39] 2010Ed. 2d 432 (1991). 140 Wn. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2009The court held that, in order for the defendant to be convicted of the offense, the State was required to prove that "a defendant knows, or should know, the characteristics of the firearm that make it unlawful." Williams, 158 Wash.2d at 905 , 148 P.3d 993 . ¶ 45 That is very different from the knowledge requirement proposed by Releford, which would, in essence, have required that Releford know not only that he possessed the weapon, but also that the weapon could be rendered functional with relative ease. 2009The court held that, in order for the defendant to be convicted of the offense, the State was required to prove that “a defendant knows, or should know, the characteristics of the firearm that make it unlawful.” Williams, 158 Wn.2d at 905 . ¶45 That is very different from the knowledge requirement proposed by Releford, which would, in essence, have required that Releford know not only that he possessed the weapon, but also that the weapon could be rendered functional with relative ease. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Glaubach v. Regence BlueShield
green
2 sentences2007This is an absurd result and "we avoid readings of statutes that result in unlikely, absurd or strained results." Glaubach v. Regence BlueShield, 149 Wash.2d 827, 833 , 74 P.3d 115 (2003). ¶ 22 The Department interprets the requirement of an employer's knowledge of the violation to mean that the employer knows of the hazardous conduct or condition but need not know about the specific behavior that led to the citation. 2007This is an absurd result, and “[w]e avoid readings of statutes that result in unlikely, absurd, or strained consequences.” Glaubach v. Regence BlueShield, 149 Wn.2d 827, 833 , 74 P.3d 115 (2003). ¶22 The Department interprets the requirement of an employer’s knowledge of the violation to mean that the employer knows of the hazardous conduct or condition but need not know about the specific behavior that led to the citation. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
| Glaubach v. Regence Blueshield green | 2 | 2007–2007 |
| Zurla v. State green | 2 | 2005–2006 |
| Staples v. United States green | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Scott green | 2 | 2005–2006 |
| State v. Johnson green | 2 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Anderson green | 2 | 2003–2004 |
| State v. Carver green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| City of Seattle v. Ivan green | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| In Re the Personal Restraint of Hews green | 2 | 2000–2000 |
| In Re the Personal Restraint of Hews green | 2 | 2000–2000 |
| Dawkins v. State green | 2 | 2000–2000 |
| State v. Simmons green | 2 | 1982–1982 |
| State v. Crittenden green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Cummings v. Future Nissan green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Manussier green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Bonner green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Manussier green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| In re the Personal Restraint of Carter neutral | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Wiltse v. Albertson's Inc. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Potelco, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industries green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Erickson v. Wick green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Leech green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.