knowledge requirement in Florida

2023In Giorgetti, the court relied on multiple United States Supreme Court opinions to hold that it “will ordinarily presume that the Legislature intends statutes defining a criminal violation to contain a knowledge requirement absent an express indication of a contrary intent.” 868 So. 2d at 516 .

2018But even when a statute does not expressly state an intent element, "Florida courts ordinarily will 'presume that the Legislature intends statutes defining a criminal violation to contain a knowledge requirement absent an express -6- indication of a contrary intent.' " Wegner, 928 So. 2d at 439 (quoting Giorgetti, 868 So. 2d at 516 ).

2012See id.

2010See § 322.34(2), Fla. Stat.; Brown, 764 So.2d at 744 ; see also Haygood v. State, 17 So.3d 894 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).

2009Further, “[t]he group of offenses punishable without proof of any criminal intent must be sharply limited.” Id. (quoting Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736, 743 (Fla.1996)).

1999We also noted that interpreting the drug possession statutes without a knowledge requirement would "criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct." Id. at 743 (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 , 105 S.Ct. 2084 , 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985)).

2018But even when a statute does not expressly state an intent element, "Florida courts ordinarily will 'presume that the Legislature intends statutes defining a criminal violation to contain a knowledge requirement absent an express -6- indication of a contrary intent.' " Wegner, 928 So. 2d at 439 (quoting Giorgetti, 868 So. 2d at 516 ).

2018In Giorgetti, the Florida Supreme Court construed sexual offender registration statutes to have a knowledge element so as to "include a requirement that the alleged offender knows of the obligation to register and maintain current addresses." 868 So. 2d at 520 ; see also Ramirez v. State, 113 So. 3d 28, 30 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (construing a statute that prevented felons from being employed at a bail bond agency to contain a mens rea requirement because absent the knowledge element the statute criminalized "otherwise innocent conduct, i.e., working at a clerical job"); Wegner, 928 So. 2d at 439 (

2015Id. (quoting Amlotte v. State, 456 So.2d 448, 450 (Fla.1984) (Overton, J., dissenting)).

1997As the Fifth District Court of Appeal correctly noted in Grinage, the language of subsection (3) indicates that specific intent must be established to convict because the subsection specifically addresses "attempted murder of a law enforcement officer." As Justice Overton stated in his dissent in Amlotte v. State, 456 So.2d 448, 450 (Fla.1984)—arguing a position we later accepted in State v. Gray, 654 So.2d 552 (Fla.1995)—when dealing with specific intent crimes, "[a] conviction for the offense of attempt has always required proof of the intent to commit the underlying crime." Amlotte, 456 So.

2013Wegner v. State, 928 So.2d 436, 439 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (statute imposing criminal liability on person who receives computer transmissions of descriptive or identifying information about minor for purpose of facilitating sexual conduct with minor would be construed as requiring knowledge by accused that person from whom or about whom he received computer transmission was minor); see also Cash-att v. State, 873 So.2d 430 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (criminal statutes, such as computer pornography statutes, are presumed to include broadly applicable scienter requirements in absence of express contrary in

2006See Cashatt v. State, 873 So.2d 430 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (concluding that the failure of section 847.0135(3) to contain a mens rea requirement is not fatal because criminal statutes are presumed to include a knowledge requirement in the absence of a contrary legislative statement).

2006See, e.g., Springer v. Morris, 74 So.2d 781, 785 (Fla.1954) ("The prime foundation of liability in negligence cases is knowledge — or what is deemed to be in law the same thing, opportunity by the exercise of reasonable diligence to acquire knowledge of the peril which subsequently results in injury.

2006See, e.g., Springer v. Morris, 74 So.2d 781, 785 (Fla.1954) ("The prime foundation of liability in negligence cases is knowledge—or what is deemed to be in law the same thing, opportunity by the exercise of reasonable diligence to acquire knowledge of the peril which subsequently results in injury.

2015“Subsequently, ... this rule was followed with regard to statutorily defined crimes, even if the statute did not expressly include a knowledge requirement.” Id. (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 , 114 S.Ct. 1793 , 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994)). .

2015“Subsequently, ... this rule was followed with regard to statutorily defined crimes, even if the statute did not expressly include a knowledge requirement.” Id. (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 , 114 S.Ct. 1793 , 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994)). .

