11 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lemaygreen2 sentences2024See Lemay, 2012 ME 86, ¶ 24 , 46 A.3d 1113 ; Brown, 1998 ME 129 , ¶ 10 n.8, 712 A.2d 513 . 2024See Lemay, 2012 ME 86, ¶ 24 , 46 A.3d 1113 ; Brown, 1998 ME 129 , ¶ 10 n.8, 712 A.2d 513 . | 1 | 1 |
Ehrlich v. Bloomgreen1 sentence2010Id. ¶ 3, 691 A.2d at 662 (citing Ehrlich v. Bloom, 585 A.2d 809, 812 (Me.1991)). [¶ 17] The May Order was a response to Smith’s motion to modify, based upon Smith’s contention that he could provide full-time daycare for the child because of his disability status. | 1 | 1 |
Tuttle v. Raymondgreen1 sentence2004Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1361 (Me. 1985). | 1 | 1 |
Eric Soby, D/B/A Soby Painting Co., and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. Lloyd W. Johnson and Max J. Kuney, D/B/A Kuney Johnson Companygreen1 sentence2004See Lockwood Grader Corp. v. Bockhaus, 129 Colo. 339 , 270 F.2d 193 (1954) (holding that no civil conspiracy can be established where the agent is the sole actor for two corporations.) Therefore, this court finds that Plaintiff Smith’s claim does not survive Defendant Melco’s Motion to Dismiss. e. Punitive Damages The Law Court has held that punitive damages are recoverable under Maine law only upon a showing of malice. | 1 | 1 |
Lockwood Grader Corp. v. Bockhausgreen1 sentence2004See Lockwood Grader Corp. v. Bockhaus, 129 Colo. 339 , 270 F.2d 193 (1954) (holding that no civil conspiracy can be established where the agent is the sole actor for two corporations.) Therefore, this court finds that Plaintiff Smith’s claim does not survive Defendant Melco’s Motion to Dismiss. e. Punitive Damages The Law Court has held that punitive damages are recoverable under Maine law only upon a showing of malice. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen1 sentence1990State v. Smith, 560 A.2d 1093, 1094 (Me.1989) (Smith II). 3 . | 1 | 1 |
Beesley v. Landmark Realty, Inc.green2 sentences1985See Beesley v. LandMark Realty, Inc., 464 A.2d 936, 937-38 (Me.1983); Bowman v. Dussault, 425 A.2d 1325 , 1329 n. 2 (Me.1981). 1985See Beesley v. LandMark Realty, Inc., 464 A.2d 936, 937-38 (Me.1983); Bowman v. Dussault, 425 A.2d 1325 , 1329 n. 2 (Me.1981). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Crockergreen1 sentence1983State v. Crocker, 435 A.2d 58, 77 (Me.1981). *2 The jury heard testimony that on the evening of May 28, 1981, Smith was seen driving erratically by a witness who also testified that he saw Smith stop his car and that when Smith emerged, he behaved as though he was drunk. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2024See Lemay, 2012 ME 86, ¶ 24 , 46 A.3d 1113 ; Brown, 1998 ME 129 , ¶ 10 n.8, 712 A.2d 513 . 2024See Lemay, 2012 ME 86, ¶ 24 , 46 A.3d 1113 ; Brown, 1998 ME 129 , ¶ 10 n.8, 712 A.2d 513 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Morgan v. Kooistra
green
2 sentences2011Cf. Morgan v. Kooistra, 2008 ME 26, ¶¶ 23-24 , 941 A.2d 447 (denying immunity where a city employee made defamatory comments outside the course and scope of his employment). 2011Cf. Morgan v. Kooistra, 2008 ME 26, ¶¶ 23-24 , 941 A.2d 447 (denying immunity where a city employee made defamatory comments outside the course and scope of his employment). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Cloutier v. Lear
green
1 sentence2010Id. ¶ 3, 691 A.2d at 662 (citing Ehrlich v. Bloom, 585 A.2d 809, 812 (Me.1991)). [¶ 17] The May Order was a response to Smith’s motion to modify, based upon Smith’s contention that he could provide full-time daycare for the child because of his disability status. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Smith v. Hawthorne
green
1 sentence2009Id. ¶ 5, 892 A.2d at 435 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Philbrick
green
1 sentence2008There was nothing improper in Officer Smith's inquiry of Newcomb - "What happened?" "Such a neutral and impersonal request for information at that initial stage qualified as a general on-the scene questioning which police officers have a duty to carry on in their conventional investigation of criminal incidents or activities." Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Thermos Co. v. Spence
green
