147 New York opinions name it 15 courts 1892–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tamagni v. Tax Appeals Tribunalgreen2 sentences2023Although applying the internal consistency test is not the first step in the dormant [*3]Commerce Clause inquiry ( see Matter of Tamagni v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y. , 91 NY2d 530, 540 [1998], cert denied 525 US 931 [1998]), in light of this Court's holding in Walt Disney , we find it necessary to focus our examination only on the "fairly apportioned" prong of the dormant Commerce Clause test, which implicates the internal and external consistency tests. 2021"If there is no differential treatment of identifiable, similarly situated in-State and out-of-State interests, there is no dormant Commerce Clause violation" ( Matter of Tamagni v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y. , 91 NY2d at 539 ). | 4 | 7 |
Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Ore.green2 sentences2016Petitioner further asserts that the wage order violates the dormant Commerce Clause even if it is facially nondiscriminatory, but makes little effort to show how “the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits” (Pike v Bruce Church, Inc., 397 US 137, 142 [1970]; see Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v Department of Environmental Quality of Ore., 511 US 93, 99 [1994]; International Franchise Assn., Inc. v City of Seattle, 803 F3d at 405 ). 2016Petitioner further asserts that the wage order violates the dormant Commerce Clause even if it is facially nondiscriminatory, but makes little effort to show how “the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits” (Pike v Bruce Church, Inc., 397 US 137, 142 [1970]; see Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v Department of Environmental Quality of Ore., 511 US 93, 99 [1994]; International Franchise Assn., Inc. v City of Seattle, 803 F3d at 405 ). | 4 | 4 |
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.green2 sentences1995The general rule for determining the constitutionality of a State statute against a Commerce Clause challenge was clearly spelled out in Pike v Bruce Church, Inc. ( 397 US 137, 142 ): "Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits” (see also, Brown-Forman Distillers v New York Liq. 1995The general rule for determining the constitutionality of a State statute against a Commerce Clause challenge was clearly spelled out in Pike v Bruce Church, Inc. ( 397 US 137, 142 ): "Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits” (see also, Brown-Forman Distillers v New York Liq. | 2 | 5 |
International Franchise Ass'n v. City of Seattlegreen2 sentences2016Accordingly, “there is no differential treatment of identifiable, similarly situated in-[s]tate and out-of-[s]tate interests, [and] there is no dormant Commerce Clause violation” on the face of the wage order (Matter of Tamagni v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 91 NY2d 530, 539 [1998], cert denied 525 US 931 [1998]; see International Franchise Assn., Inc. v City of Seattle, 803 F3d 389, 400 [9th Cir 2015]; Matter of Pascazi v Gardner, 106 AD3d 1143, 1145 [2013], appeal dismissed 21 NY3d 1057 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 857 [2013]). 2016Accordingly, “there is no differential treatment of identifiable, similarly situated in-[s]tate and out-of-[s]tate interests, [and] there is no dormant Commerce Clause violation” on the face of the wage order (Matter of Tamagni v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 91 NY2d 530, 539 [1998], cert denied 525 US 931 [1998]; see International Franchise Assn., Inc. v City of Seattle, 803 F3d 389, 400 [9th Cir 2015]; Matter of Pascazi v Gardner, 106 AD3d 1143, 1145 [2013], appeal dismissed 21 NY3d 1057 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 857 [2013]). | 2 | 2 |
Pascazi v. Gardnergreen2 sentences2016Accordingly, “there is no differential treatment of identifiable, similarly situated in-[s]tate and out-of-[s]tate interests, [and] there is no dormant Commerce Clause violation” on the face of the wage order (Matter of Tamagni v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 91 NY2d 530, 539 [1998], cert denied 525 US 931 [1998]; see International Franchise Assn., Inc. v City of Seattle, 803 F3d 389, 400 [9th Cir 2015]; Matter of Pascazi v Gardner, 106 AD3d 1143, 1145 [2013], appeal dismissed 21 NY3d 1057 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 857 [2013]). 2016Accordingly, “there is no differential treatment of identifiable, similarly situated in-[s]tate and out-of-[s]tate interests, [and] there is no dormant Commerce Clause violation” on the face of the wage order (Matter of Tamagni v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 91 NY2d 530, 539 [1998], cert denied 525 US 931 [1998]; see International Franchise Assn., Inc. v City of Seattle, 803 F3d 389, 400 [9th Cir 2015]; Matter of Pascazi v Gardner, 106 AD3d 1143, 1145 [2013], appeal dismissed 21 NY3d 1057 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 857 [2013]). | 2 | 2 |
