knowledge standard in Massachusetts

2006See Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 424 Mass. 501, 519 (1997) (“An actual knowledge standard applies to a plaintiff who argues that a breach of fiduciary duty of disclosure constitutes fraudulent concealment under G.

2005See also Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc., 424 Mass. 501, 520-521 (1997) (“The objective standard of reasonableness . . . does not displace the actual knowledge standard that has been applied to . . . conduct involving a repudiation of trust”).

2007In the more recent case Doe v. Harbor Schools, Inc., 446 Mass. 245, 255 (2006), the SJC explained: “the actual knowledge standard recognizes the dependent status of the beneficiary vis-a-vis the fiduciary, and protects the beneficiary’s legitimate expectation that the fiduciary will act with the utmost probity in all matters concerning the relationship.” Also in Doe the SJC said, “we hold that the critical event that starts the limitations period running on a claim for breach of fiduciary duly is when the plaintiff first became aware of facts giving rise to her injury by the defendant, and not

2007In the more recent case Doe v. Harbor Schools, Inc., 446 Mass. 245, 255 (2006), the SJC explained: “the actual knowledge standard recognizes the dependent status of the beneficiary vis-a-vis the fiduciary, and protects the beneficiary’s legitimate expectation that the fiduciary will act with the utmost probity in all matters concerning the relationship.” Also in Doe the SJC said, “we hold that the critical event that starts the limitations period running on a claim for breach of fiduciary duly is when the plaintiff first became aware of facts giving rise to her injury by the defendant, and not

2026In other words, the statute of limitations is tolled until "the beneficiary's harm at the fiduciary's hands has 'come home' to the beneficiary." Doe v. Harbor Sch., Inc., 446 Mass. 245, 255 (2006), quoting Akin v. Warner, 318 Mass. 669, 676 (1945).

2006See Akin v. Warner, 318 Mass. 669, 674-675 (1945).

2007Indeed, in the joint venture context, “the defendant’s knowledge requirement is satisfied by his or her knowledge that there is a substantial likelihood that the crime will be committed by the other person.” Commonwealth v. Walsh, 407 Mass. 740, 743 (1990).

1993For joint venturer criminal liability, the defendant’s knowledge requirement is satisfied by his or her knowledge that there is a substantial likelihood that the crime will be committed by the other person.” (Citations omitted.) Commonwealth v. Walsh, 407 Mass. 740, 743 (1990).

2024Co., 450 Mass. at 52 , quoting Calci, supra. "Essentially, the standard for determining actual knowledge is whether there is '[i]ntelligible information of a fact, either verbally or in writing,' or in documentation that can be registered or not." Id., quoting Emmons v. White, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 54, 65 (2003).

2024Co., 450 Mass. at 52 , quoting Calci, supra. "Essentially, the standard for determining actual knowledge is whether there is '[i]ntelligible information of a fact, either verbally or in writing,' or in documentation that can be registered or not." Id., quoting Emmons v. White, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 54, 65 (2003).

2008In this manner, the actual knowledge standard recognizes the dependent status of the beneficiary vis-á-vis the fiduciary, and protects the beneficiary’s legitimate expectation that the fiduciary will act with the utmost probity in all matters concerning the relationship.” Doe v. Harbor Schs., Inc., 63 Mass. App. Ct. 337, 449-450 (2005) (citation omitted).

2006In Doe v. Harbor Schools, Inc., 63 Mass.App.Ct. 337 (2005), 8 the Appeals Court applied the actual knowledge requirement to a claim of negligent breach of fiduciary relationship based on a claim of sexual abuse between a counselor and client, stating that, “where psychological injuries are at issue, knowledge of psychological harm flowing from another’s conduct or even knowledge that the other person’s conduct is wrong is not knowledge that the conduct violates the other person’s fiduciary obligations.” Id. at 348 .

2006In Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239 (1991), for example, we addressed a breach of fiduciary duty claim centered on a therapeutic relationship.

1997See, e.g., Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 243 (1991) (medical malpractice claims against psychotherapist); Anthony’s Pier Four, Inc. v. Crandall Dry Dock Eng’rs, Inc., 396 Mass. 818, 824-826 (1986) (express warranty of design); Cannon v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 374 Mass. 739, 742-743 (1978) (product liability); Friedman v. Jablonski, 371 Mass. 482, 485-486 (1976) (misrepresentation on sale of real estate); Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass. 83, 89 (1974) (legal malpractice for negligent certification of title to real estate). 28 The objective standard of reasonableness developed in these cases d

2022See Commonwealth v. Bolling, 462 Mass. 440, 450 (2012).

2020Commonwealth v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 916 [1976].) Cassidy's emphasis on the Legislature's decision explicitly to put the word "knowing" in the statute could be seen to have supported the defendant's argument.

2019Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 596, 600 (2007).

2017Accord Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 461 Mass. at 828 n.7.

2016The defendant also argues for the first time on appeal that the judge failed to instruct the jury on the knowledge requirement described in Britt, supra at 100, which warrants reversal of the convictions of the crimes to which the knowledge requirement applied, and the grant of a new trial.

