12 South Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1984–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Armstronggreen2 sentences2023Ed. 2d 434 (1985) (inferring that a knowledge requirement may be necessary to avoid criminalizing innocent conduct); see also State v. Armstrong, 2020 S.D. 6, ¶ 33 , 939 N.W.2d 9, 17 (same). [¶14.] But here, we are not confronted with a statute that is silent as to a scienter requirement, and, contrary to the State’s argument to the circuit court, SDCL 22-34-1 is not a strict liability crime. 2023Ed. 2d 434 (1985) (inferring that a knowledge requirement may be necessary to avoid criminalizing innocent conduct); see also State v. Armstrong, 2020 S.D. 6, ¶ 33 , 939 N.W.2d 9, 17 (same). [¶14.] But here, we are not confronted with a statute that is silent as to a scienter requirement, and, contrary to the State’s argument to the circuit court, SDCL 22-34-1 is not a strict liability crime. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2020Instead, the Court held that in cases charged under SDCL 22-22-1(4), “the State must prove the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the complainant’s intoxicated condition rendered her incapable of consenting.” 2011 S.D. 60, ¶ 15 , 804 N.W.2d at 414 (emphasis added). -20- #28800 [¶42.] A circuit court has broad discretion regarding the admission of expert testimony. 2020Instead, the Court held that in cases charged under SDCL 22-22-1(4), “the State must prove the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the complainant’s intoxicated condition rendered her incapable of consenting.” 2011 S.D. 60, ¶ 15 , 804 N.W.2d at 414 (emphasis added). -20- #28800 [¶42.] A circuit court has broad discretion regarding the admission of expert testimony. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Carrgreen1 sentence2020While reasonable minds can differ as to which label is more appropriate, we, like the Court in Elonis, leave that determination for another day, if and when it is squarely presented. -18- #28722 conduct is objectively intimidating.” United States v. Carr, 314 F.Supp.3d 272, 281, n.12 (D.D.C. 2018). [¶38.] Finally, our statutes criminalizing other types of threats support our conclusion that a mental state beyond negligence is required under SDCL 22-22-45. | 1 | 1 |
Pardo v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Indeed, our holding in Minkel illustrates our inclination to impose a knowledge requirement for the existence of an accident in a prosecution under SDCL 32-34-5. -8- #28794 [¶22.] First, we agree with the sensible observation of the Supreme Court of Delaware that “[r]equiring the State to prove the defendant’s knowledge of the consequences of a collision would defeat the purpose of the statute by encouraging drivers to avoid knowledge by fleeing, rather than stopping to investigate whether anyone was seriously injured or killed.” Pardo v. State, 160 A.3d 1136, 1146 (Del. 2017). | 1 | 1 |
Elonis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2020Compare Elonis, 575 U.S. at ___ , 135 S. Ct. at 2011– 12 (majority employing a knowledge requirement and referring to “whether a defendant knew the character of what was sent,” or stated somewhat differently, “with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat”), with Elonis, 575 U.S. at ___ , 135 S. Ct. at 2015 (Alito, J., concurring in part) (utilizing a recklessness standard, namely whether a defendant “is aware that others could regard his statements as a threat”), and Elonis, 575 U.S. at ___ , 135 S. Ct. at 2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (concluding the statute requires only 2020Compare Elonis, 575 U.S. at ___ , 135 S. Ct. at 2011– 12 (majority employing a knowledge requirement and referring to “whether a defendant knew the character of what was sent,” or stated somewhat differently, “with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat”), with Elonis, 575 U.S. at ___ , 135 S. Ct. at 2015 (Alito, J., concurring in part) (utilizing a recklessness standard, namely whether a defendant “is aware that others could regard his statements as a threat”), and Elonis, 575 U.S. at ___ , 135 S. Ct. at 2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (concluding the statute requires only | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fulksgreen2 sentences2011State v. Schuster, 502 N.W.2d 565, 568 (S.D.1993); State v. Fulks, 83 S.D. 433, 436-37 , 160 N.W.2d 418, 420 (1968), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ree, 331 N.W.2d 557, 560 (S.D.1983). 