commerce clause (Delaware) · Go Syfert
← Delaware issues

commerce clause in Delaware

8 Delaware opinions name it 4 courts 1948–2018 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

CaseFollowedCited
Midwest Title Loans, Inc. v. Millsgreen
ca7 · 2010 · cited in 1 Delaware opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
1 sentence

2018Petitioners have failed to provide a case, and the Court has failed to find such a case, where the commerce clause was applied to an arbitrator’s choice-of-law decision. ln fact, the case Petitioners rely on, i\,’l.irf.w.c'.\'! 771/6 Loam, Iac. a Mz`//.t, notes_in the context of a state statute requiring state licensing if a territorial component to the lending occurred_that the commerce clause does not prevent a choice-of-law analysis. 566 593 F.3d 660, 668 (7th Cir. 2010).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (14)

CaseCitedYears
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. green
scotus · 1970
2 sentences

1991While this has not been raised as a consideration in determining the constitutionality of the application of the Delaware Lemon Law in this case, it does indicate absence of unequal treatment. 2 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 , 90 S.Ct. 844 , 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970) balanced state regulation versus the commerce clause in a realistic context which applies to the present case.

1991While this has not been raised as a consideration in determining the constitutionality of the application of the Delaware Lemon Law in this case, it does indicate absence of unequal treatment. 2 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 , 90 S.Ct. 844 , 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970) balanced state regulation versus the commerce clause in a realistic context which applies to the present case.

21987–1991
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia green
scotus · 1954
2 sentences

1959In my opinion, however, this is not such a case, the statute here under attack not adapting itself to any of the recently devised state tax schemes for levying taxes from persons doing an interstate business which have met the approval of the Supreme Court (compare Railway Express Agency v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 , 74 S.Ct. 558 , 98 L.Ed. 337 ) which is understandable in view of the fact that the essential provisions of the statute date from 1909.

1959In my opinion, however, this is not such a case, the statute here under attack not adapting itself to any of the recently devised state tax schemes for levying taxes from persons doing an interstate business which have met the approval of the Supreme Court (compare Railway Express Agency v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 , 74 S.Ct. 558 , 98 L.Ed. 337 ) which is understandable in view of the fact that the essential provisions of the statute date from 1909.

21959–1959
Georgia v. United States green
scotus · 1958
2 sentences

1959While defendant concedes that the tax in question is not applicable to plaintiff unless it is a property tax, it must be noted that substantial tax inroads by the states into the intrastate ownership and activities of what had once been considered interstate businesses protected by the Commerce clause have been countenanced where such taxes are designed so as to overcome the objection that they compel a taxpayer to pay for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. State of Minnesota, supra, and Railway Express Agency v. Commonwealth of Virgini

1959While defendant concedes that the tax in question is not applicable to plaintiff unless it is a property tax, it must be noted that substantial tax inroads by the states into the intrastate ownership and activities of what had once been considered interstate businesses protected by the Commerce clause have been countenanced where such taxes are designed so as to overcome the objection that they compel a taxpayer to pay for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. State of Minnesota, supra, and Railway Express Agency v. Commonwealth of Virgini

21959–1959
Barsky v. Board of Regents of the University of New York green
scotus · 1953
2 sentences

1959In my opinion, however, this is not such a case, the statute here under attack not adapting itself to any of the recently devised state tax schemes for levying taxes from persons doing an interstate business which have met the approval of the Supreme Court (compare Railway Express Agency v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 , 74 S.Ct. 558 , 98 L.Ed. 337 ) which is understandable in view of the fact that the essential provisions of the statute date from 1909.

1959In my opinion, however, this is not such a case, the statute here under attack not adapting itself to any of the recently devised state tax schemes for levying taxes from persons doing an interstate business which have met the approval of the Supreme Court (compare Railway Express Agency v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 , 74 S.Ct. 558 , 98 L.Ed. 337 ) which is understandable in view of the fact that the essential provisions of the statute date from 1909.

