Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
41 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Khourigreen2 sentences2025Under the Smith framework, a trial court begins its analysis by “determining the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services” based on “reliable surveys or other credible evidence of the legal market.” Smith, 481 Mich at 530-531 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 2025Under the Smith framework, a trial court begins its analysis by “determining the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services” based on “reliable surveys or other credible evidence of the legal market.” Smith, 481 Mich at 530-531 (quotation marks and citations omitted). | 9 | 13 |
Pirgu v. United Services Automobile Associationgreen2 sentences2023This framework is also known as the “Smith/Pirgu factors,” and it applies in determining reasonable attorney fees under FOIA and other fee-shifting statutes or rules. 18 See Pirgu, 499 Mich at 278 (recognizing that Smith refined the framework that courts apply for fee-shifting statutes or rules); Smith, 481 Mich at 535 (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.) (stating that the framework “provide[s] a workable, objective methodology for assessing reasonable attorney fees that Michigan courts can apply consistently to our various fee- shifting rules and statutes”); see also Coblentz v Novi, 485 Mich 961 (2009) 2023This framework is also known as the “Smith/Pirgu factors,” and it applies in determining reasonable attorney fees under FOIA and other fee-shifting statutes or rules. 18 See Pirgu, 499 Mich at 278 (recognizing that Smith refined the framework that courts apply for fee-shifting statutes or rules); Smith, 481 Mich at 535 (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.) (stating that the framework “provide[s] a workable, objective methodology for assessing reasonable attorney fees that Michigan courts can apply consistently to our various fee- shifting rules and statutes”); see also Coblentz v Novi, 485 Mich 961 (2009) | 5 | 8 |
Coblentz v. City of Novigreen2 sentences2023This framework is also known as the “Smith/Pirgu factors,” and it applies in determining reasonable attorney fees under FOIA and other fee-shifting statutes or rules. 18 See Pirgu, 499 Mich at 278 (recognizing that Smith refined the framework that courts apply for fee-shifting statutes or rules); Smith, 481 Mich at 535 (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.) (stating that the framework “provide[s] a workable, objective methodology for assessing reasonable attorney fees that Michigan courts can apply consistently to our various fee- shifting rules and statutes”); see also Coblentz v Novi, 485 Mich 961 (2009) 2023This framework is also known as the “Smith/Pirgu factors,” and it applies in determining reasonable attorney fees under FOIA and other fee-shifting statutes or rules. 18 See Pirgu, 499 Mich at 278 (recognizing that Smith refined the framework that courts apply for fee-shifting statutes or rules); Smith, 481 Mich at 535 (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.) (stating that the framework “provide[s] a workable, objective methodology for assessing reasonable attorney fees that Michigan courts can apply consistently to our various fee- shifting rules and statutes”); see also Coblentz v Novi, 485 Mich 961 (2009) | 2 | 3 |
Augustine v. Allstate Insurancegreen2 sentences2015And, although it did so in dicta, the panel in Augustine v Allstate Ins Co, 292 Mich App 408, 429, 434-436 ; 807 NW2d 77 (2011), stated that the Smith framework applied to an award of attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(1) of the no-fault act when a plaintiff seeks recovery for attorney fees on an hourly (as compared to a contingent fee) basis. 9 Further, in several unpublished decisions, this Court has applied the Smith framework to other fee-shifting statutes and in other situations. 2015And, although it did so in dicta, the panel in Augustine v Allstate Ins Co, 292 Mich App 408, 429, 434-436 ; 807 NW2d 77 (2011), stated that the Smith framework applied to an award of attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(1) of the no-fault act when a plaintiff seeks recovery for attorney fees on an hourly (as compared to a contingent fee) basis. 9 Further, in several unpublished decisions, this Court has applied the Smith framework to other fee-shifting statutes and in other situations. | 1 | 3 |
Danny Burton v. State of Michigangreen2 sentences2025See Burton v State, 340 Mich App 633 , 649; 987 NW2d 879 (2022) (courts “may not award attorney fees . . .solely on the basis of what it perceives to be fair or on equitable principles.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). -8- 2025See Burton v State, 340 Mich App 633 , 649; 987 NW2d 879 (2022) (courts “may not award attorney fees . . .solely on the basis of what it perceives to be fair or on equitable principles.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). -8- | 1 | 1 |
In Re Kostin Estategreen1 sentence2023See In re Kostin, 278 Mich App at 51 . | 1 | 1 |
