Smith motion in Missouri

2024See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 , 720 (8th Cir. 2005) (“We observe, moreover, that the Supreme Court has cautioned that this factor not be over-emphasized….”); Nelson v. Town of Paris, 78 F.4th 389 , 398-99 (7th Cir. 2023) (“As we—and many other courts—have noted, determining whether sex offender residency restrictions promote the traditional aims of punishment provides little value to the over-all Smith inquiry.”); Prynne v. Settle, 848 F. App’x 93 , 102 (4th Cir. 2021) (holding, for the factor to be given significant weight, an appellant must establish more than “the mere presence” of a trad

2013In R.W., 168 S.W.3d 65 , this Court, using the Smith analysis, held that Missouri’s sex offender registration statute was civil and non-punitive and, therefore, did not violate the ex post facto clause.

2019Smith held, “[a]bsent evidence supporting a conclusion that the insurers agreed or intended to provide inspection services for the employers’ benefit, the threshold element of duty which in a case based upon [section] 324A flows from an undertaking to render services to another is lacking.” Id. at 710 . 3 The Smith analysis has been applied in two Missouri cases where it was claimed that an insurer had breached its section 324A duty to a third-party plaintiff by its negligent inspection of the insured’s property: Brown, supra, and Wurst v. Nat'l Oil & Supply Co., Inc., 780 S.W.2d 97 (Mo.App. 1

2019Smith held, “[a]bsent evidence supporting a conclusion that the insurers agreed or intended to provide inspection services for the employers’ benefit, the threshold element of duty which in a case based upon [section] 324A flows from an undertaking to render services to another is lacking.” Id. at 710 . 3 The Smith analysis has been applied in two Missouri cases where it was claimed that an insurer had breached its section 324A duty to a third-party plaintiff by its negligent inspection of the insured’s property: Brown, supra, and Wurst v. Nat'l Oil & Supply Co., Inc., 780 S.W.2d 97 (Mo.App. 1

2016Id. ■ ' • The Supreme Court noted that counsel never contacted, questioned, or otherwise investigated Carroll. .

2016Id. ■ ' • The Supreme Court noted that counsel never contacted, questioned, or otherwise investigated Carroll. .

2024A flat denial with no justifying reason “is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion.” Asmus, 115 S.W.3d at 437 (citing Forman, 371 U.S. at 182 ).

2024See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 , 720 (8th Cir. 2005) (“We observe, moreover, that the Supreme Court has cautioned that this factor not be over-emphasized….”); Nelson v. Town of Paris, 78 F.4th 389 , 398-99 (7th Cir. 2023) (“As we—and many other courts—have noted, determining whether sex offender residency restrictions promote the traditional aims of punishment provides little value to the over-all Smith inquiry.”); Prynne v. Settle, 848 F. App’x 93 , 102 (4th Cir. 2021) (holding, for the factor to be given significant weight, an appellant must establish more than “the mere presence” of a trad

2020For example, State v. Collins, 72 S.W.3d 188 (Mo. App. S.D. 2002), held traveling on the highway shoulder “was a violation of state law for failing to drive in the right-hand lane.” Id. at 195 (citing § 304.015.2, RSMo 2000).

2020For example, State v. Collins, 72 S.W.3d 188 (Mo. App. S.D. 2002), held traveling on the highway shoulder “was a violation of state law for failing to drive in the right-hand lane.” Id. at 195 (citing § 304.015.2, RSMo 2000).

2019Smith held, “[a]bsent evidence supporting a conclusion that the insurers agreed or intended to provide inspection services for the employers’ benefit, the threshold element of duty which in a case based upon [section] 324A flows from an undertaking to render services to another is lacking.” Id. at 710 . 3 The Smith analysis has been applied in two Missouri cases where it was claimed that an insurer had breached its section 324A duty to a third-party plaintiff by its negligent inspection of the insured’s property: Brown, supra, and Wurst v. Nat'l Oil & Supply Co., Inc., 780 S.W.2d 97 (Mo.App. 1

2019Smith held, “[a]bsent evidence supporting a conclusion that the insurers agreed or intended to provide inspection services for the employers’ benefit, the threshold element of duty which in a case based upon [section] 324A flows from an undertaking to render services to another is lacking.” Id. at 710 . 3 The Smith analysis has been applied in two Missouri cases where it was claimed that an insurer had breached its section 324A duty to a third-party plaintiff by its negligent inspection of the insured’s property: Brown, supra, and Wurst v. Nat'l Oil & Supply Co., Inc., 780 S.W.2d 97 (Mo.App. 1

