Smith motion in Georgia

2025See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

2025See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

2018See Peters v. State , 224 Ga.App. 837 , 839-840 (4), 481 S.E.2d 898 (1997) (remanding for falsity determination); Humphrey v. State , 207 Ga.App. 472 , 476 (2), 428 S.E.2d 362 (1993) ("Since appellant contended that no rape occurred, any evidence showing a 'reasonable probability' that the prosecutrix had made other false accusations would certainly be the strongest defense available to him; thus it cannot be said that the failure to adhere to the Smith rule was harmless error.").

2018See Peters v. State , 224 Ga.App. 837 , 839-840 (4), 481 S.E.2d 898 (1997) (remanding for falsity determination); Humphrey v. State , 207 Ga.App. 472 , 476 (2), 428 S.E.2d 362 (1993) ("Since appellant contended that no rape occurred, any evidence showing a 'reasonable probability' that the prosecutrix had made other false accusations would certainly be the strongest defense available to him; thus it cannot be said that the failure to adhere to the Smith rule was harmless error.").

2014See Franklin v. Shackelford, 174 Ga. App. 520 ( 330 SE2d 449 ) (1985).

2014See Franklin v. Shackelford, 174 Ga. App. 520 ( 330 SE2d 449 ) (1985).

2013See Higgenbottom v. State, 288 Ga. 429, 430-431 ( 704 SE2d 786 ) (2011) (holding that trial court’s limited findings were insufficient to allow determination of whether trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment on constitutional speedy trial grounds).

2013See Higgenbottom v. State, 288 Ga. 429, 430-431 ( 704 SE2d 786 ) (2011) (holding that trial court’s limited findings were insufficient to allow determination of whether trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment on constitutional speedy trial grounds).

2013See Fallen v. State, 289 Ga. 247, 248 ( 710 SE2d 559 ) (2011).

2013See Fallen v. State, 289 Ga. 247, 248 ( 710 SE2d 559 ) (2011).

1998Compare Peters, 224 Ga.App. at 839 (4), 481 S.E.2d 898 (court refused to conduct Smith hearing after request); Berry, 210 Ga.App. at 789-790 (1), 437 S.E.2d 630 (court refused hearing after request). [24] 222 Ga.App. 828, 829-830 (1), 476 S.E.2d 101 (1996). [25] See Hines v. State, 221 Ga.App. 193, 195 , 470 S.E.2d 787 (1996) ("Because no evidence had been presented at the time of this proffer to support a theory that the allegations ... were false, the trial court did not err in keeping [the prior molestation testimony] from the jury"); Eason v. State, 215 Ga.App. 614, 615 (1), 451 S.E.2d 820

1998Compare Peters, 224 Ga.App. at 839 (4), 481 S.E.2d 898 (court refused to conduct Smith hearing after request); Berry, 210 Ga.App. at 789-790 (1), 437 S.E.2d 630 (court refused hearing after request). [24] 222 Ga.App. 828, 829-830 (1), 476 S.E.2d 101 (1996). [25] See Hines v. State, 221 Ga.App. 193, 195 , 470 S.E.2d 787 (1996) ("Because no evidence had been presented at the time of this proffer to support a theory that the allegations ... were false, the trial court did not err in keeping [the prior molestation testimony] from the jury"); Eason v. State, 215 Ga.App. 614, 615 (1), 451 S.E.2d 820

1998Compare Peters, 224 Ga. App. at 839 (4) (court refused to conduct Smith hearing after request); Berry, 210 Ga. App. at 789-790 (1) (court refused hearing after request). 222 Ga. App. 828, 829-830 (1) ( 476 SE2d 101 ) (1996).

1998Compare Peters, 224 Ga. App. at 839 (4) (court refused to conduct Smith hearing after request); Berry, 210 Ga. App. at 789-790 (1) (court refused hearing after request). 222 Ga. App. 828, 829-830 (1) ( 476 SE2d 101 ) (1996).

1998Compare Peters, 224 Ga. App. at 839 (4) (court refused to conduct Smith hearing after request); Berry, 210 Ga. App. at 789-790 (1) (court refused hearing after request). 222 Ga. App. 828, 829-830 (1) ( 476 SE2d 101 ) (1996).

