Smith claim in Maryland

2015At the conclusion of Daughtry, 419 Md. at 80-81 , 18 A.3d at 87 , we held that our decision was to be given “full retrospective effect.” 12 Here, we conclude that Smith’s plea was knowing and voluntary, and Smith’s lawyer’s testimony was admissible at the coram nobis hearing.

2015At the conclusion of Daughtry, 419 Md. at 80-81 , 18 A.3d at 87 , we held that our decision was to be given “full retrospective effect.” 12 Here, we conclude that Smith’s plea was knowing and voluntary, and Smith’s lawyer’s testimony was admissible at the coram nobis hearing.

2014Invited error Nevertheless, the State contends that Mr. Smith “invited” the court’s error when he did not correct “a factual misstatement by the prosecutor.” Under the “invited error” doctrine, “ ‘a defendant who himself invites or creates error cannot obtain a benefit—mistrial or reversal—from that error.’” State v. Rich, 415 Md. 567, 575 , 3 A.3d 1210 (2010) (quoting Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 544 , 735 A.2d 1061 (1999)).

2014Invited error Nevertheless, the State contends that Mr. Smith “invited” the court’s error when he did not correct “a factual misstatement by the prosecutor.” Under the “invited error” doctrine, “ ‘a defendant who himself invites or creates error cannot obtain a benefit—mistrial or reversal—from that error.’” State v. Rich, 415 Md. 567, 575 , 3 A.3d 1210 (2010) (quoting Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 544 , 735 A.2d 1061 (1999)).

2014Invited error Nevertheless, the State contends that Mr. Smith “invited” the court’s error when he did not correct “a factual misstatement by the prosecutor.” Under the “invited error” doctrine, “ ‘a defendant who himself invites or creates error cannot obtain a benefit—mistrial or reversal—from that error.’” State v. Rich, 415 Md. 567, 575 , 3 A.3d 1210 (2010) (quoting Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 544 , 735 A.2d 1061 (1999)).

2014Invited error Nevertheless, the State contends that Mr. Smith “invited” the court’s error when he did not correct “a factual misstatement by the prosecutor.” Under the “invited error” doctrine, “ ‘a defendant who himself invites or creates error cannot obtain a benefit—mistrial or reversal—from that error.’” State v. Rich, 415 Md. 567, 575 , 3 A.3d 1210 (2010) (quoting Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 544 , 735 A.2d 1061 (1999)).

2013Moreover, when two members of this Court followed the Smith standard in Raines , they addressed the Article 17 protection together with the federal ex post facto protection. 383 Md. at 26 , 857 A.2d at 34 .

2013Moreover, when two members of this Court followed the Smith standard in Raines , they addressed the Article 17 protection together with the federal ex post facto protection. 383 Md. at 26 , 857 A.2d at 34 .

2011As stated in Trinity Assembly of God of Baltimore City v. People's Counsel for Baltimore County, 407 Md. 53, 87 , 962 A.2d 404, 424 (2008), "[t]he substantial burden test (the Sherbert test) remained the law of the land governing claims under the Free Exercise Clause until 1990," when the Supreme Court decided Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872 , 110 S.Ct. at 1608 , 108 L.Ed.2d at 896 .

2011As stated in Trinity Assembly of God of Baltimore City v. People's Counsel for Baltimore County, 407 Md. 53, 87 , 962 A.2d 404, 424 (2008), "[t]he substantial burden test (the Sherbert test) remained the law of the land governing claims under the Free Exercise Clause until 1990," when the Supreme Court decided Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872 , 110 S.Ct. at 1608 , 108 L.Ed.2d at 896 .

2010See Branch, 123 Md.App. at 353 , 718 A.2d 631 ; Williams, 112 Md.App. at 548 , 685 A.2d 884 . 20 .

2010See Branch, 123 Md.App. at 353 , 718 A.2d 631 ; Williams, 112 Md.App. at 548 , 685 A.2d 884 . 20 .

