15 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1918–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pfiffner v. Correagreen1 sentence2025Not only is Pfiffner the seminal case delineating the common knowledge exception, but also the phrasing in Curahealth’s Motion for Summary Judgment—“an obviously careless act”— matches the language used by the Louisiana Supreme Court in discussing the exception in Pfiffner. 1994-0924, 0963, 0992, p. 9, 643 So.2d at 1233 (noting that “[e]xpert testimony is not required where the physician does an obviously careless act” and then listing examples of same (emphasis added)). | 1 | 1 |
Portie v. Flavin [Realty] Inc.green2 sentences2020App. 3 Cir. 11/4/09), 22 So.3d 1143, 1147 . 12 The trial court noted that the issue of whether the cancellation was signed under duress was reserved for trial on the merits of Atocha Properties’ reconventional demand. 13 Despite ASC’s claims to the contrary, ratification was sufficiently pled as an affirmative defense in the answer. 8 Expounding on the knowledge requirement, “the jurisprudence states that [r]atification which is not expressed in writing will not be presumed. 2020The party seeking to enforce the contract must prove that the other party ratified the agreement with full knowledge of all the facts.” Portie, 09-436, p. 6, 22 So.3d at 1147 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
Liparota v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 , 105 S.Ct. 2084 , 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (it is appropriate to interpret statutes in a way that does not criminalize “a broad range of apparently innocent conduct”). 4 More, specifically, deviation from the general preference for a mens rea requirement is not unusual in the realm of offenses involving juveniles. 2016See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 , 105 S.Ct. 2084 , 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (it is appropriate to interpret statutes in a way that does not criminalize “a broad range of apparently innocent conduct”). 4 More, specifically, deviation from the general preference for a mens rea requirement is not unusual in the realm of offenses involving juveniles. | 1 | 1 |
Leigh v. Commissionergreen1 sentence2015In its November 10, 2014 judgment, the Fifth Circuit explained: |/Actual knowledge is not required; ‘[t]he knowledge requirement of [ 31 U.S.C. § 3713 ] may be satisfied by either actual knowledge of the liability or notice of such facts as would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry as to the existence of the unpaid claim of the United States.’ ” U.S. v. Marshall, 771 F.3d 854, 875 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Leigh v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 1105, 1110 (1979)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Finley Hilliardgreen1 sentence2015In its November 10, 2014 judgment, the Fifth Circuit explained: |/Actual knowledge is not required; ‘[t]he knowledge requirement of [ 31 U.S.C. § 3713 ] may be satisfied by either actual knowledge of the liability or notice of such facts as would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry as to the existence of the unpaid claim of the United States.’ ” U.S. v. Marshall, 771 F.3d 854, 875 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Leigh v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 1105, 1110 (1979)). | 1 | 1 |
Hutchinson v. Shahgreen1 sentence2012FFIC cites the well-settled jurisprudence holding that “expert medical testimony is required when the conclusion regarding medical causation is one that is not within common knowledge.” Chavers v. Travis, 04-0992, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/20/05), 902 So.2d 389, 395 ; Hutchinson v. Shah, 94-264, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/22/94), 648 So.2d 451, 452 (citing Lasha v. Olin Corp., 625 So.2d 1002, 1005 (La.1995))(noting that “when the conclusion regarding medical causation is not one within common knowledge, expert medical testimony if required.”) FFIC contends that “questions concerning the effects of | 1 | 1 |
Lasha v. Olin Corp.green1 sentence2012FFIC cites the well-settled jurisprudence holding that “expert medical testimony is required when the conclusion regarding medical causation is one that is not within common knowledge.” Chavers v. Travis, 04-0992, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/20/05), 902 So.2d 389, 395 ; Hutchinson v. Shah, 94-264, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/22/94), 648 So.2d 451, 452 (citing Lasha v. Olin Corp., 625 So.2d 1002, 1005 (La.1995))(noting that “when the conclusion regarding medical causation is not one within common knowledge, expert medical testimony if required.”) FFIC contends that “questions concerning the effects of | 1 | 1 |
