Smith motion in South Carolina

2020Thus, in requesting the new felony attempted-murder charge, which the trial court accepted over Smith's objection, the State essentially circumvented then-existing law 1 See, e.g., State v. Wilds, 355 S.C. 269 , 276–77, 584 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Ct. App. 2003) (explaining malice must be implied when there is no positive evidence of a deliberate intention to unlawfully take the life of another (i.e., when there is no evidence of express malice), but instead circumstances demonstrate that a reasonably prudent man would have known there was a strong likelihood death would follow his actions (citing 40

2020Thus, in requesting the new felony attempted-murder charge, which the trial court accepted over Smith's objection, the State essentially circumvented then-existing law 1 See, e.g., State v. Wilds, 355 S.C. 269 , 276–77, 584 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Ct. App. 2003) (explaining malice must be implied when there is no positive evidence of a deliberate intention to unlawfully take the life of another (i.e., when there is no evidence of express malice), but instead circumstances demonstrate that a reasonably prudent man would have known there was a strong likelihood death would follow his actions (citing 40

2010Id. *625 A. Cross-Examination of Co-Defendant The basis for Smith's motion for severance was her assertion that she would be unable to effectively cross-examine Hollins.

2010See id. (holding the granting of a motion for severance is within the discretion of the trial court and its ruling on such a motion will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is shown).

2026See State v. Hunsberger, 418 S.C. 335, 342 , 794 S.E.2d 368, 371 (2016) ("The trial court's ruling on a motion for speedy trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard."); id. at 342 , 794 S.E.2d at 371-72 ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's decision is based on an error of law or upon factual findings that are without evidentiary support.").

2026See State v. Hunsberger, 418 S.C. 335, 342 , 794 S.E.2d 368, 371 (2016) ("The trial court's ruling on a motion for speedy trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard."); id. at 342 , 794 S.E.2d at 371-72 ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's decision is based on an error of law or upon factual findings that are without evidentiary support.").

2023See M & M Grp., Inc. v. Holmes, 379 S.C. 468, 473 , 666 S.E.2d 262, 264 (Ct. App. 2008) ("In reviewing an order for summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard which governs the trial court under Rule 56 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure."); id. ("Summary judgment is appropriate when 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" (quoting Rule 56(c), SCRCP));

2023See M & M Grp., Inc. v. Holmes, 379 S.C. 468, 473 , 666 S.E.2d 262, 264 (Ct. App. 2008) ("In reviewing an order for summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard which governs the trial court under Rule 56 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure."); id. ("Summary judgment is appropriate when 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" (quoting Rule 56(c), SCRCP));

2023See State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292 , 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, [the appellate court] views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); State v. Fuller, 346 S.C. 477, 480 , 552 S.E.2d 282, 283 (2001) ("The elements of accessory after the fact to a crime are 1) the felony has been completed, 2) the accused must have knowledge that the principal committed the felony, and 3) the accused must harbor or assist the principal felon."); Weston, 367 S.C. at 292 , 625 S.E.2d at 648 ("When ruling on a motio

2023See State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292 , 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, [the appellate court] views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); State v. Fuller, 346 S.C. 477, 480 , 552 S.E.2d 282, 283 (2001) ("The elements of accessory after the fact to a crime are 1) the felony has been completed, 2) the accused must have knowledge that the principal committed the felony, and 3) the accused must harbor or assist the principal felon."); Weston, 367 S.C. at 292 , 625 S.E.2d at 648 ("When ruling on a motio

2023See M & M Grp., Inc. v. Holmes, 379 S.C. 468, 473 , 666 S.E.2d 262, 264 (Ct. App. 2008) ("In reviewing an order for summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard which governs the trial court under Rule 56 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure."); id. ("Summary judgment is appropriate when 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" (quoting Rule 56(c), SCRCP));

2023See M & M Grp., Inc. v. Holmes, 379 S.C. 468, 473 , 666 S.E.2d 262, 264 (Ct. App. 2008) ("In reviewing an order for summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard which governs the trial court under Rule 56 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure."); id. ("Summary judgment is appropriate when 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" (quoting Rule 56(c), SCRCP));

