commerce clause in Washington

2016The Court found that application of a B&O tax to these sales did not offend the commerce clause because Tyler Pipe had hired an in-state contractor to call on customers and solicit orders, and that it was through these sales contacts that Tyler Pipe maintained and improved its “ ‘name recognition, market share, goodwill, and individual customer relations.’ ” Id. (quoting Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 105 Wn.2d 318, 325 , 715 P.2d 123 (1986)).

2016The Court found application of a B&O tax to these sales did not offend the commerce clause because Tyler Pipe had hired an in- state contractor to call on customers and solicit orders, and that it was through these sales contacts that Tyler Pipe maintained and improved its '"name recognition, market share, goodwill, and individual customer relations."' !d. (quoting Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Dep't ofRevenue, 105 Wn.2d 318, 325 , 715 P.2d 123 (1986), vacated, 483 U.S. 232 ).

2021This is essentially the same increasing-the-cost-of-business argument the Association already raised and that Exxon, 437 U.S. at 126 , and General Motors, 377 U.S. at 439 , resolve: the commerce clause does not release those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the costs of doing business.

1983It has long been recognized, however, that "'[i]t was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their *826 just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the business.'" General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 439 , 12 L.

2016Id. at 308 . ¶27 The Quill Court then turned to the nexus necessary under the commerce clause.

2009Confirming the "bright-line" rule articulated in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 , 87 S.Ct. 1389 , 18 L.Ed.2d 505 (1967), the Quill court held that a use tax is impermissible where the seller's only connection with a particular state is orders placed and merchandise delivered through a common carrier or the United States mail; a seller must have a physical presence in a state to satisfy the commerce clause.

2016The Court found that application of a B&O tax to these sales did not offend the commerce clause because Tyler Pipe had hired an in-state contractor to call on customers and solicit orders, and that it was through these sales contacts that Tyler Pipe maintained and improved its “ ‘name recognition, market share, goodwill, and individual customer relations.’ ” Id. (quoting Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 105 Wn.2d 318, 325 , 715 P.2d 123 (1986)).

2016The Court found that application of a B&O tax to these sales did not offend the commerce clause because Tyler Pipe had hired an in-state contractor to call on customers and solicit orders, and that it was through these sales contacts that Tyler Pipe maintained and improved its “ ‘name recognition, market share, goodwill, and individual customer relations.’ ” Id. (quoting Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 105 Wn.2d 318, 325 , 715 P.2d 123 (1986)).

2009Presumably, if the state law had been directly authorized by the federal law, the Court's detailed and extensive Commerce Clause analysis would have been wholly unnecessary. ¶ 27 In sum, the State "identifies nothing in the text or legislative history of the [statutes cited] that suggests Congress wished to validate state laws that would be unconstitutional without federal approval." Taylor, 477 U.S. at 139 , 106 S.Ct. 2440 .

2009Presumably, if the state law had been directly authorized by the federal law, the Court's detailed and extensive Commerce Clause analysis would have been wholly unnecessary. ¶ 27 In sum, the State "identifies nothing in the text or legislative history of the [statutes cited] that suggests Congress wished to validate state laws that would be unconstitutional without federal approval." Taylor, 477 U.S. at 139 , 106 S.Ct. 2440 .

1990See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279 ; Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Rev., 303 U.S. 250, 254 , 82 L.

1970Ed. 823 , 58 S. Ct. 546 (1938), stated at page 254: *232 It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the business.

2025Under the statute applicable to the Period at Issue, Valente could not prove it was taxable in another state and, as a result, Valente did need to calculate its throw-out income. 18 Thus, the Board did not err when it 17 Valente’s reply brief cites to Lamtec Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 170 Wn.2d 838 , 246 P.3d 788 (2011), to support the contention that “Washington courts have long established that a taxpayer has substantial nexus, and therefore is ‘taxable’ in a state if the taxpayer has physical presence there.” In Lamtec, the Washington Supreme Court was asked to determine what requireme

2023The Supreme Court in Lamtec addressed whether there was a physical presence requirement to establish a substantial nexus with the taxing state under the commerce clause. 170 Wn.2d at 844-46 .

2010Id. "[B]ecause of the important role the Commerce Clause plays in protecting the free flow of interstate trade," Congress' delegation of that authority must be "`unmistakably clear.'" Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138-39 , 106 S.Ct. 2440 (quoting South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 , 104 S.Ct. 2237 , 81 L.Ed.2d 71 (1984)). ¶ 10 Here, the State argues two Congressional acts manifest "unmistakably clear" *1088 intent to delegate to the states the authority to regulate on-line gambling.

2010Id. “[B]ecause of the important role the Commerce Clause plays in protecting the free flow of interstate trade,” Congress’ delegation of that authority must be “ 'unmistakably clear.’ ” Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138 -39 (quoting S.-Cent.

2007See Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560, 564 , 95 S.Ct. 706 , 42 L.Ed.2d 719 (1975); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 440 , 59 S.Ct. 325 , 83 L.Ed. 272 (1939) ("Although the tax, measured by gross receipts, to some extent burdened the commerce, it was held that the burden did not infringe the commerce clause.

2007See Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560, 564 , 95 S.Ct. 706 , 42 L.Ed.2d 719 (1975); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 440 , 59 S.Ct. 325 , 83 L.Ed. 272 (1939) ("Although the tax, measured by gross receipts, to some extent burdened the commerce, it was held that the burden did not infringe the commerce clause.