Juarez v. Holbrookgreen2 sentences2015Notably, a few of the justices were critical of their colleagues in Juarez v Holbrook, 483 Mich 970 (2009), for failing to remand the case for reconsideration in light of Smith . 2015Notably, a few of the justices were critical of their colleagues in Juarez v Holbrook, 483 Mich 970 (2009), for failing to remand the case for reconsideration in light of Smith . | 1 | 1 |
Adair v. Michigangreen2 sentences2015For instance, in Adair v Michigan (On Third Remand), 298 Mich App 383, 390 ; 827 NW2d 740 (2012), overruled in part on other grounds 494 Mich 852 (2013), a panel of this Court applied the Smith framework to a Headlee Amendment case. 2015For instance, in Adair v Michigan (On Third Remand), 298 Mich App 383, 390 ; 827 NW2d 740 (2012), overruled in part on other grounds 494 Mich 852 (2013), a panel of this Court applied the Smith framework to a Headlee Amendment case. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Doegreen1 sentence2012Smith, 538 US at 92 (“If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry.”). | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Allengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Galli v. Kirkebygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ross v. Consumers Power Co.yellow | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kennedy v. Robert Lee Auto Sales
green
2 sentences2022It is unlike, for example, MCL 15.271(4) of the Open Meetings Act (OMA), MCL 15.261 et seq., which provides that a successful OMA plaintiff is entitled to “court costs and actual attorney fees.” We have regularly applied the Pirgu framework, or its predecessor Smith framework, to statutes that refer to “reasonable attorney fees.” For example, in Cadwell v City of Highland Park, 324 Mich App 642, 655 ; 922 NW2d 639 (2018), we applied the Pirgu framework to MCL 15.364 of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq., which provides that “[a] court may also award the complainant all or a 2022It is unlike, for example, MCL 15.271(4) of the Open Meetings Act (OMA), MCL 15.261 et seq., which provides that a successful OMA plaintiff is entitled to “court costs and actual attorney fees.” We have regularly applied the Pirgu framework, or its predecessor Smith framework, to statutes that refer to “reasonable attorney fees.” For example, in Cadwell v City of Highland Park, 324 Mich App 642, 655 ; 922 NW2d 639 (2018), we applied the Pirgu framework to MCL 15.364 of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq., which provides that “[a] court may also award the complainant all or a | 5 | 2019–2022 |
Mika Powers v. Kelly Ray Brown
green
2 sentences2022It is unlike, for example, MCL 15.271(4) of the Open Meetings Act (OMA), MCL 15.261 et seq., which provides that a successful OMA plaintiff is entitled to “court costs and actual attorney fees.” We have regularly applied the Pirgu framework, or its predecessor Smith framework, to statutes that refer to “reasonable attorney fees.” For example, in Cadwell v City of Highland Park, 324 Mich App 642, 655 ; 922 NW2d 639 (2018), we applied the Pirgu framework to MCL 15.364 of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq., which provides that “[a] court may also award the complainant all or a 2022It is unlike, for example, MCL 15.271(4) of the Open Meetings Act (OMA), MCL 15.261 et seq., which provides that a successful OMA plaintiff is entitled to “court costs and actual attorney fees.” We have regularly applied the Pirgu framework, or its predecessor Smith framework, to statutes that refer to “reasonable attorney fees.” For example, in Cadwell v City of Highland Park, 324 Mich App 642, 655 ; 922 NW2d 639 (2018), we applied the Pirgu framework to MCL 15.364 of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq., which provides that “[a] court may also award the complainant all or a | 3 | 2020–2022 |
Theodore Cadwell v. City of Highland Park
green
2 sentences2022It is unlike, for example, MCL 15.271(4) of the Open Meetings Act (OMA), MCL 15.261 et seq., which provides that a successful OMA plaintiff is entitled to “court costs and actual attorney fees.” We have regularly applied the Pirgu framework, or its predecessor Smith framework, to statutes that refer to “reasonable attorney fees.” For example, in Cadwell v City of Highland Park, 324 Mich App 642, 655 ; 922 NW2d 639 (2018), we applied the Pirgu framework to MCL 15.364 of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq., which provides that “[a] court may also award the complainant all or a 2022It is unlike, for example, MCL 15.271(4) of the Open Meetings Act (OMA), MCL 15.261 et seq., which provides that a successful OMA plaintiff is entitled to “court costs and actual attorney fees.” We have regularly applied the Pirgu framework, or its predecessor Smith framework, to statutes that refer to “reasonable attorney fees.” For example, in Cadwell v City of Highland Park, 324 Mich App 642, 655 ; 922 NW2d 639 (2018), we applied the Pirgu framework to MCL 15.364 of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq., which provides that “[a] court may also award the complainant all or a | 3 | 2019–2022 |
University Rehabilitation Alliance, Inc. v. Farm Bureau General Insurance
red