Wheat v. Kinslowgreen1 sentence2005Proof of Facts 652 (noting that the reluctance of courts to shortcut the knowledge requirement by imposing presumptions of incompetence, such as age, as a basis for imposing negligent entrustment liability on rental agencies); Wheat v. Kinslow, 316 F.Supp.2d 944, 953 (D.Kan.2003)(rejecting plaintiff's argument that would "endorse a per se characterization of 18 year-old drivers as reckless or incompetent"). [14] Although the plaintiffs in the companion Dortch case raised this issue, the federal court found it unpersuasive. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences2023State v. Jones, 07-1052 (La. 6/3/08), 983 So. 2d 95 ; State v. Matthews, 50,838 (La. 2015State v. Jones, 2007-1052, p. 9 (La.6/3/08), 983 So.2d 95, 101 ; State v. Tatum, 09-1004, p. 12 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/25/10), 40 So.3d 1082, 1090 . | 2 | 2015–2023 |
Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Government of Turkmenistan
green
2 sentences2019Noble Drilling Servs., Inc. v. Certex USA, Inc. , 620 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2010) ; Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkmenistan , supra ; In re Lloyd's Register N. Am., Inc. , 780 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 64 , 193 L.Ed.2d 31 (2015). 2019Noble Drilling Servs., Inc. v. Certex USA, Inc. , 620 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2010) ; Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkmenistan , supra ; In re Lloyd's Register N. Am., Inc. , 780 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 64 , 193 L.Ed.2d 31 (2015). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Noble Drilling Services, Inc. v. Certex USA, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019Noble Drilling Servs., Inc. v. Certex USA, Inc. , 620 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2010) ; Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkmenistan , supra ; In re Lloyd's Register N. Am., Inc. , 780 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 64 , 193 L.Ed.2d 31 (2015). 2019Noble Drilling Servs., Inc. v. Certex USA, Inc. , 620 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2010) ; Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkmenistan , supra ; In re Lloyd's Register N. Am., Inc. , 780 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 64 , 193 L.Ed.2d 31 (2015). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Mosher v. Long Beach Mortg. Co.
green
2 sentences2019Noble Drilling Servs., Inc. v. Certex USA, Inc. , 620 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2010) ; Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkmenistan , supra ; In re Lloyd's Register N. Am., Inc. , 780 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 64 , 193 L.Ed.2d 31 (2015). 2019Noble Drilling Servs., Inc. v. Certex USA, Inc. , 620 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2010) ; Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkmenistan , supra ; In re Lloyd's Register N. Am., Inc. , 780 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 64 , 193 L.Ed.2d 31 (2015). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Pearl Seas Cruises, LLC v. Lloyd's Register N. Am., Inc.
green
2 sentences2019Noble Drilling Servs., Inc. v. Certex USA, Inc. , 620 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2010) ; Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkmenistan , supra ; In re Lloyd's Register N. Am., Inc. , 780 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 64 , 193 L.Ed.2d 31 (2015). 2019Noble Drilling Servs., Inc. v. Certex USA, Inc. , 620 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2010) ; Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkmenistan , supra ; In re Lloyd's Register N. Am., Inc. , 780 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 64 , 193 L.Ed.2d 31 (2015). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
In Re Lloyd's Register North America, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019Noble Drilling Servs., Inc. v. Certex USA, Inc. , 620 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2010) ; Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkmenistan , supra ; In re Lloyd's Register N. Am., Inc. , 780 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 64 , 193 L.Ed.2d 31 (2015). 2019Noble Drilling Servs., Inc. v. Certex USA, Inc. , 620 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2010) ; Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkmenistan , supra ; In re Lloyd's Register N. Am., Inc. , 780 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 64 , 193 L.Ed.2d 31 (2015). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Elias
green
2 sentences2000State v. Elias, 357 So.2d 275 (La.1978) ("Although the presence of a `vicious will' or mens rea has long been a requirement of criminal responsibility, many exceptions have been recognized."), overruled on other grounds by, State v. Bosworth, 373 So.2d 152 (La. 1979). [3] *1001 In Louisiana's statute, the crime of carnal knowledge of a juvenile requires proof of consensual sexual intercourse between a person over the age of 17 with a person 12 years old or older, but under the age of 17. 1995Subsection (B) provides that "[l]ack of knowledge that the prohibited act occurred on or within one thousand feet of school property shall not be a defense." In State v. Elias, 357 So.2d 275 (La. 1978), we recognized that in the interest of *877 protecting juveniles, the legislature has dispensed with the knowledge requirement of several crimes involving that class of persons. | 2 | 1995–2000 |
Ainsworth ex rel. Mother v. Am. Home Assurance Co.
