57 New York opinions name it 7 courts 1898–2026 17 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wright v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2024General knowledge that a wrong has been committed is not enough to satisfy the actual knowledge requirement (see Matter of Devivo v Town of Carmel, 68 AD3d 991 [2d Dept 2009]; Matter of Wright v City of New York, 66 AD3d 1037 [2d Dept 2009]). 2016General knowledge that a wrong has been committed is not enough to satisfy the actual knowledge requirement (see Matter of Devivo v Town of Carmel, 68 AD3d 991, 992 [2009]; Matter of Wright v City of New York, 66 AD3d 1037, 1038 [2009]). | 2 | 3 |
Devivo v. Town of Carmelgreen2 sentences2024General knowledge that a wrong has been committed is not enough to satisfy the actual knowledge requirement (see Matter of Devivo v Town of Carmel, 68 AD3d 991 [2d Dept 2009]; Matter of Wright v City of New York, 66 AD3d 1037 [2d Dept 2009]). 2016General knowledge that a wrong has been committed is not enough to satisfy the actual knowledge requirement (see Matter of Devivo v Town of Carmel, 68 AD3d 991, 992 [2009]; Matter of Wright v City of New York, 66 AD3d 1037, 1038 [2009]). | 2 | 3 |
Wally G., an Infant,by His Mother and Natural Guardian, Yoselin T. v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (Metropolitan Hospital)green2 sentences2023Corp. [Metro Hosp.] , 27 NY3d 672, 677 [2016], rearg denied 28 NY3d 905 [2016]). 2018The actual knowledge requirement "contemplates actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim,' not knowledge of a specific legal theory" ( Wally G. , 27 NY3d at 677 , quoting Williams , 6 NY3d at 537 ). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Ramosgreen2 sentences2021In contrast, the knowledge requirement under the New York Penal Law sections relevant here "demands proof of 'knowledge that the item at issue was, in fact, the controlled substance the defendant is charged with selling or possessing'" ( Muhammad , 168 AD3d at 549, quoting People v Ramos , 145 AD3d 432, 433 [1st Dept 2016]). 2019This was broader than the knowledge requirement under Penal Law § 220.16, which demands proof of "knowledge that the item at issue was, in fact, the controlled substance the defendant is charged with selling or possessing" ( People v Ramos , 145 AD3d 432, 433 [1st Dept 2016]). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Martingreen1 sentence2026For example, in People v Martin ( 153 AD2d 807, 808 [1st Dept 1989], lv denied 74 NY2d 950 [1989]), we held, in a different context, that "Penal Law § 220.16(1) does not distinguish between the types of narcotics possessed, but treats all drugs classified as narcotics interchangeably." Under the correct definition of the nature of the substance possessed, defendant's federal conviction and Penal Law § 220.16(1) are strictly equivalent. | 1 | 1 |
Metzger v. . &198tna Ins. Co.green1 sentence2023The fact remains that because respondent signed the stockholder agreements, he is presumed to have read and understood its contents, the rights conferred therein, and as relevant here, his belief that petitioner did not own any shares ( Pimpinello at 162; Metzger at 416; Renee Knitwear Corp. at 216; Barclays Bank of New York, N.A. at 493; Slater at 81). | 1 | 1 |
Pimpinello v. Swift & Co.green1 sentence2023The fact remains that because respondent signed the stockholder agreements, he is presumed to have read and understood its contents, the rights conferred therein, and as relevant here, his belief that petitioner did not own any shares ( Pimpinello at 162; Metzger at 416; Renee Knitwear Corp. at 216; Barclays Bank of New York, N.A. at 493; Slater at 81). | 1 | 1 |
Elizabeth Gordon v. New York City Board of Educationgreen1 sentence2023To satisfy the knowledge requirement on a retaliation claim, nothing "more is necessary than general corporate knowledge that the plaintiff has engaged in a protected activity" ( Gordon v New York City Bd. of Educ. , 232 F3d 111, 117 [2d Cir 2000]). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Dusch v. Erie County Med. Ctr.green1 sentence2021"The actual knowledge requirement of General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) contemplates actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim, not knowledge of a specific legal theory" ( Dusch , 184 AD3d at 1170 [internal quotation marks omitted]). | 1 | 1 |
Noble Drilling Services, Inc. v. Certex USA, Inc.green1 sentence2020"To satisfy the knowledge requirement, the case law requires that the non-signatory [] had actual knowledge of the contract containing the arbitration clause" ( Noble Drilling Servs., Inc. v Certex USA, Inc., 620 F3d 469, 473 [5th Cir 2010]). | 1 | 1 |
Ranegas-Nobles v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp.green1 sentence2010Corp., 184 AD2d 379, 380 [1992]). | 1 | 1 |
Varsity Transit, Inc. v. Board of Educationgreen1 sentence2009The Town’s prior knowledge of a claim, however, does not preclude its assertion of a notice of claim defense (see Varsity Tr., Inc. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 5 NY3d 532, 536 [2005]; Parochial Bus Sys. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 539, 548 [1983]; Walter H. | 1 | 1 |
