knowledge requirement in Texas

2006We reiterated nearly a decade later that the knowledge requirement was met in Corbin because “Safeway did not have to know that a particular grape was on the floor at a particular time because it knew that the grapes would be on the floor due to the nature of the display.” Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 265 (Tex.1992).

2006We reiterated nearly a decade later that the knowledge requirement was met in Corbin because "Safeway did not have to know that a particular grape was on the floor at a particular time because it knew that the grapes would be on the floor due to the nature of the display." Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 265 (Tex.1992).

2005Allen cites Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc. , 648 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tex. 1983), in which the Texas Supreme Court held the defendant's knowledge of the high risk of harm associated with a self-serve display of grapes was sufficient to satisfy the knowledge requirement.

2002Allen cites Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc. , 648 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tex. 1983), in which the Texas Supreme Court held the defendant's knowledge of the high risk of harm associated with a self-serve display of grapes was sufficient to satisfy the knowledge requirement.

1992Robinson v. Preston Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. , 633 S.W.2d 500, 502 (Tex. 1982) ("No such duty to know the facts are true arises when the seller does not make representations, but merely fails to reveal information which he does not know.").

1992Robinson v. Preston Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 500, 502 (Tex.1982) (“No such duty to know the facts are true arises when the seller does not make representations, but merely fails to reveal information which he does *173 not know.”).

2025In Levinson Alcoser Assocs., L.P. v. El Pistolon II, Ltd., 513 S.W.3d 487, 494 (Tex. 2017) (“Levinson II,”) the Supreme Court of Texas concluded “[t]hat the statute’s knowledge requirement is not synonymous with the expert’s licensure or active engagement in the practice; it requires some additional explication or evidence reflecting the expert’s familiarity or experience with the practice area at issue in the litigation.” Levinson II, 513 S.W.3d at 494 . (emphasis added) The Corpus Christi-Edinburg Court of Appeals re-emphasized this holding in Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London Subscr

2025In Levinson Alcoser Assocs., L.P. v. El Pistolon II, Ltd., 513 S.W.3d 487, 494 (Tex. 2017) (“Levinson II,”) the Supreme Court of Texas concluded “[t]hat the statute’s knowledge requirement is not synonymous with the expert’s licensure or active engagement in the practice; it requires some additional explication or evidence reflecting the expert’s familiarity or experience with the practice area at issue in the litigation.” Levinson II, 513 S.W.3d at 494 . (emphasis added) The Corpus Christi-Edinburg Court of Appeals re-emphasized this holding in Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London Subscr

2024An employee can satisfy the first element—the knowledge requirement—“by establishing that (1) the defendant placed the [dangerous condition] on the floor, (2) the defendant actually knew that the [condition] was on the floor, or (3) it is more likely than not that the condition existed long enough to give the premises owner a reasonable opportunity to discover it.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece, 81 S.W.3d 812, 814 (Tex. 2002); see Brookshire Bros., Ltd. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9 , 15–16 (Tex. 2014); Carey v. Hi-Lo Auto Supply, LP, No. 02-15-00345-CV, 2016 WL 3198872 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Wo

2022See Reece, 81 S.W.3d at 814 .

2021For example, in Morissette v. State, the federal embezzlement statute at issue read in relevant part, “Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use . . . [.]” The Court had no problem reading a knowledge requirement backwards up the statute to apply to conduct that was not modified by a culpable mental state.102 The Court justified this construction by noting that the requirement of mental culpability was so ingrained that it requires no statutory affirmation.103 Similarly, in United States v. X-Citement Video, the Supreme Court read a knowledge requirement into the Pr

2021For example, in Morissette v. State, the federal embezzlement statute at issue read in relevant part, “Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use . . . [.]” The Court had no problem reading a knowledge requirement backwards up the statute to apply to conduct that was not modified by a culpable mental state.102 The Court justified this construction by noting that the requirement of mental culpability was so ingrained that it requires no statutory affirmation.103 Similarly, in United States v. X-Citement Video, the Supreme Court read a knowledge requirement into the Pr

2019Harris, 568 U.S. at 247 (defendant must have opportunity to challenge evidence of dog’s reliability).

2019Harris, 568 U.S. at 247 (defendant must have opportunity to challenge evidence of dog’s reliability).

2008See Porterfield v. Ethicon, Inc., 183 F.3d 464, 468 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding producing cause negated when plaintiff alleged marketing defect in surgical mesh that caused abdominal infection, but surgeon testified that he was aware of the risk of infection and decided to use the mesh anyway); see also Dyer v. Danek Med., Inc., 115 F.Supp.2d 732, 741 (N.D.Tex.2000) (applying doctrine to spinal fixation device).

2008See Porterfield v. Ethicon, Inc., 183 F.3d 464, 468 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding producing cause negated when plaintiff alleged marketing defect in surgical mesh that caused abdominal infection, but surgeon testified that he was aware of the risk of infection and decided to use the mesh anyway); see also Dyer v. *517 Danek Med., Inc., 115 F.Supp.2d 732, 741 (N.D.Tex.2000) (applying doctrine to spinal fixation device).