2019Smith held, “[a]bsent evidence supporting a conclusion that the insurers agreed or intended to provide inspection services for the employers’ benefit, the threshold element of duty which in a case based upon [section] 324A flows from an undertaking to render services to another is lacking.” Id. at 710 . 3 The Smith analysis has been applied in two Missouri cases where it was claimed that an insurer had breached its section 324A duty to a third-party plaintiff by its negligent inspection of the insured’s property: Brown, supra, and Wurst v. Nat'l Oil & Supply Co., Inc., 780 S.W.2d 97 (Mo.App. 1

2019Smith held, “[a]bsent evidence supporting a conclusion that the insurers agreed or intended to provide inspection services for the employers’ benefit, the threshold element of duty which in a case based upon [section] 324A flows from an undertaking to render services to another is lacking.” Id. at 710 . 3 The Smith analysis has been applied in two Missouri cases where it was claimed that an insurer had breached its section 324A duty to a third-party plaintiff by its negligent inspection of the insured’s property: Brown, supra, and Wurst v. Nat'l Oil & Supply Co., Inc., 780 S.W.2d 97 (Mo.App. 1

2019Rather than engage in a Smith analysis of the threshold applicability of section 324A here, however, Plaintiff has engaged in the same faulty analysis used by the plaintiff in Bowman, supra. In that case, Bowman, a customer who was criminally assaulted at a restaurant, claimed that his petition set forth a cause of action under section 324A against McDonald’s Corporation, the restaurant’s franchisor, that his proposed Instruction F accurately presented that claim, and that the trial court erred in refusing to submit that instruction to the jury.

2019Rather than engage in a Smith analysis of the threshold applicability of section 324A here, however, Plaintiff has engaged in the same faulty analysis used by the plaintiff in Bowman, supra. In that case, Bowman, a customer who was criminally assaulted at a restaurant, claimed that his petition set forth a cause of action under section 324A against McDonald’s Corporation, the restaurant’s franchisor, that his proposed Instruction F accurately presented that claim, and that the trial court erred in refusing to submit that instruction to the jury.

2016Ctr., 412 S.W.3d 252 , 262 n.9 (Mo. App. 2013) (holding that “the evidence in the record supported the Commission’s determination that Smith’s claim did not accrue until 2005, when he was informed by his physician of a possible connection between his hepatitis C and his employment with Capital Region”).

2013“A trial court maintains broad discretion in the control of closing arguments.” State v. Middleton, 995 S.W.2d 443, 455 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1054 , 120 S.Ct. 598 , 145 L.Ed.2d 497 (1999).

2013“A trial court maintains broad discretion in the control of closing arguments.” State v. Middleton, 995 S.W.2d 443, 455 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1054 , 120 S.Ct. 598 , 145 L.Ed.2d 497 (1999).

2011“If an instruction is an accurate statement of law and supported by the evidence ... there is no prejudice.” Avery, 275 S.W.3d at 233 .

1998I concur fully in Judge Smith's analysis of Zemelman v. Equity Mutual Insurance Company, 935 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. App. 1997) and Jackson v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America, 949 S.W.2d 130 (Mo. App. 1997), in which the Southern District followed Zemelman without extended critical analysis.

1998I concur fully in Judge Smith’s analysis of Zemelman v. Equity Mutual Insurance Company, 935 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. App. 1997) and Jackson v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America, 949 S.W.2d 130 (Mo. App. 1997), in which the Southern District followed Zemelman without extended critical analysis.

1998I concur fully in Judge Smith's analysis of Zemelman v. Equity Mutual Insurance Company, 935 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. App. 1997) and Jackson v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America, 949 S.W.2d 130 (Mo. App. 1997), in which the Southern District followed Zemelman without extended critical analysis.

1998I concur fully in Judge Smith’s analysis of Zemelman v. Equity Mutual Insurance Company, 935 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. App. 1997) and Jackson v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America, 949 S.W.2d 130 (Mo. App. 1997), in which the Southern District followed Zemelman without extended critical analysis.

1998I do not agree that State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Sommers, 954 S.W.2d 18 (Mo.App.

1998I do not agree that State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Sommers, 954 S.W.2d 18 (Mo.App.