2015In other words: “In reviewing the extent of an employer’s awareness, a court *104 ‘need only inquire whether the circumstances . . . were such that the employer either had knowledge [of overtime hours being worked] or else had the opportunity through reasonable diligence to acquire knowledge.’ ” Reich v. Department of Conservation & Natural Resources, 28 F.3d 1076, 1082 (11th Cir. 1994), quoting from Gulf King Shrimp Co. v. Wirtz, supra. To the extent that an employee has reported his hours in accordance with the employer’s mandated timekeeping procedures, the employer’s knowledge of those hou

2015Pursuant to the FLSA, an employee must prove both that he incurred unpaid overtime work, and that the employer “had actual or constructive knowledge that he was working overtime.” Prime Communications, Inc. v. Sylvester, 34 Mass. App. 708, 709 (1993). 6 The knowledge inquiry requires an assessment of what the employer knew or should have known, and is to be made in view of the employer’s “duty ... to inquire into the conditions prevailing in his business.” Gulf King Shrimp Co. v. Wirtz, 407 F.2d 508, 512 (5th Cir. 1969) (quotation omitted).

2015In other words: “In reviewing the extent of an employer’s awareness, a court *104 ‘need only inquire whether the circumstances . . . were such that the employer either had knowledge [of overtime hours being worked] or else had the opportunity through reasonable diligence to acquire knowledge.’ ” Reich v. Department of Conservation & Natural Resources, 28 F.3d 1076, 1082 (11th Cir. 1994), quoting from Gulf King Shrimp Co. v. Wirtz, supra. To the extent that an employee has reported his hours in accordance with the employer’s mandated timekeeping procedures, the employer’s knowledge of those hou

2007The actual knowledge exception was first applied in Killam v. March, 316 Mass. 646, 652 (1944), where the court held that a purchaser of registered land was subject to the encumbrance of an unregistered lease when the purchaser had actual notice through a reference to the lease in the purchase and sale agreement. 6 Registered land owners forfeit the protections afforded by the registration system when they have actual notice because the “Legislature did not intend to give certificate hold ers . . . an indefeasible title as against interests of which they had actual notice.” Id. at 651 .

2007The actual knowledge exception was first applied in Killam v. March, 316 Mass. 646, 652 (1944), where the court held that a purchaser of registered land was subject to the encumbrance of an unregistered lease when the purchaser had actual notice through a reference to the lease in the purchase and sale agreement. 6 Registered land owners forfeit the protections afforded by the registration system when they have actual notice because the “Legislature did not intend to give certificate hold ers . . . an indefeasible title as against interests of which they had actual notice.” Id. at 651 .

2007See Commonwealth v. Kilburn, 426 Mass. 31, 34 (1997); Commonwealth v. Sadberry, 44 Mass. App. Ct. at 936 .

2007See Commonwealth v. Nieves, 446 Mass. 583, 597-598 (2006) (statutes are to be interpreted to avoid unconstitutionality).

2007The Appeals Court’s analysis, id. at 668, relied on Doe v. Harbor Schs., Inc., 446 Mass 245 (2006), and applied the actual knowledge standard, which is applicable for claims involving breach of fiduciary duty, rather than the discovery rule, which hinges on when “a plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, that [he was] harmed... by the defendant’s conduct.” Phinney v. Morgan, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 202, 204 (1995).

2007See Phinney v. Morgan, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 202, 204 (1995) (applying discovery rule to G.

2007See Wild v. Constantini, 415 Mass. 663, 666 (1993) (actual knowledge where owner of parcel acknowledges the existence of right of way before land is registered that owner is bound by encumbrance even if it is not on subsequent registration certificate); One-O-Six Realty, Inc. v. Quinn, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 149, 154 (2006) (actual knowledge of easement on registered land where landowner of two abutting parcels, one registered and one unregistered, knew deed of unregistered parcel contained easement with particular provisions, and where one could not use the easement without crossing the registered

2007See Wild v. Constantini, 415 Mass. 663, 666 (1993) (actual knowledge where owner of parcel acknowledges the existence of right of way before land is registered that owner is bound by encumbrance even if it is not on subsequent registration certificate); One-O-Six Realty, Inc. v. Quinn, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 149, 154 (2006) (actual knowledge of easement on registered land where landowner of two abutting parcels, one registered and one unregistered, knew deed of unregistered parcel contained easement with particular provisions, and where one could not use the easement without crossing the registered

2003See Commonwealth v. Hardy, 426 Mass. 725, 730 (1998), citing Commonwealth v. Sires, 413 Mass. 292, 299 (1992) (evidence of intent and knowledge relevant to whether murder was committed at all). 12 Trial counsel was therefore faced with a situation where he had experts that would testify toward a diminished capacity claim, but not lack of responsibility.

2003See Commonwealth v. Hardy, 426 Mass. 725, 730 (1998), citing Commonwealth v. Sires, 413 Mass. 292, 299 (1992) (evidence of intent and knowledge relevant to whether murder was committed at all). 12 Trial counsel was therefore faced with a situation where he had experts that would testify toward a diminished capacity claim, but not lack of responsibility.