1998Compare Peters, 224 Ga.App. at 839 (4), 481 S.E.2d 898 (court refused to conduct Smith hearing after request); Berry, 210 Ga.App. at 789-790 (1), 437 S.E.2d 630 (court refused hearing after request). [24] 222 Ga.App. 828, 829-830 (1), 476 S.E.2d 101 (1996). [25] See Hines v. State, 221 Ga.App. 193, 195 , 470 S.E.2d 787 (1996) ("Because no evidence had been presented at the time of this proffer to support a theory that the allegations ... were false, the trial court did not err in keeping [the prior molestation testimony] from the jury"); Eason v. State, 215 Ga.App. 614, 615 (1), 451 S.E.2d 820

1998Compare Peters, 224 Ga.App. at 839 (4), 481 S.E.2d 898 (court refused to conduct Smith hearing after request); Berry, 210 Ga.App. at 789-790 (1), 437 S.E.2d 630 (court refused hearing after request). [24] 222 Ga.App. 828, 829-830 (1), 476 S.E.2d 101 (1996). [25] See Hines v. State, 221 Ga.App. 193, 195 , 470 S.E.2d 787 (1996) ("Because no evidence had been presented at the time of this proffer to support a theory that the allegations ... were false, the trial court did not err in keeping [the prior molestation testimony] from the jury"); Eason v. State, 215 Ga.App. 614, 615 (1), 451 S.E.2d 820

1998Compare Peters, 224 Ga.App. at 839 (4), 481 S.E.2d 898 (court refused to conduct Smith hearing after request); Berry, 210 Ga.App. at 789-790 (1), 437 S.E.2d 630 (court refused hearing after request). [24] 222 Ga.App. 828, 829-830 (1), 476 S.E.2d 101 (1996). [25] See Hines v. State, 221 Ga.App. 193, 195 , 470 S.E.2d 787 (1996) ("Because no evidence had been presented at the time of this proffer to support a theory that the allegations ... were false, the trial court did not err in keeping [the prior molestation testimony] from the jury"); Eason v. State, 215 Ga.App. 614, 615 (1), 451 S.E.2d 820

2026See Smith, 337 Ga. App. at 611 (2). 7 determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury improperly applied a challenged instruction.” Walker v. State, 311 Ga. 719, 724 (3) ( 859 SE2d 25 ) (2021) (punctuation omitted). “[T]he trial court may correct errors in a charge by calling attention to the erroneous parts of the charge and giving the jury the correct rule.” Fassnacht v. Moler, 358 Ga. App. 463 , 472(1)(a) ( 855 SE2d 692 ) (2021) (punctuation omitted).

2026See Smith, 337 Ga. App. at 611 (2). 7 determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury improperly applied a challenged instruction.” Walker v. State, 311 Ga. 719, 724 (3) ( 859 SE2d 25 ) (2021) (punctuation omitted). “[T]he trial court may correct errors in a charge by calling attention to the erroneous parts of the charge and giving the jury the correct rule.” Fassnacht v. Moler, 358 Ga. App. 463 , 472(1)(a) ( 855 SE2d 692 ) (2021) (punctuation omitted).

2026See Hartsfield v. State, 294 Ga. 883, 886 (2014) (no abuse of discretion in denying a mistrial where the trial court sustained the objection, admonished the prosecuting attorney in the presence of the jury, and told the jury to disregard the statement); Jackson v. State, 292 Ga. 685, 689 (2013) (no abuse of discretion in denying a mistrial where trial court sustained objection and gave curative instruction regarding improper reference).

2026As a matter of contract law, incorporation by reference is generally effective to accomplish its intended purpose where the provision to which reference is made has a reasonably clear and ascertainable meaning.” Brooks Peanut Co. v. Great S. Peanut, LLC, 322 Ga. App. 801, 810 (3) ( 746 SE2d 272 ) (2013) (citation modified). 5 The main dispute between the parties is whether Smith’s claim regarding his stolen truck is a claim “arising out of or relating to” the Repair Order such that it would be covered by the arbitration agreement.

2026As a matter of contract law, incorporation by reference is generally effective to accomplish its intended purpose where the provision to which reference is made has a reasonably clear and ascertainable meaning.” Brooks Peanut Co. v. Great S. Peanut, LLC, 322 Ga. App. 801, 810 (3) ( 746 SE2d 272 ) (2013) (citation modified). 5 The main dispute between the parties is whether Smith’s claim regarding his stolen truck is a claim “arising out of or relating to” the Repair Order such that it would be covered by the arbitration agreement.

