Smith motion in Indiana

2024“Five factors guide our review of a trial court’s rulings on late disclosed evidence, namely, ‘when the parties first knew of the evidence; the importance of the evidence; the prejudice resulting to the opposing party; the appropriateness of a less severe remedy such as a continuance; and whether the opposing party would be unduly surprised and prejudiced by admission.’” See Luckett v. State, 223 N.E.3d 1170 , 1176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Perryman v. State, 80 N.E.3d 234, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)). [8] Despite Smith’s claim that the State’s evidence was not disclosed until the Friday bef

2020See Large, 417 N.E.2d at 1165 .

2020See Conrad, 938 N.E.2d at 855 ; see also Williams, 681 N.E.2d at 200 (affirming exclusion of evidence that would have shifted jury’s attention away from the defendant’s actions to those of the victim).

2020See Mickens, 742 N.E.2d at 929 .

2020See Conrad, 938 N.E.2d at 855 ; see also Williams, 681 N.E.2d at 200 (affirming exclusion of evidence that would have shifted jury’s attention away from the defendant’s actions to those of the victim).

2019For his part, Smith points out that the School did not claim below that he failed to give it ITCA notice, and “[f]ailure to give notice is a defense that a political subdivision must assert in its answer to a plaintiff’s complaint.” Fowler v. Brewer, 773 N.E.2d 858, 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.1 Because the School has raised alleged deficiency of ITCA notice for the first time on appeal, the claim is waived for appellate consideration.

2017Litherland v. McDonnell, 796 N.E.2d 1237, 1240 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied.

2017See id.

2016Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).

2016If a term or provision is ambiguous, “we will construe [it] to determine and give effect to the intent of the parties at the time they entered into the contract.” Citimortgage, Inc. v. Barabas, 975 N.E.2d 805, 813 (Ind.2012) (quoting George S. May Int’l Co. v. King, 629 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied), reh’g denied. [12] One term of Smith’s plea agreement was: “As a part of this plea agreement the defendant agrees that he will be precluded from asking for Misdemeanor treatment in this cause.” (Appellant’s App. at 8.) The term “Misdemeanor treatment” is not defined, nor is a s

2016If a term or provision is ambiguous, “we will construe [it] to determine and give effect to the intent of the parties at the time they entered into the contract.” Citimortgage, Inc. v. Barabas, 975 N.E.2d 805, 813 (Ind.2012) (quoting George S. May Int’l Co. v. King, 629 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied), reh’g denied. [12] One term of Smith’s plea agreement was: “As a part of this plea agreement the defendant agrees that he will be precluded from asking for Misdemeanor treatment in this cause.” (Appellant’s App. at 8.) The term “Misdemeanor treatment” is not defined, nor is a s

2015Smith v. State, 993 N.E.2d 1185, 1187-88 (Ind.Ct.App.2013), tram, denied. [4] On appeal, this court held the trial court erred in failing to dismiss counts 1 through 5 of the information, which had alleged that Smith violated Indiana Code Section 23-19-3-1 .by selling' securities that had not been registered with' the Indiana Secretary of State.

2015See Cole, 28 N.E.3d at 1137 (State disproved self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt because defendant instigated the fight and willingly participated). [17] Alternatively, the State’s evidence further disproved Smith’s claim of self- defense because Smith conceded on cross-examination that he “had no reason to be scared of [Watkins.]” Tr. p. 44.

2014See Williams, 891 N.E.2d at 630 .

2014“The purpose of a jury instruction ‘is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.’” Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Chandler v. State, 581 N.E.2d 1233, 1236 (Ind. 1991)).

2014It must “convey sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding.” Rhinehardt v. State, 477 N.E.2d 89, 93 (Ind.1985).

2014It must “convey sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding.” Rhinehardt v. State, 477 N.E.2d 89, 93 (Ind. 1985).

2014Smith’s challenge primarily falls under the first category of vagueness claims, 8 which means the challenged stat ute must “give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden so that ‘no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.’ ” Brotan, 868 N.E.2d at 467 (quoting Healthscript Inc. v. State, 770 N.E.2d 810, 816 (Ind.2002)).

2014Smith’s challenge primarily falls under the first category of vagueness claims, 8 which means the challenged statute must “give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden so that ‘no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.’” Brown, 868 N.E.2d at 467 (quoting Healthscript, Inc. v. State, 770 N.E.2d 810, 816 (Ind. 2002)).

2014“The purpose of a jury instruction ‘is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.’” Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Chandler v. State, 581 N.E.2d 1233, 1236 (Ind. 1991)).