2008See, e.g., Kirsch v. Picker Int'l, Inc., 753 F.2d 670, 671-72 (8th Cir.1985) (applying Missouri law) (applying doctrine to x-ray therapy machine); King v. Danek Med., Inc., 37 S.W.3d 429, 453 (Tenn.Ct.

2008See, e.g., Kirsch v. Picker Int'l, Inc., 753 F.2d 670, 671-72 (8th Cir.1985) (applying Missouri law) (applying doctrine to x-ray therapy machine); King v. Danek Med., Inc., 37 S.W.3d 429, 453 (Tenn.Ct.

2008See Porterfield v. Ethicon, Inc., 183 F.3d 464, 468 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding producing cause negated when plaintiff alleged marketing defect in surgical mesh that caused abdominal infection, but surgeon testified that he was aware of the risk of infection and decided to use the mesh anyway); see also Dyer v. Danek Med., Inc., 115 F.Supp.2d 732, 741 (N.D.Tex.2000) (applying doctrine to spinal fixation device).

2008See Porterfield v. Ethicon, Inc., 183 F.3d 464, 468 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding producing cause negated when plaintiff alleged marketing defect in surgical mesh that caused abdominal infection, but surgeon testified that he was aware of the risk of infection and decided to use the mesh anyway); see also Dyer v. *517 Danek Med., Inc., 115 F.Supp.2d 732, 741 (N.D.Tex.2000) (applying doctrine to spinal fixation device).

2008See, e.g., Kirsch v. Picker Int'l, Inc., 753 F.2d 670, 671-72 (8th Cir.1985) (applying Missouri law) (applying doctrine to x-ray therapy machine); King v. Danek Med., Inc., 37 S.W.3d 429, 453 (Tenn.Ct.

2008See, e.g., Kirsch v. Picker Int'l, Inc., 753 F.2d 670, 671-72 (8th Cir.1985) (applying Missouri law) (applying doctrine to x-ray therapy machine); King v. Danek Med., Inc., 37 S.W.3d 429, 453 (Tenn.Ct.

2008In her motion for rehearing, Meyer argues that we applied the wrong standard of review because the independent knowledge doctrine is an affirmative defense on which Ethicon had the burden and urges us to adopt the standard set forth in Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989).

2008NOTES [1] The jury also found negligence on the part of Dr. Mosier and assigned 50% proportionate responsibility each to Ethicon and Dr. Mosier. [2] In her motion for rehearing, Meyer argues that we applied the wrong standard of review because the independent knowledge doctrine is an affirmative defense on which Ethicon had the burden and urges us to adopt the standard set forth in Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989).

2006Like many other jurisdictions, Texas has tacitly applied this objective standard of reasonableness regarding a driver’s knowledge of injury to another person. 1 See Scott v. State, 90 Tex.Crim. 100 , 233 S.W. 1097, 1100 (1921) (holding fair and reasonable construction of the statute in question required driver to render all aid that would reasonably appear to him as ordinary person to be necessary); see also Williams v. State, 132 Tex.Crim. 33 , 102 S.W.2d 212, 213 (1937) (holding that in automobile collision cases, parties must stop and render aid to person struck, offering all such help and

2006Like many other jurisdictions, Texas has tacitly applied this objective standard of reasonableness regarding a driver's knowledge of injury to another person. [1] See Scott v. State, 90 Tex.Crim. 100 , 233 S.W. 1097, 1100 (1921) (holding fair and reasonable construction of the statute in question required driver to render all aid that would reasonably appear to him as ordinary person to be necessary); see also Williams v. State, 132 Tex.Crim. 33 , 102 S.W.2d 212, 213 (1937) (holding that in automobile collision cases, parties must stop and render aid to person struck, offering all such help an

2006Like many other jurisdictions, Texas has tacitly applied this objective standard of reasonableness regarding a driver’s knowledge of injury to another person. 1 See Scott v. State, 90 Tex.Crim. 100 , 233 S.W. 1097, 1100 (1921) (holding fair and reasonable construction of the statute in question required driver to render all aid that would reasonably appear to him as ordinary person to be necessary); see also Williams v. State, 132 Tex.Crim. 33 , 102 S.W.2d 212, 213 (1937) (holding that in automobile collision cases, parties must stop and render aid to person struck, offering all such help and

2006Like many other jurisdictions, Texas has tacitly applied this objective standard of reasonableness regarding a driver's knowledge of injury to another person. [1] See Scott v. State, 90 Tex.Crim. 100 , 233 S.W. 1097, 1100 (1921) (holding fair and reasonable construction of the statute in question required driver to render all aid that would reasonably appear to him as ordinary person to be necessary); see also Williams v. State, 132 Tex.Crim. 33 , 102 S.W.2d 212, 213 (1937) (holding that in automobile collision cases, parties must stop and render aid to person struck, offering all such help an

