knowledge exception in Nebraska

2021(Jan. 23, 1991) (summary of purpose); Judiciary Committee Hearing, L.B. 95, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 38-42 (Jan. 23, 1991); Floor Debate, L.B. 95, Judiciary Committee, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 267-72 (Jan. 28, 1991). 35 See, In re Estate of Masopust, 232 Neb. 936 , 443 N.W.2d 274 (1989); In re Estate of McCleneghan, 145 Neb. 707 , 17 N.W.2d 923 (1945). 36 See, e.g., Kaspar v. Schack, 195 Neb. 215 , 237 N.W.2d 414 (1976). 37 See Committee Statement, L.B. 354, Judiciary Committee, 83d Leg., 2d Sess. 1-2 (Feb. 4, 1974). 38 See, Unif.

2021(Jan. 23, 1991) (summary of purpose); Judiciary Committee Hearing, L.B. 95, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 38-42 (Jan. 23, 1991); Floor Debate, L.B. 95, Judiciary Committee, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 267-72 (Jan. 28, 1991). 35 See, In re Estate of Masopust, 232 Neb. 936 , 443 N.W.2d 274 (1989); In re Estate of McCleneghan, 145 Neb. 707 , 17 N.W.2d 923 (1945). 36 See, e.g., Kaspar v. Schack, 195 Neb. 215 , 237 N.W.2d 414 (1976). 37 See Committee Statement, L.B. 354, Judiciary Committee, 83d Leg., 2d Sess. 1-2 (Feb. 4, 1974). 38 See, Unif.

2021(Jan. 23, 1991) (summary of purpose); Judiciary Committee Hearing, L.B. 95, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 38-42 (Jan. 23, 1991); Floor Debate, L.B. 95, Judiciary Committee, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 267-72 (Jan. 28, 1991). 35 See, In re Estate of Masopust, 232 Neb. 936 , 443 N.W.2d 274 (1989); In re Estate of McCleneghan, 145 Neb. 707 , 17 N.W.2d 923 (1945). 36 See, e.g., Kaspar v. Schack, 195 Neb. 215 , 237 N.W.2d 414 (1976). 37 See Committee Statement, L.B. 354, Judiciary Committee, 83d Leg., 2d Sess. 1-2 (Feb. 4, 1974). 38 See, Unif.

2021(Jan. 23, 1991) (summary of purpose); Judiciary Committee Hearing, L.B. 95, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 38-42 (Jan. 23, 1991); Floor Debate, L.B. 95, Judiciary Committee, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 267-72 (Jan. 28, 1991). 35 See, In re Estate of Masopust, 232 Neb. 936 , 443 N.W.2d 274 (1989); In re Estate of McCleneghan, 145 Neb. 707 , 17 N.W.2d 923 (1945). 36 See, e.g., Kaspar v. Schack, 195 Neb. 215 , 237 N.W.2d 414 (1976). 37 See Committee Statement, L.B. 354, Judiciary Committee, 83d Leg., 2d Sess. 1-2 (Feb. 4, 1974). 38 See, Unif.

2021(Jan. 23, 1991) (summary of purpose); Judiciary Committee Hearing, L.B. 95, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 38-42 (Jan. 23, 1991); Floor Debate, L.B. 95, Judiciary Committee, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 267-72 (Jan. 28, 1991). 35 See, In re Estate of Masopust, 232 Neb. 936 , 443 N.W.2d 274 (1989); In re Estate of McCleneghan, 145 Neb. 707 , 17 N.W.2d 923 (1945). 36 See, e.g., Kaspar v. Schack, 195 Neb. 215 , 237 N.W.2d 414 (1976). 37 See Committee Statement, L.B. 354, Judiciary Committee, 83d Leg., 2d Sess. 1-2 (Feb. 4, 1974). 38 See, Unif.

2021(Jan. 23, 1991) (summary of purpose); Judiciary Committee Hearing, L.B. 95, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 38-42 (Jan. 23, 1991); Floor Debate, L.B. 95, Judiciary Committee, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 267-72 (Jan. 28, 1991). 35 See, In re Estate of Masopust, 232 Neb. 936 , 443 N.W.2d 274 (1989); In re Estate of McCleneghan, 145 Neb. 707 , 17 N.W.2d 923 (1945). 36 See, e.g., Kaspar v. Schack, 195 Neb. 215 , 237 N.W.2d 414 (1976). 37 See Committee Statement, L.B. 354, Judiciary Committee, 83d Leg., 2d Sess. 1-2 (Feb. 4, 1974). 38 See, Unif.