| Prudential Insurance v. Benjamingreen | 2 | 2 |
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Bradygreen2 sentences2016A state tax survives a Commerce Clause challenge “when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State” (Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v Brady, 430 US 274, 279 [1977]; see American Trucking Assns., Inc. v Schemer, 483 US 266, 295 [1987]). 2016A state tax survives a Commerce Clause challenge “when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State” (Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v Brady, 430 US 274, 279 [1977]; see American Trucking Assns., Inc. v Schemer, 483 US 266, 295 [1987]). | 1 | 9 |
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co.green2 sentences1951In short, there has been here demonstrated no unconstitutional burden upon, or regulation of, interstate commerce. *240 (See McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. , 309 U. S. 33, 45 , STONE, J.) Entirely apart from that, however, we are unable to agree that the commerce clause has any application to our problem. 1951(See McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33, 45 , Stone, J.) Entirely apart from that, however, we are unable to agree that the commerce clause has any application to our problem. | 1 | 5 |
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota Ex Rel. Heitkampred2 sentences2002A state tax survives a Commerce Clause challenge “when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State” (Complete Auto Tr., Inc. v Brady, 430 US 274, 279 ; see Quill Corp. v North Dakota By and Through Heitkamp, supra at 310-311). 2002A state tax survives a Commerce Clause challenge “when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State” (Complete Auto Tr., Inc. v Brady, 430 US 274, 279 ; see Quill Corp. v North Dakota By and Through Heitkamp, supra at 310-311). | 1 | 3 |
H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mondgreen2 sentences1983(Hood & Sons v Du Mond, 336 US 525, 531-532 .) In areas where there is apparent conflict between activities of legitimate local concern and national interest expressed by the commerce clause, the role of the courts, in the absence of congressional action, is to make a “delicate adjustment” of conflicting State and Federal claims. 1980For, as is true of the *675 privileges and immunities clause as well (US Const, art IV, § 2), the commerce clause was a primary tool in the framers’ conversion of the weak and failing central government the parochially oriented former colonies had maintained under the Articles of Confederation into a strong and united Nation under the Constitution (see Salla v County of Monroe, 48 NY2d 514, 520-521 ; Hood & Sons v Du Mond, 336 US 525, 533-534 ; Gibbons v Ogden, 9 Wheat [22 US] 1, 209; Madison, The Federalist Nos. 41, 42; Tribe, American Constitutional Law, p 319; Hall, Constitutional Law, p 28 | 1 | 3 |
McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co.green2 sentences1983The commerce clause is intended quite simply “to create an area of free trade among the several States” (McLeod v Dilworth Co., 322 US 327, 330 ). 1961Since the transaction here occurred in different cities but within the same State, no issue is presented under the commerce clause as to whether the discrimination constituted an undue burden on interstate commerce (cf. McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327, 330, 331 ; Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472, 480-482 ). | 1 | 3 |