2023See State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292 , 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, [the appellate court] views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); State v. Fuller, 346 S.C. 477, 480 , 552 S.E.2d 282, 283 (2001) ("The elements of accessory after the fact to a crime are 1) the felony has been completed, 2) the accused must have knowledge that the principal committed the felony, and 3) the accused must harbor or assist the principal felon."); Weston, 367 S.C. at 292 , 625 S.E.2d at 648 ("When ruling on a motio

2023See State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292 , 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, [the appellate court] views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); State v. Fuller, 346 S.C. 477, 480 , 552 S.E.2d 282, 283 (2001) ("The elements of accessory after the fact to a crime are 1) the felony has been completed, 2) the accused must have knowledge that the principal committed the felony, and 3) the accused must harbor or assist the principal felon."); Weston, 367 S.C. at 292 , 625 S.E.2d at 648 ("When ruling on a motio

2022Accordingly, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Coleman v. Dunlap, 306 S.C. 491, 494 , 413 S.E.2d 15, 17 (1992) ("Whether to grant or deny a motion under SCRCP 60(b) is within the sound discretion of the judge."); Rule 60(b)(4), SCRCP (stating that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment if "the judgment is void"); Gainey v. Gainey, 382 S.C. 414, 424 , 675 S.E.2d 792, 797 (Ct. App. 2009) ("A judgment of a court without subject matter jurisdiction is void and constitutes grounds for the court to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b)(4)."); S.C.

2022Accordingly, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Coleman v. Dunlap, 306 S.C. 491, 494 , 413 S.E.2d 15, 17 (1992) ("Whether to grant or deny a motion under SCRCP 60(b) is within the sound discretion of the judge."); Rule 60(b)(4), SCRCP (stating that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment if "the judgment is void"); Gainey v. Gainey, 382 S.C. 414, 424 , 675 S.E.2d 792, 797 (Ct. App. 2009) ("A judgment of a court without subject matter jurisdiction is void and constitutes grounds for the court to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b)(4)."); S.C.

2022Accordingly, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Coleman v. Dunlap, 306 S.C. 491, 494 , 413 S.E.2d 15, 17 (1992) ("Whether to grant or deny a motion under SCRCP 60(b) is within the sound discretion of the judge."); Rule 60(b)(4), SCRCP (stating that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment if "the judgment is void"); Gainey v. Gainey, 382 S.C. 414, 424 , 675 S.E.2d 792, 797 (Ct. App. 2009) ("A judgment of a court without subject matter jurisdiction is void and constitutes grounds for the court to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b)(4)."); S.C.

2022Accordingly, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Coleman v. Dunlap, 306 S.C. 491, 494 , 413 S.E.2d 15, 17 (1992) ("Whether to grant or deny a motion under SCRCP 60(b) is within the sound discretion of the judge."); Rule 60(b)(4), SCRCP (stating that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment if "the judgment is void"); Gainey v. Gainey, 382 S.C. 414, 424 , 675 S.E.2d 792, 797 (Ct. App. 2009) ("A judgment of a court without subject matter jurisdiction is void and constitutes grounds for the court to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b)(4)."); S.C.

2021See Smith v. Fedor, 422 S.C. 118, 126 , 809 S.E.2d 612, 616 (Ct. App. 2017) (holding issues raised in a Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider that are denied for failure to comply with Rule 59(g) are not preserved for appellate review).

2021See Smith v. Fedor, 422 S.C. 118, 126 , 809 S.E.2d 612, 616 (Ct. App. 2017) (holding issues raised in a Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider that are denied for failure to comply with Rule 59(g) are not preserved for appellate review).

2021See State v. Alston, 422 S.C. 270, 279 , 811 S.E.2d 747, 751 (2018) ("On appeal from a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, [the appellate court] applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse only if there is clear error." (quoting Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169, 180-81 , 754 S.E.2d 862, 868 (2014))); id. ("[T]his deference does not bar [the appellate court] from conducting its own review of the record to determine whether the trial [court]'s decision [was] supported by the evidence." (quoting State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 521 , 698 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010))); State v.