2021Because Nebraska adopted its current statutory structure from the UPC, we look for guidance to the UPC and the states that have adopted it. 37 But since Nebraska’s adoption of the UPC, the UPC has been amended, causing the Nebraska non- claim statute to become nonconforming. 38 Additionally, the UPC does not propose a knowledge requirement as seen in § 25-520.01, because the UPC does not mandate that notice 34 See, Francisco, supra note 9 ; In re Interest of A.W., 224 Neb. 764 , 401 N.W.2d 477 (1987); Committee Statement, L.B. 95, Judiciary Committee, 92d Leg., 1st Sess.

2021Because Nebraska adopted its current statutory structure from the UPC, we look for guidance to the UPC and the states that have adopted it. 37 But since Nebraska’s adoption of the UPC, the UPC has been amended, causing the Nebraska non- claim statute to become nonconforming. 38 Additionally, the UPC does not propose a knowledge requirement as seen in § 25-520.01, because the UPC does not mandate that notice 34 See, Francisco, supra note 9 ; In re Interest of A.W., 224 Neb. 764 , 401 N.W.2d 477 (1987); Committee Statement, L.B. 95, Judiciary Committee, 92d Leg., 1st Sess.

2019Real Estate Comm., 213 Neb. 807 , 331 N.W.2d 526 (1983). 18 See State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 456 , 586 N.W.2d 591 (1998). 19 Neb.

2019Real Estate Comm., 213 Neb. 807 , 331 N.W.2d 526 (1983). 18 See State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 456 , 586 N.W.2d 591 (1998). 19 Neb.

2019Real Estate Comm., 213 Neb. 807 , 331 N.W.2d 526 (1983). 18 See State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 456 , 586 N.W.2d 591 (1998). 19 Neb.

2019Real Estate Comm., 213 Neb. 807 , 331 N.W.2d 526 (1983). 18 See State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 456 , 586 N.W.2d 591 (1998). 19 Neb.

2019Section 28-520 is patterned after § 2.02 of the Model Penal Code.21 The comments to the Model Penal Code explain that the knowledge requirement excludes from criminal liability both the inadvertent trespasser and the trespasser who believes 16 See Uston v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc., 89 N.J. 163 , 445 A.2d 370 (1982). 17 See Hancock v. State ex. rel.

2019Section 28-520 is patterned after § 2.02 of the Model Penal Code.21 The comments to the Model Penal Code explain that the knowledge requirement excludes from criminal liability both the inadvertent trespasser and the trespasser who believes 16 See Uston v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc., 89 N.J. 163 , 445 A.2d 370 (1982). 17 See Hancock v. State ex. rel.

2018Dispensing with the knowledge requirement is appropriate where the underlying conduct is illegal, irrespective of a defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s age.23 Yet, another analogy is to the crime of first degree sexual assault of a child.24 Under § 28-319.01(1), a person commits sexual assault of a child (a) when he or she subjects another person under 12 years of age to sexual penetration and the actor is at least 19 years of age or older or (b) when the victim 20 See § 28-831. 21 Placek v. Edstrom, 148 Neb. 79 , 26 N.W.2d 489 (1947); Nebraska State Railway Commission v. Alfalfa Butter Co.,

2018Dispensing with the knowledge requirement is appropriate where the underlying conduct is illegal, irrespective of a defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s age.23 Yet, another analogy is to the crime of first degree sexual assault of a child.24 Under § 28-319.01(1), a person commits sexual assault of a child (a) when he or she subjects another person under 12 years of age to sexual penetration and the actor is at least 19 years of age or older or (b) when the victim 20 See § 28-831. 21 Placek v. Edstrom, 148 Neb. 79 , 26 N.W.2d 489 (1947); Nebraska State Railway Commission v. Alfalfa Butter Co.,

2018Dispensing with the knowledge requirement is appropriate where the underlying conduct is illegal, irrespective of a defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s age.23 Yet, another analogy is to the crime of first degree sexual assault of a child.24 Under § 28-319.01(1), a person commits sexual assault of a child (a) when he or she subjects another person under 12 years of age to sexual penetration and the actor is at least 19 years of age or older or (b) when the victim 20 See § 28-831. 21 Placek v. Edstrom, 148 Neb. 79 , 26 N.W.2d 489 (1947); Nebraska State Railway Commission v. Alfalfa Butter Co.,

