commerce clause in Pennsylvania

2023In the City’s view, then, “[t]he Commonwealth Court correctly applied the same logic to the instant matter and found that there was no double taxation because ‘[Appellant] never pays more than one local tax or more than one state tax.’” Id. at 23 (quoting Zilka, 1063-1064 C.D. 2019, at 5).

2023In the City’s view, then, “[t]he Commonwealth Court correctly applied the same logic to the instant matter and found that there was no double taxation because ‘[Appellant] never pays more than one local tax or more than one state tax.’” Id. at 23 (quoting Zilka, 1063-1064 C.D. 2019, at 5).

2023In her final effort to sway this Court with respect to the question of aggregation, Appellant proffers three out-of-state cases — Arizona Public Service, supra; General Motors, supra; and Matkovich, supra. In the first of these cases, an Arizona court of appeals held that an Arizona public utility company which purchased coal from a mine located in McKinley County, New Mexico, was entitled to tax credits, against the amount it paid in Arizona’s use tax, for gross receipts taxes which the company paid to both New Mexico and McKinley County.

2023In her final effort to sway this Court with respect to the question of aggregation, Appellant proffers three out-of-state cases — Arizona Public Service, supra; General Motors, supra; and Matkovich, supra. In the first of these cases, an Arizona court of appeals held that an Arizona public utility company which purchased coal from a mine located in McKinley County, New Mexico, was entitled to tax credits, against the amount it paid in Arizona’s use tax, for gross receipts taxes which the company paid to both New Mexico and McKinley County.

2023In her final effort to sway this Court with respect to the question of aggregation, Appellant proffers three out-of-state cases — Arizona Public Service, supra; General Motors, supra; and Matkovich, supra. In the first of these cases, an Arizona court of appeals held that an Arizona public utility company which purchased coal from a mine located in McKinley County, New Mexico, was entitled to tax credits, against the amount it paid in Arizona’s use tax, for gross receipts taxes which the company paid to both New Mexico and McKinley County.

2023In her final effort to sway this Court with respect to the question of aggregation, Appellant proffers three out-of-state cases — Arizona Public Service, supra; General Motors, supra; and Matkovich, supra. In the first of these cases, an Arizona court of appeals held that an Arizona public utility company which purchased coal from a mine located in McKinley County, New Mexico, was entitled to tax credits, against the amount it paid in Arizona’s use tax, for gross receipts taxes which the company paid to both New Mexico and McKinley County.

2023In her final effort to sway this Court with respect to the question of aggregation, Appellant proffers three out-of-state cases — Arizona Public Service, supra; General Motors, supra; and Matkovich, supra. In the first of these cases, an Arizona court of appeals held that an Arizona public utility company which purchased coal from a mine located in McKinley County, New Mexico, was entitled to tax credits, against the amount it paid in Arizona’s use tax, for gross receipts taxes which the company paid to both New Mexico and McKinley County.

2023In her final effort to sway this Court with respect to the question of aggregation, Appellant proffers three out-of-state cases — Arizona Public Service, supra; General Motors, supra; and Matkovich, supra. In the first of these cases, an Arizona court of appeals held that an Arizona public utility company which purchased coal from a mine located in McKinley County, New Mexico, was entitled to tax credits, against the amount it paid in Arizona’s use tax, for gross receipts taxes which the company paid to both New Mexico and McKinley County.

2013Quill, 504 U.S. at 309-19 , 112 S.Ct. 1904 (quoting South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185 , 58 S.Ct. 510 , 82 L.Ed. 734 (1938)).

2013Quill, 504 U.S. at 309-19 , 112 S.Ct. 1904 (quoting South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185 , 58 S.Ct. 510 , 82 L.Ed. 734 (1938)).

1905We held in Commonwealth v. Vandyke, 13 Pa. Superior Ct. 484 , that the sale of oleomargarine, which was colored in imitation of yellow butter by the admixture of the same coloring matter that is used in coloring pure butter, was in violation of the Act of May 5, 1899, P. L. 241, and that the prohibition of the sale of oleomargarine so colored, although manufactured in another state and brought into this state and sold in the original package, was not repugnant to the commerce clause of the federal constitution.

1900We held in Commonwealth v. Vandyke, supra, following Plumley v. Massachusetts, supra, that such a regulation does not conflict with the commerce clause of the national constitution; and upon the principles recognized in Powell v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. 265 ; 127 U. S. 678 , Plumley v. Massachusetts and a multitude of other cases, it cannot be declared to be an infringement of the rights of the citizen secured by section 1, article 1 of the state constitution, or by the fourteenth amendment of the national constitution.

