8 Delaware opinions name it 4 courts 1948–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Midwest Title Loans, Inc. v. Millsgreen1 sentence2018Petitioners have failed to provide a case, and the Court has failed to find such a case, where the commerce clause was applied to an arbitrator’s choice-of-law decision. ln fact, the case Petitioners rely on, i\,’l.irf.w.c'.\'! 771/6 Loam, Iac. a Mz`//.t, notes_in the context of a state statute requiring state licensing if a territorial component to the lending occurred_that the commerce clause does not prevent a choice-of-law analysis. 566 593 F.3d 660, 668 (7th Cir. 2010). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.
green
2 sentences1991While this has not been raised as a consideration in determining the constitutionality of the application of the Delaware Lemon Law in this case, it does indicate absence of unequal treatment. 2 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 , 90 S.Ct. 844 , 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970) balanced state regulation versus the commerce clause in a realistic context which applies to the present case. 1991While this has not been raised as a consideration in determining the constitutionality of the application of the Delaware Lemon Law in this case, it does indicate absence of unequal treatment. 2 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 , 90 S.Ct. 844 , 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970) balanced state regulation versus the commerce clause in a realistic context which applies to the present case. | 2 | 1987–1991 |
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia
green
2 sentences1959In my opinion, however, this is not such a case, the statute here under attack not adapting itself to any of the recently devised state tax schemes for levying taxes from persons doing an interstate business which have met the approval of the Supreme Court (compare Railway Express Agency v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 , 74 S.Ct. 558 , 98 L.Ed. 337 ) which is understandable in view of the fact that the essential provisions of the statute date from 1909. 1959In my opinion, however, this is not such a case, the statute here under attack not adapting itself to any of the recently devised state tax schemes for levying taxes from persons doing an interstate business which have met the approval of the Supreme Court (compare Railway Express Agency v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 , 74 S.Ct. 558 , 98 L.Ed. 337 ) which is understandable in view of the fact that the essential provisions of the statute date from 1909. | 2 | 1959–1959 |
Georgia v. United States
green
2 sentences1959While defendant concedes that the tax in question is not applicable to plaintiff unless it is a property tax, it must be noted that substantial tax inroads by the states into the intrastate ownership and activities of what had once been considered interstate businesses protected by the Commerce clause have been countenanced where such taxes are designed so as to overcome the objection that they compel a taxpayer to pay for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. State of Minnesota, supra, and Railway Express Agency v. Commonwealth of Virgini 1959While defendant concedes that the tax in question is not applicable to plaintiff unless it is a property tax, it must be noted that substantial tax inroads by the states into the intrastate ownership and activities of what had once been considered interstate businesses protected by the Commerce clause have been countenanced where such taxes are designed so as to overcome the objection that they compel a taxpayer to pay for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. State of Minnesota, supra, and Railway Express Agency v. Commonwealth of Virgini | 2 | 1959–1959 |
Barsky v. Board of Regents of the University of New York
green
2 sentences1959In my opinion, however, this is not such a case, the statute here under attack not adapting itself to any of the recently devised state tax schemes for levying taxes from persons doing an interstate business which have met the approval of the Supreme Court (compare Railway Express Agency v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 , 74 S.Ct. 558 , 98 L.Ed. 337 ) which is understandable in view of the fact that the essential provisions of the statute date from 1909. 1959In my opinion, however, this is not such a case, the statute here under attack not adapting itself to any of the recently devised state tax schemes for levying taxes from persons doing an interstate business which have met the approval of the Supreme Court (compare Railway Express Agency v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 , 74 S.Ct. 558 , 98 L.Ed. 337 ) which is understandable in view of the fact that the essential provisions of the statute date from 1909. | 2 | 1959–1959 |
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia
neutral
2 sentences1959While defendant concedes that the tax in question is not applicable to plaintiff unless it is a property tax, it must be noted that substantial tax inroads by the states into the intrastate ownership and activities of what had once been considered interstate businesses protected by the Commerce clause have been countenanced where such taxes are designed so as to overcome the objection that they compel a taxpayer to pay for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. State of Minnesota, supra, and Railway Express Agency v. Commonwealth of Virgini 1959While defendant concedes that the tax in question is not applicable to plaintiff unless it is a property tax, it must be noted that substantial tax inroads by the states into the intrastate ownership and activities of what had once been considered interstate businesses protected by the Commerce clause have been countenanced where such taxes are designed so as to overcome the objection that they compel a taxpayer to pay for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. State of Minnesota, supra, and Railway Express Agency v. Commonwealth of Virgini | 2 | 1959–1959 |
Williams v. Lee
green
2 sentences1959While defendant concedes that the tax in question is not applicable to plaintiff unless it is a property tax, it must be noted that substantial tax inroads by the states into the intrastate ownership and activities of what had once been considered interstate businesses protected by the Commerce clause have been countenanced where such taxes are designed so as to overcome the objection that they compel a taxpayer to pay for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. State of Minnesota, supra, and Railway Express Agency v. Commonwealth of Virgini 1959While defendant concedes that the tax in question is not applicable to plaintiff unless it is a property tax, it must be noted that substantial tax inroads by the states into the intrastate ownership and activities of what had once been considered interstate businesses protected by the Commerce clause have been countenanced where such taxes are designed so as to overcome the objection that they compel a taxpayer to pay for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. State of Minnesota, supra, and Railway Express Agency v. Commonwealth of Virgini | 2 | 1959–1959 |
cluster 678506
green
2 sentences2018In fact, the Third Circuit has noted that a party’s agreement to be bound by another state’s laws is distinct from cases in which the State has violated the commerce clause. 566 Imz‘mcl‘z`oaa/ 5}/5. a Cowpalw“ Cam'ra/am Co)]j., 35 F.3d 813 , 825-26 (3d Cir. 1994). 2018In fact, the Third Circuit has noted that a party’s agreement to be bound by another state’s laws is distinct from cases in which the State has violated the commerce clause. 566 Imz‘mcl‘z`oaa/ 5}/5. a Cowpalw“ Cam'ra/am Co)]j., 35 F.3d 813 , 825-26 (3d Cir. 1994). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Coons v. American Honda Motor Co.