2 sentences2016Accordingly, we reversed and remanded for a re-determination of the plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney fees using the Smith factors. 34 The answer to Justice Cavanagh’s question of whether the rule applies to other fee-shifting provisions, Smith, 481 Mich at 554-555 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting), must be determined by examining the plain language of the rule or statute at issue in a given case. 35 Driver v Naini, 490 Mich 239, 246-247 ; 802 NW2d 311 (2011). 36 Johnson v Pastoriza, 491 Mich 417, 436 ; 818 NW2d 279 (2012). 37 Duncan, 494 Mich at 723 . 38 We agree with Justice Corrigan’s statement in S 2016Accordingly, we reversed and remanded for a re-determination of the plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney fees using the Smith factors. 34 The answer to Justice Cavanagh’s question of whether the rule applies to other fee-shifting provisions, Smith, 481 Mich at 554-555 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting), must be determined by examining the plain language of the rule or statute at issue in a given case. 35 Driver v Naini, 490 Mich 239, 246-247 ; 802 NW2d 311 (2011). 36 Johnson v Pastoriza, 491 Mich 417, 436 ; 818 NW2d 279 (2012). 37 Duncan, 494 Mich at 723 . 38 We agree with Justice Corrigan’s statement in S | 3 | 2014–2016 |
Pioneer State Mutual Insurance Company v. Stephen a Michalek
green
2 sentences2022We acknowledge that MCL 691.1755(2)(c) refers to “[r]easonable attorney fees” that are “incurred,” thereby arguably signaling that any fees that are actually incurred by a successful WICA plaintiff are recoverable, assuming that the fees are “reasonable.” However, we have applied the Pirgu framework to the previous version of MCR 2.114(E),10 which provided that the trial court may order a party to pay “the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the [frivolous] document, including reasonable attorney fees.” See Pioneer State Mut Ins Co v Michalek, 330 Mich App 138 , 2022We acknowledge that MCL 691.1755(2)(c) refers to “[r]easonable attorney fees” that are “incurred,” thereby arguably signaling that any fees that are actually incurred by a successful WICA plaintiff are recoverable, assuming that the fees are “reasonable.” However, we have applied the Pirgu framework to the previous version of MCR 2.114(E),10 which provided that the trial court may order a party to pay “the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the [frivolous] document, including reasonable attorney fees.” See Pioneer State Mut Ins Co v Michalek, 330 Mich App 138 , | 2 | 2022–2022 |
John Does v. Richard Snyder
green
2 sentences2018Defendant urges with respect to this second prong of the Smith test that this Court adopt the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Snyder , 834 F.3d 696 . 2018Defendant urges with respect to this second prong of the Smith test that this Court adopt the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Snyder , 834 F.3d 696 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People of Michigan v. Stanton Wesley Morrison
green
1 sentence2026As we have explained, “to consider evidence presented on appeal that the parties failed to present to the trial court would be an impermissible expansion of the lower-court record.” People v Morrison, 328 Mich App 647 , 655; 939 NW2d 728 (2019), citing MCR 7.210(A). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
in the Matter of Ann Marie Moriconi
green
1 sentence2023See MCR 2.613(A); Matter of Moriconi, 337 Mich App 515 , 522; 977 NW2d 583 (2021). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Ford Motor Company v. Department of Treasury
green
2 sentences2019See, e.g., Colbentz v Novi, 485 Mich 961 (2009) (remanding for redetermination of reasonable attorney fees awarded in Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.231 et seq., proceeding using Smith framework); Cassidy v Cassidy, 318 Mich App 463 , 489-490; 899 NW2d 65 (2017) (applying Smith framework to attorney fees awarded in divorce action); Ford Motor Co v Dep’t of Treasury, 313 Mich App 572, 589-591 ; 884 NW2d 587 (2015) (applying Smith to attorney fees awarded as sanction for asserting a frivolous defense). 2019See, e.g., Colbentz v Novi, 485 Mich 961 (2009) (remanding for redetermination of reasonable attorney fees awarded in Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.231 et seq., proceeding using Smith framework); Cassidy v Cassidy, 318 Mich App 463 , 489-490; 899 NW2d 65 (2017) (applying Smith framework to attorney fees awarded in divorce action); Ford Motor Co v Dep’t of Treasury, 313 Mich App 572, 589-591 ; 884 NW2d 587 (2015) (applying Smith to attorney fees awarded as sanction for asserting a frivolous defense). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Dobek
green
2 sentences2019A. PROSECUTORIAL ERROR1 “[T]he test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether a defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial.” People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 63 ; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). 2019A. PROSECUTORIAL ERROR1 “[T]he test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether a defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial.” People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 63 ; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Payne
green
