Smith motion in New York

2013Here, it is undisputed that the vehicle driven by defendant was traveling at a lawful rate of speed and had the right-of-way, and the Smith defendants failed to raise an issue of fact whether defendant had an opportunity to avoid the accident (see id. at 1195 ).

2013Here, it is undisputed that the vehicle driven by defendant was traveling at a lawful rate of speed and had the right-of-way, and the Smith defendants failed to raise an issue of fact whether defendant had an opportunity to avoid the accident (see id. at 1195 ).

2024To establish prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, a movant must come forward with evidentiary proof, in admissible form, demonstrating the absence of any material issues of fact ( see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp. , 68 NY2d 320 , 508 NYS2d 923 [1986]; Sillman v Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. , 3 NY2d 395 , 165 NYS2d 498 [1957]).

2024To establish prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, a movant must come forward with evidentiary proof, in admissible form, demonstrating the absence of any material issues of fact ( see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp. , 68 NY2d 320 , 508 NYS2d 923 [1986]; Sillman v Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. , 3 NY2d 395 , 165 NYS2d 498 [1957]).

2024To establish prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, a movant must come forward with evidentiary proof, in admissible form, demonstrating the absence of any material issues of fact ( see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp. , 68 NY2d 320 , 508 NYS2d 923 [1986]; Sillman v Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. , 3 NY2d 395 , 165 NYS2d 498 [1957]).

2024To establish prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, a movant must come forward with evidentiary proof, in admissible form, demonstrating the absence of any material issues of fact ( see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp. , 68 NY2d 320 , 508 NYS2d 923 [1986]; Sillman v Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. , 3 NY2d 395 , 165 NYS2d 498 [1957]).

2015Footnote 8: Notably, the Court of Appeals in Jimenez distinguished its earlier decision in People v Smith ( 59 NY2d 454 [1983]), in which a search of the defendant's briefcase simultaneous with his arrest for turnstile jumping had been held lawful, on the ground that the Smith defendant "wore a bulletproof vest and denied this fact when questioned by police" ( 22 NY3d at 722 ).

2015Notably, the Court of Appeals in Jimenez distinguished its earlier decision in People v Smith ( 59 NY2d 454 [1983]), in which a search of the defendant’s briefcase simultaneous with his arrest for turnstile jumping had been held lawful, on the ground that the Smith defendant “wore a bulletproof vest and denied this fact when questioned by police” ( 22 NY3d at 722 ).

2014Since “no appeal lies from an order denying leave to reargue” (O’Brien v O’Brien, 115 AD3d 720 , 721-722 [2014]; see Indymac Bank, F.S.B. v Moise, 107 AB3d 851, 852 [2013]; Neunteufel v Nelnet Loan Servs., Inc., 104 AD3d 657 , 657 [2013]), Smith’s appeal must be dismissed.

2014Since “no appeal lies from an order denying leave to reargue” (O’Brien v O’Brien, 115 AD3d 720 , 721-722 [2014]; see Indymac Bank, F.S.B. v Moise, 107 AB3d 851, 852 [2013]; Neunteufel v Nelnet Loan Servs., Inc., 104 AD3d 657 , 657 [2013]), Smith’s appeal must be dismissed.

2014Since “no appeal lies from an order denying leave to reargue” (O’Brien v O’Brien, 115 AD3d 720 , 721-722 [2014]; see Indymac Bank, F.S.B. v Moise, 107 AB3d 851, 852 [2013]; Neunteufel v Nelnet Loan Servs., Inc., 104 AD3d 657 , 657 [2013]), Smith’s appeal must be dismissed.

2014Since “no appeal lies from an order denying leave to reargue” (O’Brien v O’Brien, 115 AD3d 720 , 721-722 [2014]; see Indymac Bank, F.S.B. v Moise, 107 AB3d 851, 852 [2013]; Neunteufel v Nelnet Loan Servs., Inc., 104 AD3d 657 , 657 [2013]), Smith’s appeal must be dismissed.

2019Significantly, both Everett's and [*2]Smith's hearing testimony was contradicted by defendant's trial testimony that Smith had actually been the one to wield a razor blade and that Smith had cut himself ( see People v Avery , 80 AD3d at 985 ).