2018Dispensing with the knowledge requirement is appropriate where the underlying conduct is illegal, irrespective of a defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s age.23 Yet, another analogy is to the crime of first degree sexual assault of a child.24 Under § 28-319.01(1), a person commits sexual assault of a child (a) when he or she subjects another person under 12 years of age to sexual penetration and the actor is at least 19 years of age or older or (b) when the victim 20 See § 28-831. 21 Placek v. Edstrom, 148 Neb. 79 , 26 N.W.2d 489 (1947); Nebraska State Railway Commission v. Alfalfa Butter Co.,

2018Dispensing with the knowledge requirement is appropriate where the underlying conduct is illegal, irrespective of a defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s age.23 Yet, another analogy is to the crime of first degree sexual assault of a child.24 Under § 28-319.01(1), a person commits sexual assault of a child (a) when he or she subjects another person under 12 years of age to sexual penetration and the actor is at least 19 years of age or older or (b) when the victim 20 See § 28-831. 21 Placek v. Edstrom, 148 Neb. 79 , 26 N.W.2d 489 (1947); Nebraska State Railway Commission v. Alfalfa Butter Co.,

2016Ctr., 275 Neb. 238 , 745 N.W.2d 898 (2008). 2 Id. - 411 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 294 Nebraska R eports BIXENMANN v. DICKINSON LAND SURVEYORS Cite as 294 Neb. 407 of the surveying work and because Dickinson’s conduct was not extreme or obvious.

2016Ctr., 275 Neb. 238 , 745 N.W.2d 898 (2008). 2 Id. - 411 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 294 Nebraska R eports BIXENMANN v. DICKINSON LAND SURVEYORS Cite as 294 Neb. 407 of the surveying work and because Dickinson’s conduct was not extreme or obvious.

2016Ctr., 275 Neb. 238 , 745 N.W.2d 898 (2008). 2 Id. - 411 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 294 Nebraska R eports BIXENMANN v. DICKINSON LAND SURVEYORS Cite as 294 Neb. 407 of the surveying work and because Dickinson’s conduct was not extreme or obvious.

2004Dec. 74 (1988); Vigil By and Through Vigil v. Payne, 725 P.2d 1155 (Colo. App. 1986); Palermo v. Nails, 334 Pa. Super. 544 , 483 A.2d 871 (1984); Uccello v. Laudenslayer, 44 Cal. App. 3d 504 , 118 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1975); Annot., 87 A.L.R. 4th 1004 (1991). *471 We continue to believe that the actual knowledge standard is appropriate because it holds landlords responsible for failing to act against certain known, unreasonable risks, while recognizing that, as a general rule, tenants enjoy a level of privacy in their rental premises.

2004Dec. 74 (1988); Vigil By and Through Vigil v. Payne, 725 P.2d 1155 (Colo. App. 1986); Palermo v. Nails, 334 Pa. Super. 544 , 483 A.2d 871 (1984); Uccello v. Laudenslayer, 44 Cal. App. 3d 504 , 118 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1975); Annot., 87 A.L.R. 4th 1004 (1991). *471 We continue to believe that the actual knowledge standard is appropriate because it holds landlords responsible for failing to act against certain known, unreasonable risks, while recognizing that, as a general rule, tenants enjoy a level of privacy in their rental premises.

2004The actual knowledge standard represents the better rule, and nothing in our recent premises liability cases would alter the reasoning in McCullough v. Bozarth, 232 Neb. 714, 442 N.W.2d 201 (1989).

2004The actual knowledge standard represents the better rule, and nothing in our recent premises liability cases would alter the reasoning in McCullough v. Bozarth, 232 Neb. 714, 442 N.W.2d 201 (1989).

2004Dec. 74 (1988); Vigil By and Through Vigil v. Payne, 725 P.2d 1155 (Colo. App. 1986); Palermo v. Nails, 334 Pa. Super. 544 , 483 A.2d 871 (1984); Uccello v. Laudenslayer, 44 Cal. App. 3d 504 , 118 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1975); Annot., 87 A.L.R. 4th 1004 (1991). *471 We continue to believe that the actual knowledge standard is appropriate because it holds landlords responsible for failing to act against certain known, unreasonable risks, while recognizing that, as a general rule, tenants enjoy a level of privacy in their rental premises.

2004Dec. 74 (1988); Vigil By and Through Vigil v. Payne, 725 P.2d 1155 (Colo. App. 1986); Palermo v. Nails, 334 Pa. Super. 544 , 483 A.2d 871 (1984); Uccello v. Laudenslayer, 44 Cal. App. 3d 504 , 118 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1975); Annot., 87 A.L.R. 4th 1004 (1991). *471 We continue to believe that the actual knowledge standard is appropriate because it holds landlords responsible for failing to act against certain known, unreasonable risks, while recognizing that, as a general rule, tenants enjoy a level of privacy in their rental premises.

