24 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sprinkler Irrigation Co., Inc. v. JOHN DEERE INS. COMPANY, INC.green2 sentences2022Co., Inc., 139 Idaho 691, 698 , 85 P.3d 667, 674 (2004) (holding sanctions were proper when Smith’s brief was “virtually void of any citation to the transcript and record relied upon” and thus “failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry that the appeal be well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law as required” by the appellate rules). 2022Co., Inc., 139 Idaho 691, 698 , 85 P.3d 667, 674 (2004) (holding sanctions were proper when Smith’s brief was “virtually void of any citation to the transcript and record relied upon” and thus “failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry that the appeal be well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law as required” by the appellate rules). | 2 | 2 |
Yon v. Stategreen2 sentences2024The district court held that Smith’s claim presented no genuine issue of material fact and granted the State’s motion for summary dismissal, explaining that there “is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of ‘professional assistance,’” and that “tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second guessed unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation” (quoting Yon v. State, 124 Idaho 821, 823 , 864 P.2d 659, 661 (Ct. App. 1993)). 2024The district court held that Smith’s claim presented no genuine issue of material fact and granted the State’s motion for summary dismissal, explaining that there “is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of ‘professional assistance,’” and that “tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second guessed unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation” (quoting Yon v. State, 124 Idaho 821, 823 , 864 P.2d 659, 661 (Ct. App. 1993)). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Treasure Valley Seed Co.green2 sentences2021Co., Inc., 139 Idaho 691, 698 , 85 P.3d 667, 674 (2004) (holding sanctions were proper when Smith’s brief was “virtually void of any citation to the transcript and record relied upon” and thus “failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry that the appeal be well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law as required” by the appellate rules); see also Smith By and Through Smith v. Treasure Valley Seed Co., LLC, 164 Idaho 654, 658 , 434 P.3d 1260, 1264 (2019) (concluding “Smith's claims are merely a regurgitation of what was argued and ruled upon by this Court previously. 2021Co., Inc., 139 Idaho 691, 698 , 85 P.3d 667, 674 (2004) (holding sanctions were proper when Smith’s brief was “virtually void of any citation to the transcript and record relied upon” and thus “failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry that the appeal be well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law as required” by the appellate rules); see also Smith By and Through Smith v. Treasure Valley Seed Co., LLC, 164 Idaho 654, 658 , 434 P.3d 1260, 1264 (2019) (concluding “Smith's claims are merely a regurgitation of what was argued and ruled upon by this Court previously. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Smithgreen1 sentence2021His attempts to relitigate this issue are therefore precluded by the ‘law of the case’ doctrine.”); Smith II, 164 Idaho at 53, 423 P.3d at 1005 (explaining Smith “has failed to show that the district court incorrectly applied well-established law” and failed to provide “any cogent argument as to why his claims…are not clearly barred by res judicata.”). | 1 | 1 |
Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLCgreen2 sentences2021See Bakker, 141 Idaho at 190 , 108 P.3d at 337 . 2021See Bakker, 141 Idaho at 190 , 108 P.3d at 337 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hawsgreen2 sentences2020See State v. Haws, 167 Idaho 471, 476 , 472 P.3d 576, 581 (2020) (noting the State is sole beneficiary of appeal waiver in plea agreement and must invoke applicability of waiver). 6 2020See State v. Haws, 167 Idaho 471, 476 , 472 P.3d 576, 581 (2020) (noting the State is sole beneficiary of appeal waiver in plea agreement and must invoke applicability of waiver). 6 | 1 | 1 |
Tingley v. Harrisongreen2 sentences2020This was the only evidence Smith cited in support of his motion for summary judgment. 6 remaining issues and a simple “Ok” from Smith indicating he had agreed to the terms of the contract.6 In granting Smith’s motion for summary judgment against Merrill, the district court concluded that Merrill had “not submitted evidence supporting the existence of a contract with properly authenticated, admissible evidence[.]” “On a motion for summary judgment, the ‘burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests at all times upon the moving party.’ ” Silicon Int’l Ore, LLC v. Monsanto Co., 155 Idaho 2020This was the only evidence Smith cited in support of his motion for summary judgment. 6 remaining issues and a simple “Ok” from Smith indicating he had agreed to the terms of the contract.6 In granting Smith’s motion for summary judgment against Merrill, the district court concluded that Merrill had “not submitted evidence supporting the existence of a contract with properly authenticated, admissible evidence[.]” “On a motion for summary judgment, the ‘burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests at all times upon the moving party.’ ” Silicon Int’l Ore, LLC v. Monsanto Co., 155 Idaho | 1 | 1 |
