commerce clause in Ohio

1995A state tax will survive a Commerce Clause challenge if the “tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.” 430 U.S. at 279 , 97 S.Ct. at 1079 , 51 L.Ed.2d at 331 .

1995A state tax will survive a Commerce Clause challenge if the “tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.” 430 U.S. at 279 , 97 S.Ct. at 1079 , 51 L.Ed.2d at 331 .

2019Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle , 421 U.S. 100 , 108, 95 S.Ct. 1538 , 44 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975). " 'It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the business.' " Id. , quoting Western Live Stock v. Bur. of Revenue , 303 U.S. 250 , 254, 58 S.Ct. 546 , 82 L.Ed. 823 (1938).

2019Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle , 421 U.S. 100 , 108, 95 S.Ct. 1538 , 44 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975). " 'It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the business.' " Id. , quoting Western Live Stock v. Bur. of Revenue , 303 U.S. 250 , 254, 58 S.Ct. 546 , 82 L.Ed. 823 (1938).

2004In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. (1970), 397 U.S. 137 , 25 L.Ed.2d 174 , 90 S.Ct. 844 , at page 142 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 174 , 90 S.Ct. 844 ], the United States Supreme Court set out the test for determining whether a state statute violates the commerce clause as follows: {¶ 39} “Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce clause is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.

2004In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. (1970), 397 U.S. 137 , 25 L.Ed.2d 174 , 90 S.Ct. 844 , at page 142 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 174 , 90 S.Ct. 844 ], the United States Supreme Court set out the test for determining whether a state statute violates the commerce clause as follows: {¶ 39} “Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce clause is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.

2002The court’s rationale was that “a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing the tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in other States.” Id. at 572 , 116 S.Ct. 1589 , 134 L.Ed.2d 809 .

2002The court’s rationale was that “a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing the tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in other States.” Id. at 572 , 116 S.Ct. 1589 , 134 L.Ed.2d 809 .

1996“The commerce clause forbids discrimination, whether forthright or ingenious.” Best & Co. v. Maxwell (1940), 311 U.S. 454, 455 , 61 S.Ct. 334, 335 , 85 L.Ed. 275, 277 ; Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Lindley (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 465, 468 , 12 O.O.3d 387, 389 , 391 N.E.2d 716, 718 .

1996“The commerce clause forbids discrimination, whether forthright or ingenious.” Best & Co. v. Maxwell (1940), 311 U.S. 454, 455 , 61 S.Ct. 334, 335 , 85 L.Ed. 275, 277 ; Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Lindley (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 465, 468 , 12 O.O.3d 387, 389 , 391 N.E.2d 716, 718 .

2019Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle , 421 U.S. 100 , 108, 95 S.Ct. 1538 , 44 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975). " 'It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the business.' " Id. , quoting Western Live Stock v. Bur. of Revenue , 303 U.S. 250 , 254, 58 S.Ct. 546 , 82 L.Ed. 823 (1938).

2019Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle , 421 U.S. 100 , 108, 95 S.Ct. 1538 , 44 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975). " 'It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the business.' " Id. , quoting Western Live Stock v. Bur. of Revenue , 303 U.S. 250 , 254, 58 S.Ct. 546 , 82 L.Ed. 823 (1938).

2016In Oklahoma Tax Comm. v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 , 115 S.Ct. 1331 , 131 L.Ed.2d 261 (1995), a Minnesota bus company had collected and remitted the Oklahoma sales tax on transportation services for trips within Oklahoma but not 17 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO for trips originating in Oklahoma and terminating outside the state.

2016In Oklahoma Tax Comm. v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 , 115 S.Ct. 1331 , 131 L.Ed.2d 261 (1995), a Minnesota bus company had collected and remitted the Oklahoma sales tax on transportation services for trips within Oklahoma but not 17 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO for trips originating in Oklahoma and terminating outside the state.

2016As for entertaining the Commerce Clause challenge to the application of the CAT statute, “the BTA receives evidence at its hearing, but we determine the facts necessary to resolve the constitutional question.” MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Limbach, 68 Ohio St.3d 195, 198 , 625 N.E.2d 597 (1994).

2016As for entertaining the Commerce Clause challenge to the application of the CAT statute, “the BTA receives evidence at its hearing, but we determine the facts necessary to resolve the constitutional question.” MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Limbach, 68 Ohio St.3d 195, 198 , 625 N.E.2d 597 (1994).

