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18 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. McCallumgreen2 sentences1996Demonstrating a “willful refusal to know” will also be sufficient to pass the first step of the test for actual malice, if the plaintiff can show that the defendant “ ‘believes that it is probable that something is a fact, but deliberately shuts his or her eyes or avoids making reasonable inquiry with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth.’ ” Godwin, 340 Md. at 360 , 667 A.2d at 128 (quoting State v. McCallum, 321 Md. 451, 458 , 583 A.2d 250, 253 (1991) (Chasanow, J. concurring)). 1996Demonstrating a “willful refusal to know” will also be sufficient to pass the first step of the test for actual malice, if the plaintiff can show that the defendant “ ‘believes that it is probable that something is a fact, but deliberately shuts his or her eyes or avoids making reasonable inquiry with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth.’ ” Godwin, 340 Md. at 360 , 667 A.2d at 128 (quoting State v. McCallum, 321 Md. 451, 458 , 583 A.2d 250, 253 (1991) (Chasanow, J. concurring)). | 2 | 2 |
Dawkins v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Writing for the Court, Judge Eldridge discussed the knowledge requirement of § 287 in Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 649 , 547 A.2d 1041, 1046 (1988): [A]n individual ordinarily would not be deemed to exercise ‘dominion or control’ over an object about which he is unaware. 1997Writing for the Court, Judge Eldridge discussed the knowledge requirement of § 287 in Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 649 , 547 A.2d 1041, 1046 (1988): [A]n individual ordinarily would not be deemed to exercise ‘dominion or control’ over an object about which he is unaware. | 1 | 4 |
Warfield v. Stategreen2 sentences1999The language of Art. 27, § 577(a)(3), crafted nearly a century ago, foreshadowed a statement from the Model Penal Code regarding the mental intent element of criminal trespass, quoted with approval in Warfield v. State, 315 Md. 474 , 554 A.2d 1238 (1989): The knowledge requirement is designed primarily to exclude from criminal liability both the inadvertent trespasser and the trespasser who believes that he has received an express or implied permission to enter or remain. 1999The language of Art. 27, § 577(a)(3), crafted nearly a century ago, foreshadowed a statement from the Model Penal Code regarding the mental intent element of criminal trespass, quoted with approval in Warfield v. State, 315 Md. 474 , 554 A.2d 1238 (1989): The knowledge requirement is designed primarily to exclude from criminal liability both the inadvertent trespasser and the trespasser who believes that he has received an express or implied permission to enter or remain. | 1 | 3 |
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobiagreen2 sentences1996To meet the knowledge requirement of the Zenobia test for actual malice, a plaintiff must show more than constructive knowledge: “[t]he plaintiff must show that the defendant actually knew of the defect and of the danger of the product at the time the product left the defendant’s possession or control.” Zenobia, 325 Md. at 462 , 601 A.2d at 653-54 (emphasis in original). 1996To meet the knowledge requirement of the Zenobia test for actual malice, a plaintiff must show more than constructive knowledge: “[t]he plaintiff must show that the defendant actually knew of the defect and of the danger of the product at the time the product left the defendant’s possession or control.” Zenobia, 325 Md. at 462 , 601 A.2d at 653-54 (emphasis in original). | 1 | 3 |
Garnett v. Stategreen2 sentences2025These verbs naturally presuppose knowledge of the entity’s nature. 5 Although we recognized in Lawerence that these verbs tended to suggest a knowledge requirement, “[r]elying on the doctrine of stare decisis,” we held that the General Assembly intended CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i) to be a strict liability offense, and also observed that the text, structure, and legislative history of CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i) overcame the “longstanding presumption that criminal offenses contain mens rea as an element[.]” Lawrence, 475 Md. at 390 ; see also Garnett, 332 Md. at 585 (reasoning that the text, structure, and leg 2025Id. at 585-86 (citations omitted). 4 The majority offers no reason why the principle that animated the Court’s decisions in Lawrence and Garnett—the same one that the majority relied on in rejecting Mr. Williams’s argument that section 9-805 requires specific intent—should not likewise counsel against grafting a knowledge requirement onto section 9-805. | 1 | 2 |