Parochial Bus Systems, Inc. v. Board of Educationgreen1 sentence2009The Town’s prior knowledge of a claim, however, does not preclude its assertion of a notice of claim defense (see Varsity Tr., Inc. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 5 NY3d 532, 536 [2005]; Parochial Bus Sys. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 539, 548 [1983]; Walter H. | 1 | 1 |
National Westminster Bank USA v. Wekselgreen1 sentence2008The motion court correctly applied an actual knowledge standard in deciding that plaintiffs allegations are insufficient to state a cause of action against defendant-respondent for aiding and abetting defendant-appellant’s alleged fraud (see National Westminster Bank v Weksel, 124 AD2d 144, 149 [1987], lv denied 70 NY2d 604 [1987]; see also JP Morgan Chase Bank v Winnick, 406 F Supp 2d 247 , 252 n 4 [SD NY 2005]; cf. Williams v Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, L.L.P., 38 AD3d 219, 220 [2007]). | 1 | 1 |
JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Winnickgreen1 sentence2008The motion court correctly applied an actual knowledge standard in deciding that plaintiffs allegations are insufficient to state a cause of action against defendant-respondent for aiding and abetting defendant-appellant’s alleged fraud (see National Westminster Bank v Weksel, 124 AD2d 144, 149 [1987], lv denied 70 NY2d 604 [1987]; see also JP Morgan Chase Bank v Winnick, 406 F Supp 2d 247 , 252 n 4 [SD NY 2005]; cf. Williams v Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, L.L.P., 38 AD3d 219, 220 [2007]). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, L.L.P.green1 sentence2008The motion court correctly applied an actual knowledge standard in deciding that plaintiffs allegations are insufficient to state a cause of action against defendant-respondent for aiding and abetting defendant-appellant’s alleged fraud (see National Westminster Bank v Weksel, 124 AD2d 144, 149 [1987], lv denied 70 NY2d 604 [1987]; see also JP Morgan Chase Bank v Winnick, 406 F Supp 2d 247 , 252 n 4 [SD NY 2005]; cf. Williams v Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, L.L.P., 38 AD3d 219, 220 [2007]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Colongreen1 sentence2007Nor did defendant object during an earlier charge conference in which the trial court agreed with the prosecutor’s contention that “the knowledge requirement should only apply to the selling of the CD and not to whether or not the name and address . . . appears.” Thereafter, the trial court issued a written decision, inter alia, explaining this ruling ( 8 Misc 3d 569, 577-580 [2005]). | 1 | 1 |
| People v. DiFalcogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Claim of Belluci v. Tip Top Farms, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Flower v. . Lancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Grande v. City of New York
green
2 sentences2026Corp., 158 AD3d 401 , 403 [1st Dept 2018]; Matter of Grande v City of New York, 48 AD3d 565 [2nd Dept 2008]). 2026Corp. , 158 AD3d 401 , 403 [1st Dept 2018]; Matter of Grande v City of New York , 48 AD3d 565 [2nd Dept 2008]). | 10 | 2024–2026 |
People v. Ryan
green
2 sentences2006There, the Legislature provided that the defendant was guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree “when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses: ... 5. six hundred twenty-five milligrams of a hallucinogen.” (Ryan, 82 NY2d at 501 .) Given the particular wording of this statute, the Court could “discern no ‘clear’ legislative intent to make the weight of a drug a strict liability element.” (Id. at 503.) The Court made this finding, in part, because “the knowledge requirement carrie [d] through to the end of the sentence” defining the crime. 1995Although we cannot simply read the knowledge requirement out of the statute, these 'compelling practical considerations’ may inform our interpretation of that element (see, People v Mizell, 72 NY2d, at 654)” ( 82 NY2d, at 505 ). | 5 | 1994–2006 |
Williams v. Nassau County Medical Center
green
2 sentences2023The actual knowledge requirement of General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) "contemplates 'actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim,' not knowledge of a specific legal theory" ( Williams , 6 NY3d at 537 ; see Wally G. v New York City Health & Hosps. 2020The actual knowledge requirement of General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) "contemplates actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim,' not knowledge of a specific legal theory" ( Williams , 6 NY3d at 537 ; see Wally G. v New York City Health & Hosps. | 3 | 2018–2023 |
Figueroa v. Mandel
green
2 sentences2023Corp. [Metro Hosp.] , 27 NY3d 672, 677 [2016], rearg denied 28 NY3d 905 [2016]). 2020Corp. [Metro Hosp.] , 27 NY3d 672, 677 [2016], rearg denied 28 NY3d 905 [2016]). | 2 | 2020–2023 |
People v. Bigelow
green
2 sentences2002The knowledge requirement was satisfied by the informant being present with defendant and witnessing the cocaine prepared for resale while in defendant’s apartment, and was corroborated by police observation of Owens — who was another participant that the informant stated was present — entering and exiting the apartment {see People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423-424 ). 2000Turning first to the basis of the knowledge test, we find that it was easily satisfied inasmuch as Bozeman and Wade personally observed defendant’s criminal activity (see, People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423 ). | 2 | 2000–2002 |
