knowledge exception in Nevada

2022See, e.g., Fields v. State, 125 Nev. 785, 792 , 220 P.3d 709, 714 (2009) (explaining that a defendant's "knowing participation in prior bad acts with" coconspirators may be used to refute the defendant's claim that he was an unwitting or innocent bystander to the crime); Cirillo v. State, 96 Nev. 489, 492 , 611 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1980) (concluding that "evidence of previous instances of [drug] possession may be used to show the defendant's knowledge of the controlled nature of a substance, when such knowledge is an element of the offense charged"); see also United States v. Vo, 413 F.3d 1010, 10

2022See, e.g., Fields v. State, 125 Nev. 785, 792 , 220 P.3d 709, 714 (2009) (explaining that a defendant's "knowing participation in prior bad acts with" coconspirators may be used to refute the defendant's claim that he was an unwitting or innocent bystander to the crime); Cirillo v. State, 96 Nev. 489, 492 , 611 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1980) (concluding that "evidence of previous instances of [drug] possession may be used to show the defendant's knowledge of the controlled nature of a substance, when such knowledge is an element of the offense charged"); see also United States v. Vo, 413 F.3d 1010, 10

2022See, e.g., Bair, 664 F.3d at 1229 (rejecting the appellant's argument that the doctor's past treatment of other patients is admissible to show the doctor did not know how to properly carry out the surgery because that "is not the kind of 'knowledge Rule 404(b) contemplates," as the doctor "had the knowledge to perform the surgery" due to his training and the appellant's evidence allows the jury to infer the defendant "had a propensity to commit malpraCtice" (internal • quotation marks omitted)).

2022See, e.g., Bair, 664 F.3d at 1229 (rejecting the appellant's argument that the doctor's past treatment of other patients is admissible to show the doctor did not know how to properly carry out the surgery because that "is not the kind of 'knowledge Rule 404(b) contemplates," as the doctor "had the knowledge to perform the surgery" due to his training and the appellant's evidence allows the jury to infer the defendant "had a propensity to commit malpraCtice" (internal • quotation marks omitted)).

2022See, e.g., Fields v. State, 125 Nev. 785, 792 , 220 P.3d 709, 714 (2009) (explaining that a defendant's "knowing participation in prior bad acts with" coconspirators may be used to refute the defendant's claim that he was an unwitting or innocent bystander to the crime); Cirillo v. State, 96 Nev. 489, 492 , 611 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1980) (concluding that "evidence of previous instances of [drug] possession may be used to show the defendant's knowledge of the controlled nature of a substance, when such knowledge is an element of the offense charged"); see also United States v. Vo, 413 F.3d 1010, 10

2022See, e.g., Fields v. State, 125 Nev. 785, 792 , 220 P.3d 709, 714 (2009) (explaining that a defendant's "knowing participation in prior bad acts with" coconspirators may be used to refute the defendant's claim that he was an unwitting or innocent bystander to the crime); Cirillo v. State, 96 Nev. 489, 492 , 611 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1980) (concluding that "evidence of previous instances of [drug] possession may be used to show the defendant's knowledge of the controlled nature of a substance, when such knowledge is an element of the offense charged"); see also United States v. Vo, 413 F.3d 1010, 10

2022See, e.g., Fields v. State, 125 Nev. 785, 792 , 220 P.3d 709, 714 (2009) (explaining that a defendant's "knowing participation in prior bad acts with" coconspirators may be used to refute the defendant's claim that he was an unwitting or innocent bystander to the crime); Cirillo v. State, 96 Nev. 489, 492 , 611 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1980) (concluding that "evidence of previous instances of [drug] possession may be used to show the defendant's knowledge of the controlled nature of a substance, when such knowledge is an element of the offense charged"); see also United States v. Vo, 413 F.3d 1010, 10

2022See, e.g., Fields v. State, 125 Nev. 785, 792 , 220 P.3d 709, 714 (2009) (explaining that a defendant's "knowing participation in prior bad acts with" coconspirators may be used to refute the defendant's claim that he was an unwitting or innocent bystander to the crime); Cirillo v. State, 96 Nev. 489, 492 , 611 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1980) (concluding that "evidence of previous instances of [drug] possession may be used to show the defendant's knowledge of the controlled nature of a substance, when such knowledge is an element of the offense charged"); see also United States v. Vo, 413 F.3d 1010, 10

2013Id. 2 Clancy suggests that we approved of an actual knowledge instruction in Dettloff.

