Smith rule in Utah

1997We noted that “Smith’s recovery under the FLSA would be limited to [liquidated damages] ... because ‘[o]nee the trial court awarded [him] his back wages, including overtime, under the UPWA, his wages were no longer “unpaid” ... thereby obviating Smith’s claim for unpaid wages under the FLSA.’ ” Id. at 1371 (quoting Smith I, 832 P.2d at 470 n. 3).

1994However, in this case we specifically held that Smith’s recovery under the FLSA would be limited to penalties under the FLSA because “[o]nce the trial court awarded [him] his back wages, including overtime, under the UPWA, his wages were no longer ‘unpaid’ ... thereby obviating Smith’s claim for unpaid wages under the FLSA.” Smith I, 832 P.2d at 470 n. 3.

2026The district court issued two orders holding Smith in contempt for disposing of portions of his property, and Smith appealed from those (continued…) 20230024-CA 10 2026 UT App 54 Cook Martin Poulson PC v. Smith The Proceedings on Remand ¶22 On remand from the first appeal, CMP asked the district court to “reinstate all of the sanctions that it [had] previously entered against” Smith. 4 In response, the court found that “based on Smith’s violation of the [c]ourt’s discovery order, . . . it [was] appropriate to reaffirm the striking of Smith’s counterclaim [against CMP] and [his] third party com

2025But a defendant is “not placed in double jeopardy . . . simply because a [midtrial] continuance [is] granted.” State v. Bradshaw, 680 P.2d 1036, 1040 (Utah 1984). 20220135-CA 26 2025 UT App 35 State v. Smith analyst to testify, that the court would not have excluded that testimony, and that admission of that testimony would have only hurt Smith’s defense, Counsel’s decision not to object to Scientist’s testimony on Confrontation Clause grounds did not constitute deficient performance.

2025Another instance where defense counsel is not obligated to object is when “uncertainties in the law” make it “far from certain” that the objection will succeed, because in that circumstance, counsel can reasonably believe that “the court might deny the objection” and thereby “give some appearance of judicial approval or official imprimatur to the prosecutor’s comments.” Id. ¶ 31 (cleaned up). ¶74 Here, as noted, the prosecutor’s arguably objectionable comment was that by the time of closing arguments, the 20220135-CA 33 2025 UT App 35 State v. Smith presumption of innocence that Smith “was clo

2025Cumulative Error ¶84 As to Smith’s claim of cumulative error, we have held elsewhere that “the cumulative error doctrine . . . does not apply” when there is “no other error with which to cumulate [t]rial [c]ounsel’s [non-prejudicial] presumed . . . errors.” State v. Torres- Orellana, 2021 UT App 74 , ¶ 30 n.11, 493 P.3d 711 .

2025Cumulative Error ¶84 As to Smith’s claim of cumulative error, we have held elsewhere that “the cumulative error doctrine . . . does not apply” when there is “no other error with which to cumulate [t]rial [c]ounsel’s [non-prejudicial] presumed . . . errors.” State v. Torres- Orellana, 2021 UT App 74 , ¶ 30 n.11, 493 P.3d 711 .

2025It first identified two sources of law that it viewed as controlling the statute of limitations issue: State v. Pierce, 782 P.2d 194 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and Utah Code section 76-1-306. ¶13 Decided by the court of appeals in 1989, State v. Pierce held that the State “bears the burden of proving that a criminal action is not barred by the statute of limitations, whenever that issue is properly raised.” 782 P.2d at 196 .

2025It first identified two sources of law that it viewed as controlling the statute of limitations issue: State v. Pierce, 782 P.2d 194 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and Utah Code section 76-1-306. ¶13 Decided by the court of appeals in 1989, State v. Pierce held that the State “bears the burden of proving that a criminal action is not barred by the statute of limitations, whenever that issue is properly raised.” 782 P.2d at 196 .

2025The State informed the court that “[i]t seem[ed] these items were disposed of as the case was closed and had been declined by the prosecutors of that time.” The applicable police department records retention policy was that felony investigation case files were to be “[r]etain[ed] for 5 years after [the] case closed and then destroy[ed].” ¶20 Based on the missing evidence, Smith asked the court to dismiss the case under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), arguing that the State had “withheld” evidence and that while “[t]he absence of the [evidence made] it impossible to know how detrimental

2025The State responded that these circumstances should not be analyzed under Brady but, rather, under State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49 , 162 P.3d 1106 , which addresses evidence that is lost or destroyed. ¶21 The court agreed with the State, saying, “There’s no indication the State has failed to disclose information, that they’ve held things back.

2025The State responded that these circumstances should not be analyzed under Brady but, rather, under State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49 , 162 P.3d 1106 , which addresses evidence that is lost or destroyed. ¶21 The court agreed with the State, saying, “There’s no indication the State has failed to disclose information, that they’ve held things back.