State of Maryland Central Collection Unit v. Jordangreen2 sentences2017We explained, “The Legislature’s omission of a mens rea requirement in [this provision] ... leads us to conclude that the Legislature deliberately chose not to make knowledge an element of the offense of maintaining the required security on an automobile.” Id. at 431-32, 952 A.2d 266 ; *521 see also Outmezguine v. State, 335 Md. 20, 43 , 641 A.2d 870 (1994) (When the surrounding provisions contained a knowledge requirement, the “conspicuous absence” of such a requirement in the offense of photographing a minor engaged in sexual activity revealed an intent to impose strict liability.); Garnett 2013Rather, the language of NR § 4-1006.1(e) indicates that as an element of the offense, DNR must provide the specific notice: That it “utiliz[ed] buoys or other visible landmarks as appropriate,” and “publish[ed], by public notice, delineations of ... and revisions to SAY protection zones.” In the past, we have stated that the absence of explicit mens rea language in a statute “does not necessarily make [a violation of the law] a strict liability offense.” Central Collection v. Jordan, 405 Md. 420, 430 , 952 A.2d 266, 272 (2008) (citations omitted); see also Outmezguine v. State, 335 Md. 20, 41 | 1 | 2 |
Outmezguine v. Stategreen2 sentences2017We explained, “The Legislature’s omission of a mens rea requirement in [this provision] ... leads us to conclude that the Legislature deliberately chose not to make knowledge an element of the offense of maintaining the required security on an automobile.” Id. at 431-32, 952 A.2d 266 ; *521 see also Outmezguine v. State, 335 Md. 20, 43 , 641 A.2d 870 (1994) (When the surrounding provisions contained a knowledge requirement, the “conspicuous absence” of such a requirement in the offense of photographing a minor engaged in sexual activity revealed an intent to impose strict liability.); Garnett 2017We explained, “The Legislature’s omission of a mens rea requirement in [this provision] ... leads us to conclude that the Legislature deliberately chose not to make knowledge an element of the offense of maintaining the required security on an automobile.” Id. at 431-32, 952 A.2d 266 ; *521 see also Outmezguine v. State, 335 Md. 20, 43 , 641 A.2d 870 (1994) (When the surrounding provisions contained a knowledge requirement, the “conspicuous absence” of such a requirement in the offense of photographing a minor engaged in sexual activity revealed an intent to impose strict liability.); Garnett | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Laneesha Colstongreen1 sentence2021Although the statute expressly contains a knowledge requirement, the Court held that that “requirement may be met by showing that the defendant knew he possessed a substance listed on the schedules, even if he did not know which substance it was.” Id. at 192 ; accord United States v. Colston, 4 F.4th 1179 (11th Cir. 2001). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Winston Eugene Mitchell, Sr.green1 sentence2005In other words, “[t]he knowledge requisite to [a] knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law.” Bryan, 524 U.S. at 192 n. 14, 118 S.Ct. 1939 (quoting with approval Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 345 , 72 S.Ct. 329 , 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting)); see also United States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir.) (quoting Bryan , and holding that the knowledge required for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (a)(2) is “ ‘knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense’ ”; therefore, actual knowledge that it | 1 | 1 |
Sealover v. Carey Canadagreen1 sentence1994Dist. of Independence v. U.S. Gypsum, 750 S.W.2d 442, 448 (Mo.Ct.App.1988) (upholding the exclusion of the Wetzel documents on the ground that they failed to satisfy the actual knowledge standard); Sealover v. Carey Canada, 793 F.Supp. 569, 577-578 (M.D.Pa.1992) (similarly holding that the Wetzel documents do not equate to actual knowledge). | 1 | 1 |
School District of Independence, No. 30 v. U.S. Gypsum Co.green1 sentence1994Dist. of Independence v. U.S. Gypsum, 750 S.W.2d 442, 448 (Mo.Ct.App.1988) (upholding the exclusion of the Wetzel documents on the ground that they failed to satisfy the actual knowledge standard); Sealover v. Carey Canada, 793 F.Supp. 569, 577-578 (M.D.Pa.1992) (similarly holding that the Wetzel documents do not equate to actual knowledge). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lawrence v. State
green
1 sentence2025These verbs naturally presuppose knowledge of the entity’s nature. 5 Although we recognized in Lawerence that these verbs tended to suggest a knowledge requirement, “[r]elying on the doctrine of stare decisis,” we held that the General Assembly intended CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i) to be a strict liability offense, and also observed that the text, structure, and legislative history of CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i) overcame the “longstanding presumption that criminal offenses contain mens rea as an element[.]” Lawrence, 475 Md. at 390 ; see also Garnett, 332 Md. at 585 (reasoning that the text, structure, and leg | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Chow v. State
green
2 sentences2022While Petitioners cite Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638 , 547 A.2d 1041 (1988), and Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431 , 903 A.2d 388 (2006), for the proposition that Pub. 2022While Petitioners cite Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638 , 547 A.2d 1041 (1988), and Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431 , 903 A.2d 388 (2006), for the proposition that Pub. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Chavis v. Blibaum & Assoc. Moore v. Peak Mgmt.