2011State v. Schuster, 502 N.W.2d 565, 568 (S.D.1993); State v. Fulks, 83 S.D. 433, 436-37 , 160 N.W.2d 418, 420 (1968), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ree, 331 N.W.2d 557, 560 (S.D.1983). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Reegreen2 sentences2011State v. Schuster, 502 N.W.2d 565, 568 (S.D. 1993); State v. Fulks, 83 S.D. 433, 436-37 , 160 N.W.2d 418 , -13- #25646 420 (1968), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ree, 331 N.W.2d 557, 560 (S.D. 1983). 2011State v. Schuster, 502 N.W.2d 565, 568 (S.D.1993); State v. Fulks, 83 S.D. 433, 436-37 , 160 N.W.2d 418, 420 (1968), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ree, 331 N.W.2d 557, 560 (S.D.1983). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Schustergreen2 sentences2011State v. Schuster, 502 N.W.2d 565, 568 (S.D. 1993); State v. Fulks, 83 S.D. 433, 436-37 , 160 N.W.2d 418 , -13- #25646 420 (1968), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ree, 331 N.W.2d 557, 560 (S.D. 1983). 2011State v. Schuster, 502 N.W.2d 565, 568 (S.D.1993); State v. Fulks, 83 S.D. 433, 436-37 , 160 N.W.2d 418, 420 (1968), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ree, 331 N.W.2d 557, 560 (S.D.1983). | 1 | 1 |
State v. McDonaldgreen2 sentences2005See State v. McDonald, 500 NW2d 243 (SD 1993) (defendant who was arrested and charged with knowing possession of controlled substance under SDCL 22-42-5 used defense of lack of knowledge at trial). [8] Helland stated at oral argument that the images identified by Elsing as child pornography were of nude children, and therefore did not meet the definition of pornography under SDCL 22-22-24.2(3), which makes illegal the possession, distribution and dissemination of images that are a "visual depiction of a minor engaging in a prohibited sexual act, or in the simulation of such an act." However, t 2005See State v. McDonald, 500 N.W.2d 243 (S.D.1993) (defendant who was arrested and charged with knowing possession of controlled substance under SDCL 22-42-5 used defense of lack of knowledge at trial). . | 1 | 1 |
Francis v. Franklingreen2 sentences1999See Franklin, 471 U.S. at 319 , 105 S.Ct. at 1974 , 85 L.Ed.2d at 356-57 (citing Sand-strom, 442 U.S. at 518 -19 n. 7, 99 S.Ct. at 2456 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 47 ). 1999See Franklin, 471 U.S. at 319 , 105 S.Ct. at 1974 , 85 L.Ed.2d at 356-57 (citing Sand-strom, 442 U.S. at 518 -19 n. 7, 99 S.Ct. at 2456 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 47 ). | 1 | 1 |
Sandstrom v. Montanagreen2 sentences1999See Franklin, 471 U.S. at 319 , 105 S.Ct. at 1974 , 85 L.Ed.2d at 356-57 (citing Sand-strom, 442 U.S. at 518 -19 n. 7, 99 S.Ct. at 2456 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 47 ). 1999See Franklin, 471 U.S. at 319 , 105 S.Ct. at 1974 , 85 L.Ed.2d at 356-57 (citing Sand-strom, 442 U.S. at 518 -19 n. 7, 99 S.Ct. at 2456 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 47 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2026We deemed the relevant question to be “whether reasonable jurors could have understood that the knowledge presumption shifted the burden of proof to [the defendant] on the element of knowledge upon proof of the predicate act.” Id. ¶ 16, 602 N.W.2d at 734–35. 2026We deemed the relevant question to be “whether reasonable jurors could have understood that the knowledge presumption shifted the burden of proof to [the defendant] on the element of knowledge upon proof of the predicate act.” Id. ¶ 16, 602 N.W.2d at 734–35. | 2 | 2026–2026 |
Staples v. United States
green