green
1 sentence2025App. 4 Cir. 2/21/18), 239 So.3d 359, 365-66 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Tatum
green
1 sentence2015State v. Jones, 2007-1052, p. 9 (La.6/3/08), 983 So.2d 95, 101 ; State v. Tatum, 09-1004, p. 12 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/25/10), 40 So.3d 1082, 1090 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Chavers v. Travis
green
1 sentence2012FFIC cites the well-settled jurisprudence holding that “expert medical testimony is required when the conclusion regarding medical causation is one that is not within common knowledge.” Chavers v. Travis, 04-0992, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/20/05), 902 So.2d 389, 395 ; Hutchinson v. Shah, 94-264, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/22/94), 648 So.2d 451, 452 (citing Lasha v. Olin Corp., 625 So.2d 1002, 1005 (La.1995))(noting that “when the conclusion regarding medical causation is not one within common knowledge, expert medical testimony if required.”) FFIC contends that “questions concerning the effects of | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Johnson v. E.I. Dupont Denemours & Co.
green
2 sentences2012DuPont deNemours & Co., 08-628 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/13/09) , 7 So.3d 734 . |4(jln Johnson, supra, which was a suit for damages allegedly caused by chemical exposure from a plant explosion, the appellate court rejected the argument that the common knowledge exception applied. 2012The court reasoned that “whether or not plaintiffs suffered injuries as a result of chemical exposure from the Dupont incident is not a determination based on common knowledge, so the plaintiffs were required to present expert medical testimony in order to meet their burden of proving medical causation.” Johnson, 08-628 at p. 8, 7 So.3d at 740 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Nunez v. A&M Rentals, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005A similar argument regarding a commercially available system to verify licenses was rejected in Nunez v. A & M Rentals, Inc., 63 Mass.App.Ct. 20 , 822 N.E.2d 743 (2005)(holding that a rental company's duty to verify a valid license was limited to its statutory duty and refusing to impose an additional duty to verify a valid license through "a direct on-line computer connection with the Registry of Motor Vehicles.") Moreover, as the court in Nunez held, the expansion of the rental company's duty to verify the validity of a license is a legislative issue. 2005A similar argument regarding a commercially available system to verify licenses was rejected in Nunez v. A & M Rentals, Inc., 63 Mass.App.Ct. 20 , 822 N.E.2d 743 (2005)(holding that a rental company's duty to verify a valid license was limited to its statutory duty and refusing to impose an additional duty to verify a valid license through "a direct on-line computer connection with the Registry of Motor Vehicles.") Moreover, as the court in Nunez held, the expansion of the rental company's duty to verify the validity of a license is a legislative issue. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
ATTORNEY U v. the Mississippi Bar
green
1 sentence2005Concerning the knowledge requirement, the board considered various legal authorities interpreting both Louisiana Rule 8.3(a) and Model Rule 8.3(a), and determined that a lawyer's duty to report professional misconduct is triggered when, under the circumstances, a reasonable lawyer would have "a firm opinion that the conduct in question more likely than not occurred." See Attorney U v. Mississippi Bar, 678 So.2d 963 (Miss.1996); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Bosworth
green
1 sentence2000State v. Elias, 357 So.2d 275 (La.1978) ("Although the presence of a `vicious will' or mens rea has long been a requirement of criminal responsibility, many exceptions have been recognized."), overruled on other grounds by, State v. Bosworth, 373 So.2d 152 (La. 1979). [3] *1001 In Louisiana's statute, the crime of carnal knowledge of a juvenile requires proof of consensual sexual intercourse between a person over the age of 17 with a person 12 years old or older, but under the age of 17. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State Ex Rel. Department of Highways v. Vermilion Development Co.
green
2 sentences1993NOEHA's argument is based upon State, Through Dept. of Highways v. Vermilion, 258 La. 1159 , 249 So.2d 167 (1971), wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed an expropriation proceeding under the "quick-taking" statute [2] (as opposed to a regular expropriation governed by R.S. 19:1 et seq., as in the instant case). 1993NOEHA's argument is based upon State, Through Dept. of Highways v. Vermilion, 258 La. 1159 , 249 So.2d 167 (1971), wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed an expropriation proceeding under the "quick-taking" statute [2] (as opposed to a regular expropriation governed by R.S. 19:1 et seq., as in the instant case). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Poirier v. Burton-Swartz Cypress Co.
green
2 sentences1918Poirier v. Burton-Swartz Cypress Co., 127 La. 936 , 54 South. 292 . 1918Poirier v. Burton-Swartz Cypress Co., 127 La. 936 , 54 South. 292 . | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.