2 sentences2019Because no evidentiary hearing has yet been held to develop Smith’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “our review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record.” People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 188 ; 774 NW2d 714 (2009). 2019Because no evidentiary hearing has yet been held to develop Smith’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “our review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record.” People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 188 ; 774 NW2d 714 (2009). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Liss v. Lewiston-Richards, Inc
green
2 sentences2018And, in Liss v Lewiston Richards, Inc, 478 Mich 203 ; 732 NW2d 514 (2007), the Court added: Applying the Smith test, the relevant inquiry “is whether the general transaction is specifically authorized by law, regardless of whether the specific misconduct alleged is prohibited.” This Court has not construed the meaning of “specifically authorized” under the MCPA. 2018And, in Liss v Lewiston Richards, Inc, 478 Mich 203 ; 732 NW2d 514 (2007), the Court added: Applying the Smith test, the relevant inquiry “is whether the general transaction is specifically authorized by law, regardless of whether the specific misconduct alleged is prohibited.” This Court has not construed the meaning of “specifically authorized” under the MCPA. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Johnson v. Pastoriza
green
2 sentences2016Accordingly, we reversed and remanded for a re-determination of the plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney fees using the Smith factors. 34 The answer to Justice Cavanagh’s question of whether the rule applies to other fee-shifting provisions, Smith, 481 Mich at 554-555 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting), must be determined by examining the plain language of the rule or statute at issue in a given case. 35 Driver v Naini, 490 Mich 239, 246-247 ; 802 NW2d 311 (2011). 36 Johnson v Pastoriza, 491 Mich 417, 436 ; 818 NW2d 279 (2012). 37 Duncan, 494 Mich at 723 . 38 We agree with Justice Corrigan’s statement in S 2016Accordingly, we reversed and remanded for a re-determination of the plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney fees using the Smith factors. 34 The answer to Justice Cavanagh’s question of whether the rule applies to other fee-shifting provisions, Smith, 481 Mich at 554-555 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting), must be determined by examining the plain language of the rule or statute at issue in a given case. 35 Driver v Naini, 490 Mich 239, 246-247 ; 802 NW2d 311 (2011). 36 Johnson v Pastoriza, 491 Mich 417, 436 ; 818 NW2d 279 (2012). 37 Duncan, 494 Mich at 723 . 38 We agree with Justice Corrigan’s statement in S | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Driver v. Naini
green
2 sentences2016Accordingly, we reversed and remanded for a re-determination of the plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney fees using the Smith factors. 34 The answer to Justice Cavanagh’s question of whether the rule applies to other fee-shifting provisions, Smith, 481 Mich at 554-555 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting), must be determined by examining the plain language of the rule or statute at issue in a given case. 35 Driver v Naini, 490 Mich 239, 246-247 ; 802 NW2d 311 (2011). 36 Johnson v Pastoriza, 491 Mich 417, 436 ; 818 NW2d 279 (2012). 37 Duncan, 494 Mich at 723 . 38 We agree with Justice Corrigan’s statement in S 2016Accordingly, we reversed and remanded for a re-determination of the plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney fees using the Smith factors. 34 The answer to Justice Cavanagh’s question of whether the rule applies to other fee-shifting provisions, Smith, 481 Mich at 554-555 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting), must be determined by examining the plain language of the rule or statute at issue in a given case. 35 Driver v Naini, 490 Mich 239, 246-247 ; 802 NW2d 311 (2011). 36 Johnson v Pastoriza, 491 Mich 417, 436 ; 818 NW2d 279 (2012). 37 Duncan, 494 Mich at 723 . 38 We agree with Justice Corrigan’s statement in S | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People of Michigan v. Stanley G Duncan
green
2 sentences2016Accordingly, we reversed and remanded for a re-determination of the plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney fees using the Smith factors. 34 The answer to Justice Cavanagh’s question of whether the rule applies to other fee-shifting provisions, Smith, 481 Mich at 554-555 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting), must be determined by examining the plain language of the rule or statute at issue in a given case. 35 Driver v Naini, 490 Mich 239, 246-247 ; 802 NW2d 311 (2011). 36 Johnson v Pastoriza, 491 Mich 417, 436 ; 818 NW2d 279 (2012). 37 Duncan, 494 Mich at 723 . 38 We agree with Justice Corrigan’s statement in S 2016Accordingly, we reversed and remanded for a re-determination of the plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney fees using the Smith factors. 34 The answer to Justice Cavanagh’s question of whether the rule applies to other fee-shifting provisions, Smith, 481 Mich at 554-555 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting), must be determined by examining the plain language of the rule or statute at issue in a given case. 35 Driver v Naini, 490 Mich 239, 246-247 ; 802 NW2d 311 (2011). 36 Johnson v Pastoriza, 491 Mich 417, 436 ; 818 NW2d 279 (2012). 37 Duncan, 494 Mich at 723 . 38 We agree with Justice Corrigan’s statement in S | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Prins v. Michigan State Police
