Smith claim in Mississippi

2024“This [C]ourt has previously held that a ‘petitioner’s status as a habitual offender can be established at the entry of a guilty plea, making it unnecessary to have a separate bifurcated hearing.’” Hill v. State, 132 So. 3d 1069, 1073 (¶12) (Miss.

2020“This [C]ourt has previously held that a ‘petitioner’s status as a habitual offender can be established at the entry of a guilty plea, making it unnecessary to have a separate bifurcated hearing.’” Hill v. State, 132 So. 3d 1069, 1073 (¶12) (Miss.

2002Smith's claim is addressed under a two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and followed by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 476 (Miss. 1984).

2001Smith’s claim is addressed under a two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and followed by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 476 (Miss.1984).

2001Jackson v. State, 784 So.2d 180, 183 (Miss. 2001). ¶ 13.

2000Jackson v. State, 784 So.2d 180, 183 (Miss. 2001). ¶13.

1998Jones v. State, 635 So.2d 884, 887 (Miss. 1994).

1995Jones v. State, 635 So. 2d 884, 887 (Miss. 1994).

2025“This Court has been clear that ‘counsel’s choice whether to make certain objections fall within the ambit of trial strategy and cannot give rise to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Turner v. State, 366 So. 3d 855 , 861 (Miss. 2023) 12 (quoting Bell v. State, 879 So. 2d 423, 440 (Miss. 2004)).

2025Then, in December 2022, the parties submitted a joint motion requesting the judgment be certified as a final judgment in 8 Allen & Smith’s brief references subsections 7.a through 7.f, while the court’s amended order references only subsections 7.a and 7.e from the unenforceable subsections of 7.b, 7.c, and 7.d. 9 See Harris v. Walters, 40 So. 3d 657, 660 (¶14) (Miss.

2024Ralph’s affair led to the dissipation of $150,000 worth of marital assets under the Smith analysis.” The chancellor made this statement in the analysis of the equitable division of the property under the Ferguson factors, specifically the second factor, which states that when equitably dividing the marital property, the chancery court should consider “[t]he degree to which each spouse has expended, withdrawn or otherwise disposed of marital assets and any prior distribution of such assets by agreement, decree or otherwise.” Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994). ¶37.

2024Ralph’s affair led to the dissipation of $150,000 worth of marital assets under the Smith analysis.” The chancellor made this statement in the analysis of the equitable division of the property under the Ferguson factors, specifically the second factor, which states that when equitably dividing the marital property, the chancery court should consider “[t]he degree to which each spouse has expended, withdrawn or otherwise disposed of marital assets and any prior distribution of such assets by agreement, decree or otherwise.” Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994). ¶37.

2023Cox, 849 So. 2d at 1268 (¶34); see also Flaggs v. State, 999 So. 2d 393, 399 (¶18) (Miss.

2023Cox, 849 So. 2d at 1268 (¶34); see also Flaggs v. State, 999 So. 2d 393, 399 (¶18) (Miss.

2020The trial court also explained that Smith’s claim had no merit because “unless time is an essential element or factor in the crime, an amendment to change the date on which the offense occurred is one of form only.” (Quoting Conley v. State, 790 So. 2d 773, 781 (¶16) (Miss. 2001)).

2020The trial court also explained that Smith’s claim had no merit because “unless time is an essential element or factor in the crime, an amendment to change the date on which the offense occurred is one of form only.” (Quoting Conley v. State, 790 So. 2d 773, 781 (¶16) (Miss. 2001)).

2020“The decision of an administrative agency is not to be disturbed unless the agency order was unsupported by substantial evidence; was arbitrary or capricious; was beyond the agency’s scope or powers; or violated the constitutional or statutory rights of the aggrieved party.” Bd. of Law Enf’t Officers Standards and Training v. Butler, 672 So. 2d 1196, 1199 (Miss. 1996) (citing Sprouse v. Miss.

2019But the Supreme Court has held “that the errors affecting fundamental rights are exceptions to the rule that questions not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Smith v. State, 477 So. 2d 191, 195 (Miss. 1985).8 This Court has found that the following four types of fundamental rights survive PCR procedural bars: “(1) the right against double jeopardy; (2) the right to be free from an illegal sentence; (3) the right to due process at sentencing; and (4) the right not to be subject to ex post facto laws.” Putnam v. State, 212 So. 3d 86, 92 (¶16) (Miss.

2019But the Supreme Court has held “that the errors affecting fundamental rights are exceptions to the rule that questions not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Smith v. State, 477 So. 2d 191, 195 (Miss. 1985).8 This Court has found that the following four types of fundamental rights survive PCR procedural bars: “(1) the right against double jeopardy; (2) the right to be free from an illegal sentence; (3) the right to due process at sentencing; and (4) the right not to be subject to ex post facto laws.” Putnam v. State, 212 So. 3d 86, 92 (¶16) (Miss.

2018"It is the duty of the movant, when a motion or other pleading is filed, ... to pursue said motion to hearing and decision by the court." URCCC 2.04 ; see also Ryan v. State , 245 So.3d 491 , 498 (¶ 20) (Miss.

2018See also Foster v. State , 639 So.2d 1263 , 1282 (Miss. 1994) ("Foster [the defendant] neither requested that the trial court admonish the jury to disregard the testimony [regarding bad acts by Foster], nor requested a mistrial.

2018See Johnson , 89 So.3d at 638 (¶¶ 22-24). 9 Finding no error, this issue lacks merit.

2018See Johnson , 89 So.3d at 638 (¶¶ 22-24). 9 Finding no error, this issue lacks merit.

2016That said, we have held that when a movant purports to have been “given erroneous advice by his attorney as to his eligibility for ... earned time and that erroneous advice goes uncorrected, and he provides evidence other than his own statement (such as a sworn affidavit from a third party), he is entitled to an eviden-tiary hearing.” Sylvester v. State, 113 So.3d 618, 623 (¶ 19) (Miss.Ct.App.2013).

2015“It is well settled in Mississippi- that courts have the authority to reinstate any sentence that was previously suspended.” Edwards v. State, 123 So.3d 936, 938 (¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2013) (citing Pruitt v. State, 953 So.2d 302, 305 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2002)).