2021See State v. Alston, 422 S.C. 270, 279 , 811 S.E.2d 747, 751 (2018) ("On appeal from a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, [the appellate court] applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse only if there is clear error." (quoting Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169, 180-81 , 754 S.E.2d 862, 868 (2014))); id. ("[T]his deference does not bar [the appellate court] from conducting its own review of the record to determine whether the trial [court]'s decision [was] supported by the evidence." (quoting State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 521 , 698 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010))); State v.

2021See State v. Alston, 422 S.C. 270, 279 , 811 S.E.2d 747, 751 (2018) ("On appeal from a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, [the appellate court] applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse only if there is clear error." (quoting Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169, 180-81 , 754 S.E.2d 862, 868 (2014))); id. ("[T]his deference does not bar [the appellate court] from conducting its own review of the record to determine whether the trial [court]'s decision [was] supported by the evidence." (quoting State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 521 , 698 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010))); State v.

2021See State v. Alston, 422 S.C. 270, 279 , 811 S.E.2d 747, 751 (2018) ("On appeal from a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, [the appellate court] applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse only if there is clear error." (quoting Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169, 180-81 , 754 S.E.2d 862, 868 (2014))); id. ("[T]his deference does not bar [the appellate court] from conducting its own review of the record to determine whether the trial [court]'s decision [was] supported by the evidence." (quoting State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 521 , 698 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010))); State v.

2021See State v. Alston, 422 S.C. 270, 279 , 811 S.E.2d 747, 751 (2018) ("On appeal from a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, [the appellate court] applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse only if there is clear error." (quoting Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169, 180-81 , 754 S.E.2d 862, 868 (2014))); id. ("[T]his deference does not bar [the appellate court] from conducting its own review of the record to determine whether the trial [court]'s decision [was] supported by the evidence." (quoting State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 521 , 698 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010))); State v.

2021See State v. Alston, 422 S.C. 270, 279 , 811 S.E.2d 747, 751 (2018) ("On appeal from a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, [the appellate court] applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse only if there is clear error." (quoting Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169, 180-81 , 754 S.E.2d 862, 868 (2014))); id. ("[T]his deference does not bar [the appellate court] from conducting its own review of the record to determine whether the trial [court]'s decision [was] supported by the evidence." (quoting State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 521 , 698 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010))); State v.

2021See State v. Alston, 422 S.C. 270, 279 , 811 S.E.2d 747, 751 (2018) ("On appeal from a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, [the appellate court] applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse only if there is clear error." (quoting Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169, 180-81 , 754 S.E.2d 862, 868 (2014))); id. ("[T]his deference does not bar [the appellate court] from conducting its own review of the record to determine whether the trial [court]'s decision [was] supported by the evidence." (quoting State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 521 , 698 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010))); State v.

2021See State v. Alston, 422 S.C. 270, 279 , 811 S.E.2d 747, 751 (2018) ("On appeal from a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, [the appellate court] applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse only if there is clear error." (quoting Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169, 180-81 , 754 S.E.2d 862, 868 (2014))); id. ("[T]his deference does not bar [the appellate court] from conducting its own review of the record to determine whether the trial [court]'s decision [was] supported by the evidence." (quoting State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 521 , 698 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010))); State v.

2016As to Smith's argument that the circuit court erred by finding the standard for resentencing set forth in South only applies to capital cases: State v. Warren, 392 S.C. 235, 240 , 708 S.E.2d 234, 236 (Ct. App. 2011) (finding an amendment to a post-motion raising additional issues is subject to the Rule 29 deadlines); Rule 29(b), SCRCrimP ("A motion for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence must be made within one (1) year after the date of actual discovery of the evidence 1 410 S.C. 456 , 765 S.E.2d 123 (2014). 2 310 S.C. 504 , 427 S.E.2d 666 (1993). 3 We decide this case without oral

2016As to Smith's argument that the circuit court erred by finding the standard for resentencing set forth in South only applies to capital cases: State v. Warren, 392 S.C. 235, 240 , 708 S.E.2d 234, 236 (Ct. App. 2011) (finding an amendment to a post-motion raising additional issues is subject to the Rule 29 deadlines); Rule 29(b), SCRCrimP ("A motion for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence must be made within one (1) year after the date of actual discovery of the evidence 1 410 S.C. 456 , 765 S.E.2d 123 (2014). 2 310 S.C. 504 , 427 S.E.2d 666 (1993). 3 We decide this case without oral

