Smith test in Arkansas

2005In Linker-Flores I, supra, our supreme court held that the no-merit procedure set forth in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), shall apply in cases of indigent-parent appeals from orders terminating parental rights.

2004Linker-Flores v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Services, supra. We denied Smith’s motion and ordered the parties to brief the issue of whether counsel representing an indigent parent in a termination proceeding should be required to file a no-merit brief, comparable to that required under Anders v. California, supra, where there appears to be no meritorious grounds for appeal.

2026Id. 14 Accordingly, in giving an expansive review of the entire transaction as set forth in Schultz—especially considering the sophistication of the parties and the purpose of the Arkansas Securities Act—as well as a consideration of the factors in the Smith test and the family-resemblance test, we hold that the circuit court did not err in finding that the agreement in this case is not a security.

2026Id. 14 Accordingly, in giving an expansive review of the entire transaction as set forth in Schultz—especially considering the sophistication of the parties and the purpose of the Arkansas Securities Act—as well as a consideration of the factors in the Smith test and the family-resemblance test, we hold that the circuit court did not err in finding that the agreement in this case is not a security.

2026We held that the circuit court erroneously applied only the five-factor Smith test to determine whether the agreement qualified as a security instead of the flexible, all-inclusive test from Schultz v. Rector- 4 Phillips-Morse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769 , 552 S.W.2d 4 (1977), as provided in Waters v. Millsap, 2015 Ark. 272 , 465 S.W.3d 851 .

2026We held that the circuit court erroneously applied only the five-factor Smith test to determine whether the agreement qualified as a security instead of the flexible, all-inclusive test from Schultz v. Rector- 4 Phillips-Morse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769 , 552 S.W.2d 4 (1977), as provided in Waters v. Millsap, 2015 Ark. 272 , 465 S.W.3d 851 .

2022For reversal, Smith relies on Cook v. State, 316 Ark. 384 , 872 S.W.2d 72 (1994), in which this court held that a prosecutor’s comment in closing argument “[a]t most” constituted “an attempt to shift the burden of proof[.]” Id. at 387 , 872 S.W.2d at 74 .

2022For reversal, Smith relies on Cook v. State, 316 Ark. 384 , 872 S.W.2d 72 (1994), in which this court held that a prosecutor’s comment in closing argument “[a]t most” constituted “an attempt to shift the burden of proof[.]” Id. at 387 , 872 S.W.2d at 74 .

2022Further, the information establishes a nexus with the items located during the search under Johnson v. State, 2015 Ark. 387 .

2022Further, the information establishes a nexus with the items located during the search under Johnson v. State, 2015 Ark. 387 .

2021Conte v. State, 2015 Ark. 220 , 463 S.W.3d 686 .

2021Conte v. State, 2015 Ark. 220 , 463 S.W.3d 686 .

2020Henington, 2020 Ark. 11 , 590 S.W.3d 736 .

2020Henington, 2020 Ark. 11 , 590 S.W.3d 736 .

2019Arkansas law allows a defendant to request a bill of particulars setting out the act or acts relied on by the State, and we have unequivocally held that "the proper time to object to the sufficiency of the information was before the trial." Barnes v. State , 94 Ark.

2019Nelson v. State, 2014 Ark. 91 , 431 S.W.3d 852 .

2019Nelson v. State, 2014 Ark. 91 , 431 S.W.3d 852 .

2018We agree with the State that in this case there is also no applicable exception to the contemporaneous-objection rule enunciated *515 in Wicks v. State , 270 Ark. 781 , 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980).

2018We agree with the State that in this case there is also no applicable exception to the contemporaneous-objection rule enunciated *515 in Wicks v. State , 270 Ark. 781 , 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980).

2015This court has consistently followed Schultz, 261 Ark. 769 , 552 S.W.2d 4 , and looked at all of the factors in any given |transaction, including a consideration of the Smith factors when doing so. 6 See, e.g., Carder, 327 Ark. 545 , 940 S.W.2d 429 ; Cook v. Wills, 305 Ark. 442 , 808 S.W.2d 758 (1991); Grand Prairie Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 298 Ark. 542 , 769 S.W.2d 20 (1989).

