knowledge exception in South Carolina

2004Id. at 142-43, 341 S.E.2d at 634-35 (finding that the trial court did not err in failing to charge the jury as to the common knowledge exception).

1987See Peder-son, 341 S. E. (2d) at 634 (a vaginal hysterectomy found to be a significant surgical procedure and not proper for the common knowledge exception).

2013Dep’t of Mental Health, 292 S.C. 11, 14 , 354 S.E.2d 778, 780 (Ct.App.1987) (“The application of the common knowledge exception to the requirement of expert testimony in proving negligence depends on the particular facts of a case.”).

2013Dep’t of Mental Health, 292 S.C. 11, 14 , 354 S.E.2d 778, 780 (Ct.App.1987) (“The application of the common knowledge exception to the requirement of expert testimony in proving negligence depends on the particular facts of a case.”).

2023"The application of the common knowledge exception in proving negligence in a case involving medical malpractice depends on the particular facts of the case." Brouwer v. Sisters of Charity Providence Hosps., 409 S.C. 514, 521 , 763 S.E.2d 200, 203-04 (2014) (quoting Hickman, 295 S.C. at 168 , 367 S.E.2d at 455 ).

2023"The application of the common knowledge exception in proving negligence in a case involving medical malpractice depends on the particular facts of the case." Brouwer v. Sisters of Charity Providence Hosps., 409 S.C. 514, 521 , 763 S.E.2d 200, 203-04 (2014) (quoting Hickman, 295 S.C. at 168 , 367 S.E.2d at 455 ).

2023"The application of the common knowledge exception in proving negligence in a case involving medical malpractice depends on the particular facts of the case." Brouwer v. Sisters of Charity Providence Hosps., 409 S.C. 514, 521 , 763 S.E.2d 200, 203-04 (2014) (quoting Hickman, 295 S.C. at 168 , 367 S.E.2d at 455 ).

2023"The application of the common knowledge exception in proving negligence in a case involving medical malpractice depends on the particular facts of the case." Brouwer v. Sisters of Charity Providence Hosps., 409 S.C. 514, 521 , 763 S.E.2d 200, 203-04 (2014) (quoting Hickman, 295 S.C. at 168 , 367 S.E.2d at 455 ).

2018See Brouwer v. Sisters of Charity Providence Hosps., 409 S.C. 514, 522 , 763 S.E.2d 200, 204 (2014) (finding the negligent exposure to latex of a patient with a known latex allergy was a matter within the common knowledge); Melton, 389 S.C. at 663 , 698 S.E.2d at 898 ("The application of the common knowledge exception in proving negligence in a case involving medical malpractice depends on the particular facts of the case.").

2018See Brouwer v. Sisters of Charity Providence Hosps., 409 S.C. 514, 522 , 763 S.E.2d 200, 204 (2014) (finding the negligent exposure to latex of a patient with a known latex allergy was a matter within the common knowledge); Melton, 389 S.C. at 663 , 698 S.E.2d at 898 ("The application of the common knowledge exception in proving negligence in a case involving medical malpractice depends on the particular facts of the case.").

2023Compare Brouwer, 409 S.C. at 522 , 763 S.E.2d at 204 (finding that the "negligent exposure of a patient to latex with a known allergy can result in an allergic reaction in that patient" was a matter within common knowledge); Green v. Lilliewood, 272 S.C. 186, 192 , 249 S.E.2d 910, 913 (1978) (holding it was a matter of common knowledge that a tubal ligation renders an intrauterine device or any other birth control device useless); Dootson, 377 S.C. at 296 , 659 S.E.2d at 255 (holding a claim arising from a surgical drill that burns skin on contact falls within common knowledge or experience of

2023Compare Brouwer, 409 S.C. at 522 , 763 S.E.2d at 204 (finding that the "negligent exposure of a patient to latex with a known allergy can result in an allergic reaction in that patient" was a matter within common knowledge); Green v. Lilliewood, 272 S.C. 186, 192 , 249 S.E.2d 910, 913 (1978) (holding it was a matter of common knowledge that a tubal ligation renders an intrauterine device or any other birth control device useless); Dootson, 377 S.C. at 296 , 659 S.E.2d at 255 (holding a claim arising from a surgical drill that burns skin on contact falls within common knowledge or experience of

2023Id. at 153 , 747 S.E.2d at 481 ("'the common knowledge exception to the requirement of expert testimony in proving negligence depends on the particular facts of the case.' Sharpe v. S.C.