2016See State v. Harris, 391 S.C. 539, 545 , 706 S.E.2d 526, 529 (Ct. App. 2011) ("In order to warrant the granting of a new trial on the ground of after-discovered evidence, the movant must show the evidence (1) is such as will probably change the result if a new trial is granted; (2) has been discovered since the trial; (3) could not have been discovered before the trial by the exercise of due diligence; (4) is material to the issue; and (5) is not merely cumulative or impeaching."). 2.

2016See State v. Harris, 391 S.C. 539, 545 , 706 S.E.2d 526, 529 (Ct. App. 2011) ("In order to warrant the granting of a new trial on the ground of after-discovered evidence, the movant must show the evidence (1) is such as will probably change the result if a new trial is granted; (2) has been discovered since the trial; (3) could not have been discovered before the trial by the exercise of due diligence; (4) is material to the issue; and (5) is not merely cumulative or impeaching."). 2.

2016As to Smith's argument that the circuit court did not provide factual findings in its order denying Smith's motion for a new trial: State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142 , 587 S.E.2d 691, 693-94 (2003) ("Issues not raised and ruled upon in the [circuit] court will not be considered on appeal."). 3.

2016As to Smith's argument that the circuit court did not provide factual findings in its order denying Smith's motion for a new trial: State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142 , 587 S.E.2d 691, 693-94 (2003) ("Issues not raised and ruled upon in the [circuit] court will not be considered on appeal."). 3.

2015See Salmonsen, 377 S.C. at 449 , 661 S.E.2d at 85 ("[The appellate court] has reviewed interlocutory orders involving class certification when they contain other appealable issues."). 2.

2015See Salmonsen, 377 S.C. at 449 , 661 S.E.2d at 85 ("[The appellate court] has reviewed interlocutory orders involving class certification when they contain other appealable issues."). 2.

2013See Wiggins, 330 S.C. at 548 , 500 S.E.2d at 495 (finding the trial judge properly denied a directed verdict of acquittal because the State presented sufficient evidence to create a jury issue regarding whether Appellant was acting in self-defense or was guilty of voluntary manslaughter); State v. Strickland, 389 S.C. 210, 214 , 697 S.E.2d 681, 683 (Ct.App.2010) (“If the State provides evidence sufficient to negate a defendant’s claim of self-defense, a motion for directed verdict should be denied.”).

2013See Wiggins, 330 S.C. at 548 , 500 S.E.2d at 495 (finding the trial judge properly denied a directed verdict of acquittal because the State presented sufficient evidence to create a jury issue regarding whether Appellant was acting in self-defense or was guilty of voluntary manslaughter); State v. Strickland, 389 S.C. 210, 214 , 697 S.E.2d 681, 683 (Ct.App.2010) (“If the State provides evidence sufficient to negate a defendant’s claim of self-defense, a motion for directed verdict should be denied.”).

2013As to whether the trial court erred in denying Smith's motion for a directed verdict on the third-degree burglary charge: State v. Lewis, 403 S.C. 345, 353 , 743 S.E.2d 124, 128 (Ct. App. 2013) ("In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict, this court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State . . . ."); id. ("[I]f there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, we must find that the case was properly submitted to the jury."); S.C.

2013As to whether the trial court erred in denying Smith's motion for a directed verdict on the third-degree burglary charge: State v. Lewis, 403 S.C. 345, 353 , 743 S.E.2d 124, 128 (Ct. App. 2013) ("In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict, this court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State . . . ."); id. ("[I]f there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, we must find that the case was properly submitted to the jury."); S.C.

2013Code Ann. § 16-13-30 (B) (Supp. 2012) ("Larceny of goods . . . valued in excess of two thousand dollars is grand larceny."); State v. Brown, 402 S.C. 119, 129 , 740 S.E.2d 493, 498 (2013) ("Under South Carolina law, a property owner is generally qualified by the fact of ownership to give her estimate concerning the value of her property unless the owner's lack of qualification is so complete as to render that testimony entirely worthless."); id. at 131 , 740 S.E.2d at 499 ("[A] property owner's testimony alone is sufficient to support a conviction for grand larceny.").

