Smith rule in Colorado

2019Indeed, we conclude that the 1960 decision in Hook and the 1987 decision in Smith do not compel, or even suggest, that a summary judgment be granted for PPRM in this case. ¶ 31 In Smith, a widow filed an action seeking damages for wrongful death against a workers’ compensation insurer and its agent after her husband was injured in a work-related accident. 749 P.2d at 463 .

2019Indeed, we conclude that the 1960 decision in Hook and the 1987 decision in Smith do not compel, or even suggest, that a summary judgment be granted for PPRM in this case. ¶ 31 In Smith, a widow filed an action seeking damages for wrongful death against a workers’ compensation insurer and its agent after her husband was injured in a work-related accident. 749 P.2d at 463 .

2018We Have Jurisdiction ¶5 Though the Land Board stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice so that the Town could appeal the issue presented, it now argues that because of that dismissal we lack jurisdiction over the appeal.2 The Land Board says the order ruling on the Smith issue isn’t appealable because it didn’t resolve the case on the merits and, 2Forest View Company and Raymond Decker, the other appellees, haven’t made any similar argument. 3 relying primarily on Foothills Meadow v. Myers, 832 P.2d 1097 (Colo. App. 1992), the stipulation for dismissal with prejudice means no court has juris

2017People v. DiGuglielmo , 33 P.3d 1248 (Colo. App. 2001). ¶ 23 Here, Smith was advised by the court of the possible penalties for the offenses to which he was pleading guilty.

2013The Kidwell court applied the Smith rule and concluded that the landowner was entitled to designate the snow removal operator as a nonparty at fault "after the settlement was accomplished." 942 P.2d at 1283 .

2013The Kidwell court applied the Smith rule and concluded that the landowner was entitled to designate the snow removal operator as a nonparty at fault "after the settlement was accomplished." 942 P.2d at 1283 .

1996Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 , 60 S.Ct. 900, 903 , 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). [4] Many lower courts have applied the Smith rule in civil contexts.

1996Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 , 60 S.Ct. 900, 903 , 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). [4] Many lower courts have applied the Smith rule in civil contexts.

1996Id.

1996Id.

1996I would hold that we need not decide whether the Smith standard applies because the UCRS’s free exercise claim in this case does not even survive the less restrictive Sherbert balancing test. 5 See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295, 1305 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Sherbert rather than Smith where there was no state interference with the free exercise of religious beliefs), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985 , 112 S.Ct. 2965 , 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992).

1996I would hold that we need not decide whether the Smith standard applies because the UCRS’s free exercise claim in this case does not even survive the less restrictive Sherbert balancing test. 5 See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295, 1305 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Sherbert rather than Smith where there was no state interference with the free exercise of religious beliefs), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985 , 112 S.Ct. 2965 , 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992).

1996I would hold that we need not decide whether the Smith standard applies because the UCRS’s free exercise claim in this case does not even survive the less restrictive Sherbert balancing test. 5 See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295, 1305 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Sherbert rather than Smith where there was no state interference with the free exercise of religious beliefs), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985 , 112 S.Ct. 2965 , 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992).

1996I would hold that we need not decide whether the Smith standard applies because the UCRS’s free exercise claim in this case does not even survive the less restrictive Sherbert balancing test. 5 See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295, 1305 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Sherbert rather than Smith where there was no state interference with the free exercise of religious beliefs), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985 , 112 S.Ct. 2965 , 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992).

1996I would hold that we need not decide whether the Smith standard applies because the UCRS’s free exercise claim in this case does not even survive the less restrictive Sherbert balancing test. 5 See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295, 1305 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Sherbert rather than Smith where there was no state interference with the free exercise of religious beliefs), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985 , 112 S.Ct. 2965 , 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992).

1996I would hold that we need not decide whether the Smith standard applies because the UCRS’s free exercise claim in this case does not even survive the less restrictive Sherbert balancing test. 5 See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295, 1305 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Sherbert rather than Smith where there was no state interference with the free exercise of religious beliefs), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985 , 112 S.Ct. 2965 , 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992).

1994In granting Smith’s motion, and later in addressing plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, the trial court concluded that the knowing concealment exception did not apply to the claims against Smith based upon the opinion of this court in Adams v. Richardson, 714 P.2d 921 (Colo.App.1986).

1985The court found that People v. Guyton, 44 Colo.App. 548 , 620 P.2d 50 (1980), sets forth a “strong governmental interest” sufficient to outweigh the need for witness immunity (the fifth part of the Smith test was not met).

1985The court found that People v. Guyton, 44 Colo.App. 548 , 620 P.2d 50 (1980), sets forth a “strong governmental interest” sufficient to outweigh the need for witness immunity (the fifth part of the Smith test was not met).