Smith claim in Pennsylvania

2025The Court concluded it did not need to decide that point, however, as “the double jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits retrial of a defendant not only when prosecutorial misconduct is intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial, but also when the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial.” Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Martorano, 741 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Pa. 1999) (holding that the Smith standard was “deliberately nonspecific, allowing for any number of scenarios in which prosec

2025The Court concluded it did not need to decide that point, however, as “the double jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits retrial of a defendant not only when prosecutorial misconduct is intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial, but also when the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial.” Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Martorano, 741 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Pa. 1999) (holding that the Smith standard was “deliberately nonspecific, allowing for any number of scenarios in which prosec

2015If the stated intent of the statute is a civil and non-punitive scheme, the second step of the Smith inquiry requires the court to “examine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the legislature’s] intention to deem it civil.” Smith, supra; Lehman, 576 Pa. at 373-374 , 839 A.2d at 271 .

2015If the stated intent of the statute is a civil and non-punitive scheme, the second step of the Smith inquiry requires the court to “examine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the legislature’s] intention to deem it civil.” Smith, supra; Lehman, 576 Pa. at 373-374 , 839 A.2d at 271 .

2024See Majority, ---DATE---, at 26 (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 529 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“[T]he Vehicle Code precludes an individual from operating a motor vehicle with any amount of scheduled controlled substance, or a metabolite thereof, in the driver’s blood.”) (emphasis in original)).

2024See Majority, ---DATE---, at 26 (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 529 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“[T]he Vehicle Code precludes an individual from operating a motor vehicle with any amount of scheduled controlled substance, or a metabolite thereof, in the driver’s blood.”) (emphasis in original)).

2023Before reviewing the merits of Smith’s claim, we must determine whether: “(1) the appeal is timely; (2) the appellant has preserved his issue; (3) his brief includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of an appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of his sentence; and (4) the concise statement raises a substantial question whether the sentence is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v. Green, 204 A.3d 469, 488 (Pa.Super. 2019); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) (stating that an appellant who challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence “shall

2023Before reviewing this claim, we must determine whether Smith has included in his brief a concise statement raising “a substantial question whether the sentence is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v. Snyder, 289 A.3d 1121, 1126 (Pa.Super. 2023) (quoting Commonwealth v. Green, 204 A.3d 469, 488 (Pa.Super. 2019)).1 “A substantial question exists when the appellant makes a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process.” Id.

2020In Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 325 (Pa. 1992), this Court held that our state constitution bars retrial on double jeopardy grounds “not only when prosecutorial misconduct is intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial, but also when the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial.” We later clarified that the Smith standard also included intentional prosecutorial misconduct “designed to harass the defendant through successive prosecutions or otherwise deprive him of his constitutional righ

2020In Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 325 (Pa. 1992), this Court held that our state constitution bars retrial on double jeopardy grounds “not only when prosecutorial misconduct is intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial, but also when the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial.” We later clarified that the Smith standard also included intentional prosecutorial misconduct “designed to harass the defendant through successive prosecutions or otherwise deprive him of his constitutional righ

2016This second prong enlists seven factors the Supreme Court has found to be “useful guideposts” for determining whether a statute unconstitutionally imposes retroactive punishment. [Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 ]; see Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 , 83 S.Ct. 554 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963).

2016This second prong enlists seven factors the Supreme Court has found to be “useful guideposts” for determining whether a statute unconstitutionally imposes retroactive punishment. [Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 ]; see Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 , 83 S.Ct. 554 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963).

2016See Perez, 97 A.3d at 762 (Donohue, J. concurring) (hesitating to “conclude that the first prong of the Smith test is satisfied without further inquiry,” given that the manner of codification is probative of legislative .intent, and “[u]n-like the Alaska statute at issue in Smith , all of SORNA’s notification, registration, and procedural provisions are codified in one section of the State’s ‘Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Code,’ specifically .under Chapter 97, titled /Sentencing”’).

2016See Perez, 97 A.3d at 762 (Donohue, J. concurring) (hesitating to “conclude that the first prong of the Smith test is satisfied without further inquiry,” given that the manner of codification is probative of legislative .intent, and “[u]n-like the Alaska statute at issue in Smith , all of SORNA’s notification, registration, and procedural provisions are codified in one section of the State’s ‘Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Code,’ specifically .under Chapter 97, titled /Sentencing”’).