2 sentences2020In Jones, we read a knowledge requirement into the crime of third- (continued . . .) -15- #28722 600, 608 n.3, 114 S. Ct. 1793 , 1798 n.3, 128 L. 2020In Jones, we read a knowledge requirement into the crime of third- (continued . . .) -15- #28722 600, 608 n.3, 114 S. Ct. 1793 , 1798 n.3, 128 L. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Hinkle v. Hargens
green
2 sentences2015South Dakota originally adopted fraudulent concealment as an implied exception to our statutes of limitation in Hinkle, 76 S.D. at 525 , 81 N.W.2d at 891 . 2015South Dakota originally adopted fraudulent concealment as an implied exception to our statutes of limitation in Hinkle, 76 S.D. at 525 , 81 N.W.2d at 891 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Barr
green
2 sentences2011It is not this Court’s position to change any legitimate policy chosen by the Legislature. [¶29.] The majority opinion cites to two South Dakota cases where this Court has read a knowledge requirement into a statute —State v. Stone, 467 N.W.2d 905 (S.D.1991) and State v. Barr, 90 S.D. 9 , 237 N.W.2d 888 (1976). 2011It is not this Court’s position to change any legitimate policy chosen by the Legislature. [¶29.] The majority opinion cites to two South Dakota cases where this Court has read a knowledge requirement into a statute —State v. Stone, 467 N.W.2d 905 (S.D.1991) and State v. Barr, 90 S.D. 9 , 237 N.W.2d 888 (1976). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Wilson
green
2 sentences2011Furthermore, applying a knowledge requirement to the statute is adding an additional element that the Legislature does not require the State to prove in a prosecution. [¶32.] Finally, the Court states that while we interpret our statutes by reading the plain meaning of the words they contain, “we have always reserved a caveat: we will not read statutes literally, if they lead to an ‘absurd or unreasonable result.’” Majority Opinion ¶ 12 (citing State v. Wilson, 2004 S.D. 33 , ¶ 9, 678 N.W.2d 176, 180 ). 2011Furthermore, applying a knowledge requirement to the statute is adding an additional element that the Legislature does not require the State to prove in a prosecution. [¶ 32.] Finally, the Court states that while we interpret our statutes by reading the plain meaning of the words they contain, “we have always reserved a caveat: we will not read statutes literally, if they lead to an ‘absurd or unreasonable result.’ ” Majority Opinion ¶ 12 (citing State v. Wilson, 2004 S.D. 33 , ¶ 9, 678 N.W.2d 176, 180 ). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Stone
green
2 sentences2011It is not this Court’s position to change any legitimate policy chosen by the Legislature. [¶29.] The majority opinion cites to two South Dakota cases where this Court has read a knowledge requirement into a statute – State v. Stone, 467 N.W.2d 905 (S.D. 1991) and State v. Barr, 90 S.D. 9 , 237 N.W.2d 888 (1976). 2011It is not this Court’s position to change any legitimate policy chosen by the Legislature. [¶29.] The majority opinion cites to two South Dakota cases where this Court has read a knowledge requirement into a statute —State v. Stone, 467 N.W.2d 905 (S.D.1991) and State v. Barr, 90 S.D. 9 , 237 N.W.2d 888 (1976). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Feyereisen
green
2 sentences1984This issue was recently raised in State v. Feyereisen, 343 N.W.2d 384 (S.D.1984), and this court specifically stated that: [W]e are unwilling to read an additional knowledge requirement into SDCL 22-18-1.1(3). 1984This issue was recently raised in State v. Feyereisen, 343 N.W.2d 384 (S.D.1984), and this court specifically stated that: [W]e are unwilling to read an additional knowledge requirement into SDCL 22-18-1.1(3). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
State v. Cook
green
2 sentences1984State v. Feyereisen, supra ; State v. Cook, supra . [*] We note, however, that Fender's knowledge of Stainbrook's status is not really at issue in this case. 1984State v. Feyereisen, supra; State v. Cook, supra. * We note, however, that Fender’s knowledge of Stainbrook’s status is not really at issue in this case. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.