2025See Roundtree v. State, 955 So. 2d 1184, 1186 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); cf. Manon v. State, 740 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (“[I]t is implicit in every condition of probation that what is forbidden is a willful and substantial violation.

2025See Roundtree v. State, 955 So. 2d 1184, 1186 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); cf. Manon v. State, 740 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (“[I]t is implicit in every condition of probation that what is forbidden is a willful and substantial violation.

2022Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 47, at 358 (1972))); State v. Bauer, 324 N.W.2d 320 (Iowa 1982) (determining that a defendant’s knowledge of his or her partner’s lack of consent is not an element of Iowa’s sexual abuse statute); Com. v. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Mass. 2001) (“Historically, the relevant inquiry has been limited to consent in fact, and no mens rea or knowledge as to the lack of consent has ever been required.”); State v. Elmore, 771 P.2d 1192, 1193 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that since the Legislature “chose not to include a degree of culpability as an element of rape,” but ins

2022Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 47, at 358 (1972))); State v. Bauer, 324 N.W.2d 320 (Iowa 1982) (determining that a defendant’s knowledge of his or her partner’s lack of consent is not an element of Iowa’s sexual abuse statute); Com. v. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Mass. 2001) (“Historically, the relevant inquiry has been limited to consent in fact, and no mens rea or knowledge as to the lack of consent has ever been required.”); State v. Elmore, 771 P.2d 1192, 1193 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that since the Legislature “chose not to include a degree of culpability as an element of rape,” but ins

2022See United States v. McDonald, 78 M.J. 376 , 379 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (analyzing the similarly worded federal statute and holding that “Congress clearly intended a general intent mens rea”); United States v. Lavallie, 666 F.2d 1217, 1219 (8th Cir. 1981) (“Rape is a crime requiring general intent—only that indicated by the commission of the offense.”); United States v. Thornton, 498 F.2d 749, 753 (D.C.

2022See United States v. McDonald, 78 M.J. 376 , 379 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (analyzing the similarly worded federal statute and holding that “Congress clearly intended a general intent mens rea”); United States v. Lavallie, 666 F.2d 1217, 1219 (8th Cir. 1981) (“Rape is a crime requiring general intent—only that indicated by the commission of the offense.”); United States v. Thornton, 498 F.2d 749, 753 (D.C.

2018In Giorgetti, the Florida Supreme Court construed sexual offender registration statutes to have a knowledge element so as to "include a requirement that the alleged offender knows of the obligation to register and maintain current addresses." 868 So. 2d at 520 ; see also Ramirez v. State, 113 So. 3d 28, 30 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (construing a statute that prevented felons from being employed at a bail bond agency to contain a mens rea requirement because absent the knowledge element the statute criminalized "otherwise innocent conduct, i.e., working at a clerical job"); Wegner, 928 So. 2d at 439 (

2017Our supreme court most recently addressed this legislative power in State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412 (Fla. 2012): “Enacting laws—and especially criminal .laws—is quintessential a legislative function.” Fla. Home of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So.2d 601, 615 (Fla. 2008). “[T]he Legislature generally has, broad authority to determine any requirement for intent or knowledge'in the definition of a crime.” State v. Ciorgetti, 868 So.2d 512 , 515 (Fla. 2004).

2017Our supreme court most recently addressed this legislative power in State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d 412 (Fla. 2012): “Enacting laws—and especially criminal laws—is quintessentially a legislative function.” Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 615 (Fla. 2008). “[T]he Legislature generally has broad authority to determine any requirement for intent or knowledge in the definition of a crime.” State v. Giorgetti, 868 So. 2d 512, 515 (Fla. 2004).

2015See State v. Brady, 745 So.2d 954, 957 (Fla.1999) (“The offense of attempted second-degree murder does not require proof of the specific intent to commit the underlying act (i.e., murder).” (citing Gentry v. State, 437 So.2d 1097 (Fla.1983))).

2015See State v. Brady, 745 So.2d 954, 957 (Fla.1999) (“The offense of attempted second-degree murder does not require proof of the specific intent to commit the underlying act (i.e., murder).” (citing Gentry v. State, 437 So.2d 1097 (Fla.1983))).