2026See Prinkey, 277 A.3d at 560, 563-64.

2026See Prinkey, 277 A.3d at 560, 563-64.

2026Zerby v. Shanon, 964 A.2d 956, 960 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).

2026See Smith, 277 A.3d at 602.

2026Smith, 277 A.3d at 598-99 (citations omitted).

2025In analyzing Smith’s claim, the High Court initially recognized that “Smith’s confrontation claim can succeed only if Rast’s statements came into - 13 - evidence for their truth[,]” as “the Clause applies solely to testimonial hearsay.” Id. at 792 (emphasis in original).

2025Id. at 789-90 .

2025See id. at 99.

2025See id. at Exhibits B-C.2 In response, the court succinctly wrote that it had “full discretion in regard to credibility determinations and the weight of evidence submitted during the PFA hearing.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/7/25, at 4.

2024Ort Trucking, Inc., 887 A.2d 1281, 1288 (Pa.Super. 2005); see also Cabiroy v. Scipione, 767 A.2d 1078, 1079 (Pa.Super. 2001) ____________________________________________ 1 The court granted Smith’s motion for a directed verdict on whether Vai was negligent and whether her negligence had caused Smith’s injuries.

2024Ort Trucking, Inc., 887 A.2d 1281, 1288 (Pa.Super. 2005); see also Cabiroy v. Scipione, 767 A.2d 1078, 1079 (Pa.Super. 2001) ____________________________________________ 1 The court granted Smith’s motion for a directed verdict on whether Vai was negligent and whether her negligence had caused Smith’s injuries.

2024Banohashim, 77 A.3d at 23-27 (new trial could not be limited to damages where instructions on comparative negligence were inadequate); Oblon v. The Ludlow-Fourth Corp., 595 A.2d 62, 67 (Pa. Super. 1991) (new trial could not be limited to plaintiff’s comparative negligence and was required on all issues because determination of plaintiff’s causal negligence was intertwined with defendants’ negligence and jury decisions on percentages of causal negligence could affect damages decision). -8- For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred in granting Smith’s motion for a directed verdict and in

2024See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vi); see also Small, 189 A.3d at 972 .

2024Banohashim, 77 A.3d at 23-27 (new trial could not be limited to damages where instructions on comparative negligence were inadequate); Oblon v. The Ludlow-Fourth Corp., 595 A.2d 62, 67 (Pa. Super. 1991) (new trial could not be limited to plaintiff’s comparative negligence and was required on all issues because determination of plaintiff’s causal negligence was intertwined with defendants’ negligence and jury decisions on percentages of causal negligence could affect damages decision). -8- For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred in granting Smith’s motion for a directed verdict and in

2024See Commonwealth v. Kraft, 737 A.2d 755, 757 (Pa. Super. 1999).

2024See id.

2024See id. -7- The trial court granted Smith’s motion and suppressed all physical evidence.

2023Commonwealth v. Dunkins, 263 A.3d 247 , 253 n.5 (Pa. 2021). -3- When this Court interprets the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, “our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Libengood, 152 A.3d 1057 , 1059 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Hann, 81 A.3d 57 , 65 (Pa. 2013)).

2023Commonwealth v. Dunkins, 263 A.3d 247 , 253 n.5 (Pa. 2021). -3- When this Court interprets the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, “our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Libengood, 152 A.3d 1057, 1059 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Hann, 81 A.3d 57, 65 (Pa. 2013)).

2023Before reviewing this claim, we must determine whether Smith has included in his brief a concise statement raising “a substantial question whether the sentence is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v. Snyder, 289 A.3d 1121, 1126 (Pa.Super. 2023) (quoting Commonwealth v. Green, 204 A.3d 469, 488 (Pa.Super. 2019)).1 “A substantial question exists when the appellant makes a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process.” Id.

2023See PCS Chadaga v. Torres, 252 A.3d 1154, 1158 (Pa. Super. 2021).7 Smith’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to strike Dr. Brooks’s “useless” testimony also fails on its merits.