21959–1959
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia neutral
scotus · 1958
2 sentences

1959While defendant concedes that the tax in question is not applicable to plaintiff unless it is a property tax, it must be noted that substantial tax inroads by the states into the intrastate ownership and activities of what had once been considered interstate businesses protected by the Commerce clause have been countenanced where such taxes are designed so as to overcome the objection that they compel a taxpayer to pay for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. State of Minnesota, supra, and Railway Express Agency v. Commonwealth of Virgini

1959While defendant concedes that the tax in question is not applicable to plaintiff unless it is a property tax, it must be noted that substantial tax inroads by the states into the intrastate ownership and activities of what had once been considered interstate businesses protected by the Commerce clause have been countenanced where such taxes are designed so as to overcome the objection that they compel a taxpayer to pay for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. State of Minnesota, supra, and Railway Express Agency v. Commonwealth of Virgini

21959–1959
Williams v. Lee green
scotus · 1958
2 sentences

1959While defendant concedes that the tax in question is not applicable to plaintiff unless it is a property tax, it must be noted that substantial tax inroads by the states into the intrastate ownership and activities of what had once been considered interstate businesses protected by the Commerce clause have been countenanced where such taxes are designed so as to overcome the objection that they compel a taxpayer to pay for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. State of Minnesota, supra, and Railway Express Agency v. Commonwealth of Virgini

1959While defendant concedes that the tax in question is not applicable to plaintiff unless it is a property tax, it must be noted that substantial tax inroads by the states into the intrastate ownership and activities of what had once been considered interstate businesses protected by the Commerce clause have been countenanced where such taxes are designed so as to overcome the objection that they compel a taxpayer to pay for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. State of Minnesota, supra, and Railway Express Agency v. Commonwealth of Virgini

21959–1959
cluster 678506 green
ca3 · 1994
2 sentences

2018In fact, the Third Circuit has noted that a party’s agreement to be bound by another state’s laws is distinct from cases in which the State has violated the commerce clause. 566 Imz‘mcl‘z`oaa/ 5}/5. a Cowpalw“ Cam'ra/am Co)]j., 35 F.3d 813 , 825-26 (3d Cir. 1994).

2018In fact, the Third Circuit has noted that a party’s agreement to be bound by another state’s laws is distinct from cases in which the State has violated the commerce clause. 566 Imz‘mcl‘z`oaa/ 5}/5. a Cowpalw“ Cam'ra/am Co)]j., 35 F.3d 813 , 825-26 (3d Cir. 1994).

12018–2018
Coons v. American Honda Motor Co. green
nj · 1983
2 sentences

1988Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., 94 N.J. 307 , 463 A.2d 921 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1123 , 105 S.Ct. 808 , 83 L.Ed.2d 800 (1985).

1988Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., 94 N.J. 307 , 463 A.2d 921 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1123 , 105 S.Ct. 808 , 83 L.Ed.2d 800 (1985).

11988–1988
Honda Motor Company, Ltd. v. Walter P. Coons green
scotus · 1985
2 sentences

1988Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., 94 N.J. 307 , 463 A.2d 921 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1123 , 105 S.Ct. 808 , 83 L.Ed.2d 800 (1985).

1988Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., 94 N.J. 307 , 463 A.2d 921 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1123 , 105 S.Ct. 808 , 83 L.Ed.2d 800 (1985).

11988–1988
Edgar v. Mite Corp. green
scotus · 1982
2 sentences

1987In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 , 102 S.Ct. 2629 , 73 L.Ed.2d 269 (1982), the Supreme Court ruled that under the commerce clause a state “has no interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations.” Id. at 645-46 , 102 S.Ct. at 2642 .

1987In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 , 102 S.Ct. 2629 , 73 L.Ed.2d 269 (1982), the Supreme Court ruled that under the commerce clause a state “has no interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations.” Id. at 645-46 , 102 S.Ct. at 2642 .

11987–1987
Natural Gas Pipe Line Co. of America v. Panoma Corp. green
okla · 1953
1 sentence

1959Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Panoma Corp., Okl., 271 P. 2d 354 .