1998First, they contended the regulatory fee was unconstitutional because it imposed an unlawful burden on interstate commerce pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s “dormant” or “negative” Commerce Clause analysis in American Trucking Ass’ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 , 107 S. Ct. 2829 , 97 L.

1998First, they contended the regulatory fee was unconstitutional because it imposed an unlawful burden on interstate commerce pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s “dormant” or “negative” Commerce Clause analysis in American Trucking Ass’ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 , 107 S. Ct. 2829 , 97 L.

1961Ed. 68 , 58 S. Ct. 72 , for the proposition that the activities of WOSCA are so closely connected with interstate commerce that WOSCA should be immune to the tax by virtue of the commerce clause.

1961WOSCA relies on Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Commission (1937), 302 U.S. 90 , 82 L.Ed. 68 , 58 S.Ct. 72 , for the proposition that the activities of WOSCA are so closely connected with interstate commerce that WOSCA should be immune to the tax by virtue of the commerce clause.

2025Under the statute applicable to the Period at Issue, Valente could not prove it was taxable in another state and, as a result, Valente did need to calculate its throw-out income. 18 Thus, the Board did not err when it 17 Valente’s reply brief cites to Lamtec Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 170 Wn.2d 838 , 246 P.3d 788 (2011), to support the contention that “Washington courts have long established that a taxpayer has substantial nexus, and therefore is ‘taxable’ in a state if the taxpayer has physical presence there.” In Lamtec, the Washington Supreme Court was asked to determine what requireme

2023The commerce clause imposes several requirements, including that the tax be “ ‘applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State.’ ” Id. at 844 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 , 97 S. Ct. 1076 , 51 L.

2011In Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358 , 111 S.Ct. 818 , 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991), the United States Supreme Court explained that the dormant commerce clause analysis set forth in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 , 97 S.Ct. 1076 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977), "encompasses as well the due process requirement" of minimum contacts.

2011In Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358 , 111 S.Ct. 818 , 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991), the United States Supreme Court explained that the dormant commerce clause analysis set forth in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 , 97 S.Ct. 1076 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977), "encompasses as well the due process requirement" of minimum contacts.

2010Id. "[B]ecause of the important role the Commerce Clause plays in protecting the free flow of interstate trade," Congress' delegation of that authority must be "`unmistakably clear.'" Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138-39 , 106 S.Ct. 2440 (quoting South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 , 104 S.Ct. 2237 , 81 L.Ed.2d 71 (1984)). ¶ 10 Here, the State argues two Congressional acts manifest "unmistakably clear" *1088 intent to delegate to the states the authority to regulate on-line gambling.

2010Id. "[B]ecause of the important role the Commerce Clause plays in protecting the free flow of interstate trade," Congress' delegation of that authority must be "`unmistakably clear.'" Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138-39 , 106 S.Ct. 2440 (quoting South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 , 104 S.Ct. 2237 , 81 L.Ed.2d 71 (1984)). ¶ 10 Here, the State argues two Congressional acts manifest "unmistakably clear" *1088 intent to delegate to the states the authority to regulate on-line gambling.

2009We recently discussed the commerce clause's limitations on the City's taxing power in KMS Financial Services, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 135 Wash.App. 489 , 146 P.3d 1195 (2006), review denied, 161 Wash.2d 1011 , 166 P.3d 1217 (2007): The United States Supreme Court has set out a four-part test to determine whether a tax violates the federal commerce clause, including that clause's negative command known as the dormant commerce clause.

2009As we recognized in KMS , "[t]he `central purpose behind the apportionment requirement is to ensure that each State taxes only its fair share of an interstate transaction.'" KMS, 135 Wash.App. at 504 , 146 P.3d 1195 (quoting Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 260-61 , 109 S.Ct. 582 , 102 L.Ed.2d 607 (1989)). ¶ 19 Here, as in KMS , only the commerce clause's fair apportionment requirement is implicated by the City's taxation method.

2009App. 489, 503-04 , 146 P.3d 1195 (2006), review denied, 161 Wn.2d 1011 (2007): The United States Supreme Court has set out a four-part test to determine whether a tax violates the federal commerce clause, including that clause’s negative command known as the dormant commerce clause.

2009We recently discussed the commerce clause's limitations on the City's taxing power in KMS Financial Services, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 135 Wash.App. 489 , 146 P.3d 1195 (2006), review denied, 161 Wash.2d 1011 , 166 P.3d 1217 (2007): The United States Supreme Court has set out a four-part test to determine whether a tax violates the federal commerce clause, including that clause's negative command known as the dormant commerce clause.

2009None of the other federal laws cited by the State constitute such a prohibition, either. ¶ 26 The State's contention that the UIGEA makes violation of a state law a "predicate offense" for its enforcement, and so disposes of Commerce Clause analysis under Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 , 100 S.Ct. 311 , 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979), is even further off base.

2009None of the other federal laws cited by the State constitute such a prohibition, either. ¶ 26 The State's contention that the UIGEA makes violation of a state law a "predicate offense" for its enforcement, and so disposes of Commerce Clause analysis under Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 , 100 S.Ct. 311 , 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979), is even further off base.

2009We recently discussed the commerce clause’s limitations on the City’s taxing power in KMS Financial Services, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 135 Wn.

2009We recently discussed the commerce clause's limitations on the City's taxing power in KMS Financial Services, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 135 Wash.App. 489 , 146 P.3d 1195 (2006), review denied, 161 Wash.2d 1011 , 166 P.3d 1217 (2007): The United States Supreme Court has set out a four-part test to determine whether a tax violates the federal commerce clause, including that clause's negative command known as the dormant commerce clause.