Silicon International Ore, LLC v. Monsanto Co.green2 sentences2020This was the only evidence Smith cited in support of his motion for summary judgment. 6 remaining issues and a simple “Ok” from Smith indicating he had agreed to the terms of the contract.6 In granting Smith’s motion for summary judgment against Merrill, the district court concluded that Merrill had “not submitted evidence supporting the existence of a contract with properly authenticated, admissible evidence[.]” “On a motion for summary judgment, the ‘burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests at all times upon the moving party.’ ” Silicon Int’l Ore, LLC v. Monsanto Co., 155 Idaho 2020This was the only evidence Smith cited in support of his motion for summary judgment. 6 remaining issues and a simple “Ok” from Smith indicating he had agreed to the terms of the contract.6 In granting Smith’s motion for summary judgment against Merrill, the district court concluded that Merrill had “not submitted evidence supporting the existence of a contract with properly authenticated, admissible evidence[.]” “On a motion for summary judgment, the ‘burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests at all times upon the moving party.’ ” Silicon Int’l Ore, LLC v. Monsanto Co., 155 Idaho | 1 | 1 |
State v. Howrygreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., State v. Howry, 127 Idaho 94, 95-96 , 896 P.2d 1002, 1003-04 (Ct. App. 1995). 2017See, e.g., State v. Howry, 127 Idaho 94, 95-96 , 896 P.2d 1002, 1003-04 (Ct. App. 1995). | 1 | 1 |
Mincey v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2016Smith argues the district court erred in affirming the magistrate’s denial of Smith’s motion to suppress because exigent circumstances, one of the warrant requirement exceptions, did not exist to justify the warrantless entry into the shed. “[W]arrants are generally required to search a person’s home or his person unless ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrant-less search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413-14 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 300-01 (1978) (quoting McDon 2016Smith argues the district court erred in affirming the magistrate’s denial of Smith’s motion to suppress because exigent circumstances, one of the warrant requirement exceptions, did not exist to justify the warrantless entry into the shed. “[W]arrants are generally required to search a person’s home or his person unless ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrant-less search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413-14 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 300-01 (1978) (quoting McDon | 1 | 1 |
Schultz v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations in post-conviction proceedings is “borne of the petitioner’s due process right to have a meaningful opportunity to present his or her claims.” Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 385-86 , 256 P.3d 791, 793-94 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Leer v. State, 148 Idaho 112, 115 , 218 P.3d 1173, 1176 (Ct. App. 2009)). 2014Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations in post-conviction proceedings is “borne of the petitioner’s due process right to have a meaningful opportunity to present his or her claims.” Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 385-86 , 256 P.3d 791, 793-94 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Leer v. State, 148 Idaho 112, 115 , 218 P.3d 1173, 1176 (Ct. App. 2009)). | 1 | 1 |
Leer v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations in post-conviction proceedings is “borne of the petitioner’s due process right to have a meaningful opportunity to present his or her claims.” Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 385-86 , 256 P.3d 791, 793-94 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Leer v. State, 148 Idaho 112, 115 , 218 P.3d 1173, 1176 (Ct. App. 2009)). 2014Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations in post-conviction proceedings is “borne of the petitioner’s due process right to have a meaningful opportunity to present his or her claims.” Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 385-86 , 256 P.3d 791, 793-94 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Leer v. State, 148 Idaho 112, 115 , 218 P.3d 1173, 1176 (Ct. App. 2009)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Parrottgreen2 sentences2013In State v. Parrott, 138 Idaho 40, 42 , 57 P.3d 509, 511 (Ct.App.2002), this Court stated: The time for filing a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence may not be extended unless an application for extension of time to file the motion is made within the statutory time limit. 2013In State v. Parrott, 138 Idaho 40, 42 , 57 P.3d 509, 511 (Ct.App.2002), this Court stated: The time for filing a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence may not be extended unless an application for extension of time to file the motion is made within the statutory time limit. | 1 | 1 |
Powell v. Sellersgreen2 sentences2010Powell, 130 Idaho at 128 , 937 P.2d at 440 (holding that a party waives an issue on appeal if either argument or authority is lacking). 13 Because Michael has not established reversible procedural or evidentiary errors in the granting of Smith’s motion to dismiss, we affirm the district court’s dismissal with prejudice. 2010Powell, 130 Idaho at 128 , 937 P.2d at 440 (holding that a party waives an issue on appeal if either argument or authority is lacking). 13 Because Michael has not established reversible procedural or evidentiary errors in the granting of Smith’s motion to dismiss, we affirm the district court’s dismissal with prejudice. | 1 | 1 |