11959–1959
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co v. Wells green
scotus · 1924
2 sentences

1948Co. v. Wells, 265 U. S. 101 , 44 S.Ct. 469 , 68 L.Ed. 928 ; Michigan Central R.

1948Co. v. Wells, 265 U. S. 101 , 44 S.Ct. 469 , 68 L.Ed. 928 ; Michigan Central R.

11948–1948
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad v. Terte green
scotus · 1932
2 sentences

1948Co. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284 , 52 S.Ct. 152, 153 , 76 L.Ed. 295 , supra, the Su preme Court “held that the constitutional limitation upon state court jurisdiction originating in the commerce clause should apply whether the action was commenced by summons or attachment,” quoting the following jfrom the opinion: “The prohibition against burdening interstate commerce cannot * * * be evaded merely by attaching the property of the non-resident railroad corporation.

1948Co. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284 , 52 S.Ct. 152, 153 , 76 L.Ed. 295 , supra, the Su preme Court “held that the constitutional limitation upon state court jurisdiction originating in the commerce clause should apply whether the action was commenced by summons or attachment,” quoting the following jfrom the opinion: “The prohibition against burdening interstate commerce cannot * * * be evaded merely by attaching the property of the non-resident railroad corporation.

11948–1948
Davis v. Farmers Co-Operative Equity Co. green
scotus · 1923
2 sentences

1948Next, petitioner argues that “state jurisdictional statutes, like Section 4631 here, whereby states attempted to exercise jurisdiction over foreign corporations actively engaged in interstate commerce upon foreign causes of action” have been held violative of the commerce clause “wherever it could factually be shown, as in the present case, that the exercise of jurisdiction, in fact, would substantially impair the efficiency of the petitioner’s operations in interstate commerce”, citing Davis v. Farmers’ Co-operative Co., 262 U. S. 312 , 43 S.Ct. 556 , 67 L.Ed. 996 ; Atchinson, T. & S. F. Ry.

1948Next, petitioner argues that “state jurisdictional statutes, like Section 4631 here, whereby states attempted to exercise jurisdiction over foreign corporations actively engaged in interstate commerce upon foreign causes of action” have been held violative of the commerce clause “wherever it could factually be shown, as in the present case, that the exercise of jurisdiction, in fact, would substantially impair the efficiency of the petitioner’s operations in interstate commerce”, citing Davis v. Farmers’ Co-operative Co., 262 U. S. 312 , 43 S.Ct. 556 , 67 L.Ed. 996 ; Atchinson, T. & S. F. Ry.

11948–1948

Where else courts name it

CA 229 (1914–2025) NY 147 (1892–2026) IL 136 (1893–2024) WA 125 (1906–2025) PA 88 (1900–2024) NJ 82 (1905–2023) TX 77 (1884–2024) MA 70 (1912–2022) AL 60 (1914–2025) FL 55 (1894–2016) KS 51 (1892–2019) MI 50 (1918–2023) LA 48 (1892–2011) IN 42 (1908–2015) MN 40 (1911–2026) MO 39 (1901–2023) AR 36 (1892–2007) OR 36 (1900–2025) IA 35 (1882–2015) WI 35 (1929–2011) GA 33 (1909–2006) WV 33 (1903–2023) OH 33 (1910–2024) NC 32 (1812–2025) OK 31 (1911–2020) MD 29 (1899–2026) TN 29 (1900–2025) VA 29 (1851–2018) CT 28 (1952–2019) NM 26 (1931–2019) MS 25 (1917–2018) AK 23 (1975–2025) KY 21 (1907–2016) ME 20 (1901–2026) AZ 20 (1953–2019) CO 19 (1962–2016) HI 18 (1903–2025) NE 18 (1904–2005) NH 17 (1909–2020) UT 16 (1908–2025) VT 14 (1916–2024) SC 12 (1906–2018) RI 11 (1925–2009) PR 11 (1912–2012) MT 11 (1931–2000) WY 10 (1972–2011) ID 10 (1897–2010) SD 9 (1908–1985) DC 9 (1974–2023) ND 9 (1894–2003) DE 8 (1948–2018) NV 5 (1952–2017) VI 2 (2011–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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