Smith rule in Illinois

2020We held that the Smith rule, which was reaffirmed in People v. Bailey, 2013 IL 113690 , applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.

2020We held that the Smith rule, which was reaffirmed in People v. Bailey, 2013 IL 113690 , applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.

2016Smith, 2013 IL App (2d) 121164, ¶¶ 1-2 , 999 N.E.2d 809 .

2016Smith, 2013 IL App (2d) 121164, ¶¶ 1-2 , 999 N.E.2d 809 .

2025See Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 32 (a “voidness challenge that is exempt from forfeiture and may be raised at any time involves a challenge to a final judgment based on a facially unconstitutional statute that is void ab initio”). ¶ 24 We also note that the State asserts that a section 2-1401 petition is “not the proper medium to plead errors of law or constitutional violations, such as immigration issues or inadequate counsel, or to substitute as an appeal.” However, our supreme court has stated that “petitions under section 2-1401(f) of the Code are proper vehicles for attacking judgments as

2017See Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 31-33 (recognizing those two types of void judgment challenges as appropriate voidness challenges in section 2-1401 challenges after Castleberry.) In fact, no discussion or analysis on the issue of voidness appears in either Bailey or Smith.

2021The only other citation in that portion of Smith’s analysis is to People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 189 (2009), for the proposition that “rules of this court are not mere suggestions.” ¶ 16 In any event, Smith is distinguishable.

2021The only other citation in that portion of Smith’s analysis is to People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 189 (2009), for the proposition that “rules of this court are not mere suggestions.” ¶ 16 In any event, Smith is distinguishable.

2020E.g., In re Marriage of Salviola, 2020 IL App (1st) 182185 , ¶ 39 (citing a number of cases); Ill.

2020E.g., In re Marriage of Salviola, 2020 IL App (1st) 182185 , ¶ 39 (citing a number of cases); Ill.

2017Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 15 (quoting LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice, 2015 IL 116129, ¶ 38 ). ¶ 54 In Bailey and Smith, this court did not hold that a violation of the rule from those decisions resulted in a void judgment or sentence.1 Nor did we find that the trial court lacked jurisdiction 1 This point further illustrates the majority’s error in equating a challenge under Arna’s void sentence rule to a challenge under the Smith rule.

2016See Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 13 (describing “void sentence rule” (citing Arna, 168 Ill. 2d at 113 )). - 15 -

2011See id. (a taxpayer may not recover taxes that he has voluntarily paid unless a statute allows such a recovery, even if the taxing body lacked authority to impose the tax in question).

2011See id. (a taxpayer may not recover taxes that he has voluntarily paid unless a statute allows such a recovery, even if the taxing body lacked authority to impose the tax in question).

2006The City initially distinguishes Gauger, noting first that Gauger's allegations were for false arrest and could have been brought immediately under different factual circumstances: "But Booker [(Booker v. Ward, 94 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir 1996))] holds that since a false arrest is not a defense to criminal charges, e.g., Corpus v. City of Edgerton, 151 F.3d 646, 648-49 (7th Cir. 1998), determining that an arrest violated the Fourth Amendment does not undermine the defendant's conviction and therefore the claim arises, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when the arrest is made." Gauger, 34

2006The City initially distinguishes Gauger, noting first that Gauger’s allegations were for false arrest and could have been brought immediately under different factual circumstances: “But Booker [(Booker v. Ward, 94 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 1996))] holds that since a false arrest is not a defense to criminal charges, e.g., Corpus v. City of Edgerton, 151 F.3d 646, 648-49 (7th Cir. 1998), determining that an arrest violated the Fourth Amendment does not undermine the defendant’s conviction and therefore the claim arises, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when the arrest is made.” Gauger, 3

2002See, e.g., City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514 , 138 L.

2002See, e.g., City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514 , 138 L.

2017Under those decisions, the error is remedied by “ ‘interpret[ing] the general verdict as a finding on felony murder’ and to impose sentence accordingly.” Bailey, 2013 IL 113690, ¶ 61 (quoting Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 28 ). ¶ 55 Because a violation of the Smith rule constitutes an abuse of discretion and is remedied by sentencing on felony murder, it cannot be said that a violation of that rule results in a void judgment.

2017Under those decisions, the error is remedied by “ ‘interpret[ing] the general verdict as a finding on felony murder’ and to impose sentence accordingly.” Bailey, 2013 IL 113690, ¶ 61 (quoting Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 28 ). ¶ 55 Because a violation of the Smith rule constitutes an abuse of discretion and is remedied by sentencing on felony murder, it cannot be said that a violation of that rule results in a void judgment.

1993App. 3d 680, 687-88 , [ 571 N.E.2d 742 ,] the court noted that an asportation lasting approximately V-k blocks, which allowed a criminal sexual assault to be carried out more easily in the defendant’s apartment and with less chance of detection, was sufficiently lengthy to satisfy the first part of the Smith test.

1993App. 3d 680, 687-88 , [ 571 N.E.2d 742 ,] the court noted that an asportation lasting approximately V-k blocks, which allowed a criminal sexual assault to be carried out more easily in the defendant’s apartment and with less chance of detection, was sufficiently lengthy to satisfy the first part of the Smith test.

2025The State further asserts that, in any event, law enforcement officers properly applied for and were granted prior judicial authorization to record the conversations under section 108A-1 (725 ILCS 108A-1 (West 2014)). ¶ 40 “In determining whether a trial court has properly ruled on a motion to suppress, findings of fact and credibility determinations made by the trial court are accorded great deference and will be reversed only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.” People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 149 (2008).

2025The State argues that Smith has forfeited these arguments because he failed to object at trial and did not raise these claims in his posttrial motion. “[T]he presence of both a trial objection and a written post-trial motion raising the issue are necessary to preserve an issue for review.” People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988).

2025See Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 32 (a “voidness challenge that is exempt from forfeiture and may be raised at any time involves a challenge to a final judgment based on a facially unconstitutional statute that is void ab initio”). ¶ 24 We also note that the State asserts that a section 2-1401 petition is “not the proper medium to plead errors of law or constitutional violations, such as immigration issues or inadequate counsel, or to substitute as an appeal.” However, our supreme court has stated that “petitions under section 2-1401(f) of the Code are proper vehicles for attacking judgments as

2025See Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 32 (a “voidness challenge that is exempt from forfeiture and may be raised at any time involves a challenge to a final judgment based on a facially unconstitutional statute that is void ab initio”). ¶ 24 We also note that the State asserts that a section 2-1401 petition is “not the proper medium to plead errors of law or constitutional violations, such as immigration issues or inadequate counsel, or to substitute as an appeal.” However, our supreme court has stated that “petitions under section 2-1401(f) of the Code are proper vehicles for attacking judgments as

2024See People v. Manning, 227 Ill. 2d 403, 419 (2008). ¶ 42 We therefore find that the circuit court satisfied due process by substantially complying with Rule 402 and that Smith’s plea was knowingly and voluntarily made.