2016SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Tracy, 73 Ohio St.3d 119, 123 , 652 N.E.2d 693 (1995). {¶ 67} I see no evidence that gross-receipts taxes are meaningfully different from use taxes for substantial-nexus purposes, and I view Tyler Pipe’s reliance on physical presence as more indicative of a requirement than an option.

2016SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Tracy, 73 Ohio St.3d 119, 123 , 652 N.E.2d 693 (1995). {¶ 67} I see no evidence that gross-receipts taxes are meaningfully different from use taxes for substantial-nexus purposes, and I view Tyler Pipe’s reliance on physical presence as more indicative of a requirement than an option.

2016We hold that the $500,000 sales- receipts threshold complies with the substantial-nexus requirement of the Complete Auto test. {¶ 53} In so holding, we express our view that the quantitative standard is necessary to make the CAT applicable to a remote seller such as Crutchfield, because the Commerce Clause standard does require the nexus to be “substantial.” This means that in order to render receipts susceptible to taxation by Ohio, the Commerce Clause requires more than the “ ‘definite link’ ” to this state, or the “ ‘purpose[ful] avail[ment]’ ” of Ohio’s protections, that would satisfy due

2016We hold that the $500,000 sales- receipts threshold complies with the substantial-nexus requirement of the Complete Auto test. {¶ 53} In so holding, we express our view that the quantitative standard is necessary to make the CAT applicable to a remote seller such as Crutchfield, because the Commerce Clause standard does require the nexus to be “substantial.” This means that in order to render receipts susceptible to taxation by Ohio, the Commerce Clause requires more than the “ ‘definite link’ ” to this state, or the “ ‘purpose[ful] avail[ment]’ ” of Ohio’s protections, that would satisfy due

2010The North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected the Commerce Clause challenge, explaining that the tax “does not make any geographical distinctions, but merely describes one method of providing television programming services to North Carolina subscribers.” DIRECTV, Inc. v. State (2006), 178 N.C.App. 659, 663 , 632 S.E.2d 543 .

2010The North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected the Commerce Clause challenge, explaining that the tax “does not make any geographical distinctions, but merely describes one method of providing television programming services to North Carolina subscribers.” DIRECTV, Inc. v. State (2006), 178 N.C.App. 659, 663 , 632 S.E.2d 543 .

2010Treesh boiled down to whether a state must charge cable companies for use of rights-of-way, see 487 F.3d at 479 , a much different question from the one presented here. {¶ 53} Nevertheless, it is true that Treesh went on to suggest that under Exxon and Amerada Hess, the Commerce Clause does not prohibit differential taxation of the cable and satellite industries.

2010Treesh boiled down to whether a state must charge cable companies for use of rights-of-way, see 487 F.3d at 479 , a much different question from the one presented here. {¶ 53} Nevertheless, it is true that Treesh went on to suggest that under Exxon and Amerada Hess, the Commerce Clause does not prohibit differential taxation of the cable and satellite industries.

2009States may not impose a tax that provides a direct commercial advantage to local businesses and thus burdens and discriminates against interstate commerce. *99 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota (1959), 358 U.S. 450, 458 , 79 S.Ct. 357 , 3 L.Ed.2d 421 . {¶ 13} A tax provision will not run afoul of the commerce clause if (1) the activity taxed has a substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) the tax is fairly apportioned to reflect the extent of commercial activity within the taxing state, (3) the tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) the tax is fair

2009States may not impose a tax that provides a direct commercial advantage to local businesses and thus burdens and discriminates against interstate commerce. *99 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota (1959), 358 U.S. 450, 458 , 79 S.Ct. 357 , 3 L.Ed.2d 421 . {¶ 13} A tax provision will not run afoul of the commerce clause if (1) the activity taxed has a substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) the tax is fairly apportioned to reflect the extent of commercial activity within the taxing state, (3) the tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) the tax is fair

2008Motors Corp., 519 U.S. at 307-308 , 117 S.Ct. 811 , 136 L.Ed.2d 761, fn. 16 . {¶ 78} In conclusion, Columbia’s failure to show that it is in direct competition with Ohio LDCs in the residential market proves fatal to its dormant Commerce Clause claim.

2008Motors Corp., 519 U.S. at 307-308 , 117 S.Ct. 811 , 136 L.Ed.2d 761, fn. 16 . {¶ 78} In conclusion, Columbia’s failure to show that it is in direct competition with Ohio LDCs in the residential market proves fatal to its dormant Commerce Clause claim.