The Minnesota Rate Casesgreen2 sentences1965Protection of life, health, safety and property is a local problem and primarily the function of the States (Bradley v. Public Utilities Comm., 289 U. S. 92 ) and the right on the part of the States in a field not occupied by Congress to protect the life, health and safety of its people is in no way inconsistent with the purpose of the commerce clause to place in Congress supreme control over interstate commerce, since the paramount authority of Congress always enables it to intervene in its discretion (Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 ; South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 1945And the fact that particular phases of an interstate business or activity have long been regulated or taxed by states has, been recognized as a strong reason why, in the continued absence of conflicting Congressional action, the state regulatory and tax laws should be declared valid.” It is now settled law that the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution does not ipso facto bar a sovereign State from adopting regulatory and protective measures of a reasonable character, in the interest of the health, safety, morals and welfare of its people, solely because interstate commerce may be involv | 1 | 3 |
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.green2 sentences2006However, in 1937, the United States Supreme Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act against a Commerce Clause challenge in NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. ( 301 US 1 [1937]). 2006However, in 1937, the United States Supreme Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act against a Commerce Clause challenge in NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. ( 301 US 1 [1937]). | 1 | 2 |
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authoritygreen2 sentences2002Auth. ( 476 US 573, 585 [1986]), “New York has a valid constitutional interest in regulating sales of liquor within the territory of New York.” Of course, “the [21st] Amendment does not license the States to ignore their obligations under other provisions of the Constitution” (Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v Crisp, 467 US 691, 712 [1984]; see Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 US at 584-585 [Commerce Clause challenge]). 2002Auth. ( 476 US 573, 585 [1986]), “New York has a valid constitutional interest in regulating sales of liquor within the territory of New York.” Of course, “the [21st] Amendment does not license the States to ignore their obligations under other provisions of the Constitution” (Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v Crisp, 467 US 691, 712 [1984]; see Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 US at 584-585 [Commerce Clause challenge]). | 1 | 2 |
International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury of State of Indianagreen2 sentences1986The case law is clear, however, that without proof of actual double taxation, the possibility of multistate sales or use taxation of a single transaction does not violate the commerce clause (Harvester Co. v Department of Treasury, supra, p 348; Matter of Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co. v Gerosa, 16 NY2d 1 , appeal dismissed 382 US 368 [and cases cited therein at pp 6-7]). 1975It is now well settled that the commerce clause does not prohibit the States from levying a tax on the transfer of property within the State (Harvester Co. v Department of Treasury, 322 US 340 , 348; cf. Freeman v Hewit, 329 US 249, 258 ). | 1 | 2 |
| Angldile Computing Scale Co. v. Gladstonegreen | 1 | 2 |
| United States v. Morrisongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Urbachgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| NATIONAL ASS'N OF OPTOMETRISTS & OPT. v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Henry v. Peguerogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Genger v. Gengergreen | 1 | 1 |
| American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheinergreen | 1 | 1 |
| D. H. Holmes Co., Ltd. v. McNamaragreen | 1 | 1 |
| Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crispgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Associated Industries of Mo. v. Lohmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Baby \Richard\"green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc.
green
2 sentences1983Seelig, Inc., 294 US 511, 522 , supra). 1983It was recognized there that: “If Louisiana were the only State to impose an additional tax burden for such out-of-state operations, the disparate treatment would be an incentive to locate within Louisiana; it would tend To neutralize advantages belonging to the place of origin.’ Baldwin v. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511, 527 . | 7 | 1940–1983 |
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn.