2026See Smith, 337 Ga. App. at 611 (2). 7 determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury improperly applied a challenged instruction.” Walker v. State, 311 Ga. 719, 724 (3) ( 859 SE2d 25 ) (2021) (punctuation omitted). “[T]he trial court may correct errors in a charge by calling attention to the erroneous parts of the charge and giving the jury the correct rule.” Fassnacht v. Moler, 358 Ga. App. 463 , 472(1)(a) ( 855 SE2d 692 ) (2021) (punctuation omitted).

2026Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, Clements v. Weaver, 301 Ga. App. 430, 430 ( 687 SE2d 602 ) (2009), the record shows that in May 2016, Adams was working as a superintendent on a bridge construction project when Claxton struck him with a car, severely injuring him.

2026Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, Clements v. Weaver, 301 Ga. App. 430, 430 ( 687 SE2d 602 ) (2009), the record shows that in May 2016, Adams was working as a superintendent on a bridge construction project when Claxton struck him with a car, severely injuring him.

2026See Hartsfield v. State, 294 Ga. 883, 886 (2014) (no abuse of discretion in denying a mistrial where the trial court sustained the objection, admonished the prosecuting attorney in the presence of the jury, and told the jury to disregard the statement); Jackson v. State, 292 Ga. 685, 689 (2013) (no abuse of discretion in denying a mistrial where trial court sustained objection and gave curative instruction regarding improper reference).

2025Several years later, the Supreme Court eliminated the Smith test, concluding that, instead of considering whether a reasonable probability of falsity exists, a trial court should analyze the admissibility of allegedly false prior accusations under “the familiar and usual rules of evidence[.]” State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 124 (2) ( 829 SE2d 367 ) (2019); see also Gallegos-Munoz v. State, 319 Ga. 803 , 812 (2) (c) ( 906 SE2d 711 ) (2024) (explaining Burns).

2025Several years later, the Supreme Court eliminated the Smith test, concluding that, instead of considering whether a reasonable probability of falsity exists, a trial court should analyze the admissibility of allegedly false prior accusations under “the familiar and usual rules of evidence[.]” State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 124 (2) ( 829 SE2d 367 ) (2019); see also Gallegos-Munoz v. State, 319 Ga. 803 , 812 (2) (c) ( 906 SE2d 711 ) (2024) (explaining Burns).

2025See Darville v. State, 289 Ga. 698, 702 (4) (b) (715 SE2d 110) (2011) (holding that the appellant’s contention that counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the omission of a particular jury instruction on felony murder “was moot because [the appellant] was found guilty of malice murder and no conviction was entered on the felony murder charge”); Anthony v. State, 311 Ga. 293, 299 fn3 (5) (857 SE2d 682) (2021) (holding that because no convictions were entered on the appellant’s felony murder charges, “his ineffective assistance claims are moot to the extent they pertain to the portions

2025See Darville v. State, 289 Ga. 698, 702 (4) (b) (715 SE2d 110) (2011) (holding that the appellant’s contention that counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the omission of a particular jury instruction on felony murder “was moot because [the appellant] was found guilty of malice murder and no conviction was entered on the felony murder charge”); Anthony v. State, 311 Ga. 293, 299 fn3 (5) (857 SE2d 682) (2021) (holding that because no convictions were entered on the appellant’s felony murder charges, “his ineffective assistance claims are moot to the extent they pertain to the portions

2025See Darville v. State, 289 Ga. 698, 702 (4) (b) (715 SE2d 110) (2011) (holding that the appellant’s contention that counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the omission of a particular jury instruction on felony murder “was moot because [the appellant] was found guilty of malice murder and no conviction was entered on the felony murder charge”); Anthony v. State, 311 Ga. 293, 299 fn3 (5) (857 SE2d 682) (2021) (holding that because no convictions were entered on the appellant’s felony murder charges, “his ineffective assistance claims are moot to the extent they pertain to the portions

2025See Darville v. State, 289 Ga. 698, 702 (4) (b) (715 SE2d 110) (2011) (holding that the appellant’s contention that counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the omission of a particular jury instruction on felony murder “was moot because [the appellant] was found guilty of malice murder and no conviction was entered on the felony murder charge”); Anthony v. State, 311 Ga. 293, 299 fn3 (5) (857 SE2d 682) (2021) (holding that because no convictions were entered on the appellant’s felony murder charges, “his ineffective assistance claims are moot to the extent they pertain to the portions