green
1 sentence2021Md. 1999), that the knowledge requirement “does not immunize debt collectors from liability for mistakes of law.” The Chavis Court opined that the language in the Spencer opinion saying that “debt collectors ‘must be held to be aware of laws affecting the validity of their collection efforts’ means that, where the law is settled at the time a collector takes a contrary position in claiming a right, the collector’s recklessness in failing to discover the contrary authority is equivalent to ‘aware[ness]’ (i.e., actual knowledge) of the authority.” Chavis, 476 Md. at 566-67 , Slip op. at 30-31 (q | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In Re Kaela C.
green
1 sentence2017When interpreting a regulation, we must read each provision in the context of the regulatory scheme to ensure that “no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered surplus-age, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory.” In re Kaela C., 394 Md. 432, 467 , 906 A.2d 915 (2006) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
In re Kaela C.
green
1 sentence2017When interpreting a regulation, we must read each provision in the context of the regulatory scheme to ensure that “no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered surplus-age, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory.” In re Kaela C., 394 Md. 432, 467 , 906 A.2d 915 (2006) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Kougl v. Board of Liquor License Commissioners
neutral
2 sentences2017Id. at 331 , 137 A.3d 1062 . 2017Id. at 331 , 137 A.3d 1062 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Lexington Market Authority v. Zappala
green
2 sentences2007An unambiguous statement of the knowledge requirement is that by Judge Henderson for the Court of Appeals in Lexington Market Authority v. Zappala, 233 Md. 444, 445-46 , 197 A.2d 147 (1964): The plaintiff was a business invitee, to whom the proprietor owed a duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition. 2007An unambiguous statement of the knowledge requirement is that by Judge Henderson for the Court of Appeals in Lexington Market Authority v. Zappala, 233 Md. 444, 445-46 , 197 A.2d 147 (1964): The plaintiff was a business invitee, to whom the proprietor owed a duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Moore v. American Stores Co.
green
2 sentences2007Nalee, Inc. v. Jacobs, 228 Md. 525, 529 , 180 A.2d 677 ; Rawls v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 207 Md. 113, 117 , 113 A.2d 405 ; Moore v. American Stores Co., 169 Md. 541, 546 , 182 A. 436 . 2007Nalee, Inc. v. Jacobs, 228 Md. 525, 529 , 180 A.2d 677 ; Rawls v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 207 Md. 113, 117 , 113 A.2d 405 ; Moore v. American Stores Co., 169 Md. 541, 546 , 182 A. 436 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Rawls v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co.
green
2 sentences2007Nalee, Inc. v. Jacobs, 228 Md. 525, 529 , 180 A.2d 677 ; Rawls v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 207 Md. 113, 117 , 113 A.2d 405 ; Moore v. American Stores Co., 169 Md. 541, 546 , 182 A. 436 . 2007Nalee, Inc. v. Jacobs, 228 Md. 525, 529 , 180 A.2d 677 ; Rawls v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 207 Md. 113, 117 , 113 A.2d 405 ; Moore v. American Stores Co., 169 Md. 541, 546 , 182 A. 436 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Nalee, Inc. v. Jacobs
green
2 sentences2007Nalee, Inc. v. Jacobs, 228 Md. 525, 529 , 180 A.2d 677 ; Rawls v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 207 Md. 113, 117 , 113 A.2d 405 ; Moore v. American Stores Co., 169 Md. 541, 546 , 182 A. 436 . 2007Nalee, Inc. v. Jacobs, 228 Md. 525, 529 , 180 A.2d 677 ; Rawls v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 207 Md. 113, 117 , 113 A.2d 405 ; Moore v. American Stores Co., 169 Md. 541, 546 , 182 A. 436 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States
green
2 sentences2005In other words, “[t]he knowledge requisite to [a] knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law.” Bryan, 524 U.S. at 192 n. 14, 118 S.Ct. 1939 (quoting with approval Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 345 , 72 S.Ct. 329 , 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting)); see also United States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir.) (quoting Bryan , and holding that the knowledge required for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (a)(2) is “ ‘knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense’ ”; therefore, actual knowledge that it 2005In other words, “[t]he knowledge requisite to [a] knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law.” Bryan, 524 U.S. at 192 n. 14, 118 S.Ct. 1939 (quoting with approval Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 345 , 72 S.Ct. 329 , 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting)); see also United States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir.) (quoting Bryan , and holding that the knowledge required for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (a)(2) is “ ‘knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense’ ”; therefore, actual knowledge that it | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Bryan v. United States
green