2025In fact, immediately after saying that the presumption of innocence was “gone,” that is exactly what Counsel argued: “We’ve proven each element beyond a reasonable doubt that he’s guilty of rape.” Nevertheless, the prosecutor was treading on thin ice. ¶75 As we recently noted in State v. Harris, 2024 UT App 191 , 562 P.3d 1215 , cert. denied, Feb. 25, 2025 (No. 20250077)—a case that also involved the prosecutor arguing in closing that the presumption of innocence was by that point “gone”—“[b]oth the Utah Supreme Court and this court have previously said in passing that the presumption of innoc

2025In fact, immediately after saying that the presumption of innocence was “gone,” that is exactly what Counsel argued: “We’ve proven each element beyond a reasonable doubt that he’s guilty of rape.” Nevertheless, the prosecutor was treading on thin ice. ¶75 As we recently noted in State v. Harris, 2024 UT App 191 , 562 P.3d 1215 , cert. denied, Feb. 25, 2025 (No. 20250077)—a case that also involved the prosecutor arguing in closing that the presumption of innocence was by that point “gone”—“[b]oth the Utah Supreme Court and this court have previously said in passing that the presumption of innoc

2025Accordingly, the district court properly denied Smith’s motion to suppress. ¶24 Affirmed. 20240235-CA 11 2025 UT App 159

2023As “review implies an analysis of the claims and defenses raised in the proceeding under review,” the “failure to preserve . . . claims . . . is accordingly preclusive of [an] attempt to assert them in an amended complaint.” Friends, 2017 UT 15, ¶ 59 . ¶22 With regard to the Smith violation, the district court granted the Division’s request “to amend its administrative citation to conform to proof after trial pursuant to” rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

2023As “review implies an analysis of the claims and defenses raised in the proceeding under review,” the “failure to preserve . . . claims . . . is accordingly preclusive of [an] attempt to assert them in an amended complaint.” Friends, 2017 UT 15, ¶ 59 . ¶22 With regard to the Smith violation, the district court granted the Division’s request “to amend its administrative citation to conform to proof after trial pursuant to” rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

2022In short, Detective “did not employ inducements that would have been, as a matter of law, sufficient 20200782-CA 24 2022 UT App 82 State v. Smith to induce an ordinary person, not otherwise inclined, to solicit sex from a thirteen-year-old.” See id. ¶ 47 (quotation simplified). ¶30 Under the circumstances presented here, the district court correctly denied Smith’s motion to dismiss.

2022And the court did not err by denying Smith’s motion to dismiss on entrapment grounds. ¶32 Affirmed. 20200782-CA 25 2022 UT App 82

2019Accordingly, the evidence discovered subsequent to Smith’s brief seizure “was not the fruit of a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.” Id. ¶ 30. ¶21 Affirmed. 20180101-CA 13 2019 UT App 75 State v. Smith POHLMAN, Judge (dissenting): ¶22 This is a close case.

2019The court denied Smith’s motion because it determined that any delay was invited by Smith, who did not argue that the rule of completeness was applicable at the time of Officer’s direct examination and then 20170282-CA 5 2019 UT App 141 State v. Smith delayed pursuing the issue when the court indicated its willingness to reconsider its initial ruling. ¶12 In seeking to establish a basis for his fear of Ashton and his belief that Ashton might kill him if he did not kill Girlfriend, Smith also sought to present evidence of “jailhouse kites”—illicit letters exchanged by prison inmates—written by

2016(Citing Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1038-39 .) Instead, Smith only argues that he “is entitled to have his motion to suppress heard in the de novo appeal so his counsel has the opportunity to advocate fully for him as the evidence may come out under the law as it stands at the time of the hearing.” ¶26 Given that the exceptions to the law of the case doctrine contemplate at least a change of some significance in the facts, the law, or the argument even under the flexible approach we have outlined here, we cannot say that the district court either misapplied the law or abused its discretion in determ

2013ANALYSIS 16 The State asserts that we lack jurisdiction to consider the validity of Smith's plea because he failed to file a timely motion to withdraw his plea When a defendant pleads guilty, he "waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations." See State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ¶ 15 , 167 P.3d 1046 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2013ANALYSIS 16 The State asserts that we lack jurisdiction to consider the validity of Smith's plea because he failed to file a timely motion to withdraw his plea When a defendant pleads guilty, he "waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations." See State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ¶ 15 , 167 P.3d 1046 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2011Therefore, because Smith did not file a motion to withdraw his plea until after his sentence was announced, this court lacks jurisdiction to review Smith's claim and has no choice but to dismiss the appeal. 2 See Merrill, 2005 UT 34, ¶ 20 , 114 P.3d 585 .

2011Therefore, because Smith did not file a motion to withdraw his plea until after his sentence was announced, this court lacks jurisdiction to review Smith's claim and has no choice but to dismiss the appeal. 2 See Merrill, 2005 UT 34, ¶ 20 , 114 P.3d 585 .

2006Id. ¶ 20 In fact, by the statute’s plain language and structure, the degree of the penalty for the crime of automobile homicide is enhanced only by the mens rea element of the crime, i.e., simple negligence or criminal negligence, not by the fact that the person had the requisite amount of alcohol in his system or was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time.

2006Id. ¶ 20 In fact, by the statute’s plain language and structure, the degree of the penalty for the crime of automobile homicide is enhanced only by the mens rea element of the crime, i.e., simple negligence or criminal negligence, not by the fact that the person had the requisite amount of alcohol in his system or was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time.

2004Corp. of Am., 977 F.Supp. 799 , 802 n. 1 (W.D.La.1997) ("In that Smith reduces the First Amendment to a paper tiger and repudiates a long history of carefully crafted free exercise jurisprudence, we agree with the [ City of Boerne ] dissenters."); James D.

2004Corp. of Am., 977 F.Supp. 799 , 802 n. 1 (W.D.La.1997) ("In that Smith reduces the First Amendment to a paper tiger and repudiates a long history of carefully crafted free exercise jurisprudence, we agree with the [ City of Boerne ] dissenters."); James D.