2015This court has consistently followed Schultz, 261 Ark. 769 , 552 S.W.2d 4 , and looked at all of the factors in any given |transaction, including a consideration of the Smith factors when doing so. 6 See, e.g., Carder, 327 Ark. 545 , 940 S.W.2d 429 ; Cook v. Wills, 305 Ark. 442 , 808 S.W.2d 758 (1991); Grand Prairie Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 298 Ark. 542 , 769 S.W.2d 20 (1989).

2015Id. (citing Union Nat’l Bank v. Farmers Bank, 786 F.2d 881 (8th Cir.1986)) (finding no error in the trial court’s determination that the Smith factors, which are used to identify a security under Arkansas law, were “substantially similar” to the test in Howey, which is used to identify a security under federal law).

2015Id. (citing Union Nat’l Bank v. Farmers Bank, 786 F.2d 881 (8th Cir.1986)) (finding no error in the trial court’s determination that the Smith factors, which are used to identify a security under Arkansas law, were “substantially similar” to the test in Howey, which is used to identify a security under federal law).

2014The majority also errs by failing to address an entire substantive claim on appeal, the denial of Smith’s motion for summary judgment based on sovereign immunity on the 11 Cite as 2014 Ark. 519 Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA) claims.

2014The following supports that the ACRA official-capacity claims are before this court and must be addressed: (1) Daniel’s 19 Cite as 2014 Ark. 519 third amended complaint, (2) Smith’s motion for summary judgment and brief in support, (3) the circuit court’s hearing and written order, (4) Smith’s brief before this court on appeal, and (5) Daniel’s brief before this court on appeal.

2009In Olsen v. Mukasy , the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals takes a dichotomous view of the Smith test: "Absent evidence of an `intent to regulate religious worship,' a law is a neutral law of general applicability." 541 F.3d 827 , 832 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted).

2009In Olsen v. Mukasy , the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals takes a dichotomous view of the Smith test: "Absent evidence of an `intent to regulate religious worship,' a law is a neutral law of general applicability." 541 F.3d 827 , 832 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted).

2008Relying on Freeman v. Rushton, 360 Ark. 445 , 202 S.W.3d 485 (2005), the circuit judge ruled that although Smith was the natural father of B.S., the legal preference to which he was entitled under the guardianship statute was subservient to the best interest of the child.

2008Relying on Freeman v. Rushton, 360 Ark. 445 , 202 S.W.3d 485 (2005), the circuit judge ruled that although Smith was the natural father of B.S., the legal preference to which he was entitled under the guardianship statute was subservient to the best interest of the child.

2003Kelly v. State, 350 Ark. 238 , 85 S.W.3d 893 (2002). 3 Though we do not address the merits of Smith’s claim, we take this opportunity to note that, contrary to Smith’s and the prosecutor’s agreement at trial that the Rape Shield Statute is inapplicable in a case involving violation of a minor, the Rape Shield Statute would have been applicable to defense counsel’s attempt to cross-examine the victim concerning her sexual history.

2003Kelly v. State, 350 Ark. 238 , 85 S.W.3d 893 (2002). 3 Though we do not address the merits of Smith’s claim, we take this opportunity to note that, contrary to Smith’s and the prosecutor’s agreement at trial that the Rape Shield Statute is inapplicable in a case involving violation of a minor, the Rape Shield Statute would have been applicable to defense counsel’s attempt to cross-examine the victim concerning her sexual history.

2003Smith cites Donihoo v. State, 325 Ark. 483 , 931 S.W.2d 69 (1996), for the proposition that the Rape Shield Statute does not apply to cases where the defendant is charged with violation of a minor.

2003Smith cites Donihoo v. State, 325 Ark. 483 , 931 S.W.2d 69 (1996), for the proposition that the Rape Shield Statute does not apply to cases where the defendant is charged with violation of a minor.