2013Code Ann. § 16-13-30 (B) (Supp. 2012) ("Larceny of goods . . . valued in excess of two thousand dollars is grand larceny."); State v. Brown, 402 S.C. 119, 129 , 740 S.E.2d 493, 498 (2013) ("Under South Carolina law, a property owner is generally qualified by the fact of ownership to give her estimate concerning the value of her property unless the owner's lack of qualification is so complete as to render that testimony entirely worthless."); id. at 131 , 740 S.E.2d at 499 ("[A] property owner's testimony alone is sufficient to support a conviction for grand larceny.").

2013Code Ann. § 16 - 11-313 (2003) ("A person is guilty of burglary in the third degree if the person enters a building without consent and with intent to commit a crime therein."); State v. Johnson, 255 S.C. 14, 16 , 176 S.E.2d 575, 576 (1970) ("One may commit a crime through the agency of another."); Town of Hartsville v. McCall, 101 S.C. 277, 279 , 85 S.E. 599, 600 (1915) ("Since an act by an agent has in law the effect of a personal act, if one employs another to do a criminal thing for him, he is guilty the same as though he had done it himself."); id. ("It makes no difference whether [the ag

2013Code Ann. § 16 - 11-313 (2003) ("A person is guilty of burglary in the third degree if the person enters a building without consent and with intent to commit a crime therein."); State v. Johnson, 255 S.C. 14, 16 , 176 S.E.2d 575, 576 (1970) ("One may commit a crime through the agency of another."); Town of Hartsville v. McCall, 101 S.C. 277, 279 , 85 S.E. 599, 600 (1915) ("Since an act by an agent has in law the effect of a personal act, if one employs another to do a criminal thing for him, he is guilty the same as though he had done it himself."); id. ("It makes no difference whether [the ag

2013See Wiggins, 330 S.C. at 548 , 500 S.E.2d at 495 (finding the trial judge properly denied a directed verdict of acquittal because the State presented sufficient evidence to create a jury issue regarding whether Appellant was acting in self-defense or was guilty of voluntary manslaughter); State v. Strickland, 389 S.C. 210, 214 , 697 S.E.2d 681, 683 (Ct.App.2010) (“If the State provides evidence sufficient to negate a defendant’s claim of self-defense, a motion for directed verdict should be denied.”).

2013See Wiggins, 330 S.C. at 548 , 500 S.E.2d at 495 (finding the trial judge properly denied a directed verdict of acquittal because the State presented sufficient evidence to create a jury issue regarding whether Appellant was acting in self-defense or was guilty of voluntary manslaughter); State v. Strickland, 389 S.C. 210, 214 , 697 S.E.2d 681, 683 (Ct.App.2010) (“If the State provides evidence sufficient to negate a defendant’s claim of self-defense, a motion for directed verdict should be denied.”).

2013Code Ann. § 16 - 11-313 (2003) ("A person is guilty of burglary in the third degree if the person enters a building without consent and with intent to commit a crime therein."); State v. Johnson, 255 S.C. 14, 16 , 176 S.E.2d 575, 576 (1970) ("One may commit a crime through the agency of another."); Town of Hartsville v. McCall, 101 S.C. 277, 279 , 85 S.E. 599, 600 (1915) ("Since an act by an agent has in law the effect of a personal act, if one employs another to do a criminal thing for him, he is guilty the same as though he had done it himself."); id. ("It makes no difference whether [the ag

2013Code Ann. § 16 - 11-313 (2003) ("A person is guilty of burglary in the third degree if the person enters a building without consent and with intent to commit a crime therein."); State v. Johnson, 255 S.C. 14, 16 , 176 S.E.2d 575, 576 (1970) ("One may commit a crime through the agency of another."); Town of Hartsville v. McCall, 101 S.C. 277, 279 , 85 S.E. 599, 600 (1915) ("Since an act by an agent has in law the effect of a personal act, if one employs another to do a criminal thing for him, he is guilty the same as though he had done it himself."); id. ("It makes no difference whether [the ag