2017The Smith defendants have demonstrated that they are bona fide purchasers and are entitled to a cancellation of the tax liens and an estoppel of enforcement of the liens (see TCJS Corp. v Koff, 74 AD3d 1188 [2d Dept 2010]).

2016As the majority points out, the next factors are the most important considerations in this analysis ( Smith , 538 US at 102 ).

2016As the majority points out, the next factors are the most important considerations in this analysis {Smith, 538 US at 102 ).

2016SARA only applies to parolees, who otherwise have restricted liberty, these factors do not strongly support a conclusion that SARA is punitive in effect.” To support this assertion, the majority cites Morrissey v Brewer ( 408 US 471, 482 [1972]) and Matter of Williams v New York State Div. of Parole ( 71 AD3d 524 [1st Dept 2010], appeal dismissed 15 NY3d 770 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 710 [2010]), neither of which address alleged violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause or consider the Smith factors.

2016SARA only applies to parolees, who otherwise have restricted liberty, these factors do not strongly support a conclusion that SARA is punitive in effect.” To support this assertion, the majority cites Morrissey v Brewer ( 408 US 471, 482 [1972]) and Matter of Williams v New York State Div. of Parole ( 71 AD3d 524 [1st Dept 2010], appeal dismissed 15 NY3d 770 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 710 [2010]), neither of which address alleged violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause or consider the Smith factors.

2016SARA only applies to parolees, who otherwise have restricted liberty, these factors do not strongly support a conclusion that SARA is punitive in effect.” To support this assertion, the majority cites Morrissey v Brewer ( 408 US 471, 482 [1972]) and Matter of Williams v New York State Div. of Parole ( 71 AD3d 524 [1st Dept 2010], appeal dismissed 15 NY3d 770 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 710 [2010]), neither of which address alleged violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause or consider the Smith factors.

2016SARA only applies to parolees, who otherwise have restricted liberty, these factors do not strongly support a conclusion that SARA is punitive in effect.” To support this assertion, the majority cites Morrissey v Brewer ( 408 US 471, 482 [1972]) and Matter of Williams v New York State Div. of Parole ( 71 AD3d 524 [1st Dept 2010], appeal dismissed 15 NY3d 770 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 710 [2010]), neither of which address alleged violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause or consider the Smith factors.

2016The submissions in opposition to Smith’s motion failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to comparative negligence on the part of Smith (see Guerrero v Milla, 135 AD3d 635 [1st Dept 2016]).

2016SARA only applies to parolees, who otherwise have restricted liberty, these factors do not strongly support a conclusion that SARA is punitive in effect.” To support this assertion, the majority cites Morrissey v Brewer ( 408 US 471, 482 [1972]) and Matter of Williams v New York State Div. of Parole ( 71 AD3d 524 [1st Dept 2010], appeal dismissed 15 NY3d 770 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 710 [2010]), neither of which address alleged violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause or consider the Smith factors.

2016SARA only applies to parolees, who otherwise have restricted liberty, these factors do not strongly support a conclusion that SARA is punitive in effect.” To support this assertion, the majority cites Morrissey v Brewer ( 408 US 471, 482 [1972]) and Matter of Williams v New York State Div. of Parole ( 71 AD3d 524 [1st Dept 2010], appeal dismissed 15 NY3d 770 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 710 [2010]), neither of which address alleged violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause or consider the Smith factors.

2015Notably, the Court of Appeals in Jimenez distinguished its earlier decision in People v Smith ( 59 NY2d 454 [1983]), in which a search of the defendant’s briefcase simultaneous with his arrest for turnstile jumping had been held lawful, on the ground that the Smith defendant “wore a bulletproof vest and denied this fact when questioned by police” ( 22 NY3d at 722 ).

2012Neither d[o] [they] give to the voter the right to vote such absentee ballot.” (Matter of Baker, 126 Misc 49, 53 [Sup Ct, Oneida County 1925], affd 215 App Div 791 [1925].) In response to Smith’s challenge, Sullivan argues that the voters should not be disenfranchised by the errors of Board of Elections representatives who issued the absentee ballots to the voters and that substantial compliance should suffice.

2002A dog is not a per se nuisance (see, McCluskey v Wile, 144 App Div 470 ).