Dunclick, Inc. v. Utah-Idaho Concrete Pipe Co.green2 sentences2009State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485 , 849 P.2d 942, 946 (1993) (citing Dunclick, Inc. v. Utah-Idaho Concrete Pipe Co., 77 Idaho 499, 502 , 295 P.2d 700, 702 (1956)). 2009State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485 , 849 P.2d 942, 946 (1993) (citing Dunclick, Inc. v. Utah-Idaho Concrete Pipe Co., 77 Idaho 499, 502 , 295 P.2d 700, 702 (1956)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fishergreen2 sentences2009State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485 , 849 P.2d 942, 946 (1993) (citing Dunclick, Inc. v. Utah-Idaho Concrete Pipe Co., 77 Idaho 499, 502 , 295 P.2d 700, 702 (1956)). 2009State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485 , 849 P.2d 942, 946 (1993) (citing Dunclick, Inc. v. Utah-Idaho Concrete Pipe Co., 77 Idaho 499, 502 , 295 P.2d 700, 702 (1956)). | 1 | 1 |
Newman v. Lancegreen2 sentences2001We note that the petition for appointment of special prosecutors came from the elected prosecutor, not the court or the county commissioners as in Newman v. Lance, 129 Idaho 98, 101 , 922 P.2d 395, 398 (1996). 2001We note that the petition for appointment of special prosecutors came from the elected prosecutor, not the court or the county commissioners as in Newman v. Lance, 129 Idaho 98, 101 , 922 P.2d 395, 398 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Clarke
green
2 sentences2025Smith’s argument invokes State v. Clarke, 165 Idaho 393 , 446 P.3d 451 (2019), in which we held that Article I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution prohibits an officer from making an arrest without a warrant for misdemeanors not committed in his presence. 2025Smith’s argument invokes State v. Clarke, 165 Idaho 393 , 446 P.3d 451 (2019), in which we held that Article I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution prohibits an officer from making an arrest without a warrant for misdemeanors not committed in his presence. | 3 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Fairchild
green
1 sentence2026Fairchild, 164 Idaho at 341, 429 P.3d at 882 . 3 At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State stipulated that Smith’s brief detention by the officers was a warrantless seizure. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2024Id. at 472-476 , 483 P.3d at 1015-1019 . 2024Id. at 472-476 , 483 P.3d at 1015-1019 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.
green
1 sentence2020During the jury instruction conference on the last day of trial, Smith objected to Instruction No. 23, having requested that the trial court include “the language of Griffith versus Clear Lakes citing to Smith versus Mutton[ 10] [sic] that this defendant bears the risk of the uncertainty which the defendant has created by its own wrongful conduct.” The trial court denied Smith’s objection, evidently confusing our Smith v. Mitton case with a 1946 United States Supreme Court case, Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
McDonald v. United States
green
2 sentences2016Smith argues the district court erred in affirming the magistrate’s denial of Smith’s motion to suppress because exigent circumstances, one of the warrant requirement exceptions, did not exist to justify the warrantless entry into the shed. “[W]arrants are generally required to search a person’s home or his person unless ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrant-less search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413-14 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 300-01 (1978) (quoting McDon 2016Smith argues the district court erred in affirming the magistrate’s denial of Smith’s motion to suppress because exigent circumstances, one of the warrant requirement exceptions, did not exist to justify the warrantless entry into the shed. “[W]arrants are generally required to search a person’s home or his person unless ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrant-less search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413-14 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 300-01 (1978) (quoting McDon | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Dana Lydell Smith
green
2 sentences2014This Court affirmed the district court’s order denying Smith’s motion for a new trial in State v. Smith, 154 Idaho 581 , 300 P.3d 1069 (Ct. App. 2013). 2014This Court affirmed the district court’s order denying Smith’s motion for a new trial in State v. Smith, 154 Idaho 581 , 300 P.3d 1069 (Ct. App. 2013). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
City of Boerne v. Flores
red
2 sentences2009In City of Boeme, 521 U.S. at 529-36 , 117 S.Ct. at 2168-72 , 138 L.Ed.2d at 644 -49 however, the Supreme Court invalidated the RFRA as it applied to states and localities, holding that the statute exceeded Congress’s remedial powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2009In City of Boeme, 521 U.S. at 529-36 , 117 S.Ct. at 2168-72 , 138 L.Ed.2d at 644 -49 however, the Supreme Court invalidated the RFRA as it applied to states and localities, holding that the statute exceeded Congress’s remedial powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Smith v. J.B. Parson Co.