green
2 sentences1988Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., 94 N.J. 307 , 463 A.2d 921 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1123 , 105 S.Ct. 808 , 83 L.Ed.2d 800 (1985). 1988Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., 94 N.J. 307 , 463 A.2d 921 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1123 , 105 S.Ct. 808 , 83 L.Ed.2d 800 (1985). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Honda Motor Company, Ltd. v. Walter P. Coons
green
2 sentences1988Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., 94 N.J. 307 , 463 A.2d 921 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1123 , 105 S.Ct. 808 , 83 L.Ed.2d 800 (1985). 1988Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., 94 N.J. 307 , 463 A.2d 921 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1123 , 105 S.Ct. 808 , 83 L.Ed.2d 800 (1985). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Edgar v. Mite Corp.
green
2 sentences1987In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 , 102 S.Ct. 2629 , 73 L.Ed.2d 269 (1982), the Supreme Court ruled that under the commerce clause a state “has no interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations.” Id. at 645-46 , 102 S.Ct. at 2642 . 1987In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 , 102 S.Ct. 2629 , 73 L.Ed.2d 269 (1982), the Supreme Court ruled that under the commerce clause a state “has no interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations.” Id. at 645-46 , 102 S.Ct. at 2642 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Natural Gas Pipe Line Co. of America v. Panoma Corp.
green
1 sentence1959Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Panoma Corp., Okl., 271 P. 2d 354 . | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co v. Wells
green
2 sentences1948Co. v. Wells, 265 U. S. 101 , 44 S.Ct. 469 , 68 L.Ed. 928 ; Michigan Central R. 1948Co. v. Wells, 265 U. S. 101 , 44 S.Ct. 469 , 68 L.Ed. 928 ; Michigan Central R. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad v. Terte
green
2 sentences1948Co. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284 , 52 S.Ct. 152, 153 , 76 L.Ed. 295 , supra, the Su preme Court “held that the constitutional limitation upon state court jurisdiction originating in the commerce clause should apply whether the action was commenced by summons or attachment,” quoting the following jfrom the opinion: “The prohibition against burdening interstate commerce cannot * * * be evaded merely by attaching the property of the non-resident railroad corporation. 1948Co. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284 , 52 S.Ct. 152, 153 , 76 L.Ed. 295 , supra, the Su preme Court “held that the constitutional limitation upon state court jurisdiction originating in the commerce clause should apply whether the action was commenced by summons or attachment,” quoting the following jfrom the opinion: “The prohibition against burdening interstate commerce cannot * * * be evaded merely by attaching the property of the non-resident railroad corporation. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Davis v. Farmers Co-Operative Equity Co.
green
2 sentences1948Next, petitioner argues that “state jurisdictional statutes, like Section 4631 here, whereby states attempted to exercise jurisdiction over foreign corporations actively engaged in interstate commerce upon foreign causes of action” have been held violative of the commerce clause “wherever it could factually be shown, as in the present case, that the exercise of jurisdiction, in fact, would substantially impair the efficiency of the petitioner’s operations in interstate commerce”, citing Davis v. Farmers’ Co-operative Co., 262 U. S. 312 , 43 S.Ct. 556 , 67 L.Ed. 996 ; Atchinson, T. & S. F. Ry. 1948Next, petitioner argues that “state jurisdictional statutes, like Section 4631 here, whereby states attempted to exercise jurisdiction over foreign corporations actively engaged in interstate commerce upon foreign causes of action” have been held violative of the commerce clause “wherever it could factually be shown, as in the present case, that the exercise of jurisdiction, in fact, would substantially impair the efficiency of the petitioner’s operations in interstate commerce”, citing Davis v. Farmers’ Co-operative Co., 262 U. S. 312 , 43 S.Ct. 556 , 67 L.Ed. 996 ; Atchinson, T. & S. F. Ry. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.