Commonwealth v. Sweeting
green
1 sentence2021The knowledge requirement of the Pennsylvania statute at issue here is satisfied when it is established that the defendant knew he or she possessed an illegal substance, without the necessity of a showing that he or she knew which illegal substance was possessed ( see Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v Mohamud , 15 A3d 80, 91-92 [Pa Super 2010]; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v Sweeting , 364 Pa Super 626, 528 A2d 978 [1987], appeal denied 517 Pa 606, 536 A2d 1331 [1987]). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Monforte
green
1 sentence2021On remand, defendant argued that the Pennsylvania conviction could not serve as a predicate [*2]felony, relying on our intervening decision in People v Muhammad ( 168 AD3d 549 [1st Dept 2019], lv denied 33 NY3d 979 [2019]), wherein we found that the "knowledge element" of a Florida statute similar to the Pennsylvania statute was "broader than the knowledge requirement under Penal Law § 220.16" ( id . at 549). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Horn Ex Rel. Horn v. Bellmore Union Free School District
green
1 sentence2018Dist., 139 AD3d 1006, 1007 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In re Carter
green
2 sentences2017Gravatt v Simpson & Brown, Inc., 532 US 957 [2001]). 2017Gravatt v Simpson & Brown, Inc. , 532 US 957 [2001]). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Gravatt v. The City Of New York
green
2 sentences2017There is no evidence that he had actual knowledge of what plaintiff intended to do and “ ‘should-have-known’ constructive knowledge is insufficient to meet the actual knowledge requirement” (Gravatt v City of New York, 226 F3d 108 , 127 n 17 [2d Cir 2000], cert denied sub nom. 2017There is no evidence that he had actual knowledge of what plaintiff intended to do and " should-have- known' constructive knowledge is insufficient to meet the actual knowledge requirement" ( Gravatt v City of New York , 226 F3d 108 , 127 n 17 [2d Cir 2000], cert denied sub nom . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Ross v. Louise Wise Services, Inc.
green
1 sentence2017The standard for punitive damages articulated in Home Insurance, while requiring an appropriate showing of heightened culpability for punitive damages consistent with the language of the provision at issue, is nevertheless properly reflective of the serious and destructive nature of the underlying discriminatory conduct and the goal of deterring "future reprehensible conduct" (Ross, 8 NY3d at 489 ). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Nostrom v. County of Suffolk
green
1 sentence2015The petitioner made these same arguments in Matter of Tax Foreclosure Action No. 51 , and the is *1166 sues already were determined by the Supreme Court (see O’Brien v City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d at 357 ; Nostrom v County of Suffolk, 100 AD3d at 974 ). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
O'Brien v. City of Syracuse
green
1 sentence2015The petitioner made these same arguments in Matter of Tax Foreclosure Action No. 51 , and the is *1166 sues already were determined by the Supreme Court (see O’Brien v City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d at 357 ; Nostrom v County of Suffolk, 100 AD3d at 974 ). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Vargas neutral | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Depczynski v. Adsco/Farrar & Trefts green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Claim of Gonzalez v. Ozalid Corp. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Sanchez green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| People v. Kilpatrick green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Hill green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Bynum green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| In Re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Reisman green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Mizell green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| State v. Bresson green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| People v. Kazmarick green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Ferrara green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Johnson green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Fuschino green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Servidio green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Lucarano green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Chung v. Kivell green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Ansare green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Sanchez green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Claim of Mealing v. Hills green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Becker v. Huss Co. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Sider v. . General Electric Co. green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Sider v. General Electric Co. green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Howard Stores Corp. v. Pope green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Munn v. Boasberg green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Rice v. Olson green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.