2023Id. at 153 , 747 S.E.2d at 481 ("'the common knowledge exception to the requirement of expert testimony in proving negligence depends on the particular facts of the case.' Sharpe v. S.C.

2023Compare Brouwer, 409 S.C. at 522 , 763 S.E.2d at 204 (finding that the "negligent exposure of a patient to latex with a known allergy can result in an allergic reaction in that patient" was a matter within common knowledge); Green v. Lilliewood, 272 S.C. 186, 192 , 249 S.E.2d 910, 913 (1978) (holding it was a matter of common knowledge that a tubal ligation renders an intrauterine device or any other birth control device useless); Dootson, 377 S.C. at 296 , 659 S.E.2d at 255 (holding a claim arising from a surgical drill that burns skin on contact falls within common knowledge or experience of

2023Compare Brouwer, 409 S.C. at 522 , 763 S.E.2d at 204 (finding that the "negligent exposure of a patient to latex with a known allergy can result in an allergic reaction in that patient" was a matter within common knowledge); Green v. Lilliewood, 272 S.C. 186, 192 , 249 S.E.2d 910, 913 (1978) (holding it was a matter of common knowledge that a tubal ligation renders an intrauterine device or any other birth control device useless); Dootson, 377 S.C. at 296 , 659 S.E.2d at 255 (holding a claim arising from a surgical drill that burns skin on contact falls within common knowledge or experience of

2014As to whether the circuit court erred in finding Tenant's obligations under the lease were not assigned to a third party: Scalise Dev., Inc. v. Tidelands Invs., LLC, 392 S.C. 27, 32 , 707 S.E.2d 440, 443 (Ct. App. 2011) ("Summary judgment is proper when no issue exists as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."); Layman v. State, 368 S.C. 631, 640 , 630 S.E.2d 265, 269 (2006) ("Once the bargain is formed, and the obligations set, a contract may only be altered by mutual agreement and for further consideration.").

2014As to whether the circuit court erred in finding Tenant's obligations under the lease were not assigned to a third party: Scalise Dev., Inc. v. Tidelands Invs., LLC, 392 S.C. 27, 32 , 707 S.E.2d 440, 443 (Ct. App. 2011) ("Summary judgment is proper when no issue exists as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."); Layman v. State, 368 S.C. 631, 640 , 630 S.E.2d 265, 269 (2006) ("Once the bargain is formed, and the obligations set, a contract may only be altered by mutual agreement and for further consideration.").

2014As to whether the circuit court erred in finding Tenant's obligations under the lease were not assigned to a third party: Scalise Dev., Inc. v. Tidelands Invs., LLC, 392 S.C. 27, 32 , 707 S.E.2d 440, 443 (Ct. App. 2011) ("Summary judgment is proper when no issue exists as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."); Layman v. State, 368 S.C. 631, 640 , 630 S.E.2d 265, 269 (2006) ("Once the bargain is formed, and the obligations set, a contract may only be altered by mutual agreement and for further consideration.").

2014As to whether the circuit court erred in finding Tenant's obligations under the lease were not assigned to a third party: Scalise Dev., Inc. v. Tidelands Invs., LLC, 392 S.C. 27, 32 , 707 S.E.2d 440, 443 (Ct. App. 2011) ("Summary judgment is proper when no issue exists as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."); Layman v. State, 368 S.C. 631, 640 , 630 S.E.2d 265, 269 (2006) ("Once the bargain is formed, and the obligations set, a contract may only be altered by mutual agreement and for further consideration.").