green
2 sentences2015For instance, in Prins v Mich State Police, 299 Mich App 634, 645 ; 831 NW2d 867 (2013), the panel applied the Smith framework to an award of attorney fees in a FOIA case. 2015For instance, in Prins v Mich State Police, 299 Mich App 634, 645 ; 831 NW2d 867 (2013), the panel applied the Smith framework to an award of attorney fees in a FOIA case. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Silich v. Rongers
green
2 sentences2015In addition, in Silich v Rongers, 302 Mich App 137, 149-150 ; 840 NW2d 1 (2013), the panel cited to Smith in a case involving an award of attorney fees under MCR 3.403(C), a court rule that pertains to the sale of premises and the division of proceeds as a substitute for partition. 2015In addition, in Silich v Rongers, 302 Mich App 137, 149-150 ; 840 NW2d 1 (2013), the panel cited to Smith in a case involving an award of attorney fees under MCR 3.403(C), a court rule that pertains to the sale of premises and the division of proceeds as a substitute for partition. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Jordan v. Transnational Motors, Inc
green
2 sentences2015“One of the purposes behind both the [MMWA] and the MCPA is to provide, via an award of attorney fees, a means for consumers to protect their rights and obtain judgments where otherwise prohibited by monetary constraints.” Jordan v Transnational Motors, Inc, 212 Mich App 94, 97-98 ; 537 NW2d 471 (1995). 2015“One of the purposes behind both the [MMWA] and the MCPA is to provide, via an award of attorney fees, a means for consumers to protect their rights and obtain judgments where otherwise prohibited by monetary constraints.” Jordan v Transnational Motors, Inc, 212 Mich App 94, 97-98 ; 537 NW2d 471 (1995). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Riemer v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2015More recently, in Riemer v Johnson, 311 Mich App 632, 656-657 ; 876 NW2d 279 (2015), this Court declined to apply Smith to an award of attorney fees under MCR 3.206(C)(2)(a), which concerns domestic relations actions. 2015More recently, in Riemer v Johnson, 311 Mich App 632, 656-657 ; 876 NW2d 279 (2015), this Court declined to apply Smith to an award of attorney fees under MCR 3.206(C)(2)(a), which concerns domestic relations actions. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Smolen v. Dahlmann Apartments, Ltd
green
2 sentences2015In reaching the conclusion that the Smith framework should apply to this and other fee-shifting statutes and court rules, we are also swayed by the pronouncement of the lead opinion in Smith, 481 Mich at 530 (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.), that “our current multi[]factor analysis”—that is, the multifactor analysis of the Wood factors and the factors in MRPC 1.5(a) used to evaluate reasonableness in attorney-fee cases—“needs some fine-tuning.” The lead opinion did not cite anything pertaining to an award of attorney fees under MCR 2.403—the court rule under which fees were authorized in Smith— when 2015In reaching the conclusion that the Smith framework should apply to this and other fee-shifting statutes and court rules, we are also swayed by the pronouncement of the lead opinion in Smith, 481 Mich at 530 (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.), that “our current multi[]factor analysis”—that is, the multifactor analysis of the Wood factors and the factors in MRPC 1.5(a) used to evaluate reasonableness in attorney-fee cases—“needs some fine-tuning.” The lead opinion did not cite anything pertaining to an award of attorney fees under MCR 2.403—the court rule under which fees were authorized in Smith— when | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Carr v. City of Lansing
green
2 sentences2014Carr, 259 Mich App at 383 - 384. 2014Carr, 259 Mich App at 383 - 384. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| In Re Forfeiture of $180,975.00 neutral | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Various Items of Personal Property v. United States green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Kitchen v. Kitchen green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. United States Currency neutral | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Smith v. Globe Life Insurance green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Burrell green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| United States v. Janis green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Marlin v. City of Detroit green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Meyer v. Nebraska green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Woodruff green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| People v. Loney yellow | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Michigan v. Tucker green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Thomas neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| McCann v. Michigan green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.