2013Cf. Dettloff v. State, 120 Nev. 588, 594 , 97 P.3d 586, 590 (2004) (declining to require knowledge of injury).

2017Otherwise, the exception would swallow the rule." Id. at 542, 245 P.3d at 1159.

2017Otherwise, the exception would swallow the rule." Id. at 542 , 245 P.3d at 1159 .

2008We reject this contention because the cases cited by the Board, Dotterweich, United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 , 95 S.Ct. 1903 , 44 L.Ed.2d 489 (1975), and Triangle Candy Co. v. United States, 144 F.2d 195 (9th Cir.1944), all discuss the absence of a knowledge requirement in 21 U.S.C. § 331 and are therefore persuasive authority concerning the interpretation of NRS 585.520, the controlling law in the instant case. [30] See NRS 639.255. [31] NRS 639.210 provides, in pertinent part: The Board may suspend or revoke any certificate, license, registration or permit issued pursuant to this chapter

2008We reject this contention because the cases cited by the Board, Dotterweich, United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 *717 (1975), and Triangle Candy Co. v. United States, 144 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1944), all discuss the absence of a knowledge requirement in 21 U.S.C. § 331 and are therefore persuasive authority concerning the interpretation of NRS 585.520, the controlling law in the instant case. 31 See NRS 639.255. 32 Although NAC 639.603(1) describes “an ongoing relationship with the manufacturer,” the parties do not dispute that this term is analogous to the term “authorized distributor.” 33 Coast

2020Hubbard v. Reed, 774 A.2d 495, 500-01 (N.J. 2001) (applying the common knowledge exception to claims based on a dentises extraction of the wrong tooth); Estate of Chin v. Saint Barnabas Med.

2020Ctr., 734 A.2d 778, 786-87 (N.J. 1999) (utilizing the exception where pumping gas into a patient caused a fatal air embolism).

2020We agree with these courts: the common knowledge exception provides sound guidance to distinguish between ordinary and professional negligence in order to determine whether a party's claim is subject to NRS 41A.071s affidavit requirement.4 When determining whether to apply the exception, we adopt the framework set forth by the Supreme Court of Michigan: [A] court must ask two fundamental questions in determining whether a claim sounds in ordinary 4We have addressed this exception before, in Szydel v. Markman, and concluded that an expert affidavit is unnecessary in res ipsa loquitur cases unde

2020We agree with these courts: the common knowledge exception provides sound guidance to distinguish between ordinary and professional negligence in order to determine whether a party's claim is subject to NRS 41A.071s affidavit requirement.4 When determining whether to apply the exception, we adopt the framework set forth by the Supreme Court of Michigan: [A] court must ask two fundamental questions in determining whether a claim sounds in ordinary 4We have addressed this exception before, in Szydel v. Markman, and concluded that an expert affidavit is unnecessary in res ipsa loquitur cases unde

2008We reject this contention because the cases cited by the Board, Dotterweich, United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 *717 (1975), and Triangle Candy Co. v. United States, 144 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1944), all discuss the absence of a knowledge requirement in 21 U.S.C. § 331 and are therefore persuasive authority concerning the interpretation of NRS 585.520, the controlling law in the instant case. 31 See NRS 639.255. 32 Although NAC 639.603(1) describes “an ongoing relationship with the manufacturer,” the parties do not dispute that this term is analogous to the term “authorized distributor.” 33 Coast

2008We reject this contention because the cases cited by the Board, Dotterweich, United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 *717 (1975), and Triangle Candy Co. v. United States, 144 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1944), all discuss the absence of a knowledge requirement in 21 U.S.C. § 331 and are therefore persuasive authority concerning the interpretation of NRS 585.520, the controlling law in the instant case. 31 See NRS 639.255. 32 Although NAC 639.603(1) describes “an ongoing relationship with the manufacturer,” the parties do not dispute that this term is analogous to the term “authorized distributor.” 33 Coast

1994Id. at 1440 ; see also In re Jones, 804 F.2d 1133, 1139 (10th Cir.1986) (attempt to limit contractually strict liability for product defects void as against public policy).