2014Code Ann. § 15-3-30 (2005) (tolling the statute of limitations when a person against whom a cause of action has accrued "depart[s] from and reside[s] out of this [s]tate or remain[s] continuously absent therefrom for the space of one year or more"); Meyer v. Paschal, 330 S.C. 175, 184 , 498 S.E.2d 635, 639 (1998) ("The period of limitations may be tolled when [the defendant's whereabouts are] not known to the plaintiff."); Tiralango v. Balfry, 335 S.C. 359, 363 , 517 S.E.2d 430, 432 (1999) (construing the knowledge requirement set forth in Meyer, 330 S.C. at 184 , 498 S.E.2d at 639 , "as requi

2014Code Ann. § 15-3-30 (2005) (tolling the statute of limitations when a person against whom a cause of action has accrued "depart[s] from and reside[s] out of this [s]tate or remain[s] continuously absent therefrom for the space of one year or more"); Meyer v. Paschal, 330 S.C. 175, 184 , 498 S.E.2d 635, 639 (1998) ("The period of limitations may be tolled when [the defendant's whereabouts are] not known to the plaintiff."); Tiralango v. Balfry, 335 S.C. 359, 363 , 517 S.E.2d 430, 432 (1999) (construing the knowledge requirement set forth in Meyer, 330 S.C. at 184 , 498 S.E.2d at 639 , "as requi

2014Code Ann. § 15-3-30 (2005) (tolling the statute of limitations when a person against whom a cause of action has accrued "depart[s] from and reside[s] out of this [s]tate or remain[s] continuously absent therefrom for the space of one year or more"); Meyer v. Paschal, 330 S.C. 175, 184 , 498 S.E.2d 635, 639 (1998) ("The period of limitations may be tolled when [the defendant's whereabouts are] not known to the plaintiff."); Tiralango v. Balfry, 335 S.C. 359, 363 , 517 S.E.2d 430, 432 (1999) (construing the knowledge requirement set forth in Meyer, 330 S.C. at 184 , 498 S.E.2d at 639 , "as requi

2014Code Ann. § 15-3-30 (2005) (tolling the statute of limitations when a person against whom a cause of action has accrued "depart[s] from and reside[s] out of this [s]tate or remain[s] continuously absent therefrom for the space of one year or more"); Meyer v. Paschal, 330 S.C. 175, 184 , 498 S.E.2d 635, 639 (1998) ("The period of limitations may be tolled when [the defendant's whereabouts are] not known to the plaintiff."); Tiralango v. Balfry, 335 S.C. 359, 363 , 517 S.E.2d 430, 432 (1999) (construing the knowledge requirement set forth in Meyer, 330 S.C. at 184 , 498 S.E.2d at 639 , "as requi

2013Hoard v. Roper Hosp., Inc., 387 S.C. 539, 547 , 694 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2010) ("'Negligence is not actionable unless it is a proximate cause of the injuries, and it may be deemed a proximate cause only when without such negligence[,] the injury would not have occurred or could have been avoided.'" (quoting Hughes v. Children's Clinic, P. A., 269 S.C. 389, 398 , 237 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1977)); Guffey v. Columbia/Colleton Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 364 S.C. 158, 163 , 612 S.E.2d 695, 697 (2005) (holding that this court will affirm a directed verdict when there is no evidence on any one element of the alleged caus

2013Hoard v. Roper Hosp., Inc., 387 S.C. 539, 547 , 694 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2010) ("'Negligence is not actionable unless it is a proximate cause of the injuries, and it may be deemed a proximate cause only when without such negligence[,] the injury would not have occurred or could have been avoided.'" (quoting Hughes v. Children's Clinic, P. A., 269 S.C. 389, 398 , 237 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1977)); Guffey v. Columbia/Colleton Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 364 S.C. 158, 163 , 612 S.E.2d 695, 697 (2005) (holding that this court will affirm a directed verdict when there is no evidence on any one element of the alleged caus

2013Soc. of S.C., 286 S.C. 347, 350 , 334 S.E.2d 125, 127 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Proof of proximate cause must . . . be established by expert testimony where either the origin of the injury is obscure and not readily apparent to a layperson or where there are several equally probable causes of the condition." (citation omitted)); id. ("When expert testimony is not relied upon to establish proximate cause, the plaintiff must offer evidence that rises above mere speculation or conjecture." (citations and quotation marks omitted)).