2008Id., citing Chrysler Corp. v. Tracy, 73 Ohio St.3d 26 , 652 N.E.2d 185 (both cases were issued the same day). {¶ 53} The United States Supreme Court held that there was no Commerce Clause violation in Gen.

2008Id., citing Chrysler Corp. v. Tracy, 73 Ohio St.3d 26 , 652 N.E.2d 185 (both cases were issued the same day). {¶ 53} The United States Supreme Court held that there was no Commerce Clause violation in Gen.

2008Id., citing Chrysler Corp. v. Tracy, 73 Ohio St.3d 26 , 652 N.E.2d 185 (both cases were issued the same day). {¶ 53} The United States Supreme Court held that there was no Commerce Clause violation in Gen.

2004At page 253 [ 692 N.Y.S.2d 248 ] the court stated: {¶ 43} “Indeed, we cannot conceive of any legitimate commerce involving, the sending of graphic images to minors while at the same time attempting to lure them into * * * sexual activity.

2000In support of their argument, the MG Drivers rely on Blangers v. Dept. of Revenue and Taxation (1988), 114 Idaho 944 , in which the Idaho Supreme Court held that there was not a sufficient nexus to justify the imposition of Idaho's state tax upon train crews who merely transverse the state.

2000In support of their argument, the MG Drivers rely on Blangers v. Dept. of Revenue and Taxation (1988), 114 Idaho 944 , in which the Idaho Supreme Court held that there was not a sufficient nexus to justify the imposition of Idaho's state tax upon train crews who merely transverse the state.

1996However, in Champion v. Ames (1903), 188 U.S. 321 , 23 S.Ct. 321 , 47 L.Ed. 492 , at the syllabus, the United States Supreme Court held that “[l]ottery tickets are subjects of traffic among those who choose to buy and sell them and their carriage by independent carriers from one State to another is therefore interstate commerce which Congress may prohibit under its power to regulate commerce among the several states.” But, see, Francis v. United States (1903), 188 U.S. 375, 377 , 23 S.Ct. 334, 335 , 47 L.Ed. 508, 510 .

1996However, in Champion v. Ames (1903), 188 U.S. 321 , 23 S.Ct. 321 , 47 L.Ed. 492 , at the syllabus, the United States Supreme Court held that “[l]ottery tickets are subjects of traffic among those who choose to buy and sell them and their carriage by independent carriers from one State to another is therefore interstate commerce which Congress may prohibit under its power to regulate commerce among the several states.” But, see, Francis v. United States (1903), 188 U.S. 375, 377 , 23 S.Ct. 334, 335 , 47 L.Ed. 508, 510 .

1996However, in Champion v. Ames (1903), 188 U.S. 321 , 23 S.Ct. 321 , 47 L.Ed. 492 , at the syllabus, the United States Supreme Court held that “[l]ottery tickets are subjects of traffic among those who choose to buy and sell them and their carriage by independent carriers from one State to another is therefore interstate commerce which Congress may prohibit under its power to regulate commerce among the several states.” But, see, Francis v. United States (1903), 188 U.S. 375, 377 , 23 S.Ct. 334, 335 , 47 L.Ed. 508, 510 .

1996However, in Champion v. Ames (1903), 188 U.S. 321 , 23 S.Ct. 321 , 47 L.Ed. 492 , at the syllabus, the United States Supreme Court held that “[l]ottery tickets are subjects of traffic among those who choose to buy and sell them and their carriage by independent carriers from one State to another is therefore interstate commerce which Congress may prohibit under its power to regulate commerce among the several states.” But, see, Francis v. United States (1903), 188 U.S. 375, 377 , 23 S.Ct. 334, 335 , 47 L.Ed. 508, 510 .

1996“The commerce clause forbids discrimination, whether forthright or ingenious.” Best & Co. v. Maxwell (1940), 311 U.S. 454, 455 , 61 S.Ct. 334, 335 , 85 L.Ed. 275, 277 ; Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Lindley (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 465, 468 , 12 O.O.3d 387, 389 , 391 N.E.2d 716, 718 .

1996“The commerce clause forbids discrimination, whether forthright or ingenious.” Best & Co. v. Maxwell (1940), 311 U.S. 454, 455 , 61 S.Ct. 334, 335 , 85 L.Ed. 275, 277 ; Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Lindley (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 465, 468 , 12 O.O.3d 387, 389 , 391 N.E.2d 716, 718 .