2 sentences2005In other words, “[t]he knowledge requisite to [a] knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law.” Bryan, 524 U.S. at 192 n. 14, 118 S.Ct. 1939 (quoting with approval Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 345 , 72 S.Ct. 329 , 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting)); see also United States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir.) (quoting Bryan , and holding that the knowledge required for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (a)(2) is “ ‘knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense’ ”; therefore, actual knowledge that it 2005In other words, “[t]he knowledge requisite to [a] knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law.” Bryan, 524 U.S. at 192 n. 14, 118 S.Ct. 1939 (quoting with approval Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 345 , 72 S.Ct. 329 , 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting)); see also United States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir.) (quoting Bryan , and holding that the knowledge required for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (a)(2) is “ ‘knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense’ ”; therefore, actual knowledge that it | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Bell v. Valdez
green
1 sentence2005In other words, “[t]he knowledge requisite to [a] knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law.” Bryan, 524 U.S. at 192 n. 14, 118 S.Ct. 1939 (quoting with approval Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 345 , 72 S.Ct. 329 , 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting)); see also United States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir.) (quoting Bryan , and holding that the knowledge required for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (a)(2) is “ ‘knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense’ ”; therefore, actual knowledge that it | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Melton v. United States
green
1 sentence2005In other words, “[t]he knowledge requisite to [a] knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law.” Bryan, 524 U.S. at 192 n. 14, 118 S.Ct. 1939 (quoting with approval Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 345 , 72 S.Ct. 329 , 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting)); see also United States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir.) (quoting Bryan , and holding that the knowledge required for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (a)(2) is “ ‘knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense’ ”; therefore, actual knowledge that it | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Brown v. Dermer
green
1 sentence2000Id. 4 *353 We granted certiorari in this case, Brown v. Dermer, 350 Md. 279 , 711 A.2d 871 (1998), to determine whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment, and to clarify the knowledge requirement in lead paint poisoning negligence actions based upon a violation of the housing code. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
ACandS, Inc. v. Godwin
green
2 sentences1996Demonstrating a “willful refusal to know” will also be sufficient to pass the first step of the test for actual malice, if the plaintiff can show that the defendant “ ‘believes that it is probable that something is a fact, but deliberately shuts his or her eyes or avoids making reasonable inquiry with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth.’ ” Godwin, 340 Md. at 360 , 667 A.2d at 128 (quoting State v. McCallum, 321 Md. 451, 458 , 583 A.2d 250, 253 (1991) (Chasanow, J. concurring)). 1996Demonstrating a “willful refusal to know” will also be sufficient to pass the first step of the test for actual malice, if the plaintiff can show that the defendant “ ‘believes that it is probable that something is a fact, but deliberately shuts his or her eyes or avoids making reasonable inquiry with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth.’ ” Godwin, 340 Md. at 360 , 667 A.2d at 128 (quoting State v. McCallum, 321 Md. 451, 458 , 583 A.2d 250, 253 (1991) (Chasanow, J. concurring)). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Bresson
green
1 sentence1995Id., 554 N.E.2d at 1334-36 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
cluster 454294
green
1 sentence1994Nonetheless, as we noted in Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, supra, 325 Md. at 444 , 601 A.2d at 645 , quoting Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., supra, 765 F.2d at 461 , the “actual knowledge of an individual manufacturer is not the issue.” State of the art “includes all of the available knowledge on a subject at a given time, and this includes scientific, medical, engineering, and any other knowledge that may be available.” Zenobia, supra, 325 Md. at 434 , 601 A.2d at 639 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Mempa v. Rhay
green
1 sentence1969The question is whether Mempa v. Rhay, supra, affects these rules, and if so, to what extent. *322 The consolidated cases decided in Mempa 5 raised “the question of the extent of the right to counsel at the time of sentencing where the sentencing has been deferred subject to probation.” 6 389 U. S. 130 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.