green
1 sentence2001The referee reached this conclusion because “Smith’s claim for benefits ... was an open, unresolved and viable claim at the time of Smith’s 1990 back injury, such that it did not constitute a pre-existing injury under the worker’s compensation statutes.” Id. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Allen v. Lewis-Clark State College
green
2 sentences1996Smith relies upon Allen v. Lewis-Clark State College, 105 Idaho 447 , 670 P.2d 854 (1983), to support Smith’s claim that Smith is entitled to review of her case under the APA. 1996Smith relies upon Allen v. Lewis-Clark State College, 105 Idaho 447 , 670 P.2d 854 (1983), to support Smith’s claim that Smith is entitled to review of her case under the APA. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Turner
green
2 sentences1993By pointing to the language in State v. Turner, 94 Idaho 548 , 494 P.2d 146 (1972), and State v. Sutliff, 97 Idaho 523 , 547 P.2d 1128 (1976), both at trial and on appeal, Pangburn has met the burden of proving that requirement. 1993By pointing to the language in State v. Turner, 94 Idaho 548 , 494 P.2d 146 (1972), and State v. Sutliff, 97 Idaho 523 , 547 P.2d 1128 (1976), both at trial and on appeal, Pangburn has met the burden of proving that requirement. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Sutliff
green
2 sentences1993By pointing to the language in State v. Turner, 94 Idaho 548 , 494 P.2d 146 (1972), and State v. Sutliff, 97 Idaho 523 , 547 P.2d 1128 (1976), both at trial and on appeal, Pangburn has met the burden of proving that requirement. 1993By pointing to the language in State v. Turner, 94 Idaho 548 , 494 P.2d 146 (1972), and State v. Sutliff, 97 Idaho 523 , 547 P.2d 1128 (1976), both at trial and on appeal, Pangburn has met the burden of proving that requirement. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1984Even assuming that this Court has adopted § 133 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and that the term "intended beneficiary" is substituted for the former concepts of "creditor" or "donee" beneficiary, see Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462 , 583 P.2d 997 (1978), there remains no showing that All American was an intended beneficiary of the alleged contract between Sweet and Farmers Home Administration. 1984Even assuming that this Court has adopted § 133 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and that the term "intended beneficiary" is substituted for the former concepts of "creditor" or "donee" beneficiary, see Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462 , 583 P.2d 997 (1978), there remains no showing that All American was an intended beneficiary of the alleged contract between Sweet and Farmers Home Administration. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Fawcett v. Irby
green
2 sentences1972Defendant and cross-appellant Smith cites Domingo v. Phillips, 87 Idaho 55 , 390 P.2d 297 (1964); Hodge v. Borden, 91 Idaho 125 , 417 P.2d 75 (1966); and Fawcett v. Irby, 92 Idaho 48 , 436 P.2d 714 (1968) as authority for his assertion that an instruction upon assumption of the risk should have been given. 1972Defendant and cross-appellant Smith cites Domingo v. Phillips, 87 Idaho 55 , 390 P.2d 297 (1964); Hodge v. Borden, 91 Idaho 125 , 417 P.2d 75 (1966); and Fawcett v. Irby, 92 Idaho 48 , 436 P.2d 714 (1968) as authority for his assertion that an instruction upon assumption of the risk should have been given. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Hodge v. Borden green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Domingo v. Phillips green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.