red
2 sentences1958Rates had long been subject to regulation in New York when, in 1944, the Supreme Court of the United States held in United States v. Underwriters Assn. ( 322 U. S. 533 ) that insurance companies conducting business transactions across State lines were subject to the regulatory power of Congress under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution (art. 1951Co. v. Benjamin , 328 U. S. 408, 414, 434 .) Then, in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn. ( 322 U. S. 533 ), the Supreme Court sustained an indictment against the insurance association under the Sherman Act, thereby holding that Congress under the commerce clause had the power to regulate the business of insurance, i. e., that insurance was commerce and, when it crossed State lines, interstate commerce. | 7 | 1945–1958 |
Hoeings v. Adams County
green
2 sentences2023Although applying the internal consistency test is not the first step in the dormant [*3]Commerce Clause inquiry ( see Matter of Tamagni v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y. , 91 NY2d 530, 540 [1998], cert denied 525 US 931 [1998]), in light of this Court's holding in Walt Disney , we find it necessary to focus our examination only on the "fairly apportioned" prong of the dormant Commerce Clause test, which implicates the internal and external consistency tests. 2016Accordingly, “there is no differential treatment of identifiable, similarly situated in-[s]tate and out-of-[s]tate interests, [and] there is no dormant Commerce Clause violation” on the face of the wage order (Matter of Tamagni v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 91 NY2d 530, 539 [1998], cert denied 525 US 931 [1998]; see International Franchise Assn., Inc. v City of Seattle, 803 F3d 389, 400 [9th Cir 2015]; Matter of Pascazi v Gardner, 106 AD3d 1143, 1145 [2013], appeal dismissed 21 NY3d 1057 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 857 [2013]). | 4 | 2000–2023 |
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences1980In my view and, that of my fellow dissenters, while the town's ordinance is not pre-empted by State law, it is in conflict with the commerce clause of the United States Constitution (art I, § 8), both "on its face and in its plain effect" ( Philadelphia v New Jersey , 437 US 617, 627 ). 1980Thereafter, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a New Jersey statute which prohibited the importation of most out-of-State wastes violated the commerce clause of the United States Constitution (City of Philadelphia v New Jersey, 437 US 617 ). | 4 | 1978–1980 |
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue
green
2 sentences1974"Gross annual receipts shall not include any taxes on services furnished by a cable television company imposed directly on any subscriber or user by any municipality, state, or other governmental unit and collected by the company for such governmental unit.” Gross annual receipts include only that income derived from operations within the State; the section does not violate the commerce clause (Western Live Stock v Bureau, 303 US 250 ; H & B Communications Corp. v Richland, 79 Wn2d 312). 1939As to claimant’s argument of additional taxation, it was said in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue (supra): “ It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the business.” Matter of Paul ( 165 N. Y. | 4 | 1939–1974 |
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison
green
2 sentences2000It has long been recognized, however, that the movement of persons across State lines is a form of commerce (see, Camps Newfound/Owatonna v Town of Harrison, 520 US 564, 573 , citing Edwards v California, 314 US 160, 172 ). 2000It has long been recognized, however, that the movement of persons across State lines is a form of commerce ( see, Camps Newfound/Owatonna v Town of Harrison, 520 US 564, 573 , citing Edwards v California, 314 US 160, 172 ). | 3 | 1998–2000 |
MTR. OF ATL. GULF & PAC. CO. v. Gerosa
green
2 sentences1986The case law is clear, however, that without proof of actual double taxation, the possibility of multistate sales or use taxation of a single transaction does not violate the commerce clause (Harvester Co. v Department of Treasury, supra, p 348; Matter of Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co. v Gerosa, 16 NY2d 1 , appeal dismissed 382 US 368 [and cases cited therein at pp 6-7]). 1984Although petitioner recognizes that New York’s sales and compensating use taxes generally are not an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce (Matter of Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co. v Gerosa, 16 NY2d 1 , app dsmd 382 US 368 ), it suggests that the use tax is unconstitutional in this instance because the airplane, having been utilized in interstate journeys both before and after being based in New York State, could no longer be subject to State use taxes. | 3 | 1979–1986 |
Toomer v. Witsell
green
2 sentences1981In its decision, the court Toomer v Witsell ( 334 US 385, 396 ) where it was said: “one of the privileges which the clause guarantees to citizens of State A is that of doing business in State B on terms of substantial equality with the citizens of that State.” ANALYSIS Prior to the Gordon decision, the effect of the interplay of CPLR 9406 (subd 2) and section 470 of the Judiciary Law was that an applicant had to be an actual resident of the State for at least six months immediately preceding admission. 1975The commerce clause, of course, imposes additional limitations on the States’ taxing powers and "restrictions inimical to the commerce clause should not be approved simply because they facilitate in some measure enforcement of a valid tax” (Toomer v Witsell, 334 US 385, 406 ). | 3 | 1975–1981 |
SC Hwy. Dept. v. Barnwell Bros.
