knowledge requirement in Illinois

2024In determining whether a Krankel inquiry was sufficient, a reviewing court should consider three factors: “(1) whether there was some interchange between the trial court and defense counsel regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegedly ineffective representation, (2) the 5 sufficiency of defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance, and (3) the trial court’s knowledge of defense counsel’s performance at trial and the sufficiency of the defendant’s allegations on their face.” Schnoor, 2019 IL App (4th) 170571, ¶ 71 (citing Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78-79 ).

2020Three factors to consider when deciding whether the Krankel inquiry was sufficient include “(1) whether there was some interchange between the trial court and defense counsel regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegedly ineffective representation, (2) the sufficiency of defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance, and (3) the trial court’s knowledge of defense counsel’s performance at trial and the sufficiency of the defendant’s allegations on their face.” People v. Schnoor, 2019 IL App (4th) 170571, ¶ 71 , (citing Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78-79 ). ¶ 27 In People v

2020See People v. Harris, 2017 IL App (1st) 140777, ¶ 45 , -6- 74 N.E.3d 1 (finding that the legislature could have amended the aggravated vehicular hijacking statute to clarify a knowledge requirement).

2019Again, we note that had the legislature intended to impose such a knowledge requirement, it could easily have done so by amending section 18-4 to specify a mental state for the circumstances elevating the offense to its aggravated form.” Id.

2020Three factors to consider when deciding whether the Krankel inquiry was sufficient include “(1) whether there was some interchange between the trial court and defense counsel regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegedly ineffective representation, (2) the sufficiency of defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance, and (3) the trial court’s knowledge of defense counsel’s performance at trial and the sufficiency of the defendant’s allegations on their face.” People v. Schnoor, 2019 IL App (4th) 170571, ¶ 71 , (citing Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78-79 ). ¶ 27 In People v

2020Three factors to consider when deciding whether the Krankel inquiry was sufficient include “(1) whether there was some interchange between the trial court and defense counsel regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegedly ineffective representation, (2) the sufficiency of defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance, and (3) the trial court’s knowledge of defense counsel’s performance at trial and the sufficiency of the defendant’s allegations on their face.” People v. Schnoor, 2019 IL App (4th) 170571, ¶ 71 , (citing Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78-79 ). ¶ 27 In People v

2022Id. at 550.

2022Id. at 550.

2022O’Brien, 197 Ill. 2d at 95.

2022O’Brien, 197 Ill. 2d at 95.

2014People v. Childs, 159 Ill. 2d 217, 228-29 (1994) (failing to respond to question asked by jury, or responding in a way that fails to answer the question, may be as prejudicial as a response that is inaccurate, misleading, or likely to direct a verdict one way or another). ¶ 24 In so finding, we reject the State's argument that because the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of the offense of possession of a firearm by repeating the statutory language defining the offense contained in section 24-5(b) and also instructed the jury that possession may be actual or constructive, the cou

2014People v. Childs, 159 Ill. 2d 217, 228-29 (1994) (failing to respond to question asked by jury, or responding in a way that fails to answer the question, may be as prejudicial as a response that is inaccurate, misleading, or likely to direct a verdict one way or another). ¶ 24 In so finding, we reject the State’s argument that because the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of the offense of possession of a firearm by repeating the statutory language defining the offense contained in section 24-5(b) and also instructed the jury that possession may be actual or constructive, the cou

2000See also People v. Johns, 153 Ill.2d 436, 446 , 180 Ill.Dec. 254 , 607 N.E.2d 148 (1992) (reiterating the Tolliver holding that the required mental state for section 4-104(a)(2) is criminal knowledge or criminal purpose); but see Tolliver, 147 Ill.2d at 403-06 , 168 Ill.Dec. 127 , 589 N.E.2d 527 (Freeman, J., concurring, joined by Miller, C.J.) (finding the majority's modification of the knowledge requirement unnecessary).

2000See also People v. Johns, 153 Ill. 2d 436, 446 (1992) (reiterating the Tolliver holding that the required mental state for section 4 — 104(a)(2) is criminal knowledge or criminal purpose); but see Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d at 403-06 (Freeman, J., concurring, joined by Miller, C.J.) (finding the majority’s modification of the knowledge requirement unnecessary).

2026“A reviewing court should consider three factors when determining whether - 12 - a Krankel inquiry was sufficient: (1) whether there was some interchange between the trial court and defense counsel regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegedly ineffective representation, (2) the sufficiency of defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance, and (3) the trial court’s knowledge of defense counsel’s performance at trial and the sufficiency of the defendant’s allegations on their face.” People v. Schnoor, 2019 IL App (4th) 170571, ¶ 71 . ¶ 58 “None of these factors are

2026“A reviewing court should consider three factors when determining whether - 12 - a Krankel inquiry was sufficient: (1) whether there was some interchange between the trial court and defense counsel regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegedly ineffective representation, (2) the sufficiency of defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance, and (3) the trial court’s knowledge of defense counsel’s performance at trial and the sufficiency of the defendant’s allegations on their face.” People v. Schnoor, 2019 IL App (4th) 170571, ¶ 71 . ¶ 58 “None of these factors are

2019At most, the evidence at trial showed that [defendant] did not become aware of the potential risk of asbestos until the early 1970s, nearly a decade after plaintiff’s purported exposure, and that evidence pertained to the potential risk posed to individuals working directly with raw asbestos, not bystanders to the finished welding[-]rod product like plaintiff.” (Emphases in original.) Defendant notes that, in Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 35 (1980), the supreme court imposed a knowledge requirement in failure-to-warn cases: the plaintiff had to “prove that the defendant manufact

2018At most, the evidence at trial showed that [defendant] did not become aware of the potential risk of asbestos until the early 1970s, nearly a decade after plaintiff's purported exposure, and that evidence pertained to the potential risk posed to individuals working directly with raw asbestos, not bystanders to the finished welding[-]rod product like plaintiff." (Emphases in original.) Defendant notes that, in Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co. , 79 Ill. 2d 26 , 35, 37 Ill.Dec. 304 , 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980), the supreme court imposed a knowledge requirement in failure-to-warn cases: the plaintiff had t

2000See also People v. Johns, 153 Ill.2d 436, 446 , 180 Ill.Dec. 254 , 607 N.E.2d 148 (1992) (reiterating the Tolliver holding that the required mental state for section 4-104(a)(2) is criminal knowledge or criminal purpose); but see Tolliver, 147 Ill.2d at 403-06 , 168 Ill.Dec. 127 , 589 N.E.2d 527 (Freeman, J., concurring, joined by Miller, C.J.) (finding the majority's modification of the knowledge requirement unnecessary).

2000See also People v. Johns, 153 Ill. 2d 436, 446 (1992) (reiterating the Tolliver holding that the required mental state for section 4 — 104(a)(2) is criminal knowledge or criminal purpose); but see Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d at 403-06 (Freeman, J., concurring, joined by Miller, C.J.) (finding the majority’s modification of the knowledge requirement unnecessary).

2025See People v. Ringland, 2017 IL 119484, ¶ 37 (declining to reach an issue not essential to the disposition of the appeal). ¶ 26 Although Wilson did not expressly adopt the knowledge requirement mentioned in Samson, this court has since held that a suspicionless search under Illinois’s mandatory search condition is unreasonable when the officer conducting the search lacked advance knowledge that the person being searched was on Illinois MSR.