2004In his discussion regarding what the Nebraska Supreme Court summarized into the five factors in Guico v. Excel Corp., 260 Neb. 712 , 619 N.W.2d 470 (2000), Professor Larson states, “The idea that the employee’s knowledge of the rule must be actual instead of constructive is a direct corollary of the requirement of ‘wilfulness.’ One cannot deliberately break a rule unless one in fact knows the rule exists.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id., § 35.02 at 35-5.

2004In his discussion regarding what the Nebraska Supreme Court summarized into the five factors in Guico v. Excel Corp., 260 Neb. 712 , 619 N.W.2d 470 (2000), Professor Larson states, “The idea that the employee’s knowledge of the rule must be actual instead of constructive is a direct corollary of the requirement of ‘wilfulness.’ One cannot deliberately break a rule unless one in fact knows the rule exists.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id., § 35.02 at 35-5.

2004Dec. 74 (1988); Vigil By and Through Vigil v. Payne, 725 P.2d 1155 (Colo. App. 1986); Palermo v. Nails, 334 Pa. Super. 544 , 483 A.2d 871 (1984); Uccello v. Laudenslayer, 44 Cal. App. 3d 504 , 118 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1975); Annot., 87 A.L.R. 4th 1004 (1991). *471 We continue to believe that the actual knowledge standard is appropriate because it holds landlords responsible for failing to act against certain known, unreasonable risks, while recognizing that, as a general rule, tenants enjoy a level of privacy in their rental premises.

2004Fossett v. Board of Regents, 258 Neb. 703 , 605 N.W.2d 465 (2000).

2004Fossett v. Board of Regents, 258 Neb. 703 , 605 N.W.2d 465 (2000).

2001The Supreme Court construed the knowledge requirement under § 28-204 in State v. Severin, 250 Neb. 841 , 553 N.W.2d 452 (1996), where an accused accessory who gave false information to police challenged § 28-204 as unconstitutionally vague.

2001The Supreme Court construed the knowledge requirement under § 28-204 in State v. Severin, 250 Neb. 841 , 553 N.W.2d 452 (1996), where an accused accessory who gave false information to police challenged § 28-204 as unconstitutionally vague.

2000See, Hanzlik v. Paustian, 211 Neb. 322 , 318 N.W.2d 712 (1982) (holding that negligence could not be presumed to be within comprehension of layper sons where patient’s esophagus was perforated during dilation), disapproved on other grounds, Anderson v. Service Merchandise Co., 240 Neb. 873 , 485 N.W.2d 170 (1992); Reifschneider v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 222 Neb. 782 , 387 N.W.2d 486 (1986) (declining to apply common knowledge exception where to do so would be assuming that ordinary trier of fact, judge or jury, is capable of assessing status of emergency room patient and determining whether

2000See, Hanzlik v. Paustian, 211 Neb. 322 , 318 N.W.2d 712 (1982) (holding that negligence could not be presumed to be within comprehension of layper sons where patient’s esophagus was perforated during dilation), disapproved on other grounds, Anderson v. Service Merchandise Co., 240 Neb. 873 , 485 N.W.2d 170 (1992); Reifschneider v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 222 Neb. 782 , 387 N.W.2d 486 (1986) (declining to apply common knowledge exception where to do so would be assuming that ordinary trier of fact, judge or jury, is capable of assessing status of emergency room patient and determining whether

1999However, the operative phrase in the above proposition is “a suit that should otherwise be filed.” Obviously, an attorney commits no negligence concerning the statute of limitations by failing to file a frivolous suit or one which otherwise would not produce a satisfactory result. *130 In Koeller v. Reynolds, 344 N.W.2d 556 (Iowa App. 1983), the plaintiff in a legal malpractice action argued that the defendant attorney’s failure to file suit prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations fell within the common knowledge exception.

1999The court responded by stating that the plaintiff’s “argument begs the question of negligence by assuming she had a good case.” Id. at 561 .

1999Rather, it limits the application of the common knowledge exception to those instances when the need to file the underlying suit is obvious, such as when an untimely suit or appeal was actually filed, see Brainerd v. Kates, 68 Ill.

1999App. 3d 781 , 386 N.E.2d 586 , 25 Ill.