green
2 sentences1965Protection of life, health, safety and property is a local problem and primarily the function of the States (Bradley v. Public Utilities Comm., 289 U. S. 92 ) and the right on the part of the States in a field not occupied by Congress to protect the life, health and safety of its people is in no way inconsistent with the purpose of the commerce clause to place in Congress supreme control over interstate commerce, since the paramount authority of Congress always enables it to intervene in its discretion (Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 ; South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 1953Dept. v. Barnwell Bros, 303 U. S. 177 ; Duckworth v. Arkansas, 201 Ark. 1123 , affd. 314 U. S. 390 ; California v. Zook, 336 U. S. 725, 735 ; Aero Tr. | 3 | 1941–1965 |
People v. Galindo
neutral
2 sentences2016Accordingly, “there is no differential treatment of identifiable, similarly situated in-[s]tate and out-of-[s]tate interests, [and] there is no dormant Commerce Clause violation” on the face of the wage order (Matter of Tamagni v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 91 NY2d 530, 539 [1998], cert denied 525 US 931 [1998]; see International Franchise Assn., Inc. v City of Seattle, 803 F3d 389, 400 [9th Cir 2015]; Matter of Pascazi v Gardner, 106 AD3d 1143, 1145 [2013], appeal dismissed 21 NY3d 1057 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 857 [2013]). 2016Accordingly, “there is no differential treatment of identifiable, similarly situated in-[s]tate and out-of-[s]tate interests, [and] there is no dormant Commerce Clause violation” on the face of the wage order (Matter of Tamagni v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 91 NY2d 530, 539 [1998], cert denied 525 US 931 [1998]; see International Franchise Assn., Inc. v City of Seattle, 803 F3d 389, 400 [9th Cir 2015]; Matter of Pascazi v Gardner, 106 AD3d 1143, 1145 [2013], appeal dismissed 21 NY3d 1057 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 857 [2013]). | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query
green
2 sentences2001Indeed, the Attorney General points to Public Service Commission documents that show, for the tax period in question, unregulated sellers served only 4,000 small customers (see, New York State Public Service Commission, Department of Public Service, 1995-1996 Annual Report, at 13). 6 Tennessee’s submissions do not convince us that sales of gas subject to sections 186 and 186-a pass-through taxes as compared to unregulated sales establish the “ ‘substantial distinctions and real injuries’ ” necessary in a Commerce Clause challenge (Associated Indus. v Lohman, 511 US 641, 654 [quoting Gregg Dyei 2001Indeed, the Attorney General points to Public Service Commission documents that show, for the tax period in question, unregulated sellers served only 4,000 small customers (see, New York State Public Service Commission, Department of Public Service, 1995-1996 Annual Report, at 13). 6 Tennessee’s submissions do not convince us that sales of gas subject to sections 186 and 186-a pass-through taxes as compared to unregulated sales establish the “ ‘substantial distinctions and real injuries’ ” necessary in a Commerce Clause challenge (Associated Indus. v Lohman, 511 US 641, 654 [quoting Gregg Dyei | 2 | 1961–2001 |
Edwards v. California
green
2 sentences2000It has long been recognized, however, that the movement of persons across State lines is a form of commerce (see, Camps Newfound/Owatonna v Town of Harrison, 520 US 564, 573 , citing Edwards v California, 314 US 160, 172 ). 2000It has long been recognized, however, that the movement of persons across State lines is a form of commerce ( see, Camps Newfound/Owatonna v Town of Harrison, 520 US 564, 573 , citing Edwards v California, 314 US 160, 172 ). | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board
green
2 sentences1997This does not end our inquiry since this case involves Canadian trucking corporations, thereby implicating the Foreign Commerce Clause (US Const, art I, § 8) which requires us to determine if the challenged tax exposes plaintiffs to an enhanced risk of multiple taxation and impairs Federal uniformity in an area where Federal uniformity is essential (see, Container Corp. v Franchise Tax Bd., 463 US 159, 185-186 ). 1986In a similar vein, the Supreme Court has recognized that, despite the commerce clause, a State can properly require a corporation to file a combined report when the corporation and a foreign corporation were involved in a unitary business (see, Container Corp. v Franchise Tax Bd., 463 US 159 ). | 2 | 1986–1997 |