2024Indeed, in Annenberg v. Commonwealth, 757 A.2d 338 (Pa. 2000), we rejected the prospectivity rationale of McNulty because that case involved a Commerce Clause challenge to a county level tax, and we concluded that the tax was 8 For purposes of structuring this dissenting opinion, I have followed the Majority’s phraseology of the central question as relating to the retroactivity of Nextel, a decision that dealt only with a discrete and specific statutory tax scheme for the 2007 tax year.

2024Indeed, in Annenberg v. Commonwealth, 757 A.2d 338 (Pa. 2000), we rejected the prospectivity rationale of McNulty because that case involved a Commerce Clause challenge to a county level tax, and we concluded that the tax was 8 For purposes of structuring this dissenting opinion, I have followed the Majority’s phraseology of the central question as relating to the retroactivity of Nextel, a decision that dealt only with a discrete and specific statutory tax scheme for the 2007 tax year.

2013Quill, 504 U.S. at 309-19 , 112 S.Ct. 1904 (quoting South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185 , 58 S.Ct. 510 , 82 L.Ed. 734 (1938)).

1939Inc., supra. For the reasons stated and upon these authorities, the conclusion of the court below must be sustained that “Section 1033(c) is not unconstitutional as an unreasonable and invalid burden on interstate commerce, and does not discriminate against interstate commerce.” *31 The second question arising under the commerce clause is whether Congress, by the enactment of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, has assumed exclusive control of the regulation of interstate motor carriers.

1996A strict scrutiny review applies where an ordinance facially discriminates against interstate commerce by creating “local economic protectionism.” C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. at 392 , 114 S.Ct. at 1683 , 128 L.Ed.2d at 409 . 11 Under strict scrutiny, a facially discriminatory ordinance almost always is deemed invalid unless the governmental entity defending the regulation establishes that the regulation advances a legitimate local public purpose and that there are no nondiscriminatory alternatives available which adequately serve the local interests at stake.

1996A strict scrutiny review applies where an ordinance facially discriminates against interstate commerce by creating “local economic protectionism.” C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. at 392 , 114 S.Ct. at 1683 , 128 L.Ed.2d at 409 . 11 Under strict scrutiny, a facially discriminatory ordinance almost always is deemed invalid unless the governmental entity defending the regulation establishes that the regulation advances a legitimate local public purpose and that there are no nondiscriminatory alternatives available which adequately serve the local interests at stake.

1992In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 , 101 S.Ct. 2946 , 69 L.Ed.2d 884 (1981); Mobil Oil Corp. and Container Corp. of America , the Supreme Court equated the first component (nexus to taxing state) of the commerce clause analysis with the first component of the due process clause analysis and equated the second component (tax liability fairly proportionate to taxpayer’s activities in taxing state) and the fourth component (tax liability fairly related to services provided by taxing state) of the commerce clause analysis with the second component of the due process clause analysi

1992In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 , 101 S.Ct. 2946 , 69 L.Ed.2d 884 (1981); Mobil Oil Corp. and Container Corp. of America , the Supreme Court equated the first component (nexus to taxing state) of the commerce clause analysis with the first component of the due process clause analysis and equated the second component (tax liability fairly proportionate to taxpayer’s activities in taxing state) and the fourth component (tax liability fairly related to services provided by taxing state) of the commerce clause analysis with the second component of the due process clause analysi

1986Furthermore, the Court commented that: *84 “It is a truism that the mere act of carrying on business in interstate commerce does not exempt a corporation from state taxation. ‘It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing business.’ Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 [ 58 S.Ct. 546, 548 , 82 L.Ed. 823 ] (1938).” Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Triangle, 421 U.S. [100], at 108 [ 95 S.Ct. 1543 , 44 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975)]. 430 U.S. at 288 , 97 S.Ct. at 1

1978"It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate *144 commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing business." Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 , 58 S.Ct. 546, 548 , 82 L.Ed. 823 (1938).' Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. at 108 , 95 S.Ct., at 1543." Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288 , 97 S.Ct. 1076, 1083 (1977), overruling Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 , 71 S.Ct. 508 , 95 L.Ed. 573 (1951).

1978“It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing business.” Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 , 58 S.Ct. 546, 548 , 82 L.Ed. 823 (1938).’ Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. at 108, 95 S.Ct., at 1543.” Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288 , 97 S.Ct. 1076, 1083 (1977), overruling Spector Motor Service v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602 , 71 S.Ct. 508 , 95 L.Ed. 573 (1951).