2006Like many other jurisdictions, Texas has tacitly applied this objective standard of reasonableness regarding a driver's knowledge of injury to another person. [1] See Scott v. State, 90 Tex.Crim. 100 , 233 S.W. 1097, 1100 (1921) (holding fair and reasonable construction of the statute in question required driver to render all aid that would reasonably appear to him as ordinary person to be necessary); see also Williams v. State, 132 Tex.Crim. 33 , 102 S.W.2d 212, 213 (1937) (holding that in automobile collision cases, parties must stop and render aid to person struck, offering all such help an

2006Like many other jurisdictions, Texas has tacitly applied this objective standard of reasonableness regarding a driver's knowledge of injury to another person. [1] See Scott v. State, 90 Tex.Crim. 100 , 233 S.W. 1097, 1100 (1921) (holding fair and reasonable construction of the statute in question required driver to render all aid that would reasonably appear to him as ordinary person to be necessary); see also Williams v. State, 132 Tex.Crim. 33 , 102 S.W.2d 212, 213 (1937) (holding that in automobile collision cases, parties must stop and render aid to person struck, offering all such help an

2025Id.

2023“Whether a condition is a special defect is a question of law.”28 If the defect is classified as a special defect, the duty the government owes to the user of its premises requires the government to use ordinary care to reduce or eliminate an unreasonable risk of harm 26City of Dallas v. Thompson, 210 S.W.3d 601, 603 (Tex. 2006). 27Compare Tex. Civ.

2011Rather, the knowledge requirement is satisfied if ―an objective examination of the facts shows that it would be apparent to a reasonable person that someone has been injured in an accident and is in need of reasonable assistance.‖ Id. at 163 .

2007Id. at 163.

1993App. 1979)); Swinney , 828 S.W.2d at 257 . (4) The knowledge requirement is best discussed in Gonzales , 588 S.W.2d at 577 .

1988See Gonzalez v. State, 588 S.W.2d at 578 .

2024Code § 13.001(a). 28 See Paris Grocer Co. v. Burks, 105 S.W. 174, 175 (Tex. 1907) (“Having such opportunities, of which prudence dictates that he shall avail himself, one who has omitted to do so will not be heard to deny that he had notice of a fact of the existence of which he was thus put upon inquiry.”); Wethered’s Adm’r v. Boon, 17 Tex. 143, 150 (1856) (“The general doctrine is, that whatever puts a party upon an inquiry amounts, in judgment of law, to notice, provided the inquiry becomes a duty, as in the case of purchasers and creditors, and would lead to the knowledge of the requisite

2024An employee can satisfy the first element—the knowledge requirement—“by establishing that (1) the defendant placed the [dangerous condition] on the floor, (2) the defendant actually knew that the [condition] was on the floor, or (3) it is more likely than not that the condition existed long enough to give the premises owner a reasonable opportunity to discover it.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece, 81 S.W.3d 812, 814 (Tex. 2002); see Brookshire Bros., Ltd. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9 , 15–16 (Tex. 2014); Carey v. Hi-Lo Auto Supply, LP, No. 02-15-00345-CV, 2016 WL 3198872 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Wo

2024An employee can satisfy the first element—the knowledge requirement—“by establishing that (1) the defendant placed the [dangerous condition] on the floor, (2) the defendant actually knew that the [condition] was on the floor, or (3) it is more likely than not that the condition existed long enough to give the premises owner a reasonable opportunity to discover it.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece, 81 S.W.3d 812, 814 (Tex. 2002); see Brookshire Bros., Ltd. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9 , 15–16 (Tex. 2014); Carey v. Hi-Lo Auto Supply, LP, No. 02-15-00345-CV, 2016 WL 3198872 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Wo

2024Code § 13.001(a). 28 See Paris Grocer Co. v. Burks, 105 S.W. 174, 175 (Tex. 1907) (“Having such opportunities, of which prudence dictates that he shall avail himself, one who has omitted to do so will not be heard to deny that he had notice of a fact of the existence of which he was thus put upon inquiry.”); Wethered’s Adm’r v. Boon, 17 Tex. 143, 150 (1856) (“The general doctrine is, that whatever puts a party upon an inquiry amounts, in judgment of law, to notice, provided the inquiry becomes a duty, as in the case of purchasers and creditors, and would lead to the knowledge of the requisite

2024Code § 13.001(a). 28 See Paris Grocer Co. v. Burks, 105 S.W. 174, 175 (Tex. 1907) (“Having such opportunities, of which prudence dictates that he shall avail himself, one who has omitted to do so will not be heard to deny that he had notice of a fact of the existence of which he was thus put upon inquiry.”); Wethered’s Adm’r v. Boon, 17 Tex. 143, 150 (1856) (“The general doctrine is, that whatever puts a party upon an inquiry amounts, in judgment of law, to notice, provided the inquiry becomes a duty, as in the case of purchasers and creditors, and would lead to the knowledge of the requisite