Goldberg v. Sweet
green
2 sentences1995Bellas Hess itself, in requiring the vendor's physical presence, explicitly stated that it was applying a definite link or minimum connection requirement, which was the then prevailing nexus standard for both Due Process and Commerce Clause analysis in interstate commerce taxation cases (see , 386 US, at 756-757 , supra) . *177 Surely as a matter of simple logic and semantics, the Supreme Court was not applying a substantial physical presence requirement when it upheld the State tax on the in-State activity of the interstate vendor in the following cases: Felt & Tarrant Co. v Gallagher ( 306 U 1991Complete Auto Tr. v Brady ( 430 US 274 ) allows a tax over a Commerce Clause challenge if the tax (1) is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State; (2) is fairly apportioned; (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) is fairly related to the services provided by the State (id., at 279; Goldberg v Sweet, 488 US 252, 266-267 ). | 2 | 1991–1995 |
General Motors Corp. v. Washington
green
2 sentences1995Co. v Bair, 437 US 267 ; General Motors v Washington, 377 US 436 ; accord, Nelson v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 US 359 ; Nelson v Montgomery Ward, 312 US 373 [no Commerce Clause violation where sellers maintained local retail stores in taxing State]). 1995Co. v Bair , 437 US 267 ; General Motors v Washington , 377 US 436 ; accord , Nelson v Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 312 US 359 ; Nelson v Montgomery Ward , 312 US 373 [no Commerce Clause violation where sellers maintained local retail stores in taxing State]). | 2 | 1982–1995 |
Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co. v. Gerosa
green
2 sentences1986The case law is clear, however, that without proof of actual double taxation, the possibility of multistate sales or use taxation of a single transaction does not violate the commerce clause (Harvester Co. v Department of Treasury, supra, p 348; Matter of Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co. v Gerosa, 16 NY2d 1 , appeal dismissed 382 US 368 [and cases cited therein at pp 6-7]). 1984Although petitioner recognizes that New York’s sales and compensating use taxes generally are not an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce (Matter of Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co. v Gerosa, 16 NY2d 1 , app dsmd 382 US 368 ), it suggests that the use tax is unconstitutional in this instance because the airplane, having been utilized in interstate journeys both before and after being based in New York State, could no longer be subject to State use taxes. | 2 | 1984–1986 |
| Maryland v. Louisiana green | 2 | 1983–1985 |
| Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter green | 2 | 1976–1984 |
| Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter green | 2 | 1976–1984 |
| Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter green | 2 | 1976–1984 |
| Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone green | 2 | 1953–1983 |
| Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota green | 2 | 1982–1983 |
| Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily green | 2 | 1983–1983 |
| Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission green | 2 | 1983–1983 |
| Dutchess Sanitation Service, Inc. v. Town of Plattekill green | 2 | 1980–1981 |
| In re Gordon green | 2 | 1979–1981 |
| Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Improvement Commission green | 2 | 1975–1979 |
| McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. green | 2 | 1948–1979 |
| Hicklin v. Orbeck green | 2 | 1978–1979 |
| Danforth v. Rodgers green | 2 | 1975–1979 |
| Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products green | 2 | 1945–1977 |
| State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young's Market Co. green | 2 | 1965–1976 |
| New York Ex Rel. Hatch v. Reardon green | 2 | 1910–1975 |
| O'Kane v. State of New York green | 2 | 1945–1975 |
| Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant green | 2 | 1926–1960 |
| Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. green | 2 | 1956–1958 |
| Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford green | 2 | 1940–1954 |
| Second Employers'liability Cases green | 2 | 1915–1954 |
| Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District green | 2 | 1906–1953 |
| Parker v. Brown green | 2 | 1945–1945 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.