2025See Mowoe v. State, 328 Ga. App. 536, 540 (2) (a) ( 759 SE2d 663 ) (2014) (“The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.”). 5 evidence from the defense,” the mistaken impression may have “pushed” the jury “over the top,” as a result of which “the best thing to do is to probably try this case again.” The court summarily granted Smith’s motion for a new trial in a one-sentence order, and this appeal followed.5 At the outset, we construe the trial court’s order as having granted the motion for new trial unde

2025See Mowoe v. State, 328 Ga. App. 536, 540 (2) (a) ( 759 SE2d 663 ) (2014) (“The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.”). 5 evidence from the defense,” the mistaken impression may have “pushed” the jury “over the top,” as a result of which “the best thing to do is to probably try this case again.” The court summarily granted Smith’s motion for a new trial in a one-sentence order, and this appeal followed.5 At the outset, we construe the trial court’s order as having granted the motion for new trial unde

2025See Darville v. State, 289 Ga. 698, 702 (4) (b) (715 SE2d 110) (2011) (holding that the appellant’s contention that counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the omission of a particular jury instruction on felony murder “was moot because [the appellant] was found guilty of malice murder and no conviction was entered on the felony murder charge”); Anthony v. State, 311 Ga. 293, 299 fn3 (5) (857 SE2d 682) (2021) (holding that because no convictions were entered on the appellant’s felony murder charges, “his ineffective assistance claims are moot to the extent they pertain to the portions

2025See Darville v. State, 289 Ga. 698, 702 (4) (b) (715 SE2d 110) (2011) (holding that the appellant’s contention that counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the omission of a particular jury instruction on felony murder “was moot because [the appellant] was found guilty of malice murder and no conviction was entered on the felony murder charge”); Anthony v. State, 311 Ga. 293, 299 fn3 (5) (857 SE2d 682) (2021) (holding that because no convictions were entered on the appellant’s felony murder charges, “his ineffective assistance claims are moot to the extent they pertain to the portions

2025See Darville v. State, 289 Ga. 698, 702 (4) (b) (715 SE2d 110) (2011) (holding that the appellant’s contention that counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the omission of a particular jury instruction on felony murder “was moot because [the appellant] was found guilty of malice murder and no conviction was entered on the felony murder charge”); Anthony v. State, 311 Ga. 293, 299 fn3 (5) (857 SE2d 682) (2021) (holding that because no convictions were entered on the appellant’s felony murder charges, “his ineffective assistance claims are moot to the extent they pertain to the portions

2025See Darville v. State, 289 Ga. 698, 702 (4) (b) ( 715 SE2d 110 ) (2011) (holding that the appellant’s contention that counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the omission of a particular jury instruction on felony murder was moot because the appellant was found “guilty of malice murder and no conviction was entered on the felony murder charge”); Anthony v. State, 311 Ga. 293, 299 (4) n.3 ( 857 SE2d 682 ) (2021) (holding that because no convictions were entered on the appellant’s felony murder charges, “his ineffective assistance claims are moot to the extent they pertain to the portion

2025Moreover, Smith’s trial counsel did not testify at the hearing on Smith’s motion for new trial, making the “strong presumption” that counsel reasonably chose not to present an expert “extremely difficult to overcome.” Patterson, 314 Ga. at 174; 177 (citation omitted).

2025Moreover, Smith’s trial counsel did not testify at the hearing on Smith’s motion for new trial, making the “strong presumption” that counsel reasonably chose not to present an expert “extremely difficult to overcome.” Patterson, 314 Ga. at 174 (2) (e), 177 (2) (f) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2025Several years later, the Supreme Court eliminated the Smith test, concluding that, instead of considering whether a reasonable probability of falsity exists, a trial court should analyze the admissibility of allegedly false prior accusations under “the familiar and usual rules of evidence[.]” State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 124 (2) ( 829 SE2d 367 ) (2019); see also Gallegos-Munoz v. State, 319 Ga. 803 , 812 (2) (c) ( 906 SE2d 711 ) (2024) (explaining Burns).

2025Several years later, the Supreme Court eliminated the Smith test, concluding that, instead of considering whether a reasonable probability of falsity exists, a trial court should analyze the admissibility of allegedly false prior accusations under “the familiar and usual rules of evidence[.]” State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 124 (2) ( 829 SE2d 367 ) (2019); see also Gallegos-Munoz v. State, 319 Ga. 803 , 812 (2) (c) ( 906 SE2d 711 ) (2024) (explaining Burns).