2013Soc. of S.C., 286 S.C. 347, 350 , 334 S.E.2d 125, 127 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Proof of proximate cause must . . . be established by expert testimony where either the origin of the injury is obscure and not readily apparent to a layperson or where there are several equally probable causes of the condition." (citation omitted)); id. ("When expert testimony is not relied upon to establish proximate cause, the plaintiff must offer evidence that rises above mere speculation or conjecture." (citations and quotation marks omitted)).

2013Hoard v. Roper Hosp., Inc., 387 S.C. 539, 547 , 694 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2010) ("'Negligence is not actionable unless it is a proximate cause of the injuries, and it may be deemed a proximate cause only when without such negligence[,] the injury would not have occurred or could have been avoided.'" (quoting Hughes v. Children's Clinic, P. A., 269 S.C. 389, 398 , 237 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1977)); Guffey v. Columbia/Colleton Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 364 S.C. 158, 163 , 612 S.E.2d 695, 697 (2005) (holding that this court will affirm a directed verdict when there is no evidence on any one element of the alleged caus

2013Hoard v. Roper Hosp., Inc., 387 S.C. 539, 547 , 694 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2010) ("'Negligence is not actionable unless it is a proximate cause of the injuries, and it may be deemed a proximate cause only when without such negligence[,] the injury would not have occurred or could have been avoided.'" (quoting Hughes v. Children's Clinic, P. A., 269 S.C. 389, 398 , 237 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1977)); Guffey v. Columbia/Colleton Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 364 S.C. 158, 163 , 612 S.E.2d 695, 697 (2005) (holding that this court will affirm a directed verdict when there is no evidence on any one element of the alleged caus

2013Hoard v. Roper Hosp., Inc., 387 S.C. 539, 547 , 694 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2010) ("'Negligence is not actionable unless it is a proximate cause of the injuries, and it may be deemed a proximate cause only when without such negligence[,] the injury would not have occurred or could have been avoided.'" (quoting Hughes v. Children's Clinic, P. A., 269 S.C. 389, 398 , 237 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1977)); Guffey v. Columbia/Colleton Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 364 S.C. 158, 163 , 612 S.E.2d 695, 697 (2005) (holding that this court will affirm a directed verdict when there is no evidence on any one element of the alleged caus

2013Hoard v. Roper Hosp., Inc., 387 S.C. 539, 547 , 694 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2010) ("'Negligence is not actionable unless it is a proximate cause of the injuries, and it may be deemed a proximate cause only when without such negligence[,] the injury would not have occurred or could have been avoided.'" (quoting Hughes v. Children's Clinic, P. A., 269 S.C. 389, 398 , 237 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1977)); Guffey v. Columbia/Colleton Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 364 S.C. 158, 163 , 612 S.E.2d 695, 697 (2005) (holding that this court will affirm a directed verdict when there is no evidence on any one element of the alleged caus

2004Multimedia Publ’g of South Carolina, Inc. v. Mullins, 314 S.C. 551, 554 , 431 S.E.2d 569, 572 (1993).

1996The trial court ruled that Walker’s expert was not qualified, but did not explicitly rule on Walker’s argument for application of the common knowledge exception. 2 See Noisette v. Ismail, 304 S.C. 56, 58 , 403 S.E.2d 122, 124 (1991) (an issue raised to the trial court but not ruled on is not preserved and the complaining party must move before the trial court to amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP).

1996The trial court ruled that Walker’s expert was not qualified, but did not explicitly rule on Walker’s argument for application of the common knowledge exception. 2 See Noisette v. Ismail, 304 S.C. 56, 58 , 403 S.E.2d 122, 124 (1991) (an issue raised to the trial court but not ruled on is not preserved and the complaining party must move before the trial court to amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP).