commerce clause in Alaska

1988In fact, these two constitutional limits overlap to a great extent.” Arco, 705 P.2d at 432 (quoting Sjong v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 622 P.2d 967, 973 (Alaska 1981), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1131 , 102 S.Ct. 986 , 71 L.Ed.2d 284 (1982)).

1984Arguing that the “Department [of Revenue] has refused to apportion the tax so as to distinguish between intrastate and interstate activities”, Alyeska alleges a commerce clause violation. 11 In response, the Department cites Sjong v. State, Department of Revenue, 622 P.2d 967, 975 (Alaska 1981): 12 The purpose of apportionment is to ensure that only activities within the taxing state are subject to taxation.

2025I, § 8, cl. 3. 25 Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 588 U.S. 504, 514 (2019) (citing New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988)).

2016These claims are unsubstantiated, and in light 19 (...continued) 2000). 20 See, e.g., New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278-80 (1988). -9- 1602 of the indisputable legal basis for the dismissal of Daniels’s ADEA and ADA claims and his failure to explain his Commerce Clause claim, no reasonable person could assign improper bias to the ultimate result in this case.

1996See id. at 323 , 99 S.Ct. at 1729 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 254 .' The Court struck down the statute as vio-lative of the commerce clause.

1996See id. at 323 , 99 S.Ct. at 1729 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 254 .' The Court struck down the statute as vio-lative of the commerce clause.

1976Hence an assurance by the State Department, even if believed, might carry little weight with foreign powers should any uncertainty exist as to whether a third power might be able to notify and set the Article 5 machinery in motion. [12] The majority relies on Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199 , 81 S.Ct. 929 , 6 L.Ed.2d 227 (1961), to show local importance under the commerce clause, and seems to appeal to this argument under its balancing test when considering foreign affairs.

1976Hence an assurance by the State Department, even if believed, might carry little weight with foreign powers should any uncertainty exist as to whether a third power might be able to notify and set the Article 5 machinery in motion. [12] The majority relies on Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199 , 81 S.Ct. 929 , 6 L.Ed.2d 227 (1961), to show local importance under the commerce clause, and seems to appeal to this argument under its balancing test when considering foreign affairs.

1988Generally, a state tax does not violate the commerce clause if it satisfies the due process requirements of nexus and fair apportionment, and if it “does not discriminate against interstate commerce and is fairly related to the services provided by the State.” Arco, 705 P.2d at 432 (quoting Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 , 97 S.Ct. 1076, 1079 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326, 331 (1977)).

1988Generally, a state tax does not violate the commerce clause if it satisfies the due process requirements of nexus and fair apportionment, and if it “does not discriminate against interstate commerce and is fairly related to the services provided by the State.” Arco, 705 P.2d at 432 (quoting Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 , 97 S.Ct. 1076, 1079 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326, 331 (1977)).

1979As a theoretical matter, then, to rehabilitate the “home port doctrine” as a tool of Commerce Clause analysis would be somewhat odd. -U.S. ---, 99 S.Ct. at 1819 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 343-44 (footnote omitted). 1 Based on the foregoing we conclude that the home port doctrine is no longer good law. 2 There remain for consideration the appellees’ due process and equal protection arguments.

1979As a theoretical matter, then, to rehabilitate the “home port doctrine” as a tool of Commerce Clause analysis would be somewhat odd. -U.S. ---, 99 S.Ct. at 1819 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 343-44 (footnote omitted). 1 Based on the foregoing we conclude that the home port doctrine is no longer good law. 2 There remain for consideration the appellees’ due process and equal protection arguments.

2025While the opinion was “fractured” over the state of the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause analysis, at least six justices still agreed to “affirmatively retain the longstanding Pike balancing test for analyzing dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state economic regulations.” Id. at 403 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). - 12 - 2116 “to put more fish in the rivers for the PU fishery and thereby increase the harvest in the PU fishery.” But CIFF’s reasoning stretches the dormant Commerce Clause too far.

2025I, § 8, cl. 3. 25 Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 588 U.S. 504, 514 (2019) (citing New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988)).

2022Our inquiry, then, must center on whether . . . [the] law regulates commerce in other States.”); see also id. at 583 (considering “practical effects” of law at issue). 71 Nabors points to Wyoming v. Oklahoma, in which the Court stated: “The volume of commerce affected measures only the extent of the discrimination; it is of no relevance to the determination whether a State has discriminated against interstate commerce.” 502 U.S. 437, 455 (1992) (emphasis omitted).

2022Our inquiry, then, must center on whether . . . [the] law regulates commerce in other States.”); see also id. at 583 (considering “practical effects” of law at issue). 71 Nabors points to Wyoming v. Oklahoma, in which the Court stated: “The volume of commerce affected measures only the extent of the discrimination; it is of no relevance to the determination whether a State has discriminated against interstate commerce.” 502 U.S. 437, 455 (1992) (emphasis omitted).

2022The superior court pointed to the United States Supreme Court’s consideration of a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to California’s worldwide combined reporting scheme for corporate income tax in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California.75 In that case the petitioner asserted that requiring foreign-owned enterprises to file a California tax return was a “prohibitive administrative burden” constituting discrimination against foreign commerce.76 The Court acknowledged that “[c]ompliance burdens, if disproportionately imposed on out-of-jurisdiction enterprises, may indeed be incons

2022The superior court pointed to the United States Supreme Court’s consideration of a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to California’s worldwide combined reporting scheme for corporate income tax in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California.75 In that case the petitioner asserted that requiring foreign-owned enterprises to file a California tax return was a “prohibitive administrative burden” constituting discrimination against foreign commerce.76 The Court acknowledged that “[c]ompliance burdens, if disproportionately imposed on out-of-jurisdiction enterprises, may indeed be incons

2022The superior court pointed to the United States Supreme Court’s consideration of a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to California’s worldwide combined reporting scheme for corporate income tax in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California.75 In that case the petitioner asserted that requiring foreign-owned enterprises to file a California tax return was a “prohibitive administrative burden” constituting discrimination against foreign commerce.76 The Court acknowledged that “[c]ompliance burdens, if disproportionately imposed on out-of-jurisdiction enterprises, may indeed be incons

2022The superior court pointed to the United States Supreme Court’s consideration of a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to California’s worldwide combined reporting scheme for corporate income tax in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California.75 In that case the petitioner asserted that requiring foreign-owned enterprises to file a California tax return was a “prohibitive administrative burden” constituting discrimination against foreign commerce.76 The Court acknowledged that “[c]ompliance burdens, if disproportionately imposed on out-of-jurisdiction enterprises, may indeed be incons

2022In that case the United States Supreme Court reviewed a Commerce Clause challenge to an amendment to New York’s transfer tax on securities transactions and held the amendment was unconstitutional.84 The Court considered the amendment’s effect on interstate commerce; in relevant part, non-residents selling securities in New York received a tax reduction, but non-residents selling securities outside of New York did not receive the reduction.85 The Court determined that, under the amendment, the choice of which securities exchange to use — one in New York or one outside New York — would not be “m

2022In that case the United States Supreme Court reviewed a Commerce Clause challenge to an amendment to New York’s transfer tax on securities transactions and held the amendment was unconstitutional.84 The Court considered the amendment’s effect on interstate commerce; in relevant part, non-residents selling securities in New York received a tax reduction, but non-residents selling securities outside of New York did not receive the reduction.85 The Court determined that, under the amendment, the choice of which securities exchange to use — one in New York or one outside New York — would not be “m

2022Considering a state statute’s discriminatory effect when determining whether it is facially discriminatory against interstate commerce also is consistent with the Court’s Commerce Clause analysis in other cases.71 In Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Department of Revenue & Finance, for example, the principal dispute concerned “whether, on its face, the Iowa statute discriminates against foreign commerce.”72 It was “indisputable that the Iowa statute treat[ed] dividends received from foreign subsidiaries less favorably than dividends received from domestic subsidiaries” because the statute 69

2022Considering a state statute’s discriminatory effect when determining whether it is facially discriminatory against interstate commerce also is consistent with the Court’s Commerce Clause analysis in other cases.71 In Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Department of Revenue & Finance, for example, the principal dispute concerned “whether, on its face, the Iowa statute discriminates against foreign commerce.”72 It was “indisputable that the Iowa statute treat[ed] dividends received from foreign subsidiaries less favorably than dividends received from domestic subsidiaries” because the statute 69

2016I, § 8, cl. 3. 19 See, e.g., Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 835 (9th Cir. (continued...) -8- 1602 interstate commerce.20 But, as the shipping company employees argued in the superior court and to us, the Commerce Clause does not appear to provide for a private individual to sue another private individual for damage liability, as Daniels tried to do here.

2016I, § 8, cl. 3. 19 See, e.g., Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 835 (9th Cir. (continued...) -8- 1602 interstate commerce.20 But, as the shipping company employees argued in the superior court and to us, the Commerce Clause does not appear to provide for a private individual to sue another private individual for damage liability, as Daniels tried to do here.

2016The Commerce Clause claim Daniels does not reference his Commerce Clause theory on appeal. “[F]ailure to argue a point [on appeal] constitutes an abandonment of it.”17 We note that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to pass laws regulating interstate commerce.18 Private individuals may challenge these laws as an invalid exercise of congressional power,19 and also may challenge state or local government laws improperly burdening 14 Id. 15 Moody-Herrera, 967 P.2d at 88 (citations omitted). 16 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1). 17 Childs v. Tulin, 799 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Alaska 1990) (alterations

2016The Commerce Clause claim Daniels does not reference his Commerce Clause theory on appeal. “[F]ailure to argue a point [on appeal] constitutes an abandonment of it.”17 We note that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to pass laws regulating interstate commerce.18 Private individuals may challenge these laws as an invalid exercise of congressional power,19 and also may challenge state or local government laws improperly burdening 14 Id. 15 Moody-Herrera, 967 P.2d at 88 (citations omitted). 16 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1). 17 Childs v. Tulin, 799 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Alaska 1990) (alterations

2016The Commerce Clause claim Daniels does not reference his Commerce Clause theory on appeal. “[F]ailure to argue a point [on appeal] constitutes an abandonment of it.”17 We note that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to pass laws regulating interstate commerce.18 Private individuals may challenge these laws as an invalid exercise of congressional power,19 and also may challenge state or local government laws improperly burdening 14 Id. 15 Moody-Herrera, 967 P.2d at 88 (citations omitted). 16 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1). 17 Childs v. Tulin, 799 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Alaska 1990) (alterations

2016The Commerce Clause claim Daniels does not reference his Commerce Clause theory on appeal. “[F]ailure to argue a point [on appeal] constitutes an abandonment of it.”17 We note that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to pass laws regulating interstate commerce.18 Private individuals may challenge these laws as an invalid exercise of congressional power,19 and also may challenge state or local government laws improperly burdening 14 Id. 15 Moody-Herrera, 967 P.2d at 88 (citations omitted). 16 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1). 17 Childs v. Tulin, 799 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Alaska 1990) (alterations

2016The Commerce Clause claim Daniels does not reference his Commerce Clause theory on appeal. “[F]ailure to argue a point [on appeal] constitutes an abandonment of it.”17 We note that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to pass laws regulating interstate commerce.18 Private individuals may challenge these laws as an invalid exercise of congressional power,19 and also may challenge state or local government laws improperly burdening 14 Id. 15 Moody-Herrera, 967 P.2d at 88 (citations omitted). 16 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1). 17 Childs v. Tulin, 799 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Alaska 1990) (alterations

2016The Commerce Clause claim Daniels does not reference his Commerce Clause theory on appeal. “[F]ailure to argue a point [on appeal] constitutes an abandonment of it.”17 We note that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to pass laws regulating interstate commerce.18 Private individuals may challenge these laws as an invalid exercise of congressional power,19 and also may challenge state or local government laws improperly burdening 14 Id. 15 Moody-Herrera, 967 P.2d at 88 (citations omitted). 16 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1). 17 Childs v. Tulin, 799 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Alaska 1990) (alterations

2007See, eg., Rademeyer v. Farris, 284 F.3d 833, 838-39 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that a Missouri tolling statute was unconstitutional under the commerce clause in the situation where a resident defendant moved out of state); Abramson v. Brownstein, 897 F.2d 389, 392 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that California's tolling statute could not constitutionally be applied to a non-resident entering into a sales transaction with a resident since the non-resident was "engaged in interstate commerce"); Tesar v. Hallas, 738 F.Supp. 240, 241-42 (N.D.Ohio 1990) (holding that the Ohio tolling statute could not be con

2007See, eg., Rademeyer v. Farris, 284 F.3d 833, 838-39 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that a Missouri tolling statute was unconstitutional under the commerce clause in the situation where a resident defendant moved out of state); Abramson v. Brownstein, 897 F.2d 389, 392 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that California's tolling statute could not constitutionally be applied to a non-resident entering into a sales transaction with a resident since the non-resident was "engaged in interstate commerce"); Tesar v. Hallas, 738 F.Supp. 240, 241-42 (N.D.Ohio 1990) (holding that the Ohio tolling statute could not be con

2007See, eg., Rademeyer v. Farris, 284 F.3d 833, 838-39 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that a Missouri tolling statute was unconstitutional under the commerce clause in the situation where a resident defendant moved out of state); Abramson v. Brownstein, 897 F.2d 389, 392 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that California's tolling statute could not constitutionally be applied to a non-resident entering into a sales transaction with a resident since the non-resident was "engaged in interstate commerce"); Tesar v. Hallas, 738 F.Supp. 240, 241-42 (N.D.Ohio 1990) (holding that the Ohio tolling statute could not be con

1996Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at ___ , 114 S.Ct. at 1349 .

1996Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at ___ , 114 S.Ct. at 1349 .

1995Similarly, in Tangier Sound Watermen's Ass'n v. Douglas, 541 F. Supp. 1287, 1306 (E.D.Va. 1982), the court stated that "[p]laintiffs have not established that unharvested crabs are articles of commerce." Thus, the court was "not convinced that the Commerce clause reaches a [Virginia] law whose effect is to prohibit a nonresident commercial crabber from catching crabs in Virginia." Id. at 1306 .

1995Similarly, in Tangier Sound Watermen's Ass'n v. Douglas, 541 F. Supp. 1287, 1306 (E.D.Va. 1982), the court stated that "[p]laintiffs have not established that unharvested crabs are articles of commerce." Thus, the court was "not convinced that the Commerce clause reaches a [Virginia] law whose effect is to prohibit a nonresident commercial crabber from catching crabs in Virginia." Id. at 1306 .