knowledge requirement in Missouri

1973The law does not contemplate that when one seeking this writ is possessed of the knowledge of the error of facts and has other equally effective remedies which he fails to invoke, that he may thereafter seek to assail the integrity of the judgment upon the strength of such concealed facts, when its timely disclosure would have afforded relief, State v. Richardson, 291 Mo. 566, 577 , 237 S.W. 765, 768 [3] (banc 1922); Blodgett v. State, supra, and he may not now complain of his failure to disclose facts that he knew existed at the time of his plea of guilty and sentencing.

1973The law does not contemplate that when one seeking this writ is possessed of the knowledge of the error of facts and has other equally effective remedies which he fails to invoke, that he may thereafter seek to assail the integrity of the judgment upon the strength of such concealed facts, when its timely disclosure would have afforded relief, State v. Richardson, 291 Mo. 566, 577 , 237 S.W. 765, 768 [3] (banc 1922); Blodgett v. State, supra, and he may not now complain of his failure to disclose facts that he knew existed at the time of his plea of guilty and sentencing.

2024Compare MAI 10.02 [2008 Revision] Negligence Constituting Conscious Disregard for Others (which was utilized in the instant case and omits the knowledge requirement), with MAI 10.07 [2008 Revision] Modification of MAI 10.02 – Submission of Specific 25 that [a] particular [injury] occurred.” Alcorn, 50 S.W.3d at 248 .

2024“A defendant’s aggressive defense at trial on either the issue of breach of duty or causation may supply, in the jurors’ minds, the ‘complete indifference’ or ‘conscious disregard’ element.” Id.

2024Id. at 759, 773 ; see Hoover’s Dairy, Acts and Knowledge (which includes the knowledge requirement).

2008See State v. McQuary, 173 S.W.3d 663 (Mo.App.

2000Considering all of these matters together with the knowledge that the doctrine of forum non conveniens is to be applied with caution and only upon a clear showing of inconvenience and when the ends of justice require it (Blankenship v. Saitz, 682 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Mo.App.E.D.1984)), we are compelled to the conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ford’s motion on the basis of this doctrine.

2000Rather, the ordinance imposes upon a dog owner the affirmative obligation to ensure that the dog either remains in the yard or is restrained on a leash under the control of a responsible person “so as to effectively prevent [the dog] from biting any person or animal.” Defendant relies on Monteer v. Prospectors Lounge Inc., 821 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Mo.App.1992) and cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that there must be a showing of some element of knowledge, consent or fault to make out a violation of a leash law.

1995Annen argues on appeal that no expert testimony was needed because negligent supervision comes within the common knowledge exception to the requirement of expert testimony, citing Jaeger v. Henningson, Durham & Richardson, Inc., 714 F.2d 773, 776 (8th Cir.1983). 4 Annen’s instruction sub *22 mitted that Verslues was negligent by failing to inspect the roof installation for defects and to make certain that a coating was placed on the roof.

1994Oster v. Kribs Ford, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 348, 356 (Mo.App.1983). b.