2 sentences2007The Court denies the request for reconsideration. 3 It is well-settled that "[a] defendant in a contribution action cannot be required to contribute to damages owed by another tortfeasor unless the contribution defendant has been found to have been a cause of the damages to the original injured party through the contribution defendant's own negligence." Thermos Co. v. Spence, 1999 ME 129, 113 , 735 A.2d 484, 487 . 2007The Court denies the request for reconsideration. 3 It is well-settled that "[a] defendant in a contribution action cannot be required to contribute to damages owed by another tortfeasor unless the contribution defendant has been found to have been a cause of the damages to the original injured party through the contribution defendant's own negligence." Thermos Co. v. Spence, 1999 ME 129, 113 , 735 A.2d 484, 487 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah
green
2 sentences2005Id. at 546, 113 S.Ct. 2217 . [¶ 47] The Diocese urges us to consider, in particular, Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Lukumi, in which he advanced the view of the four concurring justices in Smith and wrote critically of the Court’s adherence to the Smith rule that the Free Exercise Clause is not violated so long as a law satisfies the criteria of “neutrality” and “general applicability.” See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 559 , 113 S.Ct. 2217 . 2005Id. at 546, 113 S.Ct. 2217 . [¶ 47] The Diocese urges us to consider, in particular, Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Lukumi, in which he advanced the view of the four concurring justices in Smith and wrote critically of the Court’s adherence to the Smith rule that the Free Exercise Clause is not violated so long as a law satisfies the criteria of “neutrality” and “general applicability.” See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 559 , 113 S.Ct. 2217 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland
green
2 sentences2005As we recognized in Swanson , courts do not inhibit the free exercise of religion by applying neutral principles of law to a civil dispute involving members of the clergy. 1997 ME 63, ¶ 8 , 692 A.2d at 443 . [¶ 50] The Diocese asserts that such a civil duty cannot meet the test of neutrality because applying “uniform standards of management to churches and secular corporations alike is not neutral because it ignores their fundamental differences and fails to recognize that churches are constitutionally protected in their beliefs and practices.” This assertion implicates the more rigorous stand 2005As we recognized in Swanson , courts do not inhibit the free exercise of religion by applying neutral principles of law to a civil dispute involving members of the clergy. 1997 ME 63, ¶ 8 , 692 A.2d at 443 . [¶ 50] The Diocese asserts that such a civil duty cannot meet the test of neutrality because applying “uniform standards of management to churches and secular corporations alike is not neutral because it ignores their fundamental differences and fails to recognize that churches are constitutionally protected in their beliefs and practices.” This assertion implicates the more rigorous stand | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Wisconsin v. Yoder
green
2 sentences2005The defect with the Smith standard under this view is that it excludes from the protection of the Free Exercise Clause laws of general applicability that satisfy formal neutrality, but, when applied, unduly burden the free exercise of religion: “[W]e have said, [o]ur cases have established that [t]he free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the burden.” Id. at 565, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 48] Justice Souter’s bro 2005The defect with the Smith standard under this view is that it excludes from the protection of the Free Exercise Clause laws of general applicability that satisfy formal neutrality, but, when applied, unduly burden the free exercise of religion: “[W]e have said, [o]ur cases have established that [t]he free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the burden.” Id. at 565, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 48] Justice Souter’s bro | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Bowman v. Dussault
green
2 sentences1985See Beesley v. LandMark Realty, Inc., 464 A.2d 936, 937-38 (Me.1983); Bowman v. Dussault, 425 A.2d 1325 , 1329 n. 2 (Me.1981). 1985See Beesley v. LandMark Realty, Inc., 464 A.2d 936, 937-38 (Me.1983); Bowman v. Dussault, 425 A.2d 1325 , 1329 n. 2 (Me.1981). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.