1978“It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing business.” Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 , 58 S.Ct. 546, 548 , 82 L.Ed. 823 (1938).’ Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. at 108, 95 S.Ct., at 1543.” Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288 , 97 S.Ct. 1076, 1083 (1977), overruling Spector Motor Service v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602 , 71 S.Ct. 508 , 95 L.Ed. 573 (1951).

1964Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U. S. 422 , 91 L.

1959There is a lengthy discussion of the reasoning in the Texas Transport case and the Puget Sound case in Jo seph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U. S. 422 (1947), where the majority of the Court held that the commerce clause precluded the levy of a tax under state or local authority upon the gross receipts of stevedoring companies, from loading and unloading vessels employed in interstate or foreign commerce or upon the privilege of conducting such business measured by those gross receipts.

1956The statute under consideration provides a reasonably accurate and nondiscriminatory formula to reflect the use of highways within this Commonwealth.” The Supreme Court of the United States has held that taxes levied by States as compensation for the use of the highways do not contravene the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution: Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Commissioners of Montana, 332 U. S. 495 (1947); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U. S. 583 (1939) Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554 (1927); Interstate Busses Corporation v. Blodgett, 276 U. S. 245 (1928); Morf v. Bingaman,

1937In Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U. S. 407 , (1936), the Supreme Court of the United States sustained a law of New Mexico that denied to all persons the use of the highways of the state for the transportation of any *174 motor vehicle, on its own wheels, for the purpose of selling it or offering it for sale within or without the state, unless the vehicle is (1) licensed by the state, or is (2) owned by a licensed automobile dealer and operated under a dealer’s license, or is (3) operated under a special permit issued by the State Commissioner of Revenue for its transportation.

1938Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 245 U.S. 493 , 510 .

1932Co. v. State Public Utilities Com. of Illinois, 245 U. S. 493, 510 , it is said: “In construing federal statutes enacted under the power conferred by the commerce clause of the Constitution, the rule is that it should never be held that Congress intends to supersede or suspend the exercise of the reserved powers of a state, even where that may be done, unless, and except so far as its purpose to do so is clearly manifested [citing cases].

1908In Commonwealth v. McCann, 14 Pa. Superior Ct. 221 , we held the Act of May 5, 1899, P. L. 241, regulating the sale of oleomargarine, constitutional, referring to Commonwealth v. Vandyke, 13 Pa. Superior Ct. 484 .

1905In Commonwealth v. McCann, 14 Pa. Superior Ct. 221 , affirmed in 198 Pa. 509 , we sustained a conviction under the act of 1899 where it appeared from the record of the alderman that the defendant sold oleomargarine duly marked as such, but “ colored' yellow by the addition thereto of analyne, a foreign substance but not injurious to health.” In neither of these cases did' the precise question which is now presented arise upon the record; both were cases of artificial coloration by the admixture of foreign substances which served that purpose only.

1900The act of' congress and the commerce clause of the United States constitution as related to an act of a state legislature containing provisions substantially the same as those contained in the Pennsylvania act of 1899 came under review in the case of Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461 ; 156 Mass. 236 .

1900We held in Commonwealth v. Vandyke, supra, following Plumley v. Massachusetts, supra, that such a regulation does not conflict with the commerce clause of the national constitution; and upon the principles recognized in Powell v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. 265 ; 127 U. S. 678 , Plumley v. Massachusetts and a multitude of other cases, it cannot be declared to be an infringement of the rights of the citizen secured by section 1, article 1 of the state constitution, or by the fourteenth amendment of the national constitution.

2022The City relied upon Lopez, supra (declaring a federal statute barring the possession of firearms in school zones unconstitutional, because Congress had regulated intrastate activity too-far removed from the stream of interstate commerce) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (declaring part of the Violence Against Women Act, 34 U.S.C. § 12361 , unconstitutional, because it criminalized intrastate activity).

2022The City relied upon Lopez, supra (declaring a federal statute barring the possession of firearms in school zones unconstitutional, because Congress had regulated intrastate activity too-far removed from the stream of interstate commerce) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (declaring part of the Violence Against Women Act, 34 U.S.C. § 12361 , unconstitutional, because it criminalized intrastate activity).

2022TitleMax of Delaware, Inc. v. Weissmann, 24 F.4th 230 (3d Cir., No. 21-1020, filed Jan. 24, 2022), rev’g, 505 F. Supp. 3d 353 (D.