2009Mich. 2003) (applying the Smith standard to a free exercise claim brought against state actors); Jocham v. Tuscola County , 239 F.Supp.2d 714 , 724 (E.D.

2009Mich. 2003) (applying the Smith standard to a free exercise claim brought against state actors); Jocham v. Tuscola County , 239 F.Supp.2d 714 , 724 (E.D.

2009Neither the State nor the petitioner has requested a review of that decision. [6] In Allison v. United States , the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that an appellate court may modify a conviction to a lesser included offense, but that [i]t must be clear (1) that the evidence adduced at trial fails to support one or more elements of the crime of which appellant was convicted, (2) that such evidence sufficiently sustains all the elements of another offense, (3) that the latter is a lesser included offense of the former, and (4) that no undue prejudice wil

2006Smith’s claim arises out of disclosures in which his counsel revealed allegedly privileged information to the trial court and upon which the judge repeatedly stated that her determination concerning Smith’s Fifth Amendment rights “was based upon the proffer of the state and [Smith’s counselj’s statement that, after consulting with his client, he didn’t believe he had a Fifth Amendment privilege.” As we noted in Newman v. State, 384 Md. 285 , 863 A.2d 321 (2004), “only the client has [the] power to waive the attorney-client privilege.” Id. at 308 , 863 A.2d at 334 .

2006Smith’s claim arises out of disclosures in which his counsel revealed allegedly privileged information to the trial court and upon which the judge repeatedly stated that her determination concerning Smith’s Fifth Amendment rights “was based upon the proffer of the state and [Smith’s counselj’s statement that, after consulting with his client, he didn’t believe he had a Fifth Amendment privilege.” As we noted in Newman v. State, 384 Md. 285 , 863 A.2d 321 (2004), “only the client has [the] power to waive the attorney-client privilege.” Id. at 308 , 863 A.2d at 334 .

1999It seems, however, *82 that it would be practically impossible to do so.” Id. at 667 , 561 A.2d at 211 .

1999It seems, however, *82 that it would be practically impossible to do so.” Id. at 667 , 561 A.2d at 211 .

1997In rejecting Smith’s exception, the Court cited the general rule that “ ‘non-experts have always been permitted to state their conclusions from the facts observed, [ ] that certain stains on clothing or other substances looked like or resembled blood stains, and to describe them by color or appearance.’ ” Id. at 185-86 , 32 A.2d at 867 (quoting 2 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 997 (11th ed.1935)).

1997In rejecting Smith’s exception, the Court cited the general rule that “ ‘non-experts have always been permitted to state their conclusions from the facts observed, [ ] that certain stains on clothing or other substances looked like or resembled blood stains, and to describe them by color or appearance.’ ” Id. at 185-86 , 32 A.2d at 867 (quoting 2 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 997 (11th ed.1935)).

1993It provides little guidance for individuals and companies to enable them to predict behavior that will either trigger or avoid punitive damages liability, and it undermines the deterrent effect of these awards.” 325 Md. at 459 , 601 A.2d at 652 .

1993It provides little guidance for individuals and companies to enable them to predict behavior that will either trigger or avoid punitive damages liability, and it undermines the deterrent effect of these awards.” 325 Md. at 459 , 601 A.2d at 652 .

1993Cf. Vance v. Whirlpool Corp., 716 F.2d 1010, 1013 (4th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 , 104 S.Ct. 2678 , 81 L.Ed.2d 873 (1984) (holding that the limitations period under ADEA was equitably tolled because the employer’s failure to post notice in accordance with Title VII prevented the employee from learning of his rights under ADEA at the time of his discharge, and when the employee later saw the notice, the limitations period had already run); Llewellyn v. Celanese Corp., 693 F.Supp. 369, 379 (W.D.N.C.